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**THE UNIFIED CHRISTOCENTRIC FIELD: TOWARD A
TIME-ETERNITY RELATIVITY MODEL FOR
THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS IN THE
ONTO-RELATIONAL THEOLOGY OF
THOMAS F. TORRANCE**

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of
Drew University in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree,
Doctorate of Philosophy

Douglas Alan Trook
Drew University
Madison, New Jersey
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DEDICATION

To my parents,
Victor and Arlene Trook,
who endured in faith;

To my children,
Dawson, Ravell, and Luther,
who endured in hope;

To my wife,
Evelyn Jo,
who endured in love.

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PREFACE

Ever since my rudimentary introduction to space-time relativity in junior high school, the enigma of time has captivated my imagination and preoccupied my daydreams. Even earlier out of the depths of Christian nurture emerged an abiding intrigue with the eternality of God. However, it seems time and eternity remained illusive and paradoxical speculations because they were always pondered within framework of dualistic reciprocal limitation. It seemed infinity and eternity could only be conceived as that which somehow reached beyond the confines of space and time--what Professor Torrance defines as a finite receptacle view. Thus by the time I first encountered Torrance's Space, Time and Incarnation, I met it with critical disagreement. In retrospect, I realize, my reaction was due to a fundamental misunderstanding of his view of contingent relation, which struck me, as I suspect it may strike others upon first reading, as introducing a species of relativism into the sovereign domain of God's eternity. There is nothing, however, further from the truth, just as Einsteinian relativity (unfortunately so designated) is antithetical to any space-time relativism, subjectively constituted.

In order to surmount this misunderstanding I began to realize an entire metaphysico-epistemological revolution was required, which at one and the same time was a theological revolution. This is not intended as hyperbola as it

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shall become apparent how all of his critics attack him from categorial perspectives, be they monist or dualist, that are a priori alien to his thought and so foist artificial constructions upon his work.

It has become increasingly apparent over the last five years of my work that until one understands what Torrance means by "relation" he cannot really begin to understand the rest of his thought. In private conversation he confided that relation, "is just about everything." Any truly scientific inquiry must first and foremost be concerned with the manner and mode of relations. The import of time throughout his work is no exception, for he defines it as "contingent relation."

Torrance recounts that as a graduate student Karl Barth advised him against writing a dissertation on relation in scientific theology because of the difficulty of doing such so early in one's career. Unfortunately this anecdote came too late for my own benefit! He, himself, decided to write a thesis upon the doctrine of Grace, which itself is the central mode of relation between God and man when Christocentrically construed.

The difficulty of penetrating Torrance's thought is highlighted by his contention that it takes two generations for an adequate transition from Eastern monist or Western dualist modes of thought to this Middle-eastern, Jewish unitary perspective. This dissertation is conceived as a first generation step toward that transition.

There is a certain difficulty in choosing an appropriate designation for Torrance's theology. He himself more often than not speaks of it as a "unitary approach," which is unfortunately open to monistic connotations, which have no place in his thought. Frequently he uses the term "interactive," and even "complementary," but these con-

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versely may suggest a mutual God-man reciprocity with dualist and even Pelagian overtones. In a recent title he uses the designation, "Evangelical Theology," which is susceptible to being interpreted in the sense of eclectic American religious conservatism, whereas Torrance's intent is both in the European sense of "Protestant" and in the Biblical sense as an objective reflection of the Gospel. Those who recognize his Barthian foundations might suggest "Neo-Orthodox," but as he makes eminently clear, the later Barth is completely misunderstood if he is identified with his earlier subjective existential leanings. Torrance has used the term, "retro-orthodox" to designate his identity with the objective foundations of the Christian faith--a term which his "scientific theology" also reflects. There is a clearly 'hierarchical' or 'upwardly open' aspect to his theology, but once again the mode of the hierarchical relation is not specified and could easily be misconstrued in Hegelian or even Dooyeweerdian terms. He himself suggested "Christo-centric" or "Nicene," both of which I consider too broad to focus upon the definitive nucleus of his theology.

Clearly none of these terms proves superior over the others. What we are seeking is a term to depict the contingent differential relation of the hypostatic union, which we identify as the distinguishing center of his thought. Possibly no single concept comes closer than that of the 'anhypostatic'-'enhypostatic' couplet--the humanity of Christ, having no pre-incarnate co-eternal reality yet nevertheless in the Incarnation being taken into everlasting conjunction with the Divine Logos and in that relation ontologically vested with full personal identity. Of course the liability here is that 'an-/enhypostasis' is both a Greek and theologically technical concept. The more

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manageable but less specific term, "onto-relation," coined by Torrance, encompasses not only this incarnational relation but also serves in analogous ways to designate both the Trinitary union and the mystical union. It is both comprehensive and comes with little preconceived misunderstandings in the public theological arena. Thus, at least provisionally, we offer this term as a generic center of reference.

It may be of help to the reader to realize the relational model toward which this entire exposition moves is diagrammatically represented by the various Matrices. If one were to keep before him especially the full-blown structural (Matrix 1) and dynamic (Matrix 2) facets of the model our presentation may prove appreciably more transparent.

The production of this thesis has been accomplished through the 'advanced' technology of the personal computer. This accounts, regrettably, for the necessity of transliteration of the German umlauts throughout the document. Your indulgence is requested.

Above all I would like to express my sincerest thanks to Professor Torrance, whose patient and cordial regard for my project expressed itself in many helpful ways: in granting interviews and conversations in the midst of his busy schedule, in providing, unsolicited, lecture notes, forthcoming manuscripts, and recent bibliographic citations, and in expeditious correspondence, all of which have served not only to be invaluable to my thesis, but have greatly enriched my life.

I would like to acknowledge my appreciation to my dissertation committee, Dr. James Pain, Professor of Religion, Drew University Graduate School, Dr. John Ollom, Professor of Science and Society, and Professor of Physics,

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I am indebted as well to the indefatigable efforts of the Interlibrary Loan staff of Rose Memorial Library, Drew University, for procuring innumerable documents beyond my access.

A word of thanks also belongs to Dr. Christopher B. Kaiser, Dr. Bryan J. A. Gray, Dr. Thomas W. Currie, III, and Dr. Richard H. Roberts for words of encouragement and permission to access their respective dissertations, and to the staff of the Joseph Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago for procuring these and others from abroad.

Words cannot express my gratitude to my wife, Evelyn Jo, for the countless hours of theological dialog, critical insight, editorial suggestion, laborious proofreading, selfless devotion and encouragement without which this project would never have survived its protracted gestation. She more than any other has taught me the reality of dynamic relation.

My children, Dawson, Ravell, and Luther, also deserve a note of thanks for their diligent attendance of the word processing of parts of the manuscript as well as living in constant competition with this intangible enterprise.

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My parents, Mr. Victor O. and Mrs. Arlene R. Trook, deserve greater thanks than words can ever express for their editorial assistance, loving patronage and for their Christian nurture, which on the human plane has knit into the very fabric of my being the motivational demand to know the Truth as it is in Jesus Christ.

Finally, I extend my appreciation to countless friends who agonized, assisted and empathized along the way. In so doing they have all contributed to the particularity of the dynamics of this theological "field."

Drew University, Ascension, 1985

INTRODUCTION

[T]he act of discovery appears personal and indeterminate. It starts with the solitary intimations of a problem, of bits and pieces here and there which seem to offer clues to something hidden. They look like fragments of a yet unknown coherent whole. This tentative vision must turn into a personal obsession, for a problem that does not worry is no problem. There is no drive to it. It does not exist. Indeed, the process by which this unknown thing will be brought to light will be acknowledged as a discovery precisely because it could not have been achieved by persistent application of explicit rules to given facts. The true discoverer will be acclaimed for the daring feat of his imagination, which crossed uncharted seas of possible thought.

--Michael Polanyi
Meaning

Problem and Prospect

In Jesus Christ, ". . . consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial with us according to the Manhood . . ." ¹ resides the concrete resolution to the most pressing philosophical quandaries of all time: ² one and many, subject and object, transcendence

¹Chalcedonian Creed, 451 A.D.

²The prospect for theological advance squarely rests upon homousion--the consubstantial relation of Jesus Christ with God the Father and with all of mankind. Torrance

and immanence, eternity and time, freedom and necessity. The problematic endurance of these relations is due essentially to the fact that they become penetrable only by virtue of the graciousness of God's self-revelation and thus remain beyond the purview of the independently speculative mind. Nevertheless, even within the context of faith the perdurance of these difficulties is uncontested. If in Emmanuel, God with us, the Divine purpose has been historically articulated, we may not challenge the perspicacity of revelation. The objective presence of God in our midst renders us all without excuse. If the problem, therefore, is neither that of inherent mystery or that of metaphysical facticity, then it is an issue of reception, which in principle may be rectified. Scripture is replete with allusions to the God-man relation, which may easily go undetected or be ignored because of their alien cast with respect to our own provincial categories of thought. Thus the apparent incomprehensibility of the multi-faceted God-man relation is more exotic than endemic, fostered by our particular epistemological myopia. The fundamental problem at hand, therefore, is not that of conforming the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ to this present world as Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, Ebeling, or Fuchs would have it, but of transforming our minds into Judeo-Christian categories and thus being conformed to the givenness of reality.

This is the hermeneutic project with which The Very

asserts: "I cannot believe that a genuine reformation of the Church can take any other line, for a reformation involves a reconstructing of the forms of the Church's life and thought on its own proper foundations, not the hacking away of those foundations" (Reconstruction, p. 264).

Reverend Professor Thomas Forsyth Torrance³ has been engaged for the greater part of his life. Far from reclaiming a provincial era within the history of thought, he is in the process of articulating a Judeo-Christian unitary mode of thinking, which, rather than antiquated, has emerged afresh in the twentieth century as the perspective essential to a proper scientific grasp of reality. He proclaims:

For the first time in all its long history, Christian

³Professor Torrance was born August 30, 1913 to missionary parents in Chengtu, Szechwan, China. After receiving his M.A. in philosophy (1934) and his B.D. (1937) at Edinburgh University, he taught theology at Auburn Seminary, New York (1938-39). In 1940 he was ordained into the ministry in the Church of Scotland, serving Alyth Barony Parish from that time until 1947 with a hiatus from 1943-1945 as chaplain to the British Forces. In 1946 he completed his D.Th. at Basel under the guidance of Karl Barth. In 1947 he assumed the pastorate of Beechgrove Church, Aberdeen, which he served until succeeding Hugh Watt's chair in Church History at Edinburgh in 1950. From 1952 until his retirement in 1979 he served as Professor of Christian Dogmatics, University of Edinburgh, and New College, Edinburgh. His ecumenical activities have included the World Conference on Faith and Order, Lund, 1952; the Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches, 1954; the Faith and Order Committee of the World Council of Churches, 1952-1962; participation in Conversations between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland from 1950-1958; and Protopresbyter of the Greek Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Alexandria), 1973. Among other associations, he is a member of the Académie Internationale des Sciences Religieuses since 1965 and the Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale since 1969. From May 1976-77 he moderated the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. In 1978 he received the distinguished Templeton Foundation Prize for Progress in Religion. Aside from his many publications he has jointly edited the Scottish Journal of Theology (1948-1981) with J. K. S. Reid, the English translations of Calvin's New Testament Commentaries (1959-1973) with his brother, David, and Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics with Geoffrey W. Bromiley (1956-1969).

For a very recent autobiographical interview by I. John Hesselink, entitled "A Pilgrimage in the School of Christ--An Interview with T. F. Torrance," see Reformed Review 38 no. 1 (August 1984): 47-64.

theology is confronted with a scientific culture which is non-dualist and which has broken down the barrier between the empirical and the theoretical, the tangible and the intangible, the visible and the invisible, and which does not automatically call in question a continuous dynamic interaction between God and the universe. All this is proving immensely liberating for theology, for it helps to purify it from distorting foreign elements by striking away the sub-structures which have done so much to misshape western notions of the real presence and eucharistic sacrifice when interpreted within Augustinian-Aristotelian or Augustinian-Newtonian frameworks of thought. Thus the old divisions between intelligible and sensible, reality and symbol, substance and accidents, etc., receptacle or container notions of space (Aristotelian or Newtonian), the intrusion of physico-causal connection and instrumentality into the field of grace, the need to find ways of explaining how we make present historical events, or how we make Jesus Christ real for ourselves, all fall away as we find them after all to involve pseudo-theological ideas wrongly extrapolated into Christian interpretation from a very different area of knowledge, a philosophy of nature, and an obsolete one at that. Doubtless the discovery of the unity of form and being and the mutual interaction of structure and matter in motion, and the discovery of the space-time continuous field of harmonious dynamic connections and transformations, may play a role in indicating to a scientific theology how it may rethink or reinterpret today doctrines of the real presence and eucharistic sacrifice, but only on its own proper ground, the field of God's interaction with the space-time structures of this world through the Incarnation. We are only at the beginning of positive work of this kind, but the door would now appear to be wide open for ecumenical agreement which will do much greater justice to the fact of Christ's real presence and the reality of our participation through the Spirit in his vicarious self-consecration and self-offering to the Father, without artificial explanations as to how all this takes place.⁴

It is my contention that the implications of Torrance's thought are revolutionary⁵ but underdeveloped⁶ and virtually

⁴Reconciliation, pp. 137-138; cf. CAC, I, p. 232.

⁵Cf. my review of Divine and Contingent Order, by Thomas F. Torrance, in Themelios, forthcoming. Hans

ignored.⁷ He himself challenges younger theologians to

Reichenbach argues: "The analysis of knowledge has always been the basic issue of philosophy; and if knowledge in so fundamental a domain as that of space and time is subject to revision, the implications of such criticism will involve the whole of philosophy" (The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity," in Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp [New York: Tudor Publishing, 1951], p. 290).

Although Reichenbach contends a revolution utilizing Einstein's relativity of simultaneity necessitated the Michelson-Morley experiments and therefore could not have been articulated prior to that negative discovery, Michael Polanyi has established the singular intuitive genius of the Einsteinian revolution (Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958], p. 10, n. 2). Torrance goes a step further in his startling discovery of its antique expression in the physics of the 'monophysite heretic,' John Philoponos: see CTSC, pp. 86-87; GGT, pp. 61, 127; STI, pp. 24-25; STR, p. 186; T. F. Torrance, "John Philoponos of Alexandria: Sixth Century Physicist," Texts and Studies, (1983): 261-262.

⁶A. O. Dyson also levels this charge in his review of Theological Science and Space, Time and Incarnation, by Thomas F. Torrance, in Theology, 74 (June 1971), p. 270, as does John David Atkinson, "The Theological Method of T. F. Torrance" (M.Litt. dissertation, Trinity Theological College, University of Bristol, 1973), p. 260, and George Yule, review of Reality and Evangelical Theology, by Thomas F. Torrance, Scottish Journal of Theology 36 (September 1983): 390.

⁷In John Macquarrie's Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1980, 2nd revised ed. (London: SCM, 1981), p. 401, Torrance is relegated only the following:

"Thomas F. Torrance (1913-) was the leading representative of the Calvinist and Barthian tradition, but he has given this a new dimension by stressing the scientific and objective character of theology, in such books as Theological Science. At the same time, he has built bridges between theology and the natural sciences, which, he holds, point today to a world-view much more receptive to a religious interpretation than they did at the beginning of the century."

(Alasdair I. C. Heron proves more generous in A Century of Protestant Theology [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980], pp. 209-214.) Such neglect may be relegated to several

undertake the development of ". . . appropriate conceptual instrumentality through which to allow our minds to fall under the power of this kind of order, with its dynamic structural relations, which is at once simple and complex and which must be holistically grasped if it is to be grasped at all."⁸ Although Karl Barth has in many ways cleared the path for this revolution, he never attempted to develop the necessary cognitive instruments to bring it to fruition. Torrance elaborates:

Historical theology has never even come up with an instrument corresponding to the four-dimensional geometries of space and time which have played such an

factors: 1) Torrance is diametrically opposed to Macquarrie's own existentialist position. 2) He is among a small minority of twentieth century thinkers who holds realist metaphysics in high regard. As such he sees the future of theology tied to scientific discovery and thus disparages the import of much contemporary theology and philosophy. 3) By and large his analyses of the history of theological and scientific thought are expressed without adequate technical documentation whereby the conformity of his argument to the reality he interprets may be scientifically confirmed. 4) To this point in his life he has been more critical than constructive, attacking both the liberal and conservative sectors of Protestant Christendom as well as the Roman Church. However, if his health continues we can look forward to a positive period, if not in his projected three volume history of hermeneutics then in his one volume dogmatics, which although on the drawing board for years, has yet to receive concentrated attention.

Unfortunately, the redundancy of his critique of dualist ways of thinking, as argued by such reviewers as A. O. Dyson, "Review TS and STI," p. 270, may put off many from reading him more extensively. Few extended treatments of his thought exist. My initial bibliographic search discovered only one published monograph (Dutch) on his thought and only three unpublished doctoral dissertations, none of which were written in this country (see Selected Secondary Bibliography below), though recently Dr. Torrance estimated there are now approximately twenty theses in production). One of the most prolific writers and editors of our time has virtually been ignored.

⁸RET, p. 45. Cf. GR, p. viii; STR, pp. 163-164; TCFK, p. 278.

astonishing role in the advance of our scientific knowledge of the created universe. But this is the task of the future. It will be far more difficult to come up with something like this in theology than in any natural science, but only if we are able to come up with it, will we finally be able to overcome the dualism we have been speaking of; not, to be sure, to become engulfed in some kind of monism, for the synthesis of the future will be altogether different--that we can already see: it will be a synthesis of new structures, hierarchically ordered in multiple levels, and infinitely open to the transcendence of the living God. That must also be the task of a thoroughly scientific theology.

. . . It will mean a profound clarification and simplification of the whole corpus of Christian theology.⁹

Predicated upon that vision, this dissertation is conceived as exposing, analyzing and extending the central dynamic component of his revolution: time, eternity and their interrelation, which we shall henceforth refer to under the more generic term, 'duration.' Ultimately, the durational problematic must be examined from three angles. 1)The doctrine of the ontological Trinity entails the eternal inter-relations of the persons of the Godhead. To use its Niceno-Constantinopolitan designation, we are concerned with the eternality of the inter-trinitary homoousion relation. As such it is a one-dimensional or "horizontal" concept. 2)The doctrine of the economic Trinity, in that it deals with the inter-relation of God with man and world as Creator to creature, Reconciler to reconciled, and Redeemer to redeemed, is a bi-dimensional or "vertical" concept. In Torrance's theology its center of focus will be the durational nature of the hypostatic union symbolized in the Chalcedonian Creed and its historical outworking in the atoning mediation of Jesus Christ. 3)A second "horizontal" level is encountered in the temporality of creation as well

⁹TCFK, p. 282. This requires a "theologic" which does justice to the dynamic, ontological field relations of the God-man-world manifold (ibid., p. 279).

as the temporal inter-relation of the humanity of Christ, homooousion with the rest of mankind, as Chalcedon expresses it.¹⁰

By analyzing Torrance's durational exposition in its complex creedal balance we shall gain an invaluable hermeneutic tool by which the deep but non-devious Biblical text might be elucidated, not only in its referential truth, but in a manner compatible with the contemporary scientific understanding of reality.¹¹ It is my contention that, due to a lack of hermeneutic regard for the stratified structure of reality, and in particular due to a lack of regard for the multi-dimensional durational strata characteristic of the eternal God's intervention in created time, dogmatic theology, both in method and content has

¹⁰For Torrance's allusion to "horizontal" and "vertical" time, see CAC, II, p. 25. For the union of time and eternity in Christ see STR, pp. 127-128, and CAC, II, pp. 22-23.

¹¹This shall go a long way in dispelling the implausibility of traditional Christian formulation, which in A. R. Peacocke's view, ". . . arises not from any basic inadequacy in their analysis of man's predicament or from any mistaking of the reality of God's word to man, but through the traditional static images not really relating at all to the world of dynamic process that the sciences now show it to be" (Creation and the World of Science. The Bampton Lectures, 1978 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979], p. 48). John D. Atkinson acknowledges the importance of establishing the relation between space-time relativity and the doctrine of the Incarnation, but does not proceed to develop it ("The Theological Method of T. F. Torrance," p. 240; cf. pp. 184-190). Torrance cites Jean Charon's (Man in Search of Himself, trans. J. E. Anderson [London: Allen and Unwin, 1976], pp. 68ff.) emphasis on replacing mechanistic concepts and language in biology with, ". . . the notion of a field with its own characteristic structure in order to begin to be in a position to make effective use of the physicist's space-time," if it hopes to make any appreciable progress. Torrance concludes: "That warning is no less applicable to theological science" (STI, p. 71). See CTSC, p. 12 for the impact of Maxwell and Einstein upon epistemology.

fallen into disrepute within this century, supplanted by the less coherent but richer Biblical theologies.¹² Geerhardus Vos makes the case for us. He establishes the differentia between Biblical and systematic theology as follows:

. . . Biblical Theology just as much as Systematic Theology makes the material undergo a transformation. The sole difference is the principle on which the transformation is conducted. In the case of Biblical Theology this is historical, in the case of Systematic Theology it is of a logical nature.¹³

Torrance adds: "Our danger recently has been to allow exegetical work to replace the discipline of hard theological thinking altogether, with the result that exegetes too often work with an uncritical and sometimes a very poor theology, much to the detriment of their Biblical research."¹⁴

Ironically, I predict, just as Mediaeval and Protestant Scholastic static categories fanned the fires of their own supersession, so the fragmentation of Biblical theology will catalyze its own conflagration as it proceeds to generate anomalies which demand a higher, integrative unity. In effect the future of theology parallels that of physics--a quest for a unified field theory, the very foundations of which are based upon a radically new understanding of time. Torrance sketches our future course:

He [the Eternal Logos] became man without ceasing to be God, and so entered space and time without leaving the

¹²For a synopsis of the checkered history of the theological quest for an Old Testament unifying motif see John H. Hayes' recent revision of Frederick Prussner's classic work, Old Testament Theology: Its History and Development (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), pp. 254-260.

¹³Biblical Theology: Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), p. 14, emphasis mine.

¹⁴Forward to Calvin's Doctrine of Last Things, by Heinrich Quistorp, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, 1955), p. 7.

throne of God. Our difficulty is that we have to think both in accordance with the nature of the Logos as eternal Son of God and in accordance with the nature of the human Jesus as creature of space and time. It will not do to think of this in terms of a receptacle view of space and time, nor will it do to cut the knot and think of them only in one way or the other. Hence if we are to be faithful to the nature of Christ as very God and very Man we have to let that determine our thinking of the incarnational event, and say both that he really and fully became man, as we men are in space and time, and yet remained God the Creator who transcends all creaturely being in space and time, and work with a relational view of space and time differentially or variationally related to God and to man. Unless we think in this way we cannot really think the incarnation without falsifying it.¹⁵

This paper emerges out of an enduring struggle with those ostensive paradoxical durational motifs within the Biblical text. If we take seriously Gilbert Ryle's analysis of "category mistakes"¹⁶ and Charles Hartshorne's contention

¹⁵STR, p. 126. Cf. GGT, p. 123.

¹⁶I.e., representing ". . . the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another (The Concept of Mind [New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949], p. 16). In our specific context the persistence of static, logical, formal relations obscures the dynamic, actual, real relations which we are attempting to elucidate (TS, p. 153). See also *ibid.*, pp. 261-262. This lies at the root of the time-eternity problematic:

"The difficulty that faces us is that this span of space-time is a coordinate system of divine and human, eternal and temporal, invisible and visible, spiritual and material relations, and we want to coordinate them in one and the same language. But that is exactly what we cannot do. Yet it is because people keep on trying to do this that they continually introduce confusion into theology, and then because this inevitably breaks down they conclude that the Incarnation was not after all an actual intersection of divine reality and this-worldly reality . . ." (STI, p. 76). Cf. TS, pp. 179-180, 232; CTSC, pp. 32-33.

that the paradoxical is but a lapse in logical rigor,¹⁷ we must be reluctant to relegate these Scriptural motifs to the realm of dialectical dualisms. The question remains, has W. G. Kueffel's impasse regarding the relation between the present and future kingdom¹⁸ been adequately overcome by Oscar Cullmann's linear "D-day" and "V-day" motif?¹⁹ A proper treatment of this question will require a thorough inquest into the categorial significance of relation²⁰ as it bears upon the interconnection of the durational strata.

Despite the large expenditure of exegetical energy

17". . . the famous paradoxes, or contradictions--to avoid the customary euphemism--of metaphysics and theology are not, as is claimed, the inevitable result of human limitations, of the finite or relative or conditioned trying to understand the infinite or absolute or unconditioned, nor of the meaninglessness of the latter, but the natural yet avoidable result of haste and inattention to exact shades of meaning" (The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948], p. 4).

18Promise and Fulfilment: The Eschatological Message of Jesus, trans. Dorothea M. Barton (London: SCM, 1957), p. 151.

19Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History, rev. ed., trans. Floyd V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), pp. 83ff.

20In a brief autobiographical excursus during a class discussion on his lectures on "The Mediation of Christ," 7 July 1981, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey, he related how his dissertation search under Karl Barth led him from the broad topic of the relation of theology to science to a more delimited notion of relation: "In all science we are concerned with the change in the concept of relation, and relation is about the most important thing. You think relationally. And this is something I can remember [from] my earliest days--real thinking is how to think things in their relation with one another." He continued: "The relation is grace--that is the characteristic of all relation between God and man and human relations with man and man." His project resulted in "The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers," (Th.D. dissertation, University of Basel, 1946).

upon the lexical stock words for time and eternity,²¹ the lack of consensus reflects the fact that there are broader linguistic²² and theological factors which must

²¹For the discussion of chronos as impersonal, objective and quantitative measure in contrast to kairos as personal, active and qualitative event see John A. T. Robinson, In the End, God (London: Collins/ Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 55-67; John Marsh, The Fulness of Time (London: Nisbet, 1952), and Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3: Life and the Spirit, History and the Kingdom of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 369-372. G. B. Caird refutes this position as a forced abstraction from the actual textual usage in The Apostolic Age (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1955), p. 184, n. 2. Gerhard Delling corroborates the ambiguity of these terms in his articles in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (hereafter TDNT), s.v. "kairos" and "chronos."

For the etymological and conceptual approach to the questions of duration in Scripture see C. von Orelli, Die Hebraeischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit genetisch und sprach vergleichend darstellt, cited by James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (London: SCM, 1962), pp. 82-102; Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time, chs. 1-3; and TDNT, s.v. "aion," by Hermann Sasse. For the syntactical alternative to this approach see James Barr, Biblical Words for Time. Frank Brabant assimilates these two perspectives in Time and Eternity in Christian Thought (London: Longmans, 1937), Appendix I. For further exegetical analyses see M. E. Glasswell, "New Testament View of Time," Communio Viatorum 16 no. 4 (1973): 249-255; J. Pathrapankal, "Time and Eternity in Biblical Thought," Journal of Dharma 1 (July 1976): 331-344; E. F. Perry, "Biblical Viewpoint [on time and eternity]," Journal of Biblical Religion 27 (April 1959): 127-132; Edwin Adam Schick, "History, Eschatology, and Time in Modern Biblical Studies with Special Reference to Redemptive Time in the Gospel of Mark," (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1962); Johannes Schmidt, Der Ewigkeitsbegriff im Alten Testament (Muenster: W. Aschendorff, 1940); Yacob Tesfai, "An Inquiry into the Role of Time and Space in the Old Testament" (S.T.D. dissertation, Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, 1975); John R. Wilch, Time and Event: An Exegetical Study of "'eth" in the Old Testament in Comparison to Other Temporal Expressions in Clarification of the Concept of Time (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969).

²²Torrance contends,
". . . words with an ordinary and straight-forward

be incorporated into the analysis.²³ When Cullmann concludes: ". . . eternity, which is possible only as an attribute of God, is time, or, to put it better, what we call 'time' is nothing but a part, defined and delimited by God, of the same unending duration of God's time",²⁴ he neglects to account for the epistemological and ontological distinctions realized in the eschaton²⁵ and adumbrated in the present.²⁶

sense, when applied to divine things, undergo a shift in their meaning, and care must be taken to determine precisely what that change involves, if an interpretation is to be offered" ("HA", p. 137).

For the Christocentric mediation of language see GR, pp. 141-142. For the error of treating language as univocal see "HA", p. 146. For the uniqueness of Christian theo-logic see TS, p. 280.

²³A similar conclusion is drawn from such divergent sectors as that of H. Emil Brunner (Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight [London: Lutterworth Press, 1954], pp. 42-43) and James Barr (Biblical Words for Time, p. 156).

²⁴Christ and Time, p. 62.

²⁵Epistemologically our perception is dim (ainigma) and mediate (ēsoptron), awaiting the immediate clarity (prósōpon pros prōsōpon) of the eschaton (I Cor. 13:12); see II Cor. 12:2 and Rev. 1:10; 21:10 for the apocalyptic, spiritual perspective. Ontologically creation awaits a metamorphosis: Rev. 21:1, 4; I Jn. 3:2; I Cor. 15:51.

²⁶The most critical relation by which the Christian may discern his present relation to the eschaton is that of his relation to Christ. All of the Christian life is predicated upon the relation of being "in Christ" and hence cannot be conceived as an independent status (I Cor. 4:10; 15:22; II Cor. 1:21; 2:14, 17; 3:14; 5:17; Gal. 1:22, 3:17; Eph. 1:3; 2:4-7; 3:6; I Thes. 4:16; I Tim. 2:7). Torrance frequently alludes to Gal. 2:20 as the locus classicus of our relation to Christ: ". . . we live, as Luther said long ago, between the two times: the time of the new world and the time of this world. The age has already come--the new age which you are living in in Christ. And you also live as yet in this age which passes away. And we live in those two times--'I, yet not I . . .'" (class discussion, "The Media-

Duration in Christological Relief

An examination of the various stages of the Christological controversies reveals the centrality of the durational problematic. The ambiguity of each conclusion was a result of an unsatisfactory metaphysical foundation, which could not reconcile the immutable and impassible Divinity with the mutable and passible humanity of Christ. On the one hand, the Alexandrian Word-flesh problem was that of docetism as evidenced in Origen, Apollinarius and Eutyches,

tion of Christ," 6 July 1981).

By virtue of Christ's humanity, He is the proleptic anticipation of the promise of which we are currently heirs. See Rom. 8:23; 11:26; I Cor. 15:20, 23; Js. 1:18 for the motif of Christ as the firstfruits (ἀρχή), Heb. 6:20 for Christ as forerunner (πρόδρομος), Col. 2:17 for Christ the substance of the liturgical shadow (σκιά), II Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:14 for the Spirit as earnest (ἀρραβὼν), Mt. 3:2 (parallel to 4:17; 10:7; Mk. 1:15); Lk. 10:9, 11; 11:20; 17:21; 21:31 for the presence of the kingdom, Acts 7:17; 26:6; Rom. 15:8; Gal. 3:29; Eph. 3:6; 6:12; II Pet. 3:4; Heb. 10:23; 11:11; Tit. 1:2 for the promisory (ἐπαγγελία and ἐπαγγέλλομαι) nature of the kingdom, Heb. 11:1, 7 for the invisibility (οὐ βλέπω) of the promise, II Cor. 5:7; Gal. 2:20; 3:11; Heb. 10:38; 11:1 for faith (πίστις) as relation to the promise, Rom. 8:17; Gal. 3:29; 4:1, 7; Tit. 3:7; Heb. 6:17; 11:7; Js. 2:5; Mt. 25:34; Eph. 1:14; Col. 3:24; Heb. 9:15; I Pet. 1:4 for our inherited (κληρονόμος, κληρονομία, κληρονομέω) relation to the benefits of the promise through adoption, Rom. 6:11 (but cf. Phil 3:13); Rom. 4:3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 23, 24 for the imputed or reckoned (λογίζομαι) relation of the Christian to the righteousness of Christ; Lk. 22:37 (parallel Is. 53:12) for the imputed transgression of sinners to Christ, Rom. 12:2; II Cor. 3:18 for the transformation (μεταμορφῶμαι) of the believer into the image of Christ and its transfigured anticipation (Mt. 17:2 parallel Mk. 9:2), and Is. 6:9, 10 (parallel Mt. 13:10-17; Mk. 4:10-12; Lk. 8:9-10); Heb. 9:9 for the parabolic (παροβολή) apprehension of the apocalyptic. In addition to the parabolic, the anthropomorphic, prophetic and apocalyptic uses of language all point to a stratified or multi-levelled reality, which if it is to be spoken of at all must be analogically rather than equivocally related to our space-time system.

and its corollary of subordinationism as articulated by Arius. The static unchangeability of deity overruled. On the other hand, the Word-man Antiochene school employed categories of external relation of the natures, as that of moral will in Theodore of Mopsuestia and psychological union in Nestorius. Their dyophysite perspective did nothing to effect the genuine unity of the person.²⁷ The Chalcedonian compromise, grounded in Aristotelian hylo-morphic ontology, militated against a genuine inter-relation between the two universal natures concretized in a single person. As G. W. H. Lampe concluded: ". . . a Christological impasse was unavoidable in the last resort so long as soteriology clung to both of its axiomatic assumptions: the impassibility of God and the hypostatic subsistence of the Nicene Logos as the consubstantial God the Son."²⁸

The Appolinarian controversy gave occasion for the Cappadocian development of the relational categories of the communicatio idiomatum--the ascription of the attributes of

²⁷Theodore of Mopsuestia maintained, an unbreachable ". . . chasm . . . exists between the one who is from eternity and the one who began to exist at a time when he was not" (Catechetical Homilies 4.6 [Studi e Testi, Rome 190ff., 45:83], quoted in Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600) [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971], p. 229).

²⁸In Hubert Cunliffe-Jones, ed., A History of Christian Doctrine (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), p. 122. See Pelikan, Emergence of the Catholic Tradition, pp. 247-248; A Dictionary of Christian Theology, s.v. "Christology," by George S. Hendry. For the identical problem in Nestorianism see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 290-291. As we shall see, Torrance's assessment of Athanasius and the Alexandrian interpretation of Chalcedon is much more positive, and monophysitism need not be an expression of monistic Christology (see, e.g. Reconciliation, pp. 30, 265; "Graduation Address" ["Alexandrian Theology"], Ekklesiastikos Pharos 52 [1970]: 188).

the two natures to the whole person--and the perichoresis--the mutual involution of the two natures.²⁹ The fact that these categories were dependent upon the primitive Stoic ontology of nature with its notion of substantial or corporeal force pervading matter,³⁰ although approaching a field metaphysic surprisingly similar to post-Einsteinian science, tolerated an unrefined notion of inter-mingling (anákrasis) which did little to clarify the relational problem.³¹

In the Eucharist controversies of the sixteenth century, Martin Chemnitz mediated by employing the Cappadocian perichoresis. The attributes of the divine nature are infused into the human nature of Christ to the fullest extent such can occur. Thus his human nature manifested the divine attributes (communicatio idiomatum, genus majestaticum), just as iron glows when fired. This, of course, supported such Lutheran declarations as finitum capax infiniti and its static receptacle notion of space and time.³² Barth contends that the inadequacies of this

²⁹E.g. Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistola 101, in Patrologiae cursus completus, series Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne, vol. 37 (Paris, 1857-1866), p. 181C. For the subsequent use of perichoresis cf. J. F. Bethume-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon (London: Methuen, 1903), p. 226, n. 2.

³⁰Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 298. See Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy rev. Ledger Wood (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), pp. 133-134.

³¹See Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 297-298; Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay, vol. 1: History of Doctrines in the Ancient Church (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), pp. 250-251; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 298-299.

³²STI, p. 62. See Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, pp. 299-300; Seeberg, vol. 2: History of Doctrines in the Middle and Modern Ages, pp. 374-377; Justo L. Gonzalez, A

position may be overcome only by substituting historical dynamics for the traditional static perspective.³³

The kenosis controversies which also emerged in the debate leading to the Formula of Concord stumbled over the problem of the divestiture of divine attributes by an immutable God. Whether this was to be conceived as a relinquishing (except for miraculous events) or a veiling of divinity, the apparent changeability of God could not be avoided. Pannenberg argues that a resolution to this problem could be found only by recasting the notions of time and eternity, which were then differentially employed, into a homogeneous or linear temporality (much like Cullmann) such that the kenosis be construed as an aspect of the inner being of God from eternity, not a subsequent mutation at the moment of Incarnation:

. . . the incarnation had been determined from all eternity in God's decree. However, the truth of such an assertion is dependent upon the temporal actuality of that thing, thus in this case the incarnation. What is true in God's eternity is decided with retroactive validity only from the perspective of what occurs temporally with the import of the ultimate.³⁴

Hendry also challenges the inadequate static view of God as a vestige of Greek philosophy rather than of Judeo-Christian revelation.³⁵

Duration and Contemporary Metaphysics

The inability of static substance metaphysics to

History of Christian Thought, vol. 3: From the Protestant Reformation to the Twentieth Century (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1975), pp. 116-118.

³³CD, IV,2, pp. 64, 104-112.

³⁴Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, p. 321.

³⁵"Christology," p. 60.

provide the sub-structure for such problems has fostered the modern search for metaphysical alternatives with dynamism at their center. In fact, it may not be too much to say the preoccupation of this century is with time.

The process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead posits creativity as the ultimate category upon which this universe is grounded.³⁶ It is the formal dynamic efficacy, sheer activity, which supplants the Aristotelian category of matter, and in the final analysis assumes the structural position of God.³⁷ Such being the case, he characterizes the central philosophical issues as:

Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide.

Here the first line expresses the permanences, 'abide,' 'me' and the 'Being' addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the metaphysics of 'substance'; and those who start with the second line have developed the metaphysics of 'flux.' But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers.³⁸

Judging from the theological retinue that has ensued from this organismic, metaphysical neo-realism, the evolutionary and relativity theories which Whitehead elucidated have indeed proven fertile.³⁹ Nevertheless, the resultant

³⁶Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Free Press, [1929], 1969), pp. 25-26.

³⁷Ibid., p. 37.

³⁸Ibid., p. 241.

³⁹The significance of the latter of course must be construed in a generic sense in that Whitehead's particular theory developed in The Principle of Relativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922) was bypassed for that of Einstein, in scientific circles.

Christologies have done little to supersede the ancient heresy of Arianism in its zeal to do justice to the full humanity of Jesus.⁴⁰

From the opposite end of the spectrum has emerged the existential ontology of the early Martin Heidegger, who has replaced the substantial concept of soul with a thoroughly dynamic view of man, in which his existence is conceived in terms of its being a decisive issue to him ("Care"), and the possibility of its being an issue derives from its temporal dynamic. Thus his existential analysis of man undergoes a thorough reinterpretation in terms of temporality: "Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care."⁴¹ In turn, this introduces the possibility of interpreting general ontology (Sein) in terms of (Zeit):

For a macroscopic overview of processive ideas in the history of thought vis a vis Whitehead, see Charles Hartshorne, "The Development of Process Philosophy," in Process Theology, ed. Ewert H. Cousins (New York: Newman Press, 1971), pp. 47-66. For more microscopic treatments see Ewert H. Cousins, "Process Models in Culture, Philosophy and Theology," in ibid., pp. 3-20; Gene Reeves and Delwin Brown, "The Development of Process Theology," in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 21-64.

⁴⁰For example, Cobb concludes: "Strict identity of Jesus with God is simply nonsensical. But it is not nonsensical that God's presence in Jesus played a structural role in the actual occasions constituting his personal life which it has played nowhere else" ("A Whiteheadian Christology," in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Brown et al., p. 390). Cf. John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), p. 104; W. Norman Pittenger, "Bernard L. Meland, Process Thought and the Significance of Christ," in Process Theology, ed. Cousins, p. 211. For Torrance's negative estimate of process theology as failing to overcome the dualist disjunction between God and the universe see GGT, p. 147.

⁴¹Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 374.

The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatic projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. . . . Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?"⁴²

Although, in John Macquarrie's view, Heidegger's central concern with temporality renders his philosophy genuinely secular,⁴³ theologians have nonetheless embraced it for its sacred import.⁴⁴ His preeminent proponent, of course,

⁴²Ibid., p. 488.

⁴³Martin Heidegger, Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), p., 35. Cf. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Rudolf Bultmann," by Ronald W. Hepburn. In Torrance's judgment, Heidegger's starting point negates the possibility of theology: "By starting with man's own Dasein or being-there, with being-in-the-world, Heidegger cuts it off at the root from any reference to ultimate objectivity" (review of Being and Time, by Martin Heidegger, in Journal of Theological Studies, 15 no. 2 [1964]: 475). Once theologians attempt to introduce genuine transcendence into Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, Torrance contends, dualism results:

"That is what happens in existentialist theology that draw's from Heidegger's analysis of human existence, for it is the infinite qualitative difference between God and man, eternity and time, that is the ultimate presupposition behind the hermeneutical method that seeks to 'demythologize' the basic Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. When this is done, however, Heidegger's distinction between Vorhandenheit [presence-at-hand] and Zuhandenheit [ready-to-hand] then becomes the bearer of the old idealist dichotomy between the sensuous and the spiritual, facts and essences, etc., and the real intention of Heidegger's reorientation in thought is betrayed" (ibid., p. 447).

⁴⁴". . . Heidegger is no theologian but a philosopher, and he is often reckoned to be a thoroughly secular philosopher at that. Yet I think it would be true to say that one could hardly hope to advance very far in the understanding of contemporary theology without some knowledge of Heidegger's thought. His influence seems to appear everywhere--in demythologizing and the problem of hermeneu-

is Rudolf Bultmann, who has employed Heidegger's existential analysis of man to reinterpret the New Testament in a manner relevant to contemporary culture. He sees all supernatural aspects of the Biblical tradition as merely primitive myths, and thus like Heidegger, by articulating reality within the ekstases of temporality, leaves no place for the transcendent.⁴⁵ The mythical is readily separated from the kerygmatic, the transcendent from the immanent, the eternal from the temporal.⁴⁶ What is more, by his existential focus upon the present and its future possibilities, the past loses all objective significance.⁴⁷ His demythologizing is

tics; in the doctrine of man; in theories of revelation; in the debate about God; and in other matters besides" (Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger, Preface).

⁴⁵Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 18-21, 35-36, and passim; Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Hamburg-Volksdorf: Herbert Reich, 1954), pp. 22-27; *ibid.*, vol. 2 (1952), pp. 180-184.

⁴⁶André Malet comments:

"The true God can only be the God of the 'moment' (of the evangelic kairos). He is the Being who permanently threatens the security of man, who is unforeseeable grace and perpetual future,

Mythology, on the other hand, speaks of God in terms of eternity; it sees him 'at the crossroads of the when and the where' (Dante). It does away with time" (The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. Richard Strachen [New York: Doubleday, 1971], p. 48).

⁴⁷Torrance concludes, the problem with Bultmann's hermeneutic is that it is,

". . . the most radical attempt in our day to think away space and time from the basic concepts of the Christian faith. Without doubt a real difficulty is being recognized and faced here. Too often the God of Newtonian Protestantism has been shaped according to the static, isotropic receptacle of space and time. Theological concepts of this kind are objectivist, rigid and closed. However, as we saw in the case of classical Lutheranism, it is no answer to the problem of spatial structures to make them timeless, yet it

in fact detemporalizing, and thus ironically he has violated the very philosophical ground upon which he stands.⁴⁸ Moreover, the historic problematics of objective Christology are rendered irrelevant, as the concept of real relation is transposed into existential subjectivity. Kerygma consists

is into this old mistake that Bultmann has led so many of his contemporaries. At this point Bultmann has set himself in sharp opposition to Luther, for the pro me of Luther, what Christ has done 'for me' included and rested on an objective pro me, what Christ had done apart from me and outside of me; but Bultmann insists that the objective reference must be dropped altogether in order to get the meaning out of it 'for me'. This is the most ruthless radicalization of the hoc significat in place of Luther's hoc est, in the existentialist 'leap of faith' in which, like Lessing, Bultmann finally discards the place of historical facticity in the ground of faith. This is of course entirely consistent with Bultmann's deistic view of the relation between God and the world, which means that we can 'speak' about God only in terms completely detached from creaturely and this-worldly content or treat language about God as the paradoxical obverse about our self-understanding in this world. What is more, Bultmann is quite prepared with an obstinate courage to accept the consequences of regarding the present as a timeless instant, viz. that the past has vanished for ever and as such can have no meaning for us, which cuts away the historical Jesus, and that the future offers us no existence, which cuts out the hope of the resurrection. All that matters is what is 'for me' here and now" (STI, pp. 48-49).

See also T. F. Torrance, "The Implications of Oikonomia for Knowledge and Speech of God in Early Christian Theology," in Oikonomia: Heilsgeschichte als Thema der Theologie. Oscar Cullmann zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet, ed. Felix Christ (Hamburg: Herbert Reich, 1967), p. 228. For Bultmann's confusion of spatial with theological categories as in Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 20, see GR, p. 79.

⁴⁸Torrance charges: "Nothing would misrepresent or dishonour Heidegger more than an abstraction of his analysis of Dasein in order to erect it, as Bultmann does into an axiomatic 'prior understanding' (Vorverstaendnis) for interpretation, especially when this is accompanied by a destroyed relation to being. As Heidegger says, that lies at the root of all misunderstanding of language" (review of Being and Time, p. 485).

of the fact (Dass) of Christ's person, not the content (Wass).⁴⁹

A third, mediating perspective may be found in John Macmurray's philosophy of personal being. He rejects both the substance metaphysic of modern philosophy embodied in mathematical physics as well as the philosophies of Descartes and the British empiricists, and the organic metaphysic of Rousseau, the German idealists, Samuel Alexander and Whitehead characterized by the biological model of nature. Furthermore, he embraced the Kierkegaardian concern to articulate the personal dimension of life, but not to a point where it lapses into solipsistic individualism and undermines the philosophical enterprise altogether.⁵⁰ He proposes his alternative as:

. . . a new phase of philosophy [which] would rest on the assertion that the Self is neither a substance nor an organism, but a person. Its immediate task would be to discover the logical form through which the unity of the personal can be coherently conceived.⁵¹

This form, contrary to the unintentional 'happening' of process, is the intentional 'action' of the practical self.⁵² Personal agency is construed in terms of act metaphysics.⁵³ Here time serves as the form of action. As such it may only be experienced, for example, in terms of movement or thought. If it is objectified it lapses

⁴⁹Glauben und Verstehen, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1954), p. 204; cf. p. 265.

⁵⁰The Self As Agent (London: Faber and Faber, [1957], 1969), pp. 32-37.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 37.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 205, 219, 220.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 214, 220.

into spatial symbol.⁵⁴ Robert J. Blaikie predicts the import of such a perspective:

A new world for theology and for thought in our Western society seems bound to open increasingly to our view as we understand better the implications of adopting new basic presuppositions which recognise persons as primarily Agents, with their status as thinking Subjects derived and subordinate. It seems clear that questions about the relation of action and of persons to various concepts of time are certain to be of great importance in the theological discussions of this new thought-world"⁵⁵

Torrance's opinion is not as positive. Metaphysically, he contends, Macmurray's concept of personal relation, being intentional or voluntaristic, is devoid of ontological reality. His preference is, rather, for the organismic relation articulated by Michael Polanyi.⁵⁶ If Torrance's analysis is correct, the unspoken Christological implication of Macmurray's position would result in a form of Nestorianism.

Turning to Macmurray's earlier work, The Clue to History, we find his guiding epistemological premise: "Christianity is essentially Jewish. This is the point from which we must start."⁵⁷ As he proceeds to elaborate, the Hebrew consciousness is a unitary religious one,⁵⁸ as distinct from the dualism of the Roman pragmatic, scientific

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 133.

⁵⁵'Secular Christianity' and the God Who Acts, with a Foreward by T. F. Torrance (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1970), p. 202.

⁵⁶Interview with T. F. Torrance, Visiting Professor, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey, 15 July 1981. Macmurray taught at Edinburgh from 1944-1958 and therefore was never Torrance's mentor.

⁵⁷(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 16.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 20-21.

and the Greek contemplative, aesthetic dualist consciousnesses. A sharp time-eternity or mortal-immortal dialectic, as characterizes so much of Western thought, fails to account for the unitary historic relation of God to man in Judeo-Christian experience.⁵⁹

With regard to the unitary origin of thought in the Hebrew consciousness, molded by God through Old Testament times as an appropriate vehicle of His self-revelation to mankind, Torrance is at one with Macmurray. Of utmost importance in the position of both is the fact that a recovery and refinement of Hebrew epistemology is essential for an adequate grasp of reality.⁶⁰ In this century, the revolutionary progress in physics is a result of the recovery of the Hebrew view of the unity of reality. In fact, Torrance argues, in ". . . point after point of our greatest advances in knowledge of the universe Jews have been responsible for creative reconstructions affecting the very foundations of knowledge . . ." ⁶¹ Thus rather than Christian theology conforming to science, science has begun to conform to the unitary foundations of Judeo-Christian revelation.⁶² Unfortunately, the Church through the ages by and large has failed to appropriate this unitary approach and has lapsed into Greek modes of thought.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 18, 30.

⁶⁰Reconstruction, pp. 14-15, 169-170; RET, p. 45; "MED," p. 45; CAC, I, pp. 301-302; "The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel in World History," in The Witness of the Jews to God, ed. David W. Torrance, (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1982), p. 96; "Salvation is of the Jews," Evangelical Quarterly 22 (1950): 165; STR, 41-42; Israel: People of God--God, Destiny and Suffering (London: Council of Christians and Jews, 1978), p. 14.

⁶¹Israel: People of God, p. 4.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 5-6; GGT, p. 73.

Central Strands of Torrance's
Theological Career

Because the alternatives of existential ontology, and substance, process, and act metaphysics are unacceptable to Torrance, we will be forced to explore some rather non-conventional channels in our attempt to illuminate his thought. In his article, "A New Reformation?",⁶³ he suggests the two factors which shall guide the Church into genuine reformation are ecumenical dialog centered in the central historical development of the Christian Church, and scientific realism illuminating the objective foundations of the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ.⁶⁴ As we examine the corpus of Torrance's published writings to date we find his contribution to this reformation coincident with these broad movements. It would be inaccurate to periodize his thought in disjunctive segments, for there is little question that his current preoccupation with scientific theological method is a continuous, albeit more rigorous, attempt to actualize the catholicity of the Church in Jesus Christ. Thus we shall identify the concentric strains which have emanated from his Christological focus.

The Christological Focus

From his earliest publications, the centrality of Christ⁶⁵ as expressed in the Chalcedonian hypostatic union⁶⁶ served as the central motif of his theology. The magnitude

⁶³London Quarterly and Holborn Review 189 (1964): 275-294; reprinted in Reconstruction, pp. 259-283.

⁶⁴Reconstruction, p. 272.

⁶⁵"PC," p. 127.

⁶⁶"PC," p. 140, n. 72; "The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," Evangelical Quarterly 14 (1942): 39, 40.

of Chalcedon is set in relief by the nearly immediate detachment of the Biblical doctrine of grace from the person of Christ by the Apostolic Fathers. The relational importance of God to man in Christ is the hinge upon which all of his subsequent theology depends.⁶⁷ Again from the very first, the durational aspects of this relationship were figural, as the incarnation dispelled all docetism and depreciation of time and history.⁶⁸ Although he had yet to employ the contemporary implications of space-time relativity, the nonexpendable importance of the historical mediation of redemption had been established from the onset. In short, all of this serves as the structure of Torrance's unitary (as distinct from monistic) approach to reality.⁶⁹

⁶⁷DGAF, pp. v, 133. See f.n. 17 above; SF, pp. lix-lx, lxii-lxiii; STR, p. 177. In private correspondence (Thomas F. Torrance to Douglas A. Troom, 2 June 1981) and discussion (Interview 15 July 1981) Torrance has indicated that H. R. Mackintosh has been very influential upon him regarding the centrality of Christ, incarnation and grace, as well as forgiveness and eschatology. In the same discussion he related the importance of William Manson's doctrine of grace and Biblical hermeneutic in his thinking. In his introduction to Manson's Jesus and the Christian (London: James Clarke, 1967) he writes; "He influenced me more intimately than any other of my teachers and over the years he had become to me more and more a spiritual father" (p. 9). Cf. T. F. Torrance, review of The Epistle to the Hebrews, An Historical and Theological Reconsideration, by William Manson, in Scottish Journal of Theology 5 (1952): 313.

⁶⁸"PC," pp. 118-119; 125; 135, n. 42; 138-139, n. 62. DGAF, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁹"PC," pp. 129-130. In "Reason in Christian Theology" (p. 33) he articulates the Barthian unitary formula, ". . . in Christ we have Truth inseparable from Being . . ." but conceives our apprehension of this as "existential." In light of his later thought we must interpret this in a personal but not relativistic sense.

For the sin of monism, see "Faith and Philosophy," Hibbert Journal 47 (1948-1949): 241.

1) The Ecumenical Strain, 1941-

A casual reading of Torrance's post-1959 major works may leave one with the impression that he has wed himself to the scientific spirit of the age and will readily be superseded by the next scientific revolution. Whether or not this prophecy may in fact be fulfilled some day is irrelevant to the fact that it is a serious misreading of Torrance's larger intention, namely, to discover the epistemological foundations of reality within the self-revelation of God in Christ, historically mediated to the Gentile by the Divinely formed unitary Hebrew consciousness. It is not until we replace Greek impersonal categories with Hebrew personal ones that we will be able to do justice to Scripture and ultimately to the universe.⁷⁰ This underlies his redundant polemic against dualism, although it frequently remains unstated.⁷¹ At no point, therefore, should his ecumenical involvement be interpreted as a contemporary, inter-cultural accommodation as is so characteristic of current existential theology. Rather,

⁷⁰Martin Buber's position, being drawn from the structure of Old Testament language, is credited as ". . . one of the most potent forces in the recovery of 'the personal' in our own day . . ." ("PC," p. 114). For Torrance's continued dependence upon Jewish non-dualist epistemology see "Salvation is of the Jews," pp. 165, 169; "Israel and the Incarnation," Interpretation 10 (1956); reprinted in CAC, I, pp. 302, 304-306; "The Eclipse of God," Baptist Quarterly 22 (1967); reprinted in GR, p. 29; Reconciliation, pp. 26, 28, 215-216; Israel: People of God, pp. 5-6, 14; "Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," pp. 97-98; "The Mediation of Revelation," in The Mediation of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), ch. 1.

⁷¹It is interesting that Torrance distanced himself from the Kantian and Neo-Platonic thought of his philosophical mentors, Norman Kemp Smith and A. E. Taylor so early in his career. His consciousness of such a parting was expressed both in Torrance to Trook, 2 June 1981 and Interview, 15 July 1981.

ecumenism is to be seen in the objective sense of dogmatic union around the objective center of the Christian faith.⁷² At various junctures he applauds the theologians who have remained faithful to the unitary Judeo-Christian Truth. Among the most significant in Torrance's development are those clustered around the Greek Fathers:⁷³ Clement,⁷⁴ Athanasius and Cyril⁷⁵ and to a certain extent Eastern

⁷²For a recent example see "The Eldership in the Reformed Church," Scottish Journal of Theology 37 no. 4 (1984): 503-518 in which he argues on purely Biblical grounds for a deaconal interpretation of presbyter, which if appreciated should move the Reformed Church toward a more ecumenical ecclesiastical consensus. For a recent discussion of the outstanding theological impediments to union with Rome see "Ecumenism and Rome," Scottish Journal of Theology 37 no. 1 (1984): 59-64.

⁷³"I would think that in some respects the deepest influences on my thought have been the great Greek Fathers . . ." (Torrance to Trook, 2 June 1981). For the similarity between the Greek Fathers and Einsteinian cosmology see Reconciliation, p. 270. For the roots of Christian realism in the Eastern Church see "Theological Realism," in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D. M. Mackinnon, ed. Brian Hebblewaite and Stewart Sutherland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 173.

⁷⁴Clement of Alexandria was the first to implement scientific theology: "Scientific knowledge is thus not basically different from faith, but is faith drawn out in its rational connection with the reality upon which it reposes, while in this way faith itself is accurately understood as it reposes directly on that reality (Stromata II.IX, 45.6; XI, 48-49)" ("Implications of Oikonomia," p. 224.

⁷⁵In Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, and their bearing upon Nicene theology,

" . . . we find a basis for profound unity between East and West. It is my plea to the Orthodox that they should resist the temptation to take their main stand today, somewhat one-sidedly, on the Cappadocian development from Athanasius, but reconsider the centrality of the Athanasius-Cyril axis on which there can be deep agreement throughout the Eastern Orthodox Churches

between so-called 'Chalcedonian' and 'Monophysite' Churches, as well as between East and West. And it is my plea to Roman Catholics that a rapprochement be made with Greek patristic understanding of the Trinity and the vicarious humanity of Christ, which is in fact the theology lying behind their own great liturgical renewal, and especially with the non-dualist theology of Athanasius and Cyril. Such a rapprochement would help them to overcome the difficulties caused by the dualist forms of thought and life in the West, not least the separation between the doctrine of the One God and the doctrine of the Triune God or the widening gap between the legalistic structures of the Church and its life as a communion of love in the Spirit. My plea to Protestants is that they learn to look behind the pluralist society and the fragmented pattern of the Reformation Churches to the 'wholeness' that belongs to the apostolic foundation of the Church in Christ, and in particular to reconsider the normative structure of the life and worship of the people of God that derives from the human priesthood of the incarnate Son of God, and thereby escape not only the disastrous forms of dualism that keep on afflicting their Christology and, where they think themselves to be strongest, their understanding of history. Moreover, through the Trinitarian orientation of the Greek Fathers, together with their doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and through the deep inter-relation of Incarnation and Atonement which they can learn from Athanasius and the balanced doctrine of justification, through the vicarious obedience of Christ taught by Cyril of Alexandria, they will find substantial and compelling ground for unity both with the Orthodox and with the Roman Catholic Church in which full justice can be done to the Evangelical as well as the Catholic mission of the Church" (Reconciliation, pp. 9-10, [emphasis mine]).

Cf. ibid., p. 12.

For the non-Western, Hebraic foundation of Athanasius see Reconciliation, pp. 215-216. For the scientific theological foundations laid by Athanasius in his Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, see Reconciliation, pp. 260-263, and HL[RST], ch. 3. For his influence upon John Philoponos of Alexandria, the first Christian physicist to employ relational concepts of space and time, see GGT, p. 60; "Graduation Address," p. 188. For his influence upon Hilary of Poitiers and Anselm see Reconciliation, p. 264. For the importance of Hilary as the "Athanasius of the West" see "HHP," p. 37; "RISNT," p. 62.

Orthodoxy;⁷⁶ Calvin⁷⁷ and his predecessor John Scotus;⁷⁸ and Karl Barth⁷⁹ and his dependence upon Kierkegaard.⁸⁰

For the objective centrality of the Nicene Creed see "The Breaking of Bread," Liturgical Studies 1 (1971): 19.

⁷⁶For Torrance's dependence upon Russian Orthodoxy, see "The Breaking of Bread," pp. 18-19.

⁷⁷". . . it is now apparent, as we look back over the last four hundred years, that to John Calvin must be ascribed the honor of being the father of modern theology. It was he who showed the way, after the revolt against the philosophy of the Mediaeval Schoolmen, back to a positive theology grounded upon the Word of God" (John Calvin, Tracts and Treatises, with an Introduction and Historical Notes by T. F. Torrance, vol. 1: On the Reformation of the Church, trans. H. Beveridge [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958], p. v). Cf. CDM, p. 8. For Calvin's considerable dependence upon the Greek Fathers via John Major, see Reconstruction, pp. 77, 82, 84. For Calvin's realist theological method see HL[RST], ch. 1; cf. Introduction, Tracts and Treatises, p. viii. For Torrance's sharp distinction between Calvin and Calvinism see Reconstruction, p. 76; Robert Bruce, The Mystery of the Lord's Supper: Sermons on the Sacrament Preached in the Kirk of Edinburgh by Robert Bruce in A.D. 1589, with an Introduction by T. F. Torrance, ed. (London: James Clark, 1958), p. 32.

⁷⁸In Torrance's estimate, Scotus' contribution to theology consists in,

" . . . his restatement of God's free and active creation of the world out of nothing, in which He confers intelligibility upon created realities while upholding them in their utter contingency; his concept of person which was not logically derived from the notion of universal substance, but ontologically derived from relations of being in God, and in man, and therefore defined not in terms of individual self-subsistence so much as aliunde in terms of a communion of personal relations in which essence and existence are one" (review of John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, Studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, vols. 1-6, 16-17, by Carl Balic, e.a., in Scottish Journal of Theology 22 [1969]: 481).

⁷⁹Torrance reserves his highest acclaim for Barth: ". . . modern theology is aware that, far from by-passing Barth, or even passing through him, it has yet to catch up

on him" (Preface to CD, I, 1, p. vii).

"Karl Barth is the greatest theological genius that has appeared on the scene for centuries. He cannot be appreciated except in the context of the greatest theologians such as Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, nor can his thinking be adequately measured except in the context of the whole history of theology and philosophy. Not only does he recapitulate in himself in the most extraordinary way the development of all modern theology since the Reformation, but he towers above it in such a way that he has created a situation in the Church, comparable only to the Reformation, in which massive clarification through debate with the theology of the Roman Church can go on. Karl Barth has, in fact, so changed the whole landscape of theology, Evangelical and Roman alike, that the other great theologians of modern times appear in comparison rather like jobbing gardeners" (Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, with an Introduction by T. F. Torrance, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith [New York: Harper and Row, 1962], p. 7).

Cf. "Karl Barth," Expository Times 66 (1955): 205; "Karl Barth," in Ten Makers of Modern Protestant Thought, ed. G. L. Hunt (New York: Association Press, 1958), p. 58; KB, pp. 9, 15; GR, p. viii; TCFK, p. 279. In describing Barth as, "the great modern Athanasius," Torrance explains,

". . . it is precisely the same issue in which he is so energetically engaged, and it is basically the same answer which he gives. It belongs to his greatness that he has not only seen Christological analogy to be the prime issue of theology, but also that he is seeking to work it out exhaustively in the wholeness of dogmatic exposition" (review of The Letters of St. Athanasius Concerning the Holy Spirit, by C. R. B. Shapland, ed. in Scottish Journal of Theology 5 [1952]: 208).

Cf. Barth, Introduction, Theology and Church, p. 14. For Barth's affinity to Calvin as opposed to Calvinism see KB, p. 54; Reconstruction, p. 103. Torrance dates his initial, 'exhilarating' exposure to Barth in 1935 through the direction of H. R. Macintosh (T. F. Torrance, "My Interaction with Karl Barth," [1985]. (Photostat), p. 1.

80 "Theologically and philosophically it was undoubtedly Kierkegaard who had the greatest impact upon him, far greater than the actual mentioning of his name, in

Although he has been criticized as a "hard Calvinist" in the years preceding his involvement as a member of the Theological Commission on Christ and the

the Romans, for example, indicates. That is obviously apparent in the indebtedness of his thinking to Kierkegaard's attack upon all direct communication and all living on easy, comfortable terms with God" (KB, p. 44).

Torrance, and by implication, the later Barth (see KB, p. 141) reject the existential interpretation of Kierkegaard's thought. His concern for existence,

". . . represented an attack upon the emasculation of the human subject through abstract and speculative thought and the failure to take time seriously through a false transmutation of temporal into logical relation. Kierkegaard carried this through not by an analysis of existence as such but by taking seriously existence as the concrete form of human being in encounter with objective Truth in the form of personal Being, that is, with God who as subject is implacably objective and who encounters us within our existence in actual history in Jesus Christ, an individual Man in time. In this way Kierkegaard introduced the notion of existence as a specific form of human being; but he was himself by no means an 'existentialist', for he did not operate with 'existence' as an ontological principle and did not proceed by way of a phenomenological analysis of existence as such.

How ironical it is, then, that Kierkegaard would be spoken of as the father of 'existentialism'! What happened was that his notion of 'existence' was abstracted from its objective reference to God in human history and subjected to contemplation and analysis in the light only of Kierkegaard's earlier writings in which he struggled to break out of romanticism and moralism. Strangely, Kierkegaard's chief influence upon much subsequent thought has been indirect through misunderstanding or misrepresentation" (review of Being and Time, p. 472; cf. TS, pp. 4-6).

Torrance contends, the pseudonymous writings reflect an irrational, non-Christian perspective, and only non-pseudonymous works convey his true Christian attitude. The "leap of faith" is to be seen as an objective entry into a dynamic or kinetic epistemological stance whereby reality can be perceived for what it is ("The Mediation of Christ," class discussion of "The Mediation of Christ in our Human Response to God," 6 July 1981). For the importance of Kierkegaard's kinetic perspective, see TS, p. 154.

Church of the World Council of Churches' Commission of Faith and Order, 1952-1962,⁸¹ there is little published evidence of this charge. As early as 1947 he had already distinguished Calvin from Calvinism and identified Barth as the true heir of the Reformer.⁸²

2) The Scientific Strain, 1959-

In 1953 Torrance lamented there was no theological method whereby the Commission on Faith and Order, ". . . could think together our one faith in the one Christ . . ." ⁸³ The success of the ecumenical process required a universal, objective method whereby positive progress could be achieved. This, along with prompting from the eminent British scientist and cousin-in-law, Sir Bernard Lovell, forced him to reassess his theological method.⁸⁴ In 1959 the first inklings of what by 1969 would find their fullest expression in Theological Science began to appear in

⁸¹Bryan Gray, "Theology as Science: An Examination of the Theological Methodology of Thomas F. Torrance," (S.T.D. thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Te Leuven, 1975), p. 101.

⁸²"The Word of God and the Nature of Man," in Reformation Old and New: Festschrift for Karl Barth, ed. F. Camfield (London: Lutterworth, 1947); reprinted in Reconstruction, p. 103.

Although he curiously distances himself from Barth in his review of The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner, by C. Van Til, in Evangelical Quarterly, 19 (1947): 144, he lays aside his customary gracious style to castigate Van Til's dead metaphysical orthodoxy (ibid., p. 148).

⁸³"Where Do We Go from Lund?", Scottish Journal of Theology 6 (1953); reprinted in CAC, I, p. 228.

⁸⁴Torrance dates this encounter in 1946 (Conversation between T. F. Torrance and Douglas A. Troom, Princeton, New Jersey, 8 October 1984).

print.⁸⁵ Though hardly predictable, what resulted was thoroughly consistent with his ecumenical concerns. By 1962, in concert with Buber's Thou and I relation, he identified Barth as a proper theological realist, wherein Christ was the objective pole and the Holy Spirit the subjective pole--the outward and inward givenness of God.⁸⁶ The compatibility of Barthian theology with contemporary physics was also introduced.⁸⁷ Thus the Hebrew-Reformed-relativity alliance was struck. The Kierkegaardian-Einsteinian mode of kinetic thinking was introduced,⁸⁸ followed in the succeeding year by an interna-

⁸⁵Hewitt Lectures on "The Nature of Theology and Scientific Method" (TS, p. iii). See SF, p. xxv for the scientific attitude as one of humble wonder rather than detachment.

Torrance relates, however, that from the onset of his teaching career at Auburn Seminary the scientific foundations of theology were formative in his lectures (Conversation between Torrance and Trook, 8 October 1984), and "My Interaction with Karl Barth," p. 4.

⁸⁶KB, p. 154; cf. Barth, Introduction to Theology and Church, p. 34.

⁸⁷KB, p. 32; Barth, Introduction to Theology and Church, pp. 42-43. For Barth as a scientific theologian see KB, pp. 19, 148; TS, pp. 7-8. For the similarity between Barth and contemporary physics see Barth, Introduction to Theology and Church, pp. 32, 42, 170-180; TS, pp. 8, 289. Torrance argued that in unifying the dynamic act and the ontic being of God, Barth anticipated the physics of light, i.e., the unity of particle and wave, by forty years ("The Mediation of Christ," Discussion of "The Mediation of Christ in our Human Response to God," 6 July 1981). Cf. TCFK, p. 280.

⁸⁸"Gnade und Natur: der Einfluss der reformatorischen Theologie auf die Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Method," Theologische Zeitschrift 18.5 (1962); reprinted English version in Reconstruction, p. 73. Frequently Torrance has claimed to have learned more philosophy from Einstein than from any of the philosophers. Thus he sees the future of philosophy residing in the philosophy of science (Interview, 15 July 1981; Torrance to Trook, 2 June

lization of Michael Polanyi's concept of open scientific systems.⁸⁹ This latter theme is subsequently applied to thermodynamics by Ilya Prigogine⁹⁰ and serves to corroborate Torrance's case for a contingent universe created ex nihilo by the will of God. It is no coincidence that each of these scientists are also Jewish. The Hebrew consciousness has enabled them to perceive the natural world in a unitary fashion, and therefore overcome the myopia of Western

1981; cf. GR, p. 105).

⁸⁹"Das Problem der theologischen Aussage heute," Theologische Zeitschrift 19.5 (1963): reprinted English version in Reconstruction, pp. 50, 54. Although Torrance's dependence upon Polanyi is considerable, his interest in "open-texture" stems from a pre-war analysis of Mozart and Bach by Sir Donald Tovey. Thus unlike Polanyi, he should not be linked to Friedrich Waismann on this issue, GR, p. viii notwithstanding (Interview with Thomas F. Torrance, Student Center Apartment, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey, 5 April, 1982). For Polanyi's dependence on Waismann see Personal Knowledge, pp. 95, n. 1; 113, n. 1.

The enduring import of Polanyi's methodologico-epistemological perspective in Torrance's thought is beyond question:

"No one has given more explicit discussion to the priority of belief in rational knowledge than Michael Polanyi who has contributed to the Maxwellian and Einsteinian restructuring of the epistemological foundations of natural science with an unrivaled delicacy and refinement. He made a particular point of restoring to rigorous scientific activity the personal coefficient of knowledge and of showing that the human reason never operates outside a framework of basic beliefs" (CTSC, p. 61).

Cf. GR, p. 105; STR, pp. 11, 22; TCFK, pp. 112-113; GGT, p. 14; ed., Belief in Science and in Christian Life: The Relevance of Michael Polanyi's Thought for Christian Faith and Life (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1980), p. xiv. For his dependence and continuity with Einstein, see TCFK, p. 110. For his extension of the second Goedelian theorem regarding the impossibility of the establishment of the consistency of a formal system within the confines of that system, see STR, p. 15.

⁹⁰Cf. GGT, pp. 12, 141-142; DCO, pp. 121; 156, n. 51.

dualism.⁹¹ More recently he has emphasized Clerk Maxwell's Christian contribution to the foundations of relativity theory⁹²--the final tour de force in establishing contemporary physics upon a thoroughly Judeo-Christian epistemology.

If we could allow ourselves the luxury of an oversimplified generalization we could summarize his last twenty five years as his meta-theological period--a time to which he once made reference as a 'ground clearing.' To be sure his historical and critical analyses have outweighed his constructive theology. The difficulty with focusing on published materials is that it obscures the underlying positive incubation which has occurred through much of his unpublished notes and lectures. He promises what has been on the drawing board for years shall begin to emerge sometime after 1985. Thus in a real sense this dissertation terminates at a fairly logical juncture of his life and may be viewed as complete in this provisional sense. We await

⁹¹Nevertheless, it took Einstein twenty years to undergo a categorial transformation from classical mechanical to relativity physics. He dates his initial intuition of the implications of the finitude of the speed of light at age sixteen (1895). Ten years later his "Elecktrodynamicck bewegter Koerper" appeared outlining his special theory of relativity. However it was not until 1916 when his "Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitaets theorie" that the universal implications of his special theory became apparent (See Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in Einstein, Schilpp, ed., pp. 52-59; TS, p. 92).

⁹²"The distinctive idea he used in developing his celebrated field theory--which has had such a powerful impact on modern science, not least upon the thought of Einstein--Clerk Maxwell gained as a student in Edinburgh University, not so much from his classes in physics as from Sir William Hamilton's lectures in metaphysics, an idea that had a theological as well as a philosophical root" (GGT, p. 7).
Cf. TCFK, p. 218; DCO, pp. 141-142; RET, p. 32; James Clerk Maxwell, A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field, with an Introduction by T. F. Torrance, ed. (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982), p. x.

his Dogmatics for final corroboration of our interpretation.

Method

Martin Heidegger, in addressing the question of the provability of the external world from a dualist perspective, once reproached:

The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. . . . If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.⁹³

In one fell swoop the Cartesian/Kantian subject-object split has been dismissed. This is hardly an isolated example, for within this century there has emerged a growing concern for the restructuring of man's relation to the world in terms of non-reductive immediacy. Thus although much of Western thought, from Plato onward, is called into question, so too is the monism of the orient. Whether we trace this contemporary reorientation through the psychological immediacy of "intentionality" in the phenomenological movement,⁹⁴ the inter-personal unity in the philosophies

⁹³Being and Time, p. 249.

⁹⁴E.g., Franz Brentano, in his investigation of psychical experience, concluded: ". . . thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention" (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I, Buch II, Kapitel I, sect. 5 [p. 126], quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: An Historical Introduction, vol. 1, 2nd ed. [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971], p. 40). Edmund Husserl, in expounding the indivisible relation between noesis and noema in general, and the intentional contra the representational view of perception in particular, argues: "In experience the intention is given with its intentional object, which as such belongs inseparably to it, thus lives really . . . within it" (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson [New York: Collier Books, (1913), 1962], p. 242). Cf. TS, pp. 2-3.

of personal being,⁹⁵ the Christological mediation of Neo-Orthodox theology,⁹⁶ or the concept of passionate

⁹⁵E.g., Buber's familiar distinction:

When one says You [Thou], the I of the word pair I-You is said, too.

When one says It, the I of the word pair I-It is said, too. . . .

There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I of the basic word I-It (I and Thou, trans. with a Prologue by Walter Kaufmann [New York: Scribners, 1970], p. 54).

John Macmurray concludes, the solution to the problem of the subject-object disjunction emerges once the problem is reoriented in terms of the primacy of the practical agent:

"Consider now the Self in relation to the world. When I act I modify the world. Action is causally effective, even if it fails of the particular effect that is intended. This implies that the self is part of the world in which it acts, and in dynamic relation with the rest of the world" (The Self as Agent, p. 91).

⁹⁶E.g., Barth, in addressing the prophetic relation of Christology to anthropology, argues, Jesus Christ,

". . . is not merely there in His own place, but as He is there in His own place He is also here in ours. He is the One who is on the way from there to here. Hence, as He is for Himself, He is also among and for and in and through us. He is and acts on His way from His own particular sphere to our surrounding, anthropological sphere. We mistake His whole being and work if we do not see its direct connexion to ours and therefore the direct connexion of ours to His; . . . The reconciliation which has taken place in Him, in His person and work, is as such an occurrence which reaches beyond its own particular sphere, which embraces our sphere, the sphere of human life generally, which comprehends every man virtually, prospectively and de iure and the Christian actually, effectively and de facto, which assigns to him a receptive and spontaneous share" (CD, IV, 3, 69, p. 279).

James Brown comments:

"As for the Barthian dogmatics the terminology of Subject and Object is there fundamental. Indeed, the relation which we have seen is properly at home within as epistemology is elevated by him into an ontology, and becomes the key to the inner nature of the Godhead in Trinity of Persons. Not man only is a Subject knowing

observer in contemporary natural science,⁹⁷ each in its own way is illuminating this common theme.

For Torrance, the methodological implications of this subject-object unity require that one approach reality from an internal rather than an external standpoint that one gains an intuitive immediacy with the object of inquiry. This is accomplished by what he variously terms "a kinetic mode of thinking"⁹⁸ or "faith."⁹⁹ It requires a transforma-

Objects, but God Himself is supreme Subject offering Himself to himself as Object in God the Son in the unity of God the Holy Spirit" (Subject and Object in Modern Theology [New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 189-190.

⁹⁷E.g., Michael Polanyi, in dispelling the myth of detached, scientific objectivity, contends: ". . . the act of knowing includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his personal obligations to universal standards" (Personal Knowledge, p. 17). Quantum physics broaches the issue in its consideration of the paradoxical nature of light. Werner Heisenberg, in his discussion of the Copenhagen interpretation explains: ". . . it seems to indicate that the observation plays a decisive role in the event and that the reality varies, depending upon whether we observe it or not. . . . The probability function combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies [A]nd these statements are completely objective, they do not depend on an observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be different for different observers" (Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science [New York: Harper and Row, 1958], pp. 52, 53).

Cf. TS, p. 16.

⁹⁸CTSC, p. 95; HL[RST], ch. 3: "The Science of God"; Reconstruction, p. 73; STR, p. 93; TCFK, p. 278; TS, pp. 65, 209, cf. 319.

⁹⁹Ed., Belief in Science and in Christian Life, pp. 2-7; CAC, II, p. 77; "Faith and Philosophy," pp. 244; 246; GR, pp. 153-154, cf. 178; RET, 103-104; "Reason in Christian

tion or conversion (metánoia) of thought. Kierkegaard proved to be Torrance's exemplar here:

. . . he had to abandon a way of thinking from a point of absolute rest, and opt for a kinetic mode of the reason with which to apprehend movement, continuity, dynamic truth, without resolving them into something quite different in terms of static necessities or timeless possibilities. He referred to his act of the reason variously as a decision, a resolution, or a leap, and spoke of faith as having the required condition.¹⁰⁰

For this study, the consequences are considerable. It is impossible to do justice to his thought without being empathically immersed in his perspective. The degree to which this is possible is of course variable. Being neither Scots nor raised in the Church of Scotland may be impediments to my penetration of his thought. A myriad of other dissimilarities could be introduced as well. Anything short of fully transparent fellowship with him weakens this kinetic relationship. Nevertheless it confirms the contingent openness of all thought--all understanding has a provisional element to it. This paper is no exception. Although an autobiography would be in order at this juncture to establish my personal kinetic relationship to Professor Torrance, suffice it to say, he more than any other has been instrumental in influencing my ecclesiastical and theological convictions. This cannot but facilitate my grasp of his position.

Torrance conceives the scientific enterprise as bringing, ". . . the inherent rationality of things to light and expression, as we let the realities we investigate disclose themselves to us under our questioning and we on

Theology," pp. 29, 37; Reconstruction, p. 159; STR, pp. 19, 37, 38, 40, 141; TS, pp. 132, 203, 325, cf. 153-154; TCFK, p. 194, 196.

¹⁰⁰HL[RST], ch. 3: "The Science of God." Cf. STR, p. 37.

our part submit our minds to their intrinsic connections and order."¹⁰¹ In that we are concerned to bring Torrance's view of time and eternity to summary and refined light, this project falls within the purview of scientific inquiry, and thus we shall, in keeping with our kinetic stance, implement the methodological procedure which he outlines at various places.

Torrance's method is Einsteinian, and Einstein's is hypothetico-deductive:

The theory of relativity is a fine example of the fundamental character of the modern development of theoretical science. The hypotheses with which it starts become steadily more abstract and remote from experience. On the other hand it gets nearer to the grand aim of all science, which is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical deduction from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms. Meanwhile the train of thought leading from the axioms to the empirical facts or verifiable consequences gets steadily longer and more subtle. The theoretical scientist is compelled in an increasing degree to be guided by purely mathematical, formal considerations in his search for a theory, because the physical experience of the experimenter cannot lift him into the regions of highest abstractions. The predominantly inductive methods appropriate to the youth of science are giving place to tentative deduction. Such a theoretical structure needs to be very thoroughly elaborated before it can lead to conclusions which can be compared with experience. Here too the observed fact is undoubtedly the supreme arbiter; but it cannot pronounce sentence until the wide chasm separating the axioms from their verifiable consequences has been bridged by much intense, hard thinking. The theorist has to set about this Herculean task in the clear consciousness that his efforts may only be destined to deal the death blow to his theory.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹TS, p. vii.

¹⁰²Albert Einstein, The World As I See It, trans. Alan Harris (New York: Covici, Friede Publishers, [1933], 1934), pp. 91-92. Torrance concurs, as, e.g., in "The Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science," Science, Medicine and Man 1 (1973): 165.

This may be summarized in the three following distinct stages.¹⁰³

Primary Level: Pre-Scientific

All science begins with the objective world with which we are immediately related by means of intuition. This is the functional conjunction of the subject with the object, given in everyday experience. This is the most fundamental stage at which we are, according to Polanyi, tacitly related such that we are immediately, subliminally, and holistically aware of more than we can intentionally explicate.¹⁰⁴ This is the level of informal Gestalt experience at which ". . . we can know more than we can tell."¹⁰⁵ In the theological realm, Torrance describes this as the evangelical or doxological level, in which,

. . . empirical and theoretical factors are inseparably interwoven with one another . . . so that--from the very start of our experience and knowledge--form and being, structure and substance, are indivisibly united in the realities with which we have to do and in our rational response to those realities.¹⁰⁶

Translated into terms of the present study, this constituted the initial phase of research in which the

¹⁰³For Torrance's several expositions of these levels, based on Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality (1936)," in Out of My Later Years (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 59-65, see GGT, pp. 115, 156-158, 169-171; "Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science," pp. 164-165; reprinted in TCFK, ch. 2; STR, pp. 191-192; TS, 286-287; TCFK, p. 140.

¹⁰⁴The Tacit Dimension (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), pp. x, 5, 6.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 4. In Einstein's words, "The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of every day thinking" ("Physics and Reality," p. 59).

¹⁰⁶GGT, p. 157.

entire primary corpus was read, lectures attended, interviews conducted, correspondence and discussion undertaken, and tapes transcribed,¹⁰⁷ all of which served to establish an amorphous and somewhat unwieldy Gestalt of 'Torrance.' Of course in actual practice this level is frequently and prematurely interrupted by the next level.

Secondary Level: Scientific

The scientific inquiry emerges as the pre-scientific understanding of reality creates a residue of problems which are unsolvable at merely a descriptive, uncritical level.¹⁰⁸ At this point Ockham's razor is introduced, stripping our pre-scientific understanding of those ideas judged to be peripheral to our deeper discernment. This is the creative moment in science in which organizational hypotheses are introduced. These are not to be seen as speculative abstractions, however. Rather, they are, ". . . intuitively correlated with reality, and [used] . . . as fluid axioms through which we may develop the theorems needed for coherent and consistent formulation of the theory."¹⁰⁹ It brings to light the orderly matrix of relations underlying the rich, variegated, abstruse, immediate experience: ". . . we must penetrate beyond the immediate and crude observation

¹⁰⁷Many of the lectures and addresses presented at Princeton Theological Seminary since 1954 as well as the Harris Lectures at Dundee are available to the public in cassette form for purchase from the Speech Studios of the Seminary.

¹⁰⁸GGT, pp. 131-132.

¹⁰⁹T. F. Torrance, Juridical Law and Physical Law p. 55. Cf. "Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science," p. 161; RET, pp. 49, 50; HL[RST], ch. 3: "The Science of God." In actual scientific praxis, provisional abstraction under the guise of methodological bracketing is sanctioned by Torrance! (GGT, pp. 94-95; HL[RST], ch. 2: "The Status of Natural Theology").

of things into the inherently non-observable structure of the space-time framework of the universe, if we are to grasp reality in its own objective depth."¹¹⁰ This procedure is effected by means of the interrogative method common to forensics whereby through a ". . . mixture of compulsion and listening applied to spoken and written testimony . . . we seek to determine what actually took place through a clarification both of intention and physical fact."¹¹¹ We proceed via dialog, not dialectic. The interrogation generates clusters of questions, which address the problem from several coherent angles. These in turn produce "clues," which are empirico-intuitive,

. . . glimpses of reality, pointers to reality, or aspects of reality pressing for recognition in our minds. As we have seen they are essentially of an anticipatory nature, anticipatory because they come from reality and draw us toward it. There are no formal rules for acquiring these enlightening intimations of reality.¹¹²

Such insights are reserved for the child-like, who penetrate the unknown by assent to the force of self-evidence. The subject-object relation is replaced by the object-object relation, in which the inquiry is controlled from beyond itself, ". . . by reference to the objective ontological structures of the realities being investigated."¹¹³ This

¹¹⁰STR, p. 187.

¹¹¹TS, pp. 331-332. For the distinction between scientific questioning and Cartesian methodological doubt, see TS, pp. 122-123.

¹¹²HL[RST], ch 3: "The Science of God." This informal relation derives from wonder ("Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science," p. 154; STR, p. 191). For the Athanasian distinction between clues and faith see "HA," p. 466.

¹¹³GGT, p. 115. This stands in stark contrast to the heirs of Schleiermacher, which transcends the subject-

heuristic process lays at the heart of all true science.

Although there is an inductive flavor to this phase, it clearly exceeds the classical one-to-one correspondence theory of truth, and thus may be designated by the recent, broader term of 'adduction.'¹¹⁴ A thorough-going realism, purged of any subjective postures which have obscured the truth, is the ultimate aim. Theologically for Torrance this procedure results in the doctrine of the economic Trinity, in which God in the persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit interacts with the space-time universe through creation, incarnation, and redemption.¹¹⁵

In concert with Goedel's second theorem, by the very nature of reality, and hence our rational apprehension of it, our conclusions are provisional. Torrance stresses:

(I)f the theory is consistent, it is incomplete, and its consistency depends on cross-level reference to relations on a higher, or meta-scientific, level, where again we must seek to order our thoughts round the basic concepts and relations into a tighter and more rigorous formulation.¹¹⁶

object relation by a subject-subject relation, resulting in the loss of the distinction between God and man. The historical upshot is none other than the death of God (TS, p. xi).

¹¹⁴For example, see Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Induction," by Max Black, p. 169. Unlike Karl Popper, Torrance does not actively seek to falsify his hypotheses, but rather speaks of verification as synonymous with justification by grace (Reconstruction, p. 163; RET, p. 148), and therefore may be viewed by some as more doctrinaire than scientific. For J. Robert Oppenheimer's view of falsification see "Physics in the Contemporary World," in Great Essays in Science, ed. Martin Gardner (New York: Pocket Books, 1957), p. 203.

For an analysis of Einsteinian empiricism, see Reichenbach, "Philosophical Significance of Relativity," pp. 309-310.

¹¹⁵GGT, p. 157.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 170.

Tertiary Level: Meta-Scientific

Herein the provisional hypotheses are coordinated and refined into a higher level disclosure or explanatory model, which becomes a transparent analogical or topological vehicle through which, ". . . we discern the real world and allow it to manifest itself to us in its own inherent rationality and order, and as such . . . a unitary vision of reality . . ."117 By and large this is the phase of consolidation in which the coherence test of truth is brought to bear upon our hypotheses. Our approach is no longer interrogative, but problematic, as we seek to bring to light the latent implications of our model or analogue, and discard those concepts and relations which are no longer essential for the operation of this more parsimonious conclusion. In Einstein's words, ". . . the story goes on until we have arrived at a system of the greatest conceivable unity, and of the greatest poverty of concepts of the logical foundations, which are still compatible with the observation made by our senses."118 Thus, far from the positivist view of science and conventionalist use of language, we are concerned to plum the "ontological reasons"119 of a given objective reality. The theological model which reflects this stage is that of the ontological or immanent Trinity which underlies and establishes the economic Trinity at the scientific level.

Historically this method has its modern roots in the inquest of Lorenzo Valla, who by employing the forensic

117TS, p. 241; cf. p. 318; HL[RST], ch. 3: "The Science of God."

118"Physics and Reality," p. 63.

119STR, p. 185.

method of ars inveniendi, exposed the subterfuge of the papal decretals. Subsequently, this had a bearing upon Calvin's theological method.¹²⁰ Barth's theological method also reflects much of the basic structure outlined here,¹²¹ accounting for his extensive dialogical approach to dogmatics.

A brief glance at the Table of Contents of this study will confirm a scientific/meta-scientific structure, applied mutatis mutandis, not to theology per se, but once removed, to the theological enterprise of Professor Torrance, the ultimate success of which is subject to confirmation by the definitive judge--a task from which he has discreetly demurred.

A Problem of Pre-Scientific Abstraction

In the immortalized confession of St. Augustine, "Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explcare velim, nescio . . .,"¹²² we find the plight of a contemporary man, who by relegating time to the functions of the psyche, is left with a psycho-logical abstraction, detached from its unified ground in God as creator and redeemer. As Søren Kierkegaard reminds us: "The mode of apprehension of the truth is precisely the truth. It is therefore untrue to answer a question in a medium in which the question cannot arise."¹²³ If we

¹²⁰TCFK, pp. 267-268. Cf. TS, pp. ix-x.

¹²¹Torrance, Introduction Theology and Church, pp. 8-9, 45.

¹²²Confessionum, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina, ed. A. J. P. Migne, vol. 32: Sancti Aurelli Augustini (Paris, 1861), p. 816.

¹²³Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Uni-

seek a psychological answer to a theological reality we necessarily beg the question and force an alien frame of reference upon our conclusion. In order to surmount this problem, we are challenged by Professor Torrance to follow the watercourse of reality--to stand in intimate personal relation with the truth and allow it to speak out of its plentitude in order that our thought be conformed to its contours by dint of its objective compulsion.¹²⁴ We can only know the truth if we stand in the truth. We must be in truth in order to reflect upon it. Torrance contends: "In no authentic knowledge do we begin with epistemology and then on the ground of theory independently argued go on to develop our actual knowledge."¹²⁵ We begin in the interstices of life in which we are directly conjoined with the other, be it God, man, or the universe, in interactive relation. This is but to assert the fundamental realist principle of Torrance's thought. In short, "We know things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves; and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the content and form of our knowledge."¹²⁶ It is no wonder he contends he has learned more epistemology

versity Press, 1941), p. 287; cf. TS, p. 5.

¹²⁴Athanasius spoke of this as diánoia (see Reconstruction, p. 49).

¹²⁵GR, p. 165; cf. TS, p. 1. In a similar vein, theologically, Barth reminds us we cannot know God by assuming some prior transcendental stance above Him. He is known only in the actuality of his self-revelation in Jesus Christ--". . . whatever may be the common denominator, God will not be embraced by it but will remain detached and independent. . . . Deus non est in genere . . ." (CD, II, 1, 28, p. 310).

¹²⁶GGT, p. 8.

from Einstein than from any of the philosophers,¹²⁷ and that the future of thought lies in the implications of the discoveries within the scientific disciplines. Of course to the student of philosophy this is all a bit of pontification, subject to the countervailing idealist critique. But if we are to grant him a hearing, we must do so within the confines of his speaking, lest we hear only ourselves. Is this not also St. John's contention under the impress of the revelatory unveiling?--Only those with ears to hear will comprehend what is ostensibly within the public domain.

In implementing Torrance's scientific method to study Torrance himself there are peculiar problems which arise which have no precedent within the confines of the dumb natural order or the auditory impress of the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Both of these occur within the context of what Einstein terms the pre-scientific level, in which all natural concepts and relations are lacking in logical unity,¹²⁸ and all religious encounter is characterized by the mutual involution of the empirical and theoretical.¹²⁹ To be sure, there are those sermonic documents which reflect his theology of time in this pre-scientific manner, especially The Apocalypse Today and When Christ Comes and Comes Again. Nevertheless the majority of his work comes to us as intentional theological extrapolations from Torrance's own evangelical and doxological interaction with the Word of God. Thus it would be methodologically inappropriate to ignore the rigor and refinement with which they are presented. As Torrance himself has so frequently stated, we cannot reset a puzzle the second time in oblivion to patterns discovered by its

¹²⁷RBET, 7/7/81.

¹²⁸"Physics and Reality," p. 63.

¹²⁹GGT, pp. 156-157, 169.

initial completion.¹³⁰ Throughout most of what follows, therefore, it will be methodologically faithful to present his logical, epistemological, metaphysical, and theological discussions of duration in their respective modalities. That is to say, at these particular junctures, methodological fidelity entails an appropriate degree of abstraction.

¹³⁰E.g., RBET, 7/13/81.

PART I
SCIENTIFIC LEVEL

SECTION I

FLUID AXIOMS OF A UNIFIED THEOLOGY OF DURATION

CHAPTER I

THREE-DIMENSIONAL CHRISTOCENTRICITY

1. Introduction

For he has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.

--Ephesians 1:9-10
(R.S.V.)

The theological question par excellence posed in its most general form is that of the relation between God and man. It supersedes the ontological question of God, which it presupposes, in that God becomes problematic only because He is in relation to us. That which is bereft of relation recedes into the oblivion of irrelevance. May it not be said, that in this century God has become a non-issue to many precisely because His relation with man has been misunderstood, trivialized, and consequently abandoned? May it not serve us well to investigate whether

this depreciation has not issued from a theological malaise that might be rectified if modern man abandoned his provincial prowess and once again sought to be extended beyond the soliloquy of ego?

This is an essay in real relations. Martin Buber reminds us that existence is fundamentally relational.¹ Christianity reveals the concrete expression of that relation in Jesus Christ. Thomas Torrance retools the Western mind so that it may once again confess the "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself."

There are a variety of approaches that one could take in investigating Torrance's analysis of relation. I have chosen the avenue of duration because God's relation to man expresses itself concretely in Christ, and that entails the spatio-temporal reality of relation. Torrance explains:

Time and space must both be conceived in relational terms, and in accordance with the active principles or forces that move and make room for themselves in such a way that space and time arise in and with them and their movements--they are not receptacles apart from bodies or forces, but are functions of events in the universe and forms of their orderly sequence and structure. Space and time are relational and variational concepts defined in accordance with the nature of the force that gives them their field and determination.²

Thus, although there is no space and time in abstraction from events, there are no events within the world which are independent from spatio-temporal consideration. It is therefore impossible to understand Christ aright without treating him within his durational field. Only as such do we escape the charge of idealizing and abstracting the Living center of our faith.

The question of starting point in our inquiry on

¹I and Thou, trans. with Prologue by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), passim.

²STR, p. 130.

duration is unmistakably supplied by Torrance himself. It is the same place that all theological inquiry must begin--with Jesus Christ himself. Torrance comments:

There seems little doubt that the New Testament gives us teaching on eschatology without committing itself to any specific conception of time. It is usually content to express the truth in terms of limited or limitless duration. On the analogy of the doctrine of the Trinity, however, where a formed doctrine is not given either, it may be that the eschatological teaching of the New Testament requires definite clarification in our theology. If so, must we not go on to form a time concept on the analogy of the Incarnation? Must we not say with Karl Barth that because the Word has become flesh it has also become time?³

If we are to understand time, therefore, we must understand the full orb of the being and acts of God in Jesus Christ. This Christocentricity establishes what Torrance terms, a 'three dimensional theology,'⁴ in which the mediatorial role of Christ serves as the theological clearing house through which all relations between God and man are transacted. As Barth so eloquently expresses it:

. . . in the incarnation we have the quintessence of all possible relationship and fellowship generally and as such, and . . . in the transcendent freedom of God . . . we see the archetype and norm of all the possible ways in which He expresses His freedom in this relationship and fellowship.⁵

³"MED", p. 224. Even Torrance's Trinitary discussion emerges out of Christology:

"It is important to remember, as Athanasius used to insist, that the Son of God is the only Logos and Eidos of the Godhead. It is in and through the incarnate Word of God in Jesus Christ that God reveals Himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and is believed and acknowledged in accordance with His divine nature and rationality . . ." (GR, p. 166).

⁴"The Place of the Humanity of Christ in the Sacramental Life of the Church," Church Service Society Annual 26 (1956): 3; cf. GR, p. 145.

⁵CD, II, 1, 28, p. 371.

Later he identifies Christology as the locus of all God-man relationship:

The legitimacy of every theory concerning the relationship of God and man or God and the world can be tested by considering whether it can be understood also as an interpretation of the relationship and fellowship created and sustained in Jesus Christ.⁶

It is the circumvention of the God-man which leads to all the ills of theology, duration being no exception. Torrance cites Bultmann, Dodd, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Tillich as exponents of the two-dimensional eschatology, in which time is depreciated in favor of eternity. The possibilities divide along the lines of either/or as the decisive hypostatic union of God and man in Christ is not fully appreciated.

As we trace the argument of Christocentricity throughout Torrance's published corpus we encounter, however, a sort of Christocentric synoptic problem which deserves further investigation. The problem is this: at certain junctures not clearly reducible to chronological development he identifies the center of his theology with the homousion of Nicea-Constantinople, the hypostatic union of Chalcedon, the enhypostasis of Cyril of Alexandria, Leontius of Byzantium and the Second Council of Constantinople, and the incarnation and resurrection as dynamically expressed in the Reformation. This is not to suggest that these concepts are in any way mutually exclusive, as indeed historically they have built upon each other in an integral and systematic way. However, we must be careful not to confuse the clarity achieved through each of these formulae.

⁶Ibid., p. 320.

2. Horizontal Dimensions of the Homousion

The Fathers, in their deliberation over the inter-relation of the Godhead sought a category of relative unity in contradistinction to the Philonic absolute unity. Aristotle provided such a differential term in his concept of "one", which connoted a diversity of relations: 1) the unity of various predicates or accidents within the subject; 2) the unity established by virtue of spatial or temporal continuity; 3) the ontologico-epistemological unity which results from the commonality of matter or form.⁷ It is this third category which the Fathers initially utilized in Nicea to define the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. However, because of the derivative aspect of the particular from the generic, it admitted of tritheism and therefore subsequently required the differentiation of numerical identity within the Godhead⁸ while allowing for a generic definition of the Chalcedonian "consubstantial

⁷Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross, ed., vol. 8: Metaphysica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), Delta 6, 1015\2b\4-1016\2b\4. Cf. Henry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, 2nd rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 314-315.

⁸Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 3: Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, From Constantine the Great to Gregory the Great, A.D. 311-600, 5th rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1910), pp. 656-657, 672-673, and 673 n. 2. Athanasius concludes in his Orationes contra Arianos, IV (in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 2nd series, vol. 4: St. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, gen. eds. Henry Wace and Philip Schaff [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907]):

". . . if the two are one, then of necessity they are two, but one according to the Godhead, and according to the Son's coessentiality [homousios] with the Father, and the Word's being from the Father Himself; so that there are two, because there is Father, and Son, namely the Word; and one because one God" (ch. 9, p. 436).

In the following chapter he strikes a mean between Sabellius and Arius.

with us according to Manhood."⁹

There is a remarkable epistemological power operative within the homousion as it establishes Christ as both the fully adequate avenue by which God is made known to us and the proper access to understanding our humanity. This follows from Torrance's oft expressed statement, "God is fully toward us what he is in Jesus Christ."¹⁰ The homousion guarantees the fidelity of our knowledge of God in Christ. Yet it also provides an enduring legitimacy to our knowledge of the created order, which through Christ has now been taken up everlastingly into the very Truth of God.

The import of the homousion spans Torrance's entire theological career. One may find allusion to it as early as 1942, although subordinate to and commingled with the hypostatic union.¹¹ It continues to flourish even within his most recent writings. He embraces it as the "linchpin" of classical theology,¹² the ontological "kingpin" of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, which has served as a most fruitful disclosure model through the centuries by preserving the ontological identity of Jesus Christ with God,¹³ and

⁹Cf. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes, vol. 2: The Greek and Latin Creeds, with Translations, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1919), p. 65, n. 2.

¹⁰Cf. e.g. STI, p. 80; GGT, p. 118; RET, p. 15.

¹¹"[W]e may perhaps use the expression 'hypostatic union' not simply to refer to that personal (consubstantial) union between God and Man in Jesus Christ, but to express just that kind of union" ("Reason in Christian Theology," p. 39).

¹²GGT, pp. 39-40.

¹³T. F. Torrance, ed., The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, A.D. 381 (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981), pp. xi-xiii; "Ecumenism and Rome," p. 64.

in principle serving as the antidote to all forms of heretical dualism.¹⁴ It is no less than the logical center of all theological formulation, serving as,

. . . an exceedingly dense or compressed statement, a fundamental dogma, which once it comes to view becomes normative for all faithful theological statement, for it enables it to be made in true correspondence with its proper object [God] in consistent relations with other faithful statements.¹⁵

Mutatis mutandis, it performs the same integrative function between Father and Son in the theological realm as Einstein's $E=MC^2$ does between matter and energy in the physical realm.¹⁶ It is the point from which the Church shall solve its most pressing theological problems today¹⁷--the foundation for the new theological revolution.¹⁸ Its ultimate importance is two-fold, corresponding to the two scientific levels of Torrance's method.

Anthropological Homoousion

At the scientific or the theological level we discover the Constantinopolitan affirmation of the consubstantiality of Christ with our humanity, which Torrance contends: ". . . takes the form that what Jesus Christ is toward us in love and grace, in redemption and sanctification, in the mediation of the divine life, he is inherently in himself in his own Being. . ." ¹⁹ His person and work are

¹⁴Ibid., p. xviii.

¹⁵Reconstruction, p. 33.

¹⁶GGT, p. 162.

¹⁷Reconciliation, p. 283.

¹⁸Reconstruction, pp. 262-263.

¹⁹GGT, p. 161.

inseparable in contradistinction to the traditional systematic schema.

The nature of this consubstantial union is elaborated by Torrance's mentor, H. R. Macintosh. He dispels the dualism inherent between the universal/particular differentiation. Frequently Torrance reiterates the Macintoshian synthesis--Christ was not only Man (in the universal sense), but equally and also a man (man in the particular sense).²⁰ For Macintosh Jesus Christ is concretely universal man.²¹ He rejects the scholastic notion of the reality of universal humanitas. It is no longer satisfactory. Generic man is a philosophic fiction: "No one can represent a man who also is the nature common to all members of the class 'man.'²² The qualitative identity which unites humanity has no subsistent identity. Thus Macintosh, with the Nicene Divines, rejects the Aristotelian universal predication of qualities as an appropriate model of the Christ-man consubstantial union. Rather, in conformity with Nicea he asserts: "The real human universe, then, is made up of individual men possessing common properties or a common character."²³ While Christ is the mediator of all humanity as the second Adam, he is not to be identified as "incarnate solidarity." Rather, Macintosh argues,

. . . it is in virtue of such oneness, such bonds of mutual involution between life and life, that we believe Jesus Christ a real individual, to be able to exert universal saving power. The individual, in short, is

²⁰Hugh Ross Macintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1913), p. 385. Cf. CAC, I, p. 243; SF, pp. cxii-cxiii, cxxiv.

²¹Doctrine of the Person of Christ, pp. 389, 390. cf. TS, p. 182.

²²Doctrine of the Person of Christ, p. 389.

²³Ibid.

not contrary to the universal; in varied degree his is the universal in concrete form. Hence, without ceasing to be individual, Christ may be the universal, focal member of our organic race.²⁴

For Torrance it is the concept of the monergistic involution of Christ through the relation struck by the Spirit and hence the reciprocal involution of man with Christ through the same Spirit on one level and the mutual involution of Christ with God at another that is the hallmark of his ontology. It is because God in the incarnate Christ and not some other man is the agent of this involution that it may be said Christ is the exclusive human concrete universal.²⁵ And it is because God is concretized in the particularity of our humanity in Christ that Christ and not the Father or Spirit is designated the concrete universal.

It must be said, therefore, with utmost emphasis that Christ is the human agent of all concrete acts of man toward God and the divine agent of all universal acts of God toward man. It is solely by virtue of our relationship with him that it may be said God acts toward us particularly and temporally and that our response to God is of any universal or eternal significance. Christ is the clearinghouse for all God-man, man-God transactions. To appreciate our total relational dependence upon the homousion is to take seriously the declaration that in Christ "we live and move and have our being."

It is this relationship of mutual involution that

²⁴Ibid., emphasis mine.

²⁵TS, p. 182. For the covenant as the general expression of the concrete universal Christ, see SF, p. lv. For Torrance's analysis of Christ as the concrete universal focus of Barth's theology see KB, p. 110, and in Kierkegaard's theology see "Kierkegaard on the Knowledge of God," The Presbyter 3 no. 1 (1943): 4-7, 13.

supplants the problematic participation (methexis) of Greek metaphysics. In this strategic role therefore we come to appreciate why the homoousion is ascribed the status of "linchpin" of all theology.

At this juncture, however, he parts ways with Macintosh and concurs with Barth. Macintosh depicts the involution of Christ with our humanity as an ethical and spiritual ideal in which truly human love and justice as well as divine dependence found their full embodiment for the first time. For Barth, as for Torrance, Christ is no ethical hero. It is in fact his renunciation of such heroism, the assumption of our sinful humanity, the recognition of the fallenness of man in the humiliation of the incarnation that constitutes his sinless representation as the second Adam.²⁶

We see here, with both Macintosh and Barth, as with Torrance, the ontological identity of Christ is inseparable from His activity. In Torrance's words, he is "personal Agent."²⁷ His Being is inseparable from His act, revelation inseparable from reconciliation.

Christ is not only the Author and Agent of our salvation, but is in Himself, even in His human nature, the Source and Substance of it; therefore everyone of the saving acts of Christ must carry with it, in our understanding, the whole substance of Christ's human

²⁶CD, I, 2, 15, pp. 149-159. Torrance reiterates much of this passage of the Church Dogmatics in his unpublished, "Jesus Christ the Servant Son," Soteriology Lectures [pre-1974]. (Mimeographed), as well as in his unpublished "Christology and Soteriology Lectures," ch. 3, sect. 4, part (c), n.d., quoted in Joannes Guthridge, The Christology of T. F. Torrance: Revelation and Reconciliation in Christ (Melbourne: Society of St. Paul, 1967), pp. 18-19.

²⁷STI, p. 1.

life and nature.²⁸

He is the first true man, the "creative source and true secret of our humanity," the Head in whom all men consist.²⁹ We look not to Adamic man for the definition of humanity but rather to Christ the faithful servant, the obedient son. Fallen man has depreciated his being. It is into this state--". . . this human-inhuman existence of Adam, Jesus Christ has come as the Son of God, to live out a truly obedient and filial, that is, a truly human life in perfect and unbroken communion with God."³⁰

Torrance distances himself from any Platonic or Aristotelian subsistent form underlying the humanity of Christ:³¹

Now if Christ's human nature is perfect and further if Christ is the Word become Man, the New Adam, then we cannot define Christ's human nature in terms of some general idea of human nature we have already conceived for it is the human nature of Christ alone that is the norm and criterion of all true human nature.³²

In a radical way the secret of ontology, the participational fulcrum, is centered in the anthropological homousion. Only in relation to Christ do we live and move and have our being. There is no possibility of ontology as such but only Christ-ian ontology, which by virtue of the theological homousion via the hypostatic union becomes Trinitary ontology.

²⁸SF, p. lxxxii.

²⁹"Atoning Justification," [pre-1974]. (Mimeographed), p. 14.

³⁰"Jesus Christ the Servant-Son," p. 4.

³¹Ibid.

³²Torrance, "Christology and Soteriology Lectures," ch. 3, sect. 4, part (c), quoted in Guthridge, Christology of T. F. Torrance, p. 19.

Theological Homoousion

At the meta-scientific level we discern the Nicene affirmation of the consubstantiality of Christ with God the Father. Torrance elaborates this ontological relation:

If Jesus Christ is the one place in space and time where we may really know the Father, then God the Father made know to us through him cannot be some static, immutable, impassible Deity utterly remote from us, but the dynamic, living God, whose Being is inherent in his Word and Act and whose Word and Act are inherent in the unity of his Being, and who has locked himself with us in our being and destiny in Jesus Christ our Brother.³³

At the hand of Athanasius this Father-Son unity intended equality in "mode of being".³⁴ Aloys Grillmeier contends it was not the intent of the Nicene Divines to Hellenize the concept of God by introducing this term.³⁵ Rather, as Barth argues, it was to establish the equality of persons, i.e., the numerical unity of the modes of being, which at most was a mathematical negation of plurality.³⁶ Because God is the self-definition of his own essence, i.e.,

³³GGT, pp. 40-41; cf. "The Evangelical Significance of the Homoousion," Abba Salama 5 (1974): 165- 167.

³⁴Athanasius, Orationes contra Arianos, III, 15: PG 26, 353A quoted in Aloys Grillmeier, S.J., Christ in the Christian Tradition: vol. 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), 2nd rev. ed, trans. John Bowden (London: Mowbrays, 1975), p. 271.

³⁵Christ in the Christian Tradition, vol. 1, p. 269. H. R. Macintosh calls for a categorial shift from a substantial to a volitional-ethical metaphysic: "Now the will of Christ as Son is one with God's will not partially, or intermittently, or by way of metaphor; it is one identically" (Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, p. 417).

³⁶CD, I, 1, 9, p. 354; cf. p. 350.

because there is no higher court of abstract philosophic appeal by which his essence may be known we ultimately run short of theological vocabulary. God, Torrance asserts, is his essence: ". . . if Christ is the Son of God become man then it is the Divine Nature which must be our only norm and criterion for the understanding of divine nature."³⁷ This essence is revealed, though not reducible without remainder, as his work as Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer.³⁸ The ontological Trinity is inseparable from the economic Trinity:

Each is coordinated with the other through the incarnation or the "human economy" which the Son of God has undertaken for our sakes--i.e., the ordered process of God's revealing and redeeming activity in space and time in which he has both extrapolated, as it were, his divine mystery within the conditions of our human nature and at the same time lifted up our human nature into union and communion with himself.³⁹

To say this is to assert that who God is in His eternal ontological trinitarian Being is inseparable from His Act toward us in His economic condescension in Jesus Christ.⁴⁰

In a word, the homoousion serves as the ontological and epistemological fulcrum of all theology.⁴¹

It appears that aside from the sheer theological weight which the homoousion can withstand, there are ecumenical factors operative in Torrance's use of it as well, for it is the Nicene Creed, along with the Apostles'

³⁷Torrance, "Christology and Soteriology Lectures," ch. 3, sect. 4, part (c), quoted in Guthridge, The Christology of T. F. Torrance, p. 19.

³⁸CD, I, 1, 9, p. 371.

³⁹RET, pp. 22-23.

⁴⁰GGT, pp. 152-153.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 160-161.

Creed, which serves as the point of intersection between the Orthodox, Roman, and Protestant Churches.⁴² As such Nicea has greater catholic utility than does Chalcedon or any subsequent symbol.

Durational Axioms

Anthropological Homoousion and Time

The anthropological homoousion, being the point of contact which assures us that the particularity of our humanity is grounded beyond itself in the true humanity of Christ, provides the apodictic starting point from which all our discussion regarding time derives. From the onset, we observe the axiom:

I. Time is ultimately unintelligible apart from Christ.

From this fact grounded in the concrete particularity of his humanity two reciprocal corollaries follow:

I.a. The time of Christ is archetypal.

We look to Him in His time to observe true time. Thus to speak of time is not to speak of a philosophic abstraction as philosophy is wont to do. Time is a Christological reality. A true understanding of time ultimately must devolve from the time of Christ. Torrance elaborates:

⁴²Its ecumenicity is grounded, Torrance argues, in the fact that it expresses the underlying theological pattern of the entire Apostolic presentation of the Gospel:

"It is because the Nicene Creed remained integrated with the embodied form of truth and doctrine in the original Deposit of Faith . . . that it shared in its once for all character and status in the foundation of the Church, so that as such it constituted the controlling base with reference to which all other Conciliar Formulations of Christian doctrine were made ("The Deposit of Faith," Scottish Journal of Theology 36 no. 1 (1983): 12.

Cf. Reconciliation, p. 9; "'The Substance of Faith': A Clarification of the Concept in the Church of Scotland," Scottish Journal of Theology 36 (September 1983): 334-336.

. . . Christian theology takes its stand in the fulness of time in Christ and looks back from there to interpret the previous history of the Covenant and the creation itself with which it is bound up, and looks forward to interpret the foundation and the life of the Church in the economy of the Covenant in the last times between the first and second Advents of Christ.⁴³

What is more, our time is true time only in relation to the time of Christ. The mode of this relationship can only be construed in terms of God's creative, reconciling and redemptive act toward us in Jesus Christ.

I.b. His time is our time.

The particularity of Christ's presence with us as a man among men assures us that his history was genuine human history. He lived as we live and died as we die. His was not a privileged existence. An analysis of the precise function of human time shall be reserved for our description of the humiliation of Christ.

In that His identity with our humanity was a lived identity a second axiom is disclosed through the homoousion:

II. Christ's consubstantiality [homoousios] is in his con-temporaneity [homo-kairos]⁴⁴ and His con-tempor-

⁴³SF, p. lvi.

⁴⁴Despite the exegetical ambiguity of kairos (see Introduction, f.n. 21 above) we coin this compound term with its help for the purpose of connoting the identity of Christ's time with ours in the fullness of its dynamic actuality--i.e., time inseparable from its content. While maintaining neutrality with regard to the exegetical debate (cf. "MED," p. 224) the entire bearing of Torrance's thought stands in theological confirmation of time so understood. He argues, e.g.: ". . . time is to be understood as time for something, the time in which we live our life, time for decision, time for repentance, time for action, and the 'time' of God is the time in which God lives his own life, the time which God has in himself for his own eternal love. . ." (STR, p. 130). Cf. CAC, I, p. 313; AT, pp. 83-84, 185; WCCCA, p. 133; "In Hoc Signo Vincas," The Presbyter, 3 no. 11 (1945): 17; RP, pp. 59-60, "PC," p. 123.

aneity is in his consubstantiality.

More generally we may assert, His being is in time and His time is in being. That is to say, his identity with us is inherently temporal. We do not look behind Christ's historical presence with us to find his true identity. He is who He is in His gracious intervention of love toward us as the Jesus of history. Any tendency toward docetism, is a patent bifurcation of reality.

Theological Homousion and Eternity

The theological homousion serves as the eternal counterpart of the temporal, anthropological homousion. As we have seen, however, our humanity is not numerically identical to Christ's humanity. Rather it finds its particular human identity in relation to His. However due to the numeric reciprocity of the Deity of Christ and the Triune God there is a thorough reciprocity between the Deity of the two. Thus we may axiomatically posit:

III. The eternity of God is in itself what it is toward us in Jesus Christ.⁴⁵

Here we are concerned with the interrelation of the ontological with the economic Trinity.⁴⁶ Although this is essentially a tautological statement it is nonetheless overlooked in much theological discourse concerning God. In stating this, the question as to the nature of God's eternity remains open. Nevertheless, what is accomplished in Torrance's view, is an appreciation of a change from the static, Stoic-Latin view of God to the dynamic Reformation, Biblical view of God, "as living, active creator and

⁴⁵Cf. The Incarnation, pp. xvi-xviii.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. xx; RET, pp. 22-23.

Redeemer."⁴⁷ At the very least this entails,

III.a. Eternity is not essentially antithetical to time.

Torrance offers this historical assessment: "If in the former outlook the world was interpreted in its attraction toward God, in the latter it was interpreted in God's action upon the world."⁴⁸ By virtue of the incarnation, the eternal transcendence of God has graciously become invested in history:

. . . the eternal relations within the Triune God have assumed an economic form within human history, while remaining immanent in the Godhead, thus opening out history to the transcendence of God while actualising the self-giving of God within it.⁴⁹

The repercussions to this were twofold. 1) The depreciation of history within the framework of the Augustinian sacramental universe was challenged.⁵⁰ No longer could history be reduced to a mere reflection of the eternal forms. Time was no longer merely the Platonic moving image of eternity. 2) Secondly, the logical, static understanding of the impassibility and changelessness of God is replaced by his living, dynamic presence. Torrance explains:

The concept of the impassibility and immutability of God is actually ambiguous: it means that God is not moved by anything outside of himself. He does not suffer from the effect of anything other than God upon him; he is not moved by any cause other than himself. In his eternal stability and invariant reliability, he remains transcendent over all such passion and change. But this does not mean that God does not move himself, or that he is incapable of divine passion. On the

p. 7. ⁴⁷Reconstruction, p. 62; cf. TS, pp. 59-60; DCO,

⁴⁸TS, p. 67.

⁴⁹Reconciliation, p. 102.

⁵⁰TS, pp. 66-67.

contrary, while God is serene and tranquil in the face of any disturbance, trouble, or hurt that may arise in the universe, he is nevertheless the living, self-moving God who is in his own fullness a communion of love, who though he is not eternally Creator was free to become the Creator of all things visible and invisible. In the incarnation God was free to do something new even for himself, for he was not eternally incarnate, and free to move outside of himself as he became incarnate, without being other than himself. He is thus revealed as the God whose being is in his act and whose act is in his being.⁵¹

In one succinct phrase he summarizes: "God [is] invariant in love but not impassible, constant in faithfulness but not immutable."⁵²

Such a view of the eternal God introduces grave internal problems if it remains encased within the categorical structure of a dualist theology. We return to the problem of universals. How can the eternal form be reduced to a finite receptacle? In Lutheran thought this emerged in the untenable postulate: finitum capax infiniti.⁵³ Eucharistically this eventuated in the ubiquity of the humanity of Christ in the sacrament. The eternal presence of God distorted its spatio-temporal receptacle.

Newtonian theology on the other hand held the more tenable infinitum capax finiti. Nevertheless the problem of participation remained: How was the divine sensorium of space and time to be transmuted into a particular within that sensorium? In the final analysis it was not. Deism resulted. Torrance comments:

⁵¹DCO, p. 6; cf. WCCCA, pp. 129, 164; GGT, pp. 40-41; 65-66; "Service in Jesus Christ, in Service in Christ: Essays Presented to Karl Barth on his Eightieth Birthday, ed. James I. McCord and T. H. L. Parker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), pp. 4-5.

⁵²DCO, p. 7 and STI, p. 75; cf. TCFK, p. 259.

⁵³Cf. STI, pp. 62-63.

. . . by relating time and space not only to the eternity and infinity of God but to his immutability and impassibility, which allowed him to think of absolute time and space as containing all bodies in the universe and controlling their behaviour without being changed in themselves by what they contained and controlled--that is what he meant by the term 'absolute.'⁵⁴

Whether the container of space-time was conceived as finite or infinite, under this framework, the reciprocity of the theological homoousion could never be implemented. We have already hinted at the alternative as that of the interrelational involution of the natures of Christ with their respective correlates. Further analysis must await further clues.

Vertical Dimension of the Hypostatic Union

Compound-complex Relation of Hypostatic Union to Homoousion

The framers of Chalcedon confessed:

. . . one and the same Christ, Son, Lord only begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures (phyesia) inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person (Prosopon) and one subsistence (Hypostasin), not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ. . .⁵⁵

In so doing they were addressing the converse of the Nicene

⁵⁴CTSC, p. 18; cf. pp. 19, 42-43; TCFK, pp. 23-24; DCO, p. 10; STI, pp. 38-39; GGT, p. 68; Barry H. Downing, "Eschatological Implications of the Understanding of Time and Space in the Thought of Isaac Newton," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1966), p. 205.

⁵⁵In Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, vol II, p. 62.

symbol, which proves much more difficult within an Aristotelian framework. Now instead of one universal in three particulars they dared to assert one particular in two universals! In so doing they overcame the more 'logical' alternatives of the Monophysites⁵⁶ and the Nestorians.⁵⁷

The hypostatic union enjoys the same high status as the homousion in Torrance's thinking. It too is acclaimed as paradigmatic of unitary theology:

. . . Chalcedonian Christology . . . did full justice to the intersection and overlapping of divine and human reality in Jesus Christ, yet in such a way as to reject any confusion or separation between them. Judged by modern scientific standards alone it was thus an exemplary model of unitary theory and of the way in which the languages of the observable and the non-observable are to be coordinated.⁵⁸

From the very beginning, Torrance contended that the hypostatic union was the, ". . . perfect pattern of the connection between the truths of Christian Theology,"⁵⁹ the ". . . centrum of a Christian dogmatic."⁶⁰ It too serves as a disclosure model and ". . . the point where theological interpretation must start . . ."⁶¹ It is the ontological relationship which enables all theological knowledge to terminate truly in God.⁶² Through it the time/eternity bifurcation is overcome:

Here above all we have to learn the discipline of thinking conjunctively together his human-historical and

⁵⁶One nature in one person.

⁵⁷Two natures in two persons.

⁵⁸STI, pp. 80-81.

⁵⁹"Reason in Christian Theology," p. 39.

⁶⁰"PC," p. 127.

⁶¹RET, p. 117.

⁶²GGT, p. 160; RET, p. 125; SF, p. cxii.

his divine-eternal aspects, and thus to think of him from the start as at once human and divine, one indivisible whole reality. It is the prevalence still of obsolete dualist assumptions that makes people approach the fact of Christ either from his human, empirical side, in the hope of deducing concepts about him of divine import, or from his divine, eternal side, in the expectation of discerning the relevance of his saving power to human existence; but the effect of such a bifurcation is to reproduce again the heretical tensions between ebionite and docetic ideas of the past which have proved both damaging and sterile. . . . (T)hen we find ourselves understanding him theologically in the light of his own intrinsic significance . . .⁶³

In Jesus Christ is found the hypostatic union of time and eternity:

In Jesus Christ the divine reality intersects this-worldly reality like an axis, so that if our language about God who cannot be observed and our language about the world which can be observed, must not be confused, it is because they intersect at decisive points, and not because they are merely the obverse of each other or because they are merely parallel to one another. The interaction of God with us in the space and time of this world sets up, as it were, a coordinate system between two horizontal dimensions, space and time, and one vertical dimension, relation to God through His Spirit. This constitutes the theological field of connections in and through Jesus Christ who cannot be thought of simply as fitting into the patterns of space and time formed by other agencies, but as organizing them round Himself and giving them transcendental references to God in and through Himself. He generates within these connections His own distinctive and continuous 'space-time track', and forms a moving and creative centre for the confluence of world-lines within the plenum of space-time. The movement of eternity into time in Jesus Christ has the effect of temporalizing space and spatializing time in an orderly continuum of successive patterns of change and coherent structures within which God may reflect and fulfil His own creative and redemptive intentionality. It is therefore a teleological as well as an eschatological movement, in which the incarnate Word calls space and time, as it were, into contrapuntal relation to the eternal rationality of God, which because of its infinite differentiability does not

⁶³TCFK, pp. 254-255; cf. STI, pp. 79-80.

override but maintains and fulfills the freedom of the created order.⁶⁴

Torrance obscures the hypostatic union, homoousion distinction. Although the latter he refers to as a "more abstract form"⁶⁵ of the former, it is a lack of precision which has introduced ambiguity into the theological 'center' of Torrance's thought. Clearly the homoousion refers to the identity of the Deity of Christ and God the Father, and the identity of the humanity of Christ with our humanity,⁶⁶ but it does not speak of the Chalcedonian relation of the two natures in one Person. It is the occasional conflation of these three relations which accounts for the alternative 'centers' within Torrance's thought. We shall therefore treat his assertion, ". . . in Christ the homoousion is inseparably bound up with the hypostatic union . . . [constituting] the epistemological center in all our knowledge of God . . ." ⁶⁷ as normative. What we have, in effect, is a compound-complex center, which though structurally operative in its various modes, is referred to by the shorthand of homoousion. Through the logic of Church history it has served as the seminal source of these conciliar developments.

Hypostatic Union of Time and Eternity: Axioms

Having already identified the horizontal, intra-categorical con-temporal identity of Christ's humanity

⁶⁴STI, pp. 72-73.

⁶⁵GGT, p. 160.

⁶⁶Historically the distinctive use of homoousion in each case was implied: the former entailing "numeric" identity, the latter only "generic" (Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of Christendom, vol. II, p. 64. n. 2).

⁶⁷GGT, p. 165; cf. p. 172.

with our humanity and his co-eternal identity with the Godhead, the hypostatic union serves the vertical, inter-categorical role of relating time and eternity. Again, we have yet to encounter the appropriate context to fully explore Torrance's definitions of time. It will not hinder our present task to delay that investigation.

From the onset our durational analysis of the natures of Christ allows us within the context of the incarnation to affirm:

IV. In Jesus Christ time and eternity are hypostatically conjoined.

This is not a temporary union but endures everlastingly from the moment of divine conception through the everlasting session of Christ at the right hand of God the Father.⁶⁸ Furthermore this is not merely the union of a particular time or a particular eternity. By virtue of the concrete universality of Christ toward us and the unity of Being and Act in the ontological and economic Trinity it follows that archetypal Time and the Eternity of God, of which there is no other, are inseparably united.

Temporally this is to say no more than has already been said: in Christ is the fullness of time. As we shall see the "in" must be construed as a relational rather than a locative preposition.

From henceforth we shall use the capitalized designations, Time and Eternity, to refer to those durations conceived in either their Christological or Trinitary specificity. Any reference to these in either abstract or anthropological generality shall retain the lower case designation.

To affirm the hypostatic union of Time and Eternity in Christ is to recognize His fundamental bi-durational

⁶⁸Cf. CAC, II, pp. 162-163; STI, p. 73; STR, p. 98; TS, pp. 152-153; "PC," pp. 118-119.

constitution. If the Word of God as the chosen avenue of God's revelation to us is bi-durational we should expect its inscripturated derivative to reflect an analogous duality.⁶⁹ This is the moving force underlying our entire project. It lays the foundation for a truly Christological hermeneutic. As such it avoids the excesses of both literalism and demythologism. On its temporal side we may say hermeneutics is grammatico-historical. But it does not end here. On its eternal side its is theological. The two are inseparable but inconfused.⁷⁰ We shall develop this in Chapter V. on Hermeneutic Dynamics below.

The durational corollary to the inconfused pole is this:

IV.a. Time is not Eternity; Eternity is not Time.

Torrance stresses, "'Time' for God Himself can only be defined by the uncreated and creative life of God."⁷¹ The abiding life of God is what eternity is. There is no higher court of appeal. Elsewhere he elaborates, God, ". . . is his own dimension, unlimited and unconditioned by anything other than himself. This means that God's presence is just as unique and incomparable as God himself is."⁷² Although Torrance says relatively little about Eternity in its inconfused relation to Time, he does offer the following description:

God's time is other than our time and we cannot comprehend it. But we do know that the everlasting God fainteth not, neither is weary. He is the Ancient of

⁶⁹Torrance warns against overlooking this (STI, p. 76).

⁷⁰Cf. e.g., STR, p. 94.

⁷¹STR, p. 131.

⁷²"Where is God?", in Asking Them Questions: New Series, vol. 1, ed. Ronald Selby Wright (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 22.

Days and yet does not grow old, and is always ready to renew the youth of those who trust Him. Somehow, present, past, and future are in one another and do not follow one another in God's eternal time. It is that time which we see in Jesus Christ who is, who was, and who is to come. In Him the Kingdom of the eternal God has broken into our sinful time and its bondage of vanity. It is the time of life abundant, of fulfilment, the time of the end that is also the beginning, the time that gathers up in itself all things visible and invisible in the perfection of communion with the living God.⁷³

Although he does not indicate one way or the other, by virtue of his treatment of the kenosis, which we shall examine below, it follows, the Eternity of God is not somehow exclusively contained within the time of Christ. It entails the entire life of God.⁷⁴ No Christomonism is intended.

From our first axiom it follows immediately, of course,

IV.b. time is not Eternity; Eternity is not time.

That is to say, fallen time is no more identifiable with Divine Eternity than is the fullness of Time in Christ.

As we have seen, duration is dependent upon its content--duration for something. Time therefore is inseparable from creation and is a created functional relation.⁷⁵ To confuse the temporality of the humanity of Christ with his divine eternality is to err in the direction of Eutychiansim. To reduce His eternal Deity to His temporal human sojourn is to stray into the kenoticist camp. The orthodoxy of both errors is adjudicable at the ecumenical Christological bench.

⁷³AT, pp. 163-164.

⁷⁴Cf. Reconciliation, p. 102.

⁷⁵E.g. cf. DCO, p. 3.

Anhypostasis and Enhypostasis:
Foundation of Differential Relation

The Chalcedonian settlement, in canonizing the Second Letter of Cyril to Nestorius,⁷⁶ adopted an implicit refinement of the Chalcedonian formula, which via Leontius of Byzantium found its ecumenical acceptance in the Second Council of Constantinople (553)⁷⁷ and its final Greek

76"For we do not say that the nature of the Word was changed and became flesh, or that it was converted into a whole man consisting of soul and body; but rather that the Word having personally united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul, did in an ineffable and inconceivable manner become man, and was called the Son of Man, not merely as willing or being pleased to be so called, neither on account of taking to himself a person, but because the two natures being brought together in a true union, there is of both one Christ and one Son; for the difference of the natures is not taken away by the union, but rather the divinity and the humanity make perfect for us the one Lord Jesus Christ by their ineffable and inexpressible union. So then he who had an existence before all ages and was born of the Father, is said to have been born according to the flesh of a woman, not as though his divine nature received its beginning of existence in the holy Virgin, for it needed not any second generation after that of the Father (for it would be absurd and foolish to say that he who existed before all ages, coeternal with the Father, needed any second beginning of existence), but since for us and for our salvation, he personally united to himself an human body, and came forth of a woman, he is in this way said to be born after the flesh; for he was not first born a common man of the holy Virgin, and then the Word came down and entered into him, but the union being made in the womb itself, he is said to endure a birth after the flesh, ascribing to himself the birth of his own flesh" (Quoted in Philip Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd series, vol. 14: The Seven Ecumenical Councils [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956], pp. 197-198.

77"If anyone uses the expression 'of two natures,' confessing that a union was made of the Godhead and of the humanity, or the expression 'the one nature made flesh of God the Word,' and shall not so understand those expressions as the holy Fathers have taught, to

expression at the hand of John of Damascus. Although, as Herbert Relton argues, the doctrine of the enhypostasia is not dependent upon Aristotelian categories for its theological utility,⁷⁸ nonetheless it is instructive to review the Leontian application of Aristotle to the problem of Chalcedon in order to understand the intricate issues involved. The Christological problem which Chalcedon ceded to the Church was, in Relton's words, ". . . the Scylla of a duplex personality and the Charybdis of an impersonal manhood . . .",⁷⁹ or in short the tension between the Nestorian emphasis upon the two natures and the monophysite emphasis upon the divine person.

Although Aristotle's Metaphysics, in contrast to Plato, established the hylo-morphic doctrine of the necessity of the subsistence of all formal qualities within the particularity of individual substance, in his Categories

wit: that of the divine and human nature there was made an hypostatic union, whereof is one Christ; but from these expressions shall try to introduce one nature or substance (made by a mixture) of the Godhead and manhood of Christ; let him be anathema. For in teaching that the only-begotten Word was united hypostatically (to humanity) we do not mean to say that there was made a mutual confusion of natures, but rather each [nature] remaining what it was, we understand that the Word was united consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead, and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood" (Ibid, pp. 313-314).

⁷⁸"It may be objected that the doctrine of Enhypostasia stands or falls with the validity or otherwise of the Aristotelian categories which he employs to illustrate it. But we hope to show that his doctrine is entirely independent of the Aristotelian setting in which it is found and can be restated as an idea in terms of modern thought stripped of all the Aristotelian terminology . . ." (Herbert Maurice Relton, A Study in Christology: The Problem of the Relation of the Two Natures in the Person of Christ [New York: Macmillan, 1917], p. 72).

⁷⁹Ibid., p. xxxi.

he mitigates this stance to allow for an intermediate subsistence between the primary substance (prôtē ousía) and the accidents (symbebékota), which he terms secondary substance (deútera ousía). In the Chalcedonian formula, two natures (phýsis) in one person (prósōpon) and one subsistence (hypóstasis),⁸⁰ the ontological status of the "natures" correspond with Aristotle's secondary substances, and are said to be universal and intra-hypostatic (én-hypóstatos); the person or subsistence corresponds with the primary substance, and is said to be particular and thus truly substantial. Thus in Seeberg's words,

. . . one nature may combine with another to form a unity in such a way that, although it retains the peculiar characteristic of its own existence, yet it has its substance (hypostasis) in the second nature. It is then not without hypostases (anhypostatos) but en-hypostatos⁸¹

⁸⁰Clement C. J. Webb in his Gifford Lectures of 1918 observes, in the Christian philosophy of antiquity, ". . . there has been a continual oscillation, according as the thought, emphasized by the Greek word hypostasis, of independent and fundamentally unchangeable individuality, or the thought of social relationship and voluntary activity, suggested by the Latin word persona, has been uppermost" (God and Personality, First Course [London: Allen and Unwin, 1918], p. 54). Cf. RET, pp. 43-44. Schaff suggests the ancient concept of person,

". . . lies midway between that of a mere form of manifestation, or a personation, which would lead to Sabellianism, and the idea of an independent, limited human personality, which would result in tritheism. In other words, it avoids the monoousian or unitarian trinity of a threefold conception and aspect of one and the same being, and the triousian or tritheistic trinity of three distinct and separate beings. In each person there is the same inseparable divine substance, united with the individual property and relation which distinguishes that person from the others" (Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, pp. 676-677).

⁸¹History of Doctrine in the Ancient Church, p. 275. David Evans concurs:

"Leontius is not a Cyrillian. He did not believe in the

John of Damascus, standing on Leontius' theological shoulders,⁸² concluded in his De Fide Orthodoxa:

For although there is no nature without subsistence, nor essence apart from person (since in truth it is in persons and subsistences that essence and nature are to be contemplated), yet it does not necessarily follow that the natures that are united to one another in subsistence should have each its own proper subsistence. For after they have come together in one subsistence, it is possible that neither should they be without subsistence, nor should each have its own peculiar subsistence, but that both should have one and the same subsistence. For since one and the same subsistence of the Word has become the subsistence of the natures, neither of them is permitted to be without subsistence, nor are they allowed to have subsistences that differ from each other, or to have sometimes the subsistence of this nature and sometimes of that, but always without division or separation they both have the same subsistence--a subsistence which is not broken up into parts or divided, so that one part should belong to this, and one to that, but which belongs wholly to this and wholly to that in its absolute entirety. For the flesh of God the Word did not subsist as an independent subsistence, nor did there arise another subsistence

preponderance of the divine nature of Christ over the human nature. He did not suppose that the nature of Christ's manhood attained hypostasis only in the hypostasis of God-Word--by no means! To the contrary, Leontius is an Origenist for whom Jesus Christ is the single unfallen nous of the intellectual creation; who by the will of God took flesh of the Virgin Mary and was made man without losing that union with God in which he had persisted from the beginning. In Jesus Christ, God and flesh are united not to one another, but each to the nous Jesus Christ, and only in him to one another. Jesus is just as much God as man, but no more: just as much man as God, but no more. God and man are components of Jesus Christ, and as such, equals. Leontius cannot say that Jesus Christ is God, for he believes that both natures of Christ are enhypostasized" (Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology [Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1970], pp. 137-138).

⁸²Harnack notwithstanding. Cf. Seeberg, History of Doctrine in the Ancient Church, p. 286, n. 2.

besides that of God the Word, but as it existed in that it became rather a subsistence which subsisted in another, than one which was an independent subsistence. Wherefore, neither does it lack subsistence altogether, nor yet is there thus introduced into the Trinity another subsistence.⁸³

This supersedes Leontius' enhypostasis of both the Divine and human natures of Christ by establishing the hypostatic primacy of the Logos over the enhypostatic dependence of the human nature.⁸⁴ In a word, Leontius posited an additive theory of enhypostasis whereas John converted it into a differential doctrine, which renders the humanity of Christ absolutely dependent upon the Divine Logos. This is a non-reciprocating subordination. All this shall henceforth be expressed by the term 'differential relation.'⁸⁵

Thus the philosophical problem of the conjunction of the fully divine and human natures is solved by the interrelation of differential ontological levels, or what we shall designate the differential or vertical concrete universal.⁸⁶ Philip Schaff simplifies the technical

⁸³Relton, A Study in Christology, pp. 84-85.

⁸⁴In Peliken's words: ". . . the single divine hypostasis of the Logos was constitutive of the union in the God-man, taking up into that union a perfect human nature, which was not a hypostasis on its own but achieved hypostatic and personal reality in the union" (The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700) [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], p. 89).

⁸⁵This is the primary way "differential" is to be understood in Torrance's thought despite the fact that he does at times use it in its technical mathematical sense of differential calculus.

⁸⁶Just as the enhypostasis was delineated in differing ways, so too is the case with the concrete universal. DuBose articulates it in our differential sense:

"The universality of Our Lord's humanity . . . is only explicable upon the fact that His Personality is a

language for us:

The centre of personal life in the God-Man resides unquestionably in the Logos, who was from eternity the second person in the Godhead, and could not lose his personality. He united himself, . . . not with a human person, but with human nature. The divine nature is therefore the root and basis of the personality of Christ. Christ himself, moreover, always speaks and acts in the full consciousness of his divine origin and character And the human nature of Christ had no independent personality of its own, besides the divine; it had no existence [anhypostatos] at all before the incarnation, but began with this act, and was so incorporated with the pre-existent Logos-personality [enhypostatos] as to find in this alone its own full self-consciousness, and to be permeated and controlled by it in every stage of its development. But the human nature forms a necessary element in the divine personality, and in this sense we may say . . . Christ is person synthetos, which was divine and human at once.⁸⁷

In modern discussion of the doctrine there is a decisive Lutheran/Reformed split. On the one hand Paul Althaus

divine one. It is only God in it that can make it applicable to all or the truth of all. . . . The concrete universal of humanity which may be found in Jesus Christ belongs to it not as humanity but as God in humanity. It is God in it which makes that particular humanity of our Lord, His holiness, His righteousness, His life, valid and available for all; so that every man may find himself in Christ, and in Christ find himself. But, to go further--may we not say, that the only true realism or idealism, the doctrine that the ideal is the real, is to be found in the New Testament doctrine of Jesus Christ? He is the eternal creative idea, the ideal principle, as of everything else so especially of man as the end and heir of all. In that sense He is humanity from before the foundation of the earth, the Man from Heaven, the Son of man, in whom in the end all humanity and all else in humanity is to come to itself and to be fulfilled. The eternal final cause is first cause as well as finis; the divine ideal is only certain and true real" (The Gospel According to St. Paul, pp. 297-298, quoted in Relton, A Study in Christology, p. 250).

⁸⁷History of the Christian Church, vol. 3, pp. 757-758.

contends the doctrine of anhypostasis depreciates his humanity. Human nature is inseparable from person.⁸⁸ G. C. Berkouwer summarizes the antipathy of Lutheran thought to the anhypostasis as grounded in its characteristic theological dualism:

People arrive at the idea because they could not bear the tension--the full paradox--of the "true God and true man" and wished in a theory of the God-man, to conceive the deity and humanity of Christ together in a person.⁸⁹

On the other hand, Barth distances himself from the adoptionist implications of the Lutherans. The theanthropic relation is utterly unique from all other relations, sacramental included. The Man Jesus Christ:

. . . does not only live through God and with God. He is Himself God. . . . His manhood is only the predicate of His Godhead, or better and more concretely, it is only the predicate, assumed in inconceivable condescension, of the Word acting upon us, the Word who is the Lord.⁹⁰

Elsewhere in a similar vein he asserts,

The eternal correlation between God and us, as shown in God's revelation [i.e., the incarnate God-man], is grounded in God alone, and not partly in God and partly in us. It means that we are tied to God, but not God to us.⁹¹

This stands in stark contrast to modern pantheistic and panentheistic religion (with which process theology identifies itself). The unconfused freedom of God with creation, which in its preeminent form is found in the

⁸⁸Die Christliche Wahrheit, II, quoted in G. C. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), p. 307.

⁸⁹The Person of Christ, p. 307.

⁹⁰CD, I, 2, 15, p. 162.

⁹¹Ibid., II, 1, 28, p. 281.

humanity of Jesus, is such that He may be truly and wholly immanent within it while at the same time being fully external to it. We quote Barth at length as illustrative of the enhypostatic relationship toward which Torrance directs us. God's freedom in immanence, i.e., his inconfused inseparability may,

. . . so indwell the other that, while He is its Creator and the Giver of its life, and while He does not take away this life, He does not withdraw His presence from its creaturely existence which is so different from His own divine life. Now that it has originated in His will and subsists by His will, He does not detach Himself from it in an alien aloofness, but is present as the being of its being with the eternal faithfulness of which no creature is capable towards another. God can allow this other which is so utterly distinct from Himself to live and move and have its being within Himself. He can grant and leave it its own special being distinct from His own, and yet even in this way, and therefore in its creaturely freedom, sustain, uphold and govern it by His own divine being, thus being its beginning, centre and end. God can in fact be nearer to it than it is to itself. He can understand it better than it understands itself. He can inspire and guide it at a deeper level than it knows how to do itself--infinitely nearer, better, more deeply, yet not in dissolution but in confirmation of His own divine singularity, and again not in dissolution but in confirmation of the singularity of the creature.⁹²

This distinction also lays at the base of the extra-Calvinisticum controversy, which we shall have occasion to examine below.

In effect, this controversy has driven us to the Christological core, from which Lutheran dualism and Reformed unitary thought respectively shall emanate.

Although the importance of the doctrine of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis is not nearly as textually visible in Torrance's writing, it may not, in fact, be too much to contend, that as our Christological magnification

⁹²Ibid., pp. 313-314.

increases, it emerges as the atomic structure of his thought. It is in this inextricable but differential union of God with man in Jesus Christ that the Divine and Eternal, in contrast to the kenoticists, has truly "become flesh and dwelt among us". In so doing he has taken up in Himself our humanity and time, in contrast to all Neo-Platonic Augustinianism, and established its everlasting integrity by virtue of redemption.

In revelation therefore, we are not concerned simply with anhypostatic revelation and with human response, but with anhypostatic revelation and true human response enhypostatic in the Word of revelation. We are not concerned simply with divine revelation which demands from us all a human response, but with a divine revelation which already includes a true and appropriate and fully human response as a part of its achievement for us and to us and in us.⁹³

It is the humanity of Christ, and in particular the humanity of the risen Christ which Torrance contends, ". . . is the main issue which divides all theologies and strikes them apart to the one side or to the other."⁹⁴ This proved to be Barth's starting point as well.⁹⁵ Torrance likens the anhypostasis-enhypostasis to "theological algebra", which provides a depth to our understanding of Christ as well as other doctrines to which the Incarnation has a bearing.⁹⁶ All created categories are not reducible to but entirely dependent upon the Divine and are unintelligible when abstracted from it. It is this delicate

⁹³Reconstruction, p. 131.

⁹⁴CAC, I, p. 98.

⁹⁵When questioned by Torrance if the centrality of the resurrection had been construed in docetic terms, Barth replied: 'Wohlverstanden, leiblich Auferstehung' (STR, p. xi).

⁹⁶TS, p. 269.

interaction which dispells all propensity toward monism on the monophysite side and dualism on the Nestorian side. Stripped of its Greek substantival baggage and refitted with an onto-relational metaphysic, it serves as the key to the Christological unity of all theology. In Torrance we find what Relton would have designated, a modern day Leontius,⁹⁷ or should we say Damascene.

Differential Unity of Time-Eternity

Possibly the foremost contribution of Torrance's theology to contemporary hermeneutics is his reintroduction of the anhypostatic, enhypostatic distinction.⁹⁸ It is this dependent relation of the humanity of Christ upon its incarnate inception that rightly relates all created events to their center in Christ.

⁹⁷A Study in Christology, p. xxxii.

⁹⁸Recently Torrance has autobiographically recounted the origin of his interest in this distinction: [In 1938-1939 at Auburn Seminary] Church Dogmatics, I, 2, absorbed me, especially the sections on 'The Incarnation of the Word' and 'The Outpouring of the Holy Spirit'. Here I found myself getting more deeply into the coherent structure of Christian theology under the guidance of Barth's discussion of the problem of Christology, and in light of his powerful recovery of theological ontology which had begun with Die christliche Dogmatik in Entwurf of 1927. In particular I was gripped by the way in which he resurrected and deployed the theological couplet anhypostasis and enhypostasia to throw into sharp focus "the inner logic of grace" (as I called it) embodied in the Incarnation, with reference to which, not least as it had taken paradigmatic shape in the Virgin Birth of Jesus, all the ways and works of God in his interaction with us in space and time may be given careful formulation. Barth had evidently taken his use here from Heinrich Heppe's Reformierte Dogmatik, but this illuminating combination of anhypostasia and enhypostasia is actually to be traced back to the Contra Theodoretum of Cyril of Alexandria" ("My Interaction with Karl Barth," pp. 3-4).

The Damascene extrapolation from Chalcedonian 'inconfusedness' extends our axiom to entail:

V. Time (and therefore time) in itself is anhypostatic. Therefore we cannot speak of the Time of the pre-incarnate Christ nor can we speak of Eternity of Time. Time is thoroughly subordinate to and dependent upon its relation with Eternity in Christ.

It is imperative that we not make more of our postulate than is intended. It is impossible to speak of that which has no status in reality without vesting it with some unintended conceptual potentiality. To speak of 'Time in itself' is not intended to ascribe a Kantian noumenal subsistence to Time. Without Arian overtones, we may properly affirm, 'There was when Time was not.' Torrance writes, "In the incarnation, . . . something new happened, even for God. . ."99 He reminds us although it is appropriate to acknowledge the presence of all temporal events to God's eternity, this does not suggest created events are eternally present and co-existent with Him.100

This of course implies that creation is not an emanation from the nature of God but is fully contingent, ex nihilo, of the gracious volition of God.101

The creation of the universe out of nothing implies the absolute priority of God over all space and time, for space and time were produced along with the creaturely world as orderly functions of contingent events within it God stands in a transcendent and creative, not a spatial or temporal, relation to the creaturely world. Hence even the relation between the actuality of the Incarnate Son within this world of space and time and the Father from whom He came cannot be spatialized

⁹⁹GGT, p. 66.

¹⁰⁰Reconstruction, p. 63.

¹⁰¹Cf. DCO, pp. vii-viii, 4, 111; Juridical Law and Physical Law, p. 37.

or temporalized.¹⁰²

The anhypostasia of time discloses the intrinsic impropriety of all temporal language for theological discourse proper. Apart from the hypostatic union all temporal language is cut off from its transcendent reference and lapses into mere symbol.¹⁰³

The positive rejoinder to the anhypostasia of Time reflecting the Chalcedonian inseparability follows:

VI. Time (and therefore time) is anhypostatic in Jesus Christ.

Time, history, life have no reality, meaning or value in and of themselves. These come only via extrinsic investiture. They emerge only by virtue of imputation in Christ. Time is, sola gratia.

Nevertheless, this is an irreversible event. As such, temporality is inalienably assumed into the person of Christ and therefore into the Eternity of God.

Thus not only has God created the world out of nothing, with space and time as the medium of its order and of His interaction with nature, but He has confirmed it and established its relation to Himself through the incarnation of His Son within it, at once affirming the reality of space and time for the fulfilment of His own eternal purpose and binding man to space and time as the sphere of his life and work and communion with the Father.¹⁰⁴

Henceforth it is inadmissible to circumvent the historical Jesus in search of a Jesus of faith. The chosen avenue of God's self-revelation is through the incarnate Word.¹⁰⁵ By virtue of the anhypostasia, God has made that which is

¹⁰²STI, p. 60.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁰⁴GR, p. 112; cf. Reconstruction, p. 234; "PC," pp. 138-139, n. 62.

¹⁰⁵Cf. TS, p. 40.

intrinsically non-existent and unintelligible, everlastingly enduring and True.

The inseparable pole of the hypostatic union of Time and Eternity includes not only the enhypostatic assumption of Time into the Eternity of God. The obverse obtains as well:

VII. In Christ, Eternity is inseparably united with Time.

Hence here primordially and thus ultimately here alone the problem of transcendence, of time-eternity dualism is solved. This is not a philosophically derived solution although it is the solution to the philosophical problematic. It is a living, concrete, a posteriori solution. It is not the logical, static, simultaneous whole of classical Boethian definition but rather a self-defining field of personal, inter-trinitary order which includes the time of the incarnation.¹⁰⁶ Torrance stresses:

The Incarnation of the Son of God must mean the moving of eternity into time. On the face of it that is an impossible thought for the usual philosophical account of eternity which is so closely bound up with the immutability of God, and the relativity of time. But that is the central fact of the Christian faith. If Christ is God, if God has come into the world in Jesus Christ, that does mean for us an approach of eternity into time. But that means again that Eternity does not treat time as mere appearance, the relative that ultimately disappears before, or is swallowed up by, the absolute. If eternity moves into time, then that means that time relations do have meaning for eternity. They are not set aside, but are implied and wanted. Eternity invades time right in the midst of all its contingency and its necessity, right in the midst of its choices and freedom, and its bondage, and sets them in a definite relation to Eternity which confronts them.¹⁰⁷

The problematic status of time-eternity dualism has endured

¹⁰⁶Cf. "PC," pp. 116 and 135, n. 42 for this totum simul, per se, distinction.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 118-119.

fundamentally as a result of a misunderstanding of Eternity generated in philosophical detachment from the sole event through which true Eternity has been revealed.¹⁰⁸ The problem therefore must be seen as that common to dualism, viz., not that eternity is conjoined to time but that the two were ever construed as essentially separable and antithetical to begin with. This, however, requires a fundamental reorientation of thought--a shift from Western Greek dualism to a Middle-Eastern, Jewish unitary outlook. We shall elaborate upon this below.

Christo-dynamics:
Katabasis and Anabasis

When the Apostles' Creed confessed Jesus Christ,

¹⁰⁸Here we construe the event of the Incarnation in its broadest Old Testament prospective and New Testament retrospective sense.

The History of eternity in philosophic thought is too complex to trace within these confines. Suffice it to say one might trace the classical Boethian formula, "Eternity is the whole and perfect possession of unlimited life all at once" (De Consolatione Philosophiae, 5 pr. 6), which pervaded the middle ages especially in Thomas' theology, back directly to its Athenian Neo-Platonic roots in Proclus. He posited, "All that is eternal is a simultaneous whole (Elements of Theology, trans. E.R. Dodds [Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1933), 1963], prop. 52.) (Cf. ibid, Introduction, pp. xxvi-xxxii for the intermediate links of the pseudonymous Dionysius the Areopagite and the Liber de Causis between Proclus and Thomas and beyond). Vestiges of the Neo-Pythagorean geometry with its identification of the unit, one, with eternity were manifest in Plato's Timaeus, time being a pluralistic manifestation of the eternal. (Cf. The Timaeus of Plato, ed. R. D. Hind [New York: Arno Press, 1973] 37C-6 - 38B-6, pp. 119, 121 and A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's "Timaeus" [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928], p. 187).] Proclus was heir to this, publishing his own commentary on the Timaeus. [Cf. Timaeus III, 18-19, in S. S. Sambursky and S. Pines, The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities/ Commercial Press, 1971), pp. 49, 51]].

". . . who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary; suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; he descended into hell; the third day he rose from the dead; he ascended into heaven; and sitteth at the right hand of God the Almighty . . .", it introduced into the history of theology the distinction which subsequently has been designated the "exinanition" or "humiliation"¹⁰⁹ and the "exaltation" of the Son. Predictably, despite the catholicity of this symbol, no little controversy has emerged from its declaration. The apex of the debate was reached in the sixteenth century, between the Orthodox Lutherans on the one hand and the disciples of Melancthon and Calvin on the other. The point at issue was the manner of the Divine incarnate and sacramental presence. As Charles Hodge recounts, the Lutherans subscribed not only to the ecumenically conceded communicatio idiomatum, in which ". . . whatever is true of either nature is true of the person," but they went on to insist upon a "Communicatio naturarum," which eventuated in the asymmetric position of the attribution of the essence of the Divine to the human nature of Christ¹¹⁰--a genus majestaticum. Although this guaranteed the real, local presence of God in the sacrament it also entailed the omnipresence of the humanity of Christ--the infinite was contained in the finite! The theandric constitution was once more in question. Although Martin Chemnitz and the Saxon divines did much to mitigate

¹⁰⁹In their technical sense, these two terms are differentiated as the assumption of the form of man, and the subjection to death on the cross respectively. Cf. e.g. Johannes Cocceius' discussion, Summa Theologiae ex Scriptura repetita (Amsterdam, 1665), quoted in Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, trans. G. T. Thomson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), p. 488.

¹¹⁰Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1973), pp. 407, 408.

the absolute ubiquitarian position of the Swabians under John Brenz, they could not escape the problem of the multiple local presences of Christ in the Eucharist.¹¹¹ Christ's glorified body was construed to be voluntarily, simultaneously, and locally present in spatially disparate observances of the Eucharist. Clearly, the operative categories were stretched beyond their limits. Nonetheless, within the framework of these categories the Reformed alternative was equally untenable. Calvin clearly distanced himself from the Aristotelio-Lutheran concept of finite receptacle, when he exposed the absurdity of the incarnate Word being:

. . . confined within the narrow prison of earthly body. This is mere impudence! For even if the Word in his immeasurable essence united with the nature of man into one person, we do not imagine that he was confined therein. Here is something marvelous: the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed to be borne in the virgin's womb, to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross; yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning!¹¹²

The Lutherans, however, interpreting this within the confines of their own categories, considered it Nestorian and pejoratively designated it the "Extra-Calvinisticum."¹¹³ Their confessional alternative affirmed: ". . .

¹¹¹Cf. Philip Schaff's excellent discussion on the ubiquitarian controversy, in The Creeds of Christendom with a History and Critical Notes, vol. 1: The History of Creeds, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1919), pp. 285-296.

¹¹²Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), II.13.4, p. 481.

¹¹³Barth contends this did in fact reap many of the dualist consequences feared by the Lutherans (CD, IV, 1, 59, pp. 180-181).

God is man and man is God, which would by no means be the truth if the divine and the human nature had no mutual intercommunication in very deed and truth."¹¹⁴ The confessional upshot for the divine condescension was that although the humanity of Jesus was in full possession (ktêsis) of the divine attributes he nevertheless voluntarily obscured them (krýpsis chrêseos).¹¹⁵ Thus the distinction between the humiliation and the exaltation was rendered superficial, and the prospect of docetism loomed large.

From the Reformed perspective the issue was a pseudo-problem generated by the admission of the communication of the Divine nature to the human. A rejection of the communicatio idiomatum, genus majestaticum circumvented the Docetic monophysite tendency. The full integrity of each nature was preserved. The theological implications of this debate are legion, and constitute much of the burden of Torrance's Space, Time and Incarnation. Among them is a differential understanding of space and time--a 'Spatio-Temporal extra' if you will. Torrance comments:

As the Incarnation meant the entry of the Son into space and time without the loss of God's transcendence over space and time, so the Ascension meant the transcendence of the Son over space and time without the loss of His incarnational involvement in space and time. Thus when they spoke of the Ascension of Christ from place to place they were adopting the open and differential

¹¹⁴Formula of Concord with History and Critical Notes, Art. VIII, 6 quoted in Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3: The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations, 4th rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1919), p. 150.

¹¹⁵Jesus Christ, ". . . in the state of his humiliation . . . divested himself of [his Majesty] . . . , for which cause he truly grew in age, wisdom, and favor with God and man. Wherefore he did not always make use of that majesty, but as often as seemed good to him, until after the resurrection, he fully and forever laid aside the form of a servant . . ." (Ibid., Art VIII, 11, p. 152).

concept of space developed by the Church Fathers, interpreting 'place' differently in accordance with the nature and activity of God on the one hand and in accordance with the nature and activity of man on the other. The Lutherans, however, were unable to follow this and on their own presuppositions would only read the language about the body of Christ in heaven to mean that it was confined there as in a container in the way that they conceived of the Incarnation.¹¹⁶

It is in this differential approach to the humiliation and exaltation of Christ, in which both are taken with full, unconfused seriousness, that we must understand the ostensible fourth axiomatic center of Torrance's theology. First and foremost it is telling despite the weighty evidence presented above for a Christological centrum, he has never written a Christology per se. He has written, however, two original and difficult theological monographs elaborating the spatio-temporal implications of the Incarnation and Resurrection.¹¹⁷ The Incarnation and Resurrection provide, in Torrance's words, ". . . the basic framework within which the New Testament writings, for all their rich diversity, are set . . .";¹¹⁸ the revolutionary categories, which, though affronts to both Jew and Greek, catalyzed ". . . a seismic restructuring of religious and intellectual belief."¹¹⁹ It will not do to rest content with the static/dynamic distinction between the Person and work of Christ. Christology must be interpreted soteriologically, and soteriology must not be abstracted from Christology. Our Christological axioms of hypostatic union and anhypostasia/enhypostasia, ". . . needs to be stated more dynami-

¹¹⁶STI, pp. 31-32; cf. STR, pp. 123-127.

¹¹⁷Viz., Space, Time and Incarnation, and its sequel, Space, Time and Resurrection.

¹¹⁸STR, p. 14.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 17.

cally in terms of the living movement of hypostatic union and atoning reconciliation in Jesus Christ."¹²⁰ Christ provides the anagoge--the active analogy--for all Biblical interpretation. In Paul's preeminent Christological passage (Philippians 2), ". . . we find him insisting that the whole movement of humiliation and exaltation in Christ, His Incarnational katabasis and His glorious anabasis has to be translated into the Church as Christ's Body."¹²¹

Despite suspending the controversy over the mode of the exinanition for the moment, the ecumenical affirmation of the katabasis and anabasis provides the rudimentary Christo-dynamic with durational terminus a quo from Divine eternity, nadir in the time of our humanity, and terminus ad quem in the time of the risen/ascended Saviour. Torrance speaks of this figuratively as a parabolic motion:

The eternal Word, in breaking into time in the Incarnation of the Saviour, does not cease to be the eternal Word. The curve of its intersection with the world of time is--to use a mathematical illustration--like the parabola or hyperbola which, coming from infinity recedes again into infinity. One focus, represented by the Incarnation and Atonement-sacrifice of Jesus, has appeared in time. The other, represented by the Second Advent, lies wholly beyond.¹²²

Together the incarnation and resurrection are the non-verifiable ultimates of Christianity.¹²³ They span two dimensions and require two languages.¹²⁴

¹²⁰CAC, I, p. 248.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²T. F. Torrance, review of The Epistle to the Hebrews, pp. 312-313; "MED," p. 170.

¹²³STR, p. 22.

¹²⁴STI, pp. 71-72.

Time and Incarnation:
Time of this World Created and Fallen

We have already had occasion to discover the anthropological homouision entails: Christ's time is our time. We must now explore the contours of this duration.

Torrance is relatively silent as to the nature of created time. He does however indicate there is no more continuity between it and the time of our fallen experience than there is between goodness and evil. One cannot define 'good time by bad time' lest the former be reduced to the latter. The relationship between fallen and unfallen time is not historical, for that imports the categories of fallen historicity into an unfallen context.¹²⁵ Or in Barthian terminology, saga is not explicable as history.¹²⁶

The little hint we are afforded must be distilled from Torrance's discussion of fallen time:

The kind of time we have in historical events is the time of creation that has fallen from what it ought to be into disorder, and yet is contained through nomos from disappearing or vanishing into illusion, but as such it is time in which we are subjected to law, time within which we are all servants.¹²⁷

Here we note two things. Fallen time is to be seen as a vestigia temporalis. Yet the price to be paid is its conformity to law, viz., its irreversibility. Elsewhere he speaks of this conformity as "hardening into rigidity (pōrōsis)."¹²⁸ Thus the fall has not introduced dynamic order into creation. It has rather turned this dynamic order into temporal tyranny.

¹²⁵RBET, 7/8/81.

¹²⁶CD, III, 1, 41, pp. 80-83.

¹²⁷STR, p. 97.

¹²⁸RP, p. 52.

Time is the underlying form of all structures, but as such comes to assume certain immanent patterns in the cosmos, which when erected into nomos [law] are like demonic éxousíai [authorities] and árchontes [traditions] which through nomos usurp the authority of God over man and seek to absolutise themselves.¹²⁹

In effect this is to turn theocentric time into cosmocentric time, characterized by the Jewish calendar and its lunar orientation. Of course one could broaden this argument to include all of antiquity and its astrological/astronomical orientation.¹³⁰

At its very center, it appears the distinguishing features of created time were: 1) its reversibility, for as Torrance notes, it was precisely ". . . the kingdom of the irreversibility of time and guilt with its strength in the law. . ." which Christ overthrew in his atonement,¹³¹ and 2) its absolute dependence upon God. Conversely, nomistic events are now ordered in self-reference rather than in relation to God.¹³² It is time which has become a law unto itself. Another way of saying this is that the field of pre-lapsarian events was ordered solely in relation to the created purpose of God. There was no dynamic order, except so related. This is time enhypostatically conceived: anhypostatic except by virtue of the grace of this contingent relation.

The fall, in severing the God-man relation from man's side eventuated in a confirmation of the relational

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 53; cf. CAC, I, p. 257.

¹³⁰Cf. e.g. S. Kitteninger, Jr., The Cosmographical Glass (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1977).

¹³¹CAC, I, p. 255.

¹³²Ibid., p. 257; The Centrality of Christ: Devotions and Addresses. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. May 1976 (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1976), 21 May, p. 19.

structure of reality. The entire bearing of time moved toward a confirmation of its anhypostaticity, viz., irreversible, necessary decay, death and nothingness.¹³³ This legal tyranny of irreversible, alienated time obversely was the very order which restrained time from lapsing into anhypostatic chaos and oblivion. This accounts for Torrance's double bearing of fallen time as both progressive and degenerative.¹³⁴

. . . God made known to man his divine will but withheld himself from him lest he should be consumed by the divine Majesty. The effect of this was to establish man in an ethical or legal order over against God, for the manifestation of the divine will contained lawlessness, restraining chaos from overwhelming man, and at the same time confirmed man within an order of existence validated by God but within which he was not the man he ought to be.¹³⁵

This is a time that despite the momentary "achievements and hopes and aspirations and joys" is ravaged by the curse and therefore is fundamentally circular and futile,¹³⁶

. . . marked by decay and corruption and above all sinful history. It is sin-impregnated and guilt-laden time, time under judgment, and therefore time that

¹³³Cf. STR, p. 88; AT, p. 44. In reference to the human condition Torrance speaks of man's alienation as "hoovering between being and non-being" (STR, p. 74).

¹³⁴Cf. Sub-section 10, "Thermodynamics of Open System: A Physical Precedent for Bi-temporality" below for the chemical correlate to this in natural science.

¹³⁵Cf. STR, p. 97.

¹³⁶AT, p. 163. Torrance mentioned, ". . . God's covenant does not allow the creation to run away from Him, namely His grace and steadfast love. He holds onto the fallen world and its development so that the whole of space and time is held within the grasp of God's covenant love. And therefore, because it is in covenant love it also falls under His judgment, because the covenant will of God is opposed to the evil in the world" (Interview, 5 April 1982).

passes irreversibly away into vanity and death, irreversibly because we can no more put the clock back than we can undo sin and expiate guilt.¹³⁷

It is precisely the detemporalizing of Time which characterizes the post-lapsarian situation. The present which lapses into a spatialized, calcified, past is irretrievable as present, i.e., in its dynamic immediacy. In fact the present is defined only in terms of the summation of one's irreversible past.¹³⁸ There is no forgiveness in such tyranny. Torrance laments:

. . . our sins become part of our past life which more and more imprisons us in ourselves and shuts us off from God and our neighbour. . . [O]ur so-called free-will is really our self-will, and we are quite unable to escape from our self-will. That is where evil has dug itself in so deeply, in the roots of the self, so that our self-will falls more and more under the tyranny of what we have been, which prevents us from escaping from ourselves into some new life in the future.¹³⁹

It may be fruitful to draw a parallel anthropological distinction here in which the imago dei as the differential, vertical, God-man relation may be entirely severed while the horizontal perpetuity of his humanum remains in tact.¹⁴⁰ As Calvin elaborates: "There is a two-fold nature: the one was produced by God, and the other is the corruption of it."¹⁴¹ Torrance comments:

¹³⁷RP, p. 50. Torrance here and in STR, p. 88 identifies this with Emil Brunner's analysis in "The Christian Understanding of Time," Scottish Journal of Theology 4 (1951), pp. 1-12.

¹³⁸AT, p. 44.

¹³⁹Centrality of Christ, 21 May, 1976, p. 19.

¹⁴⁰"PC," p. 138, n. 58; CDM, p. 107.

¹⁴¹Commentary on Ephesians, 2:3, quoted in CDM, p. 107.

Since Adam lost the similitude of God, he can only beget men in his own image--the spiritual image cannot be handed on. The spiritual image has to do with our heavenly nature and is gained only through our restoration in Christ.¹⁴²

For Calvin the distinction is between rectitude/integrity, i.e., the orderly dependent relation with God reflecting His glory and subjectively manifest in obedient and thankful dependence upon Him, and intelligence and discretion which differentiates man from beast.¹⁴³

Clearly, fallen time lacks the relational dependence upon God and reversibility of created time, and yet throughout Torrance's analysis time continues as a function of independent rational sequential order. To this extent the anthropological analogy is helpful.

One final aspect of created time must be considered. It is inferior to or shall we say anticipates the time redeemed in Christ. The atonement not only reversed the ravages of time but established it as a field of higher relational order:

The Cross makes contact with creation. Christ the Second, the Last Adam undoes the work of the first Adam and heads the race to a new and higher glory that far transcends the old, for here the past is not only undone but suborned by the Cross and made to serve the purpose of God's redemption.¹⁴⁴

It is this differential in potentials, to use a physical metaphor, that accounts for the dynamization of history. The redemption of time, must not, then, be seen as an afterthought. It is inherent in the Divine purpose of God

¹⁴²CDM, p. 67.

¹⁴³Cf. KC, pp. 150-151; CDM, pp. 47-48, 107.

¹⁴⁴CAC, I, p. 256. Clearly this quotation is open to an alternative interpretation as referring solely to post-lapsarian time. However, our understanding has been corroborated by Torrance in RBET, 7/8/81.

revealed in Jesus Christ. It is a similar Barthian 'purified supralapsarianism', Christocentrically conceived that informs Torrance's thought here.¹⁴⁵ Divine providence is not a logically prior, absolute, secret decree which in some way becomes mitigated by the fall. Rather His providence is inseparable from His election in Christ, who is both the object and subject of God's divine love. Torrance explains:

There is no higher will in God than Grace. Predestination cannot therefore be made an independent principle of theology or viewed as subordinate to a wider doctrine of Providence. Predestination adds nothing new to the doctrine of salvation by grace alone. Predestination really means that our justification is sola gratia, and it adds no more to that doctrine than the emphasis that our salvation is not the fleeting thought of a moment but a deliberate act of the eternal God, an act therefore grounded in eternity, while nevertheless grounded in Jesus Christ.¹⁴⁶

Torrance, in holding to the unity of God's decree would not conceive of redeemed time in Christ as an 'afterthought' consequent upon the fall. If the aim of creation is to be revelatory of the glory of God, then ultimately man must reflect this glory. Not just any man will do, but only Jesus Christ who is both universally representative of all man by virtue of the anthropological homoousion and Man who is God's express image and as such His elect medium of self-glorification in His creation.

Not only does the unity of the decree of God account for the dynamic supersession of created time in the redemptive Time of Christ, but it also accounts for the compatibility of Time and Eternity. Torrance writes: ". . .

¹⁴⁵To be sure, Torrance is unhappy with this logical scholastic designation, but we use it provisionally for want of a better term. Cf. CD, II, 2, 33, pp. 127-145.

¹⁴⁶"PC", p. 110-111. Cf. SF, pp. cxx for the unity of the Covenant of Grace.

the salvation of the believer goes back to an eternal decree of God, and yet that act of election is in and through Christ. . . . Christ is in His own Person the eternal decree of God."¹⁴⁷ The eternal decree is a decree of Time. Once again, this is not time as an abstract relation but Time as God's Time for man in Jesus Christ.

Time and Resurrection

We have seen that fallen, nomistic time is actually irreversible and relatively a-relational. We would expect any redemption of time to rectify these anomalies.

Redemption and Temporal Reversibility

Torrance defines redemption in terms of recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις,¹⁴⁸ Eph. 1:10) in which time retrospectively and prospectively is gathered up into the fullness of Time in Christ.

On the one hand, it [recapitulation] involves a penetration backwards in time and existence into the roots of man's involvement in sin and evil, even into death and hell. . . . On the other hand, recapitulation involves a forward movement, in which the unravelled existence and time of man are gathered up and restored in Christ in ontological relation to God.¹⁴⁹

We see retrospectively in the exinanition of Christ that the tyranny of irreversible time is broken. That is to say, the deposit of the historical past, which in its flight from the present becomes fixed in its irretrievable, actual necessity, in the atonement is liberated from its determinate

¹⁴⁷"PC," p. 109, 110.

¹⁴⁸Cf. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 1965, s.v. "kephalē, ἀνακεφαλαίωμαι," by Heinrich Schlier for a corroborating analysis.

¹⁴⁹STR, p. 86; cf. WCCCA, p. 68.

futility. Torrance observes: "In the Cross we do not have mere amnesty for sin but such a total act of forgiveness and justification that guilt is utterly undone and done away. At the Cross God puts the clock back."¹⁵⁰ History is reversed.¹⁵¹ This is not merely a particular history but in that Christ is the concrete universal Man, the Second Adam, in Him all history is reversed.¹⁵²

Redemption and Differential Temporal Relation

Prospectively in the exaltation of Christ the recapitulation of the atonement restores nomistic time to the fullness of Time in Christ, i.e., the autonomy of fallen time is dispelled. The time of this world is rendered ultimately intelligible in relation to the Time of Christ. But just as created time was not reducible to nomistic time, nomistic time cannot be confused with redemptive Time.¹⁵³ The Time of the Resurrection, Torrance explains,

. . . is therefore a new kind of historical happening which instead of tumbling down into the grave and oblivion rises out of the death of what is past into continuing being and reality. This is temporal happening that runs not backwards but forwards, and overcomes all illusion and privation. . . [of] being. This is fully real historical happening, so real that it remains real happening and does not slip away from us, but keeps pace with us and outruns us as we tumble down in decay and lapse into death and the dust of past history and even comes to meet us out of the future. That is how we are to think of the risen Jesus Christ. He is not dead but alive, more real than any of us. Hence he does not need to be made real for us, because he does not decay or become fixed in the past. He lives on in the present as real live continuous happening,

¹⁵⁰CAC, I, p. 255.

¹⁵¹AT, p. 167; "In Hoc Signo Vincens," p. 17.

¹⁵²CAC, I, p. 256.

¹⁵³RP, pp. 50, 57.

encountering us here and now in the present and waiting for us in the future.¹⁵⁴

In short, He is everlastingly contemporary. In proleptic recapitulation He has gathered up all of human history and fulfilled it. As such He not only transcends history but is also its consummate future, viz., its Alpha and Omega, its beginning and end in everlasting contemporaneity veiled under the temporal protraction of historic time.¹⁵⁵ What is more, and herein redemptive Time supersedes created time, the possibility no longer exists that redeemed Time cease to be ontologically related to God. It is everlasting fullness of Time in Christ.¹⁵⁶

However, by virtue of the ascension, ". . . this new time of the new creation in Christ is hidden from us. . . ." ¹⁵⁷ It is already complete but held in eschatological suspension from us, until the fruits of the ascension are realized in the individual lives of the saints. This new Time, from the terrestrial perspective between the advents, is identified as millennial Time. This is Time accessible only 'in the Spirit' as John's Apocalypse refers to it.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, Torrance asserts, it is invisible except to the eye of faith:

On this side we see the time of human failure and sin, the time of dark and tragic history, the time of wrath, the time of crucifixion, but on the other side seen only by faith, there is the time of the resurrection or the new age which is, as it were, the silver lining behind the time of secular history. Millennium time will be unveiled with the advent of Christ, for then there will

¹⁵⁴STR, pp. 88-89; cf. TS, pp. 335-336.

¹⁵⁵Cf. AT, p. 165; CAC, I, p. 255.

¹⁵⁶Cf. STR, p. 79; cf. CAC, I, p. 213.

¹⁵⁷STR, p. 98.

¹⁵⁸Rev. 1:10; cf. AT, p. 11-12.

take place the apocalypse of all that Christ has done through history in making the wrath of man to serve him in the eschatological outreach of his Kingdom to its consummation in the new creation.¹⁵⁹

Ultimately it is millennial Time, by virtue of the hypostatic union, which is conjoined with the Eternity of God.¹⁶⁰

Three-Durational Theology

Keeping in mind the enhypostatic dependence of nomistic time upon redeemed/millennial time we have now exposed the three durational dimensions operative in Torrance's theology. In broadest terms, the many durational terms Torrance uses may be categorized as the time of man/universe, the Time of Jesus Christ, and the Eternity of God. He writes:

It belongs to the very essence of the New Testament Gospel that it is not concerned only with two dimensions of thought, with God and man, but with a third dimension in Jesus Christ in whom God and man are one and in whom there is a new creation.¹⁶¹

When the hypostatic, third dimension is lost, the time-eternity dialectic is reintroduced, ultimately lapsing toward one extreme or the other.¹⁶²

In the final analysis millennarianism, in its 'literal' one-dimensional interpretation of the Apocalypse does violence not only to the resurrection and ascension of

¹⁵⁹STR, p. 101; cf. AT, pp. 162-167.

¹⁶⁰STR, p. 98.

¹⁶¹"The Place of the Humanity of Christ in the Sacramental Life of the Church," p. 3; cf. CAC, II, p. 15.

¹⁶²Cf. "Humanity of Christ in Sacramental Life of Church," p. 3; Centrality of Christ, 22 May, p. 20; RP, pp. 58-59.

Christ, but also to the hypostatic union. Its one-dimensional temporality bespeaks an implicit denial of the finished atoning work of Christ, as the Apocalypse is not an unveiling of what in Christ is already fulfilled but rather points toward a further, future soteriological agenda.¹⁶³ Furthermore this comports serious ebionite tendencies: real Time is strictly reducible to the time of this world; Time that transcends fallen human history is in some way conceived as spiritualized and unreal. To say there is no time except that of this world is tantamount to affirming the sole reality of the man Jesus.

Needless to say, it should be perfectly clear by this point that the Millennium is in no way depreciated in its proper Christo-centric elevation. It is the pitfall of naturalism (which only supralapsarianism principally avoids),¹⁶⁴ which preserves the priority of this world's time over Resurrected Time. Because in naturalistic terms creation is ultimately separable from redemption, Christ serves rather than is served by His creation. This view fails to appreciate that Christ's function as Redeemer proleptically conditions creation.¹⁶⁵

Positively, it is the analogue of the mystical union of the Church with Christ which provides the key to Torrance's eschatology. However, further clues are needed before this relation becomes perspicuous.

It should now be quite apparent that despite the perfunctory designation of 'Christocentricity' with which we began our discussion, we have arrived at a dynamic compound-complex concept that is in need of conceptual

¹⁶³Cf. STR, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴For Barth's acute analysis of this in its infralapsarian context cf. CD, II, 2, 33, p. 138.

¹⁶⁵CAC, I, p. 49.

disseverance from all alien categories if we hope to achieve any genuine hermeneutic progress. This is the axiomatic cornerstone from which all else shall be measured. But at the same time it is but a heuristic tool--a fluid axiom, which must be, in Torrance's words, ". . . progressively modified in light of the realities that are disclosed to us in God" and by which the God/man/world relation is penetrated.¹⁶⁶

The positing of the Christocentric axiom in itself does not guarantee that we have come to a full appreciation of its functional power or scope. The witness of historical theology and the recalcitrance of contemporary Biblical criticism confirm this. The Western mind is at a decided disadvantage. This axiom of real relation, which has experienced a checkered history, is not intrinsically difficult, but defies us, Torrance contends,

. . . because of long-ingrained habits of mind and of speech with which we are beset in the Latin-Greek tradition of Western culture, and the static connections with which we have been accustomed to operate in our linear logic.¹⁶⁷

In affirming the God-man relation as so construed, we invariably introduce new questions, and it is the fundamental clues which derive from our succeeding relational inquiry which shall serve to provide the super-structure for our subsequent heuristic model.

¹⁶⁶RET, p. 50.

¹⁶⁷GGT, p. 174. John Macmurray contends, ". . . we are incapable (though not incurably so) . . ." of thinking out of this predominately Hebrew mind set (The Clue to History, p. 20).

CHAPTER II

THE GOD-CHRIST-MAN DIMENSION:

REDEMPTIVE RELATION

How may we express the space-time of the Incarnation as a coordinate system of real relations in such a way as to do justice both to the divine and to the human centres of reference, and therefore to coordinate the corresponding movements of thought and speech about them without confusing them?

--T. F. Torrance
Space, Time and Incarnation

The ecumenical creeds, in their studied attempt to delineate the revealed Trinity and theanthropic relations, struck a middle course between all forms of sabellianism and tritheism on the one hand, and docetism and adoptionism on the other. The Church therefore defined itself in contradistinction to all forms of monism and dualism. It is this identical median with which Torrance is concerned, and it surfaces in one form or another in nearly everything he has written. To be sure, he expends most of his energies in polemic against dualism as the drift of doctrinal history has been predominately in that direction.¹ However, one

¹The contemporary preoccupation with oriental and process theology marks a heterodox overreaction to the

must not, therefore, conclude his position is monistic.² An either/or misperception lies at the foundation of Donald Klinefelter's critique of Torrance's use of complementarity as the mode of relating science and theology.³ He concludes:

. . . we are beginning to probe one of the central ambiguities or perhaps dilemmas of Torrance's method, an epistemological or ontological dualism--there are hints of both. Torrance is fully aware of the difficulty and wants to avoid it, but he has not found a satisfactory solution. . . . Now granted that "complementarity" is not "paradox," we nevertheless have a traditional problem of the dialectical theologian squarely before us.⁴

Torrance is searching for a way to express the derivative analogical implications of the homoousion and the hypostatic union in the world. The inadequacy of our language is uncontested, but in its referential intent, it is pointing to this profound differential unity. The designation of "unity" is an abbreviation for the Chalcedonian 'inseparable yet unconfused' structure. To read Torrance in any other

dualist problematic.

²Torrance contends,

"Without doubt, one of the most powerful urges with which human minds are endowed is the urge to unify all thought. And it is a right urge. The tragedy is that under the power of the urge facts are almost inevitably forced into an abortive unity, which in the Christian view is the very essence of sin. It is the original sin of the mind that proudly disregards the actual contradictions of life in order to seek to set up a false Pantheon" ("Faith and Philosophy," p. 241).

For his critique of the naturalistic monism behind Nazism and American pragmatism see "The Importance of Fences in Religion," The British Weekly, 30 January 1941, p. 180.

³In reference to TS, p. 102.

⁴"God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance," Journal of Religion 53 (January 1973): 121.

way is to misread him.

In order to appreciate the force of his argument we must examine the organizational import of his "God-man-universe" triad.⁵ Just as one cannot speak of God and man apart from Christ, one cannot speak of the relation of God and man apart from the universe nor the relation of God and universe apart from man. Because Christ has without reservation entered into our creaturely humanity, not only our humanity but also our creaturehood has in a concrete manner been 'enhypostatically' united with God. Thus creation and redemption together become inexpendable coefficients in our knowledge of God:

. . . there is a necessary and inescapable connection between theological concepts and physical concepts, spiritual and natural concepts, positive and natural theology, or rather between theological science and natural science,. . .⁶

We must examine the way in which God as Creator has effected his communion with us yet not in such a way that we reduce our theology to its scientific analogue. It will serve our purposes of scientific parsimony at this level if we synthesize Torrance's three-dimensional theology to conform to these additional considerations. Thus we shall coordinate the "universe" with the creaturely level of "man" such that the most technical designation should read, 'God-Christ-world', where 'world' entails 'man' and the 'universe.' Within the latter, the interrelation of his ecumenical and scientific strains coalesce. One cannot

⁵"Theologically understood man and the universe belong together and together form what we mean by world in its relation to God" (HL[RST], p. 76). Cf. DCO, p. 1; RET, p. 25. This is a more careful expression of the synonymous "God-man-world" triad of which he speaks e.g., in HL[RST] p. 77; RET, pp. 27, 29.

⁶ HL[RST], pp. 77-78; cf. STR, pp. 183-184; TS, pp. 99-105.

abstract his scientific from his ecclesiastical intention, though the two do not always appear in the same context.

4. Relation in Jewish Perspective

Although it may be possible to trace the roots of dualist thought to the fall,⁷ ontologically dualism is fictitious.⁸ Torrance looks to the Greek philosophical and cosmological systems in which to find its traceable conceptual structure. Modern epistemological, anthropological and cosmological dualism,

. . . took its definitive shape through the thought of Kant and Descartes or of Newton and Galileo, but it goes back through the Christian centuries to the foundations of classical Western culture in Greece. I refer here to the irreducible dualisms in the philosophy and cosmology of Plato and Aristotle, which threw into sharp contrast rectilinear motion in the terrestrial mechanics and circular motion in celestial mechanics, which were related to the dualisms between the empirical and theoretical, the physical and the spiritual, the

⁷Torrance defines evil as, ". . . an assault upon the love of God, an attack upon the majesty and prerogative of the Creator, an anarchic force making for the vitiation and destruction of all that is true and good and orderly in God's creation" (DCO, p. 118). Elsewhere he argues: ". . . original sin has not only to do with the selfishness of appetite but with the tendency of reason toward autocracy" ("Reason in Christian Theology," p. 24).

⁸Torrance sees the Platonic-Augustinian claim of privative evil as a misperception of reality generated by the inadequate conception of the bifurcation of heaven and earth. In that the enhypostasis renders the space-time terrestrial realm of ultimate, everlasting importance to God, the Platonic notion of evil does violence to Christ, the preeminent reality. With Barth, evil maintains the "impossible possibility" of an improper existence (DCO, p. 119). For Torrance's opinion of dualistic forms of evil, see "PC", pp. 121-122; 137, f.n. 51; "Reason in Christian Theology," p. 33; TS, pp. 264-265; DCO, pp. 113-128.

temporal and the eternal, the mortal and the divine.⁹

John Macmurray

Unitary Hebrew Consciousness

Following the thesis of John Macmurray, Torrance posits the unitary alternative as that of the Hebrew religious consciousness.¹⁰

What is characteristic of the Hebrew people is that it achieved a development to a high level of civilization without this breaking up of the aspects of social life into autonomous, contrasted and competing fields of interest and effort. Art and science, politics, law, morality and philosophy, or rather what corresponds to these autonomous spheres of activity in other cultures, remain, as in primitive society, aspects of religion. Religion, thus, never becomes a particular sphere of human activity, but remains the synthesis of all. In consequence Jewish culture is integral in a sense that no other culture has been.¹¹

Torrance presses this thesis to its historical genesis. Israel characteristically lives in unitary interrelation with the world due to its unique, unmerited status as the elect of God to be the bearer of divine revelation to mankind. Through the crucible of Old Testament history God has molded a distinctive orientation to the world into the very fabric of his Chosen so that they may serve as an adequate instrument of His revelation.¹²

⁹GGT, p. 21. Cf. pp. 21-27 for a brief history of dualism.

¹⁰STR, pp. 41-42; T. F. Torrance, The Christian Frame of Mind (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1985), pp. 29-30. Cf. Reconciliation, p. 28.

¹¹The Clue to History, p. 28.

¹²Cf. "The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 89; Salvation is of the Jews," p. 165.

The unitary Hebrew consciousness is the divinely sanctioned way of knowing.¹³ In the final analysis, Jerusalem, not Rome, Byzantium or the heirs of Wittenberg, is the mediator of the oracles of God to the Gentiles. The New Testament Church can understand itself only in light of Israel. This is the heart of the ecumenical solution.¹⁴ Thus, at bottom, all anti-semitism is in fact anti-Christian.¹⁵

Macmurray contends, although dualism is not incurable, it is universal in the Western world.¹⁶ If we are to

¹³This is not to suggest that Torrance indiscriminately points to all Jewish thought as unitary. In fact even ancient Israel was constantly plagued by the temptation to dualism between being God's people (laos) and becoming an independent ethnic-political nation (ethnos) (Israel: People of God, p. 3). Cf. Macmurray, The Clue to History, p. 31. The Rabbinic tradition, first evidenced in the moral/physical distinction of Rabbi Judah (c. 150 A.D.), also suffered from an inherent dualism that rendered God so transcendent that he was both immutable and ineffable (Israel: People of God, p. 5; RBET, 6/29/81). Macmurray differentiates the 'working' God of Israel from the 'aristocratic' God of dualism (Clue to History, p. 33). Torrance contends, however, that throughout the history of thought, ". . . Jews have been responsible for creative reconstructions affecting the very foundations of knowledge. . . ." (Israel: People of God, p. 4). Among those he identifies are Weyle, Einstein and Ilya Prigogine (RBET 6/29/81).

¹⁴Cf. Reconciliation, p. 26; CAC I, pp. 294-295; Israel: People of God, pp. 2-3; Review of Le Problème Oecumenique, by Bernard Lambert, in Scottish Journal of Theology 16 (1963): 104.

¹⁵"Anti-semitism is, after all, a rebellion against the peculiar vocation and destiny of Israel, especially against its vicarious mission, but for that very reason it is also a deep-seated rebellion against the vicarious mission of Jesus Christ himself. That is to say, anti-semitism is a manifestation of what the New Testament calls 'anti-Christ'" ("The Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 87).

¹⁶Clue to History, p. 20.

understand Torrance, therefore, we must seek a reorientation of thought--to go to school with Israel.¹⁷ To this end, he recommends a mastery of Martin Buber:

Out of the very heart of Israel comes a voice calling us back from our abstract and impersonal philosophy to the Biblical way of knowledge, to a personal God who encounters us face to face in His Word.¹⁸

The Via Media

In Space, Time and Incarnation Torrance develops the thesis that the understanding of time which properly reflects its reality both theologically and scientifically is time conceived as a contingent relation.¹⁹ We have already begun our inquiry into the precise dynamic structure

¹⁷Israel: People of God, p. 14; cf. "Salvation is of the Jews," p. 165. This must be appreciated in a distinctive way:

"Far from meaning that Gentiles have to become proselytes to Judaism, this means that Gentiles grafted into Israel in Christ bear a fruit as Gentiles which would have been otherwise wanting. It is not the substitution of Jewish for Gentile modes of thought that is to be envisaged here, but a "learning obedience" to the Word of God which Gentile modes of thought can only gain in the midst of Israel where the Mind of God and the mind of rebellious man have at last been brought to reconciliation, after long discipline in the history of Israel, in Jesus Christ" (CAC I, p. 302).

¹⁸"Salvation is of the Jews," p. 169. It is significant that one of the most potent forces in the recovery of "the personal" in our own day, Martin Buber, appears to have drawn his whole argument from the basic structure of the Hebrew language" ("PC," p. 114).

¹⁹E.g., cf. pp. 58-59, 64-90. Frederick W. Norris evinces a basic misunderstanding of unitary thought as distinct from the monist and dualist extremes, as he argues: ". . .the homocousion offers a foundation which resists dualism. It is strongly monistic, but in Christology it strengthens the dualistic difficulty of describing the unity of the God-man" ("Mathematics, Physics and Religion: A Need for Candor and Rigor," Scottish Journal of Theology 37 no. 4 [1984]: 466).

of this relation quintessentially expressed in Jesus Christ. The service Macmurray performs for us is to cast relation within a cultural context such that we might by way of contrast differentiate more acutely the identity of such time.

We have already encountered Klinefelter's critique of Torrance as a Western dualist. Ironically, albeit later, Fritjof Capra appreciates what he conceives as the oriental monist direction of Torrance's thought.²⁰ Both extremes err. The former is theologically eliminated in its tendency toward tritheism and Nestorianism. The latter belies a unitarian and Eutychian propensity. We need not pursue further the ecumenical judgments passed against these as any student of Church history is thoroughly versed in these matters.

In my judgment, the monist versus unitary distinction is much more subtle than the dualist versus unitary difference. Even the most casual reading of Torrance will expose his antipathy toward dualism. Macmurray has indicated the primary, Jewish, direction we must travel if we are to discern the intricate importance of this distinction.

Martin Buber

I-Thou

For Buber the Greek approach²¹ is causal,²² static,²³ abstract,²⁴ objectivizing,²⁵ opticizing,²⁶

²⁰GGT, pp. 175-176.

²¹I and Thou, p. 87.

²²Ibid, pp. 81, 100.

²³Ibid, pp. 63-64, 84.

philosophical,²⁷ mediating,²⁸ and demonstrable,²⁹ and therefore is dualistic.³⁰ It creates not only a crisis between persons³¹ but also eclipses our relation to God³² and jeopardizes our very existence.³³ This subject-object split is overcome in the subject-subject intimacy of the I-Thou relation, which is fundamentally Hebrew, reciprocal,³⁴ living,³⁵ concrete whole,³⁶ existential,³⁷ imageless,³⁸ religious,³⁹ immediate,⁴⁰ and referential.⁴¹ This

²⁴Ibid, p. 59.

²⁵Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 165.

²⁶Ibid, p. 56.

²⁷Ibid, pp. 39-63.

²⁸Ibid, pp. 34-35.

²⁹Ibid, pp. 59-60.

³⁰I and Thou, pp. 74-75.

³¹Maurice Friedmann, ed., The Knowledge of Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: G. Allen and Unwin, [1965]), p. 77.

³²The Eclipse of God, p. 34.

³³I and Thou, p. 80.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 81, 100.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 63-64, 84.

³⁶Eclipse of God, pp. 49, 51-53, 56-58; I and Thou, p. 59.

³⁷Eclipse of God, p. 165.

³⁸Ibid, pp. 62-63.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 39-63.

is a revolution of Copernican dimension as it undercuts the subject-object problematic.⁴² Existence is relational: "In the beginning is the relation--as the category of being, as readiness, as a form that reaches out to be filled, as a model of the soul; the a priori of relation; the innate You."⁴³ The epitome of relation is inter-personal presence, community or fellowship in which all stand: ". . .in a living, reciprocal relationship to one another."⁴⁴ This center is active reality--the Between. Genuine encounter constitutes the ontological dimension of personal relation. The "Thou" is an integral aspect of the emergence of the "I". Without it the "I" would never come to full consciousness.⁴⁵ It is inseparable from the "I", Buber contends, while remaining unconfused with it:

Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither merely a part of him nor outside him. All actuality is an activity in which I participate without being able to appropriate it. Where there is no participation, there

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 49.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁴²In Robert E. Wood's words:

"Kant had formulated the first such revolution, instead of subjects moving about objects, Kant saw the opposite: the objective world as a function of cognitive subjectivity. While steadfastly holding to the Kantian position as valid on its own level, Martin Buber introduced the notion of an ontological prior relation of Presence, binding subject and object together in an identity-in-difference which he termed the I-Thou relation and which constituted the region of what he calls the Between (das Zwischen)" (Martin Buber's Ontology: An Analysis of "I and Thou" [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969], p. xiii).

⁴³I and Thou, p. 78.

⁴⁴Ibid, p. 94.

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 80.

is no actuality. Where there is self-appropriation, there is no actuality. The more directly the You is touched, the more perfect is participation.⁴⁶

One need not listen too acutely to hear the resonance of Buber within Torrance. Although in his early career Torrance rejected the ontological implications of relation,⁴⁷ as his Christology developed and the weight of the homousion of Christ with humanity became fully appreciated, he ascribed full ontological status to personal relation.⁴⁸ However he surpasses Buber (or explicates his implicit Trinitarianism) in grounding onto-relations in ". . . the Communion of Being in Love in God himself."⁴⁹ That is, the Holy Spirit is the personal ontological agency of all relation:

The Holy Spirit who is the consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son in the Trinity is the Spirit through whom the Word was made flesh in the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the Person of the Son, but it is the same Spirit through whom we have union with Christ and partake of the communion between the Father and the Son and the Son and the Father.⁵⁰

In our fellowship with God, Buber asserts, we are neither mystically lost in His being nor deistically

⁴⁶Ibid, p. 113. Wood continues: "If one were to remove all that belongs to the object and all that belongs to the subject, there still would remain the Between. For Buber there is another dimension, which is man's opening toward God . . ." (Martin Buber's Ontology, pp. 41-42).

⁴⁷"Reason in Christian Theology," pp. 30-31.

⁴⁸GGT, pp. 173-174; RET, pp. 42-43, 45; TCFK, p. 230; HL[RST], pp. 63-64.

⁴⁹GGT, p. 174.

⁵⁰GR, p. 180; cf. "Answer to God," Biblical Theology 2 (1951): 10; "PC," p. 127; TS, p. 349; Reconstruction, p. 205. For his critique of Barth's failure to develop this point, see "Karl Barth," p. 209.

disjoined. We comprehend the entire world in relation to God, ". . . giving the world its due and truth, to have nothing besides God but to grasp everything in him, that is the perfect relationship."⁵¹ One must not confuse this with mystical pantheism for ". . . the I is indispensable for any relationship. . ."52

Alexander Kohanski outlines the delicate distinction between Buber and mysticism.⁵³ Buber's thought is dyadic, and the fundamental religious dyad is that of the God-man relation. There are no Greek dualist strains in his thought as there are in the mystics, who due to their depreciation of the body seek to transcend it in undifferentiated union with the Absolute.

For Buber the mystery is in the duality of the finite and the Infinite, not in their unification or identity. Both see it as a paradox, but while Buber finds it in the exclusiveness-inclusiveness of the primal relation with the Absolute, the mystics look for it in oneness-and-separation of the Absolute itself. The latter is a logical paradox of oneness of being with non-being; the former is an alogical paradox of duality of being with

⁵¹I and Thou, p. 127.

⁵²Ibid, p. 126; cf. pp. 131, 136, 148.

⁵³This is not to deny Buber passed through a Hasidic mystical phase, which, in his own words, he abandoned before he ". . . could enter into an independent relationship with being" (Martin Buber, Pointing the Way, trans. by Maurice Friedman [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957], p. ix). See "With a Monist," ibid, pp. 25-30 for his denial of mysticism. Maurice Friedman suggests, ". . . we can at least escape the trap of labeling Buber a mystic or not a mystic by focusing on his encounter with mysticism"--a period he designates from 1898-1917 (Martin Buber's Life and Work: The Early Years 1878-1923 [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981], Part III, p. 77; cf. pp. 76-147). Cf. Kohanski, Martin Buber's Philosophy of Interhuman Relations: A Response to the Human Problematic of Our Time (East Brunswick, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1982), p. 47.

being.⁵⁴

How one can reconcile Buber's rejection of mysticism⁵⁵ with Wood's claim that his is a panentheistic variant of being as totality in the Whiteheadian tradition⁵⁶ is hardly satisfactory, and I believe a result of his 'logical' summary of philosophic notions of unitary being.⁵⁷ To be sure, Torrance admits another option which does greater justice to Buber's intent, though it may be detected only from a Christian standpoint.⁵⁸ This is the theological option of the hypostatic union, which does greater justice to the transcendence-immanence distinction than does any of Wood's philosophic options. Once again the importance of Jesus Christ, the unique, personal, concrete universal precisely fits the categorial requirement.

That which conjoins subject with subject is various-

⁵⁴Martin Buber's Philosophy of Interhuman Relation, p. 48.

⁵⁵I and Thou, pp. 131-144; Wood, Martin Buber's Ontology, pp. 92-98.

⁵⁶Martin Buber's Ontology, pp. 67; 91, f.n. 17.

⁵⁷Wood outlines the options as follows:

1. The unity of being is the ultimate particle composing the things of experience (Democritean atomism).
2. The unit of being lies in the individuals we encounter (Aristotelian substantialism).
3. The unit of being is the totality (a spectrum of positions from Parmenidean absolute monism to Whiteheadian organicism).
4. The unit of being lies in a transcendent principle within which all is rooted (Plotinian participationism)" (Martin Buber's Ontology, p. 67).

⁵⁸"At this point Buber's thought appears to be covertly trinitarian, in his appeal to the relations of love within the Being of God himself--which he took over from Spinoza, whose doctrine of God's rational love of himself within himself had been influenced by Christian thought" (GGT, p. 150).

ly designated by Buber as spirit,⁵⁹ the third dimension of the between,⁶⁰ intuition⁶¹, love,⁶² grace and election.⁶³

⁵⁹"Spirit is not the I but between I and You [Thou] Man lives in the spirit when he is able to respond to his You. He is able to do that when he enters into this relation with his whole being. It is solely by virtue of his power to relate that man is able to live in the spirit" (I and Thou, p. 89).

⁶⁰"'Between' [Zwischen] is not an auxiliary construction, but the real place and bearer of what happens between men; it has received no specific attention because, in distinction from the individual soul and its context, it does not exhibit a smooth continuity, but is ever and again re-constituted in accordance with men's meetings with one another;. . .

(W)hat is essential does not take place in each of the participants or in a neutral world which includes the two and all other things; but it takes place between them in the most precise sense, as it were in a dimension which is accessible only to them both" ("What is Man" (1938), in Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith [Boston: Beacon Press, 1955], pp. 203-204). Gabriel Marcel depicts this as an "intermediary reality," an "authentic bond" which is "ontic" in character ("I and Thou," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice Friedman [La Salle: Open Court, 1967], pp. 43, 44).

⁶¹"The intellect, which divides the self, holds us apart from the world that it assists us in utilizing. Instinct joins us to the world, but not as persons. Intuition, through vision, binds us as persons with the world which is over against us, binds us to it without being able to make us one with it, through a vision that cannot be absolute" ("Bergson's Concept of Intuition" [1943] in Pointing the Way, p. 86).

⁶²"Feelings dwell in man, but man dwells in his love. This is no metaphor but actuality: love does not cling to an I, as if the You were merely its "content" or object; it is between I and You. Whoever does not know this, know this with his being, does not know love, even if he should ascribe to it the feelings that he lives through, experiences, enjoys, and expresses. Love is a cosmic force" (I and Thou, p. 66).

This designation of relation is not to be construed as a mediary, but rather the mode of immediacy.

The relation to the You is unmediated. Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and you, no prior knowledge and no imagination, and memory itself is changed as it plunges from particularity into wholeness. No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no anticipation;. . . Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounter occurs.⁶⁴

It is this immediacy with the other that reflects the heart of Torrance's realism. With Buber, the non-personal natural world is not excluded. Although science may abstract nature from the immediacy of relational givenness, it is still the case that our primordial relation with nature is in the immediacy of its exclusive reality.⁶⁵ In the objectivating attempts of science to establish the

⁶³"The You encounters me by grace--it cannot be found by seeking. But that I speak the basic word to it is a deed of my whole being, is my essential deed.

The You encounters me. But I enter into a direct relationship to it. Thus the relationship is election and electing, passive and active at once. An action of the whole being must approach passivity, for it does away with all partial actions and thus with any sense of action which always depends on limited exertions" (I and Thou, p. 62).

⁶⁴Ibid, pp. 62-63.

⁶⁵"There is nothing that I must not see in order to see, and there is no knowledge that I must forget. Rather is everything, picture and movement, species and instance, law and number included and inseparably fused.

Whatever belongs to the free is included: its form and its mechanics, its color and its chemistry, its conversation with the elements and its conversation with the stars--all this in its entirety.

The free is no impression, no play of imagination, no aspect of a mood; it confronts me bodily and has to deal with me as I must deal with it--only differently. . . .

What I encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself" (I and Thou, pp. 58-59).

causal coordination of reality, space and time become figural frameworks imposed upon the "It" in order to render it conditional and measurable.⁶⁶ This is the space-time of classical physics. However, in all I-Thou relations, the encounter itself constitutes space and time. Encounter begets the fundamental durational aspect of existence. It would not be too much to claim that relation generates duration. Buber asserts:

And even as prayer is not in time but time in prayer, the sacrifice not in space but space in the sacrifice--and whoever reverses the relation annuls the reality--I do not find the human being to whom I say You [Thou] in any Sometime and Somewhere.⁶⁷

This encounter, therefore, is strictly speaking, the present, and its recession into the past is its objectivation--its abdication of genuine relation.⁶⁸ Only the immediacy of pure relational presence is genuinely temporal. All reflection upon the present (memory of the present) has rendered the present as static. Buber designates these two approaches to time as anthropological and cosmological respectively.⁶⁹ This is why it is so difficult to speak

⁶⁶Ibid, p. 81.

⁶⁷Ibid, p. 59.

⁶⁸Ibid, p. 84.

⁶⁹". . . we must distinguish sharply between cosmological and anthropological time. We can as it were comprehend cosmological time, that is, make sense of the concept of it, as if all time were present in a relative way, even though the future is not given to us at all. Anthropological time, on the other hand, that is, time in respect of actual, consciously willing man, cannot be comprehended, because the future cannot be present, since it depends to a certain extent, in my consciousness and will, on my decision. Anthropological time is real only in the part which has become cosmological time, that is, in the part called the past. This distinction is not identical with Bergson's

about duration, for such an analysis is already detached from the immediacy of encounter. It is problematic whether one may even discuss duration as it is by nature intrinsic to the immediate living context. It is no wonder that most of Western thought has in fact spatialized, i.e., ossified, all temporality.

Thorlief Boman⁷⁰ develops this thesis in terms

well-know one, where duree means a flowing present, whereas the anthropological time which I mean functions essentially through the memory--of course, in respect of the present, this is always "open" memory; as soon as we experience something as time, as soon as we become conscious of the dimension of time as such, the memory is already in play; in other words, the pure present knows no specific consciousness of time" (Between Man and Man, pp. 140-141).

(But for Bergson's equation of duration with memory, see Creative Evolution, [trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911)] p. 17.) For commentary on Buber's concepts of time see Karl Heim, Christian Faith and Natural Science (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 104-105.

⁷⁰We cite Boman because of his general corroboration of Buber and Torrance regarding a Jewish vs. Western conceptual distinction. That Torrance is familiar with his Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, trans. Jules L. Moreau (London: SCM, 1960) is without question, as he served on the editorial committee for the Library of History and Doctrine series, of which this is a part. With regard to the general conclusion that Hebrew active and Greek ontological categories are complementary modes of thought, it is generally the case (despite isolated exceptions) that Torrance would assume a less charitable view toward the Greeks. By appealing to the contemporary redefinition of science as necessarily personal, he would depreciate the importance of Greek scientific impersonal objectivity, which forms one of Boman's epistemological poles. Such complementarity, Torrance would argue, fails to appreciate the thoroughgoing unitary character of Hebrew thought itself.

Furthermore, despite his helpful Greek/Hebrew distinctions, Boman fails to grasp the fundamental relational notion of time by reducing it to a psychic container:

"For us [Greeks] space is like a great container that stores, arranges, and holds everything together; space is also the place where we live, breathe, and can expand freely. Time played a similar role for the

of the Greek mind, which emphasizes the primacy of space over the transitory, privative world. Spatial geometric relation was paramount, as so well attested in its art and even religion. "(T)he Greek gods and the divine world had to be conceived as exempt from all time, transitoriness, and change because, time, change, and transitoriness are synonymous terms."⁷¹ The static immutability of God, in consequence becomes fundamental not only to Platonic-Augustinian theology but also to the heirs of Aristotle and Thomas. The Hebrew alternative is the all-encompassing life of God:

God's consciousness is a world consciousness in which everything that takes place is treasured and held fast in the eternal and is therefore as indestructible as 'matter'. Without a world consciousness, all the history of humanity and of the universe would end in nothing; for a people, however, for whom life and history is everything, the concept of a divine world consciousness is as necessary as the concept of eternal being was for the Greeks. For the Israelites, the world was transitory, but Jahveh and his words (and deeds) were eternal (Isa. 40.8).⁷²

Whereas Greek spatialization reflects a visual, quantitative, fixed linear or cyclical, solar rendering of time, the Hebrews calculated their calendar in terms of the waxing and waning of the moon in its relation to the

Hebrews. Their consciousness is like a container in which their whole life from childhood on and the realities which they experienced of which they had heard are stored" (Ibid, p. 137).

In the end it is Boman's psychological individualism which distances him from Buber and Torrance's interpersonal relationalism.

⁷¹Ibid, p. 128.

⁷²Ibid, p. 139. Cf. Wood, Martin Buber's Ontology, pp. 14-15. For the distinction between Greek substantive and Hebrew verbal language, cf. CAC, I, pp. 304-306.

qualitative events of the agrarian, religious society.⁷³ Boman concurs with VonOrelli's conclusion that ". . . the Semitic concept of time is closely coincident with that of its content without which time would be quite impossible."⁷⁴ Hebrew time is functional or instrumental, rhythmic, and consequently non-visual. Where spatialization of time is overcome so too is its mechanistic nexus. Robert H. Stein argues, the Western mind proceeds from the logical necessity of cause to effect whereas the Semitic sequence is from effect to cause,⁷⁵ where necessity is contingent upon actuality. The temporal edge of experience is the standpoint from which the past is viewed. The cause is discussed only upon the occasion of the effect.

The Relational Present

The unmistakable contribution which Buber offers our analysis is that the immediacy of inter-personal encounter

⁷³We have already observed (p. 98 above) the tendency of even the Jewish rendering of time toward static, nomistic spatialization.

⁷⁴Hebraeischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit, cited in Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, p. 139.

⁷⁵An Introduction to the Parables of Jesus (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981), pp. 30-31. Cf. C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 142; Edmund F. Sutcliffe, "Effect as Purpose: A Study in Hebrew Thought Patterns," Biblica 35 (1954), pp. 320-327. N.B.: This view continues within the confines of the Reformed position as cause and effect are not reversed--the acts of man do not condition the decrees of God as in Arminianism. Furthermore, this supports the view of Calvin as distinct from the Calvinism of his later successors as evidenced in the sequence in which election appears in the Institutes, viz., after sanctification and justification. Later Calvinism lapsed into a mechanistic stance by treating election within theology proper and hence prior to and hypothetically abstracted from history.

generates a durational relation. One might therefore expect each relation to constitute a distinct duration. This supposition appears ludicrous from a non-relational standpoint in which time functions in an absolute, monolithic capacity. However, as we shall see shortly, within a relativity framework this is perfectly proper.

For our immediate purposes Buber's thought clarifies one further piece of our puzzle. It is Torrance's concept of the imminency of Christ. This is the event in which the grace of God in the ascended Christ through the Spirit impinges upon man within the conditions of nomistic time in such a way that he encounters eternity. Torrance applies this both to the sinner and the saint:

Confronted by eternity, he is as it were, in eternity! Or to make it even more picturesque, we might say that this confrontation takes him for the moment out of the bondage of time, out of the temporal-causal continuum where law operates; his fetters are severed and he is free.⁷⁶

This may occur in the event of one's salvation, the time of decision at which the Word of God unrelentingly confronts him. It may also occur in the Eucharist in anticipation of the final Parousia.

It is above all in the Lord's Supper that the new age which overlaps the old, and is therefore veiled by it, is sacramentally unveiled in anticipation of the great unveiling of the Kingdom of Christ at the final Parousia. This means that we have to distinguish in a doctrine of 'the real presence' between the Eucharistic Parousia of Christ and His final Parousia in judgment and new creation. Jesus Christ is really present under the veil of the bread and wine, but in such a way that He holds back the full power and majesty of His presence to give us time on earth and in history to fulfil His

⁷⁶"PC," p. 123; cf. AT, pp. 83-84.

will before He comes again.⁷⁷

Through Word and Sacrament in the Spirit of Christ, therefore, the imminence of Christ is experienced. It is in these moments of personal encounter that the Time of Christ is generated in the relational between. We enter His time frame.

One further corollary is derived from this analysis. We have concluded, it is only in the immediacy of relational encounter that genuine duration exists. Without an appreciation of the 'concurrence' of redemptive and nomistic time it would be impossible to speak of the real presence of Christ to contemporary man. The imminence of Christ is synonymous with His everlasting contemporaneity. It is telling that those within the baptistic tradition, who have devaluated the sacraments to ordinances tend also to be those who reduce the Living Word to the enscripturated word without remainder and verge on what Torrance warns is blasphemy of the Holy Spirit.⁷⁸ The living reality of Christ is preserved solely for the historic dimension of this world. It is expedient within this context that a relational corrective be applied.

Predictably, it was a solitary Jewish voice, in Henri Bergson, that challenged the monolith of Greek temporality.⁷⁹ Buber directs us to Bergson's notion of *duree'* for an approximate understanding of the relational

⁷⁷CAC, II, pp. 139; cf. pp. 19-20, 163, 171; Reconciliation, pp. 121, 135; STR, pp. 101-102, 149; AT, pp. 178-179.

⁷⁸RBET, 7/15/81; cf. Reconstruction, p. 256.

⁷⁹Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, pp. 126, 129.

present.⁸⁰ This is significant, because Torrance has also intimated the value of Bergson for our durational analysis.⁸¹

Henri Bergson

Pure Duration

For the early Bergson,⁸² pure duration is the fundament of conscious processes whereby the heterogeneous psychic experience emerges in the organic unity of living presence. Unlike abstract, mathematical time, which spatializes duration by reducing it to a completed, linear, visual succession of objects, pure duration melts the past into the present as a musical performance generates an indivisible rhythmic succession--a qualitative impression. He writes:

We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration [of past and present], an interconnection and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by

⁸⁰"The You appears in time, but in that of a process that is fulfilled in itself--a process lived through not as a piece that is a part of a constant and organized sequence but in a 'duration' whose purely intensive dimension can be determined only by starting from the You. It appears simultaneously as acting on and as acted upon, but not as if it had been fitted into a causal chain; rather as, in its reciprocity with the I, the beginning and end of the event" (I and Thou, p. 81).

⁸¹It is not merely coincidental that Bergson, from his Jewish perspective countered the idealizing tendencies of much durational discussion. He was influential upon Michael Polanyi (The Tacit Dimension, p. 46) and Ilya Prigogine, whom we shall discuss below (RBET, 7/7/81). Cf. DCO, p. 55.

⁸²Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (London: George Allen and Unwin, [1889], 1910.

abstract thought.⁸³

All arithmetic concepts of time are scientific reductions of duration to space; classical ". . . science cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative element--of time, duration, and of motion, mobility."⁸⁴ As such time was conceived as a fourth coordinate on the Cartesian axis--a "fourth dimension of space."⁸⁵ Time became reducible to divisible, homogeneous units. The future could be projected quantitatively, and hard determinism ensued. In short:

The problem of freedom has thus sprung from a misunderstanding: it has been to the moderns what the paradoxes of the Eleatics were to the ancients, and, like those paradoxes, it has its origin in the illusion through which we confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality and quantity.⁸⁶

In his later writings he speaks of duration as the most substantial reality--". . . the continuous progress of the past which grows into the future and swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation."⁸⁷ Life processes as creative change.

It is to his credit that he continually inveighs against what we shall call the 'detemporalizing' tendency

⁸³Ibid, p. 101.

⁸⁴Ibid, p. 115; cf. DCO, pp. 49-50.

⁸⁵Ibid, p. 109.

⁸⁶Ibid, p. 240.

⁸⁷Creative Evolution, p. 4.

of the Western mind. In his Duration and Simultaneity⁸⁸ he exposed the tendency of early relativity physicists to lapse back into a semi-relativity--the Newtonian absolutist framework, which posited space as an inert vessel in which all motion was ultimately correlated. It is a similar detemporalizing tendency in contemporary Protestant hermeneutics, whether of the a-historical or of the propositional genre, that in Torrance's view detracts from the fundamental living, personal relation of God with man in Jesus Christ. The recent hermeneutic dilemma is this abstractionist dualism which extricates the past from the present or the existential from the essential.

Despite the magnitude of the importance of Bergson for his critique of spatialization of time, which informs Torrance's analysis of temporality, we cannot ignore the fact that as a 'half-Kantian'⁸⁹ he failed to overcome an inveterate dualism. He even distinguished between the social self and the psychological self as the difference between external spatiality and internal temporality.⁹⁰ Thus although the concrete versus abstract durational motif of Bergson parallels that of Buber's I-Thou versus I-It temporality, his psycho-biological orientation renders his vitalism introspective and organic, thus lacking in rela-

⁸⁸Trans. by Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).

⁸⁹Bergson depicts Kant's error as allowing time to be merged into a spatial category of the understanding. Bergson admitted only time within the categories of consciousness, while relegating space to the reality of the external world (Time and Free Will, p. 232). Cf. Milič Čapek, Bergson and Modern Physics: A Reinterpretation and Re-evaluation (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1971), p. 83.

⁹⁰Time and Free Will, p. 231.

tional immediacy. Buber's personal is not reducible to Bergson's psychological.⁹¹ Wood suggests Buber's alternative be expressed as "ontologism"⁹²--the relational Between. As such we must concede, Bergson is but an excursus upon the way to understanding Buber and ultimately Torrance.

Durational Polyphony

It is the musical metaphor of Bergson's duration which best reflects Torrance's understanding of the continuity of dynamic relation. However, for our purposes it is most fruitful in illuminating redeemed rather than fallen time. In fact one might go so far as to say the tyranny of fallen time is its propensity toward spatialization.

In Torrance's discussion of the parousia he maintains, it appears from the perspective of fallen time to be a double event--first and second advent. However, the New Testament maintains its singularity.⁹³ There is a continuity between the first and second advents such that the presence of Christ is imminent.⁹⁴

Since it [the second advent] is not different from the first advent but is essentially continuous with it, that final parousia constantly impinges upon the Church in the present so that inevitably it feels and must feel that the final advent is about [to] . . . dawn. It is in fact already there knocking at the door and waits only the eschatological moment of its open manifestation when the veil of sense and time of our world will be

⁹¹Cf. I and Thou, pp. 121-122; "Von der Veredelung der Welt," Nachlese (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1965), p. 149.

⁹²Martin Buber's Ontology, p. 86.

⁹³STR, p. 144; CAC, I, p. 309.

⁹⁴STR, pp. 142-146; cf. AT, p. 186.

torn aside (Rev. 3:20).⁹⁵

This is, so to speak, the cantus firmus of which our space-time stands in contrapuntal relation. Torrance elaborates in terms of a Bach fugue:

. . . where the given canto firmo calls the lower melodies into added counterpoint, and where the counter subject finds its real continuity only in answer to the prime subject and in harmony with it. In such a fugue there is an uninterrupted unfolding of events already implied from the outset.⁹⁶

The parousia is understood aright as a melodic whole. In A. N. Whitehead's vibratory theory of matter we find an apt illustration:

. . . taking a metaphor from the ocean tides, the system will sway from one high tide to another high tide. This system, forming the primordial elements, is nothing at any instant. It requires the whole period in which to manifest itself. In an analogous way, a note of music is nothing at an instant, but it also requires its whole period in which to manifest itself.⁹⁷

This undulatory pattern fits the precise motion of the Parousia: Incarnation/Katabasis, Resurrection/Anabasis, and second Advent as one harmonious event.

It is due to the ascension that the consummate presence of Jesus Christ is hidden from view. The ascension effects an "eschatological pause" in the parousia.⁹⁸ That is to say, what is eschatologically complete already as a single dynamically continuous event in Jesus Christ, the

⁹⁵STR, p. 146; cf. p. 152.

⁹⁶CAC, I, p. 219; cf. RET, pp. 107-108; STI, pp. 72-73.

⁹⁷Science and the Modern World, (New York: Free Press, [1925], 1967), p. 35. See Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern Physics, pp. 316-318 where he demonstrates Bergson's compatibility with such a metaphor.

⁹⁸STR, p. 145.

Eschatos,⁹⁹ is split apart from our vantage point, because we still operate under the conditions of nomistic, incremental time. This protracted time, which though contrapuntal to the presence of Christ, does not yet embrace it as a consummate whole. Rather, it is a teleological goal. Any adequate eschatology must, therefore, take into account both temporal frames of reference. We shall elaborate this further at appropriate junctures.

Onto-relational vs. Existential Relation

If Buber provides a fundamental clue to an understanding of Torrance, we must entertain the question of the propriety of an existential interpretation of relation.¹⁰⁰ We have already intimated that the relational conjunction of I and Thou was far more than merely a psychological projection¹⁰¹ or subjective determination reducible to a single pole of the relation. If this were the case we would be left with either transcendental mysticism or solipsistic individualism. It is the latter which plagues so much of contemporary existentialism. Because the 'other' is fully real, our relation to it in Torrance's words is, "onto-relational, . . . subsisting between things . . . [as] an essential constituent of their being, and without which they would not be what they are. It is a being-constituting relation."¹⁰² Undoubtedly it is Buber's unitary God which prevents him from making full

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 151.

¹⁰⁰Wood labels Buber a practical rather than a theoretical existentialist, concerned with relational presence rather than the primacy of existence (Ibid, p. 118).

¹⁰¹Cf. Ibid, pp. 41, 85.

¹⁰²RET, pp. 42-43.

hypostatized use of the Spirit relation to which he refers.¹⁰³ Torrance contends, Buber is in fact a covert Trinitarian.¹⁰⁴ The I-Thou relation is a communion of love, which within the ontological and economic aspects of the Trinity is the theological expression of the Holy Spirit. To adequately speak of personal relation is to speak of relation constituted by the Person of God in His Spirit. This is the ontological Between--the realism which overcomes all subjectivist existential attempts to effect it. Just as the Being and Act of God are inseparable so too the essential and existential aspects of relation must be conjointly unified, but the unity is an hypostasis.

Torrance directs us to the Greek Fathers, who have implemented the fundamental Jewish insight of person into its overt Christian fruition.

5. Relation in Eastern Orthodox Perspective

The most natural progression from Hebrew to Christian categories, as might be expected, is found in the Greek rather than Latin Fathers. Torrance, following R. V. Sellers, traces the continuity of this tradition from St. Mark to Demitrius and Dionysius, Peter and Alexander to St. Athanasius.¹⁰⁵

As we inquire into the hypostatized reality of personal onto-relation we are directed by Torrance especially to the theology of St. Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria and the foundations which eventuated in the Church's defeat of Arian and Macedonian heresies. In Athanasius the Hebrew "between" becomes multifaceted.

¹⁰³Cf. f.n. 60 above.

¹⁰⁴GGT, p. 150; Israel: People of God, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵Reconciliation, pp. 215-216.

Through the prism of Athanasian thought, onto-relation refracts theologically into the trinitary perichoresis of the Father-Son-Spirit relation, Christologically into the Christological perichoresis of the God-man relation, and pneumatologically into the theosis of the Spirit-man relation. The first is the uncreated, ontological category, the latter two the created economic categories.¹⁰⁶

Perichoresis

In order to safeguard the person of the Holy Spirit from the Arian, Tropici, and Macedonian subordinatist tendencies the Eastern Church has been careful to avoid the Western Niceno-Constantinopolitan assertion of the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son (Filioque). Nevertheless, as Torrance points out:

It is one of the curious features of church history that the Western Church which had officially championed the addition of the filioque clause . . . has tended in practice to ignore it, whereas the Eastern Church which decidedly rejected it has tended to uphold the emphasis which it was designed to safeguard . . .¹⁰⁷

Athanasius rejects the temptation succumbed to by later theology of disjoining the being and operation of God¹⁰⁸ and in particular the being of Christ and the activity of the Spirit. In effect, without explicitly stating it, Torrance sees Athanasius as supporting the necessity of the Filioque, which,

. . . is the earliest and profoundest way of saying solo Christo, solo gratia, sola fide. The extent to which the Reformation had to recall the Western Church to the centrality of Christ is the measure of its departure

¹⁰⁶GGT, p. 173.

¹⁰⁷Reconstruction, p. 229.

¹⁰⁸Reconciliation p. 236.

from the homousion of the Spirit.¹⁰⁹

Theological/ Trinitary Perichoresis

Theologically it is essential that the reciprocity of the persons of the Trinity be maintained if the redemption of Christ and its Spiritual appropriation is to be preserved. To effect this, the East introduced the technical term, perichoresis. In its broadest definition perichoresis derives, as Harry A. Wolfson argues, from the Stoic notion of "mixture etymologically evidenced as thorough penetration."¹¹⁰ It variously assumed Trinitary and Christological significance, the former referring to the dynamism of the trinitary homousion, in contradistinction to the Arian and Sabellian formulae, the latter to the dynamic mode of the hypostatic union in its twofold motion of the antecedent penetration of humanity by the Word and the consequent penetration of the Word by man. In short the Christological perichoresis entails 'deification' of man and the humanization of God without the integrity of either being jeopardized as in some mystical and monophysite and kenotic and Nestorian theologies.

The Eastern Church, in distinction from the West,

¹⁰⁹Reconstruction, p. 230; cf. pp. 217-218; Reconciliation, p. 235. Athanasius comes very close to a declaration of the filioque in Orationes contra Arianos, IV, III, xxv, p. 24: ". . .the Son does not merely partake the Spirit, that therefore He too may be in the Father; nor does He receive the Spirit, but rather He supplies It Himself to all; and the Spirit does not unite the Word to the Father, but rather the Spirit receives from the Word." This is also the case in Ad Serapionem Orationes, IV, I, 25; "And if the Son, because He is of the Father, is proper to His essence, it must be that the Spirit, who is said to be from God, is in essence proper to the Son. And so, as the Lord is Son, the Spirit is called Spirit of Sonship."

¹¹⁰The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, pp. 419-420, 428.

emphasized the more dynamic posture of tri-unity by virtue of the mutual intercommunal reciprocity of Persons rather than the more static substantival unity of nature. This harkened back to the Johannine account of the circumcission of Christ and the Father.¹¹¹ Athanasius comments:

For when it is said, 'I in the Father and the Father in Me, They are not therefore . . . discharged into Each other filling the One the Other, as in the case of empty vessels, so that the Son fills the emptiness of the Father and the Father that of the Son, and Each of Them by Himself is not complete and perfect . . ., for the Father is full and perfect and the Son is the Fulness of Godhead.¹¹²

He uses the figures of the radiance of the sun and the stream of the fountain as illustrations.¹¹³ The extent of this interrelation is total with the single exception of the designation of personal names, Father, Son (and Spirit). Perichoresis reached its formal articulation by John of Damascus, who employed it in both Trinitary and Christological service.¹¹⁴ In the East, personhood thus became conceived aright only in terms of diversity in unity and inconfused inseparability. Eberhard Juengel commenting upon the Barthian doctrine of perichoresis writes:

None of the divine modes of being, then, exists in abstraction from the others. Even the mutual relatedness of the modes of being is no abstract structuring of the being of God. But the mutual relatedness of the modes of being takes place as participation in each other. . . . In this participation it is a question of a "passing into one another,"^x through which a trespass of one mode of being against another is impossible.

¹¹¹Jn. 10:38; 14:11; 17:21.

¹¹²Orationes contra Arianos, III, 1, p. 394.

¹¹³Ibid, III, 3, p. 395.

¹¹⁴Cf. Leonard Prestige, "PERICHŌREŌ and PERICHŌRESIS in the Fathers," Journal of Theological Studies 29 (April 1928): 248-251.

Rather does the perichoresis work "that the divine modes of being mutually condition and permeate one another so completely that one is always in the other two and the other two in the one." The doctrine of perichoresis helps us to formulate the concrete unity of the being of God in that we think of the modes of God's being as meeting one another in unrestricted participation.¹¹⁵

The ostensive metaphysical paradoxes of the Trinitary and Christological formulae are, within this context, but categorial aberrations foisted upon theology from an alien perspective.

Christological Perichoresis

Furthermore it is essential that the interrelationship of Christ with man be more than a psychological or moral union if we are to escape docetism. Thus, Torrance contends that, unlike Plato and Origen, Athanasius affirms:

. . . through His relation with the Father and His relation with us, the incarnate Son of God fulfils the part of a Mediator (mesitēs) even in regard to space-relations between man and God, for mere creatures are unable to make room (choreîn) for God in their natures, far less are they able to endure the Creator in their created beings. This bridge is supplied in the Incarnation but the relation between the incarnate Son and the Father, cannot be thought out in terms of a receptacle (ángeion) notion of space, for the applications of such a concept to the kenosis can only lead to a false kenoticism which does not do justice to the 'fullness' and 'perfection' of either the Father or Son, since it fails to think of them in accordance with their natures. The inter-relations of the Father and the Son must be thought out in terms of 'abiding' and 'dwelling' in which each wholly rests in the other. This is the doctrine of the perichoresis . . . in which we are to think of the whole being of the Son as proper to the Father's essence, as God from God, Light from Light. Creaturely realities are such

¹¹⁵The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being is in Becoming, trans. Horton Harris (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976), pp. 32-33. Quotation ^x, CD, IV, 1, 59, p. 203; ^y, CD, I, 1, 3, p. 370.

that they can be divided up in separate places . . . but this is impossible with the uncreated source of all Being, with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit who wholly dwell in each other and who each have room fully for the others in the one God.¹¹⁶

In a most illuminating article, to which Torrance directs our attention,¹¹⁷ J. D. Zizioulas moves in the direction which Relton intimated above--toward a non-Aristotelian rendering of the hypostatic union. The intent of Nicene Christology, Zizioulas suggests, was to transform the substantival notion of "hypostasis" into a personal one. Unfortunately through the influence of Augustinian introspection and Boethian individuation this transformation was never adequately incorporated into the Western tradition. The Orthodox alternative, he contends,

. . . is basically different from being an individual or 'personality' in that the person can not be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to. Thus personhood implies the 'openness of being', and even more than that, the ek-stasis [communion, relatedness, lit. to stand out of] of being, i.e., a movement towards communion which leads to a transcendence of the boundaries of the 'self' and thus to freedom. At the same time, and in contrast to the particularity of the individual which is subject to addition and combination, the person in its ekstastic character reveals its being in a catholic, i.e. integral and undivided, way, and thus in its being ekstastic it becomes hypostatic [particularity, uniqueness], i.e., the bearer of its nature in its totality. Ekstasis and hypostasis represent two basic aspects of Personhood, and it is not to be regarded as a mere accident that both of these words have been historically applied to the notion of Person. Thus the idea of Person affirms at once both that being cannot be 'continued' or 'divided', and that the mode of its existence, its hypostasis, is absolutely unique and unrepeatable. Without these two conditions being falls into an

¹¹⁶STI, pp. 15-16.

¹¹⁷Via his "Toward and Ecumenical Consensus on the Trinity," Theologische Zeitschrift (Basel) 31 (1975): 348.

a-personal reality, defined and described like a mere 'substance', i.e., it becomes an a-personal thing.¹¹⁸

The very notion of personhood requires relation with God for its constitution. Human personhood, in and by itself, is a privative, truncated reality. It is in fact a misnomer. Given this definition, all tendency toward autonomy, toward relation with creation apart from God, is deleterious to personhood and tantamount to idolatry. This is the character of original sin, which Christ alone, by virtue of his hypostatic theanthropic relation, could dispel. It is only man in relationship to God who is fully personal, and it is only in Christ that this relation is now effected. Thus, though Christ is a particular man or hypostasis he is at the same time the ontological way of all men to the Father. In Torrance's words, he is the personalizing person. This is, Zizioulas contends, the "de-individualized" Christ.¹¹⁹ Now this is far superior to forensic, sacramental, or moral categories of representation, which do not adequately account for our participation in Christ.

Theosis

Our relation to Christ is in the Spirit. Zizioulas continues:

. . . in each man's relation to Christ the Spirit is not simply an assistant to the individual in reaching Christ, but the in, in which he is participant in Christ. Baptism was from the beginning 'in the Spirit' and 'into Christ.'¹²⁰

¹¹⁸"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity," Scottish Journal of Theology 28 (1975): 407-408.

¹¹⁹Ibid, p. 441.

¹²⁰Ibid, p. 442.

Although the mystical elements of Greek Orthodoxy readily allow this Spiritual, ontological union to be interpreted in terms of the deification of man, this is not necessarily the case, and Torrance argues, a misunderstanding of the term theosis. Again, Zizioulas elaborates:

. . . man becomes truly man, i.e. he acquires fully his natural identity in relation to God, only if he is united with God--the mystery of personhood is what makes this possible. Theosis as a way of describing this unity in personhood, is, therefore, just the opposite of a divinisation in which human nature ceases to be what it really is. Only if we lose the perspective of personhood and operate with 'nature' as such [i.e. non-relational individuality], such a misunderstanding of theosis can arise.¹²¹

Robert Stephanopoulos concurs: Theosis is ". . . an objective, historical reality already achieved fully in the person of Jesus Christ who redeemed humanity by his incarnation."¹²² For Athanasius we may speak of "deification" only in Christological and Pneumatological terms, or as Torrance explains it, in the outward and inward givenness of God respectively.¹²³

¹²¹Ibid, p. 440.

¹²²"The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis," in An Orthodox and Reformed Dialogue, John Meyendorff and Joseph McLelland, ed. (New Brunswick: Agora Books, 1973), p. 156; cf. pp. 149, 155. However, unlike Torrance, he contends when we move from Christology to anthropology the ontological categories are replaced with moral and spiritual ones (ibid, pp. 150, 160). It is fair to say Stephanopoulos has failed to consistently implement a relational metaphysic in his theological interpretation. See Reconciliation, p. 184 where Torrance cites the objective mediation of Christ, the Offerer and Offering.

¹²³KB, p. 154; cf. Reconstruction, pp. 93-97.

Christological Theosis: Outward

Athanasius explains: "For he [Christ] became man that we might become divine: and he revealed himself through a body that we might receive the idea of the invisible Father. . ."¹²⁴ Our Christology lapses into a form of docetism if humanity in any sense merges into deity. Thus whenever we speak of our union with Christ it can only be expressed as a participation in his human nature. Athanasius belabors this point. Such a doctrine avoids the problem of transcendent participation (méthexis) introduced by Socrates and exposed in the Parmenides: if the particular participates in the entire Idea then a sort of ubiquitarian pluralism a la Luther would emerge; if the particular participates only in a part of the Idea, the one paradoxically is divisible.¹²⁵ Plato found no adequate solution to this dilemma. Torrance suggests the Christian response to participation is the doctrine of koinonia:

¹²⁴De Incarnatione in Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, ed. and trans., Robert W. Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 54, p. 269; cf. 43, p. 243; Orationes contra Arianos, IV, I, xi, 39, p. 329; 45, p. 333; II, xxi, 70, p. 386 & n. 1; III, xxvi, 34, p. 412; 38, p. 414; 39, p. 415.

¹²⁵Remarkably, Athanasius introduced a proto-Extra-Calvinisticum: "He was not enclosed in the body, nor was he in the body but nowhere else. Nor did he move the latter while the universe was deprived of his action and providence. But what is most wonderful is that, being the Word, he was not contained [sunéchō] by anyone, but rather himself contained everything. And as he is in all creation, he is in essence outside the universe but in everything by his power, ordering everything and extending his providence over everything. And giving life to all, separately and together, he contains the universe and is not contained, but in his Father only he is complete in everything. So also being in a human body and giving it life itself, he accordingly gives life to everything, and was both in all and outside all. And although he was known by his body through his works, yet he was not invisible by his action on the universe" (De Incarnatione, 17, p. 175).

. . . in which the human nature of the participant is not deified but reaffirmed and recreated in its essence as human nature, yet one in which the participant is really united to the Incarnate Son of God partaking in him in his own appropriate mode of the oneness of the Son and the Father and the Father and the Son, through the Holy Spirit. In the nature of the case we are unable to describe this participation in positive language any more than we can describe the hypostatic union in positive language. . .¹²⁶

Cyril of Alexandria subsequently spoke of this, Torrance argues, as a metastoicheiosis or transelementing in contrast to a transubstantiation, which, ". . . far from implying any depreciation or diminishing of human nature it was interpreted to mean not only the upholding and preserving of it in its integrity as human but the completing and perfecting of it in an enriched relation to God. . ." ¹²⁷

Pneumatological Theosis: Inward

Now, although the person of Christ is the onto-historical solution to the problem of transcendent participation, the problem of the horizontal relation of his humanity to ours requires the 'divinizing' activity of the Holy Spirit. This is Athanasius' objective pneumatological inwardness:

Therefore because of the grace of the Spirit which has been given to us, in Him we come to be, and He in us; and since it is the Spirit of God, therefore through His becoming in us, reasonably are we, as having the Spirit, considered to be in God, and thus is God in us. . . (T)he Spirit does not unite the Word to the Father, but rather the Spirit receives from the Word. And the Son is in the Father, as His own Word and Radiance; but we, apart from the Spirit, are strange and distant from God,

¹²⁶Reconstruction, p. 186; cf. p. 217.

¹²⁷Reconciliation, p. 162.

and by the participation of the Spirit we are knit into the Godhead; so that our being in the Father is not ours, but is the Spirit's which is in us and abides in us. . .¹²⁸

Significantly, although the operative categories of redemption in the early Latin Church were ethical and forensic, and in the Greek Church, following Origen, cosmological, Athanasius maintained a physical or realist perspective in the manner of Ignatius.¹²⁹ Torrance elaborates:

The Athanasian doctrine of theosis or theopoesis through the Spirit, in which we are so renewed and enlightened through adoption in the incarnate Son to be sons of God, does not import any inner deification of our human nature, but the assuming of us into the sphere of the direct and immediate activity of God himself in such a way that our human being is brought to its teleiosis in relation to the Creator and we find our real life hid with Christ in God.¹³⁰

This then is how we are to understand the mystical union.

¹²⁸Orationes contra Arianos, IV, III, xxv, 24, pp. 406 & 407. Cf. The Letters of St. Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit [Ad Serapionem Orationes, IV], trans. with Intro. C. R. B. Shapland (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), I, 24, pp. 125-126.

¹²⁹Archibald Robertson, "Prolegomena," in Wace and Schaff, Athanasius, pp. lxix-lxx. This was also the case with Cyril of Alexandria: Reconciliation, p. 160.

¹³⁰Reconciliation, p. 234; cf. TS, p. 349; Reconstruction, pp. 205, 243; GR, p. 180. Father Kallistos Ware, Bishop of Diokleia, independently corroborates Torrance's interpretation:

"We are called to share in God's life, in His Glory. We remain human, we remain created, but we are truly and fully united with God in His divine energies. And these energies transform us, so while we remain human we also share in the divine life. That is our final aim. Saint Basil says, "The human person is a creature that has received the commandment to become God" ("Image and Likeness: An Interview with Bishop Kallistos Ware," ed. James Morgan, Parabola 10 no. 1 [Spring 1985]: 65).

It is the Church's analogue to the hypostatic union and should be construed as synonymous with the fellowship (koinonia) of the saints in the Church, the body of Christ, through the Spirit.¹³¹

In that for Athanasius the Spirit is understood as the "creative activity of God",¹³² Torrance therefore infers that the mode of Spiritual relation is a mode of ongoing creativity.¹³³ It is this continual creative relationship with God through the Spirit of Christ which supplants the Scholastic Protestant, mechanistic, rationalistic structures of grace. Our relation to God is thoroughly unpredictable and contingent from our perspective.

Perichoresis and Theosis of Duration

The Eternally Living God

There is a profound change of perspective which is required in the conceptualization of both time and eternity once the full import of perichoresis is appreciated. Within a substantival frame of thought the suggestion of interpenetration requires displacement. Distinct entities cannot occupy the same space. However once persons are understood in terms of inter-relation the problems introduced by substance disappear. Relations neither displace nor jeopardize the integrity of the other.¹³⁴

¹³¹CAC, I, p. 51.

¹³²Reconstruction, p. 215.

¹³³Cf. Reconciliation, p. 2 where Torrance argues the same point regarding Cyril, and STI, p. 85 where he identifies the Holy Spirit, "The immediate personal energy of God," as disclosing the interrelational principle of the sheer creativity of God.

¹³⁴GGT, p. 173.

They unify without confusion. This ultimately is possible, Juengel explains, because in His Trinitary communion, God is self-related:

God's self-relatedness is based on God's 'Yes' to himself. In this 'Yes' of God to himself God sets himself in relation to himself, in order so to be he who he is. In this sense God's being is in becoming.¹³⁵

Thus God as self-relational does not require another than Himself for his being.¹³⁶ It is His self-relation ad intra which is the ground for all relation ad extra.¹³⁷

Torrance suggests within the Divine life there is a temporal correlate to the perichoresis in as much as space-time and its Divine archetype are inseparable.¹³⁸ Eternity is not a duration which the Triune God indwells. God is not in eternity. Eternity is the act of indwelling. Eternity

¹³⁵The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 102.

¹³⁶This is a major point of distinction between Barth and Torrance's relational theology and Whitehead's process theology. The former subscribe to a divine dynamism ad intra while the latter, devoid of a doctrine of the Trinity, generates the actuality of its becoming ("consequent nature") only by ingression into the world. Whitehead summarizes: "It is as true to say that God [as the primordial possibility and subjective datum] creates the world, as that the World [as superjective datum] creates God" (Process and Reality, p. 410).

For Torrance, the anhypostasis of Christ's humanity serves the analogous Christological function of preventing the necessity of Christ's dependence upon created humanity. It is the sheer contingent dependence of the world upon God in Christ maintained sola gratia within creatio ex nihilo and in the enhypostatic conjunction of humanity with the Word that distances Torrance's thought from the panentheism or even the "panenChristism" of process theology (cf. Thomas W. Ogletree, "A Christological Assessment of Dipolar Theism," in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978], p. 343).

¹³⁷Juengel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 99.

¹³⁸STR, pp. 130-131.

is not something behind or above God but is the interactive between of the dynamism of Trinitary communion. Barth provides a useful exposition for our 'perichoretic' sequel of eternity. Eternity as relational is properly conceived only from the triune perspective:

We are speaking about the God who is eternally the Father, who without origin or begetting is Himself the origin and begetter, and therefore undividedly the beginning, succession and end, all at once in His own essence. We are speaking about the God who is also eternally the Son, who is begotten of the Father and yet of the same essence with Him, who as begotten of the Father is also undividedly beginning, succession and end, all at once in His own essence. We are speaking about the God who is also eternally the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son but is of the same essence as both, who as the Spirit of the Father and the Son is also undividedly beginning, succession and end, all at once in His own essence. It is this "all," this God, who is the eternal God, really the eternal God. For this "all" is pure duration, free from all the fleetingness and the separations of what we call time, the nunc aeternitatis which cannot come into being or pass away, which is conditioned by no distinctions, which is not disturbed and interrupted but established and confirmed in its unity by its trinity, by the inner movement of the begetting of the Father, the being begotten by the Son and the procession of the Spirit from both. Yet in it there is order and succession. The unity is in movement.¹³⁹

This, in Torrance's terms, is ". . . the uncreated and creative life of God."¹⁴⁰ This alone is true uncreated duration. As Barth contends, the eternity of God,

. . . decides and conditions all beginning, succession and end. It controls them. It is itself that which begins in all beginnings, continues in all successions, and ends in all endings. Without it nothing is or begins or follows or ends. In it and from it, in and from eternity everything is which is, including all beginning, succession and end. To that extent it is and

¹³⁹CD, II, 1, 63, p. 615.

¹⁴⁰STR, p. 131.

has itself beginning, succession and end.¹⁴¹

This dynamic Trinitary communion reflects the Scriptural designation of the living God much more adequately than those who subscribe to the eternity of God fitted with philosophic categories of static unity. We see that a static unity is not essential for the integrity of the Godhead. In fact such a notion is alien to the divine life and intimates a nomistic rigor analogous to that which we have seen introduced by the interpersonal alienation of man from God.

The Bi-durational Person of Christ

If God is, as Torrance claims, 'antecedently and eternally in Himself what He is toward us in Jesus Christ', one would expect to find a Christological expression of this dynamic interrelation such that the inconfused conjunction of Time and Eternity are not antithetical but rather endemic to the very life of Christ.

It is clear that the Orthodox view of person as ekstatic provides the key for such a dynamic relation as intrinsic and constitutive of what it is to be personal. To be personal is to be in durational relation. What is more, however, is the orthodox understanding of the hypostatic integrity of person ensures that the dynamism of this relation does not introduce factors alien to its nature. The Christological perichoresis establishes the coexistence of human time within Divine eternity. This is not a casual conjunction but the norm, any detraction from which is a privation. True personhood is durationally two-dimensional.

If this is the case, we must ask, who then is personal? The fall, having introduced a breach in the

¹⁴¹CD, II, 1, 31, p. 610.

God-man relation introduces depersonalization, which includes a fundamental detemporalization in the sense of nomistic ossification, which we have already discussed. Death is the ultimate confirmation of this detemporalized alienation. It is into this breach that the only true person--the personalizing person--Jesus Christ steps. This personalizing person is temporalizing person as in Him time is redeemed, death is conquered and life is set in everlasting communion with God.

Theosis of Time in the Spirit

True personhood is two dimensional: Eternal and Temporal. Just as Christ is the outward relation of God to man, Time to Eternity, the Holy Spirit is the hypostatic relation between the Time of Christ's humanity and the time of our humanity--the time of the Church. It is essential that we do not coordinate our time with Eternity per se, but we only have access to Eternity through the representation of Christ, who is both a man and the man. We are not in any sense both divine and human, eternal and temporal. To refit an Athanasian dictum in this context, Christ assumed our temporality that we might assume his eternality. That is by virtue of his human, historical, temporal incarnation, we through Him fellowship with the eternal God. Man or the Church is not in and of itself durationally two-dimensional, but in Christ we are. God in his ek-static union with man assumed Time into His Eternal life. In turn, Christ, as Person, ek-statically incorporates our humanity into His. As the one true Person, Christ is concrete in His universality, i.e., in His ekstasis, and universal in his concretion, i.e., in his hypostasis. This is a concrete universal event which by virtue of the filioque issues from itself a fully adequate mode of participation. Whereas the Christological theosis is concrete universality in its

extension, the pneumatological theosis provides the intensive participated relation--applied universality.¹⁴² To be in the Spirit is to be ek-statically united to Christ. The strength of the ek-static between is grounded in nothing less than the filioque. It therefore is of divine rather than human origin. As such it is an inalienable relation.

Man under the conditions of nomistic time stands outside of himself through the reconciliation of Christ and in the Spirit. As ek-static he stands out of nomistic time and stands in the Time of Christ. He is who he is beyond himself. He is fundamentally bi-temporal--everlasting and mortal, without mitigating his individual identity as mortal. We have, therefore, discovered with Torrance's direction a more adequate way to understand how it is that one may already be in Christ what he is not yet in himself.

Our understanding of ek-static personhood leads us to realize individuality is inseparable from corporate community. Torrance continues, ". . . private and corporate communion in the Spirit belong inseparably together and are mutually dependent within the fellowship of the Church,"¹⁴³ of whom Christ is the Head. Elsewhere he elaborates:

In the New Testament koinōnia means primarily the Church's participation through the Spirit in Jesus Christ, and so in the divine Nature; but it also means a communion or fellowship in love with one another on that basis. Vertically so to speak, the communion of the Spirit is the relation of the Church to Christ, horizontally it is the fellowship of love between believers, between members of the Church or Body of Christ.¹⁴⁴

Here in effect we have an antepenultimate relation. The

¹⁴²Cf. Reconstruction, p. 242.

¹⁴³SF, p. cxxiii.

¹⁴⁴CAC, I, p. 271.

Spirit mystically unites the saints to Christ in the communion (koinōnía) of the Church. Furthermore the Spirit unites our humanity with Christ in the hypostatic union. Finally the Spirit is the consubstantial communion, the mutual involution of the Father and the Son in Trinitary love.¹⁴⁵ We see here a hierarchy of relation developing within the confines of Torrance's thought.

For our immediate purposes this allows us to analyze one further component--the time of the Church. With this hierarchy in mind we immediately realize there can be no confusion between the redemptive time of Christ and the nomistic time of this world. The Church as bi-temporal participates in both of these. Torrance elaborates:

The Church thus lives, as it were, in two times: in the time of this passing world, that is in the midst of on-going secular history and world events, the time of decay that flows down into the past and into the ashes of death, but also in the time of the risen Saviour and of the new creation that is already a perfected reality in him. This happens through the koinōnía of the Spirit, so that the Church lives and works and fulfills its mission in the overlap of the two times or two ages, this present aeon that passes away and the new aeon that has already overtaken us in Christ Jesus, the end-time that has telescoped itself into the present and penetrated the Church through the coming of the Spirit.¹⁴⁶

The time of the Church is a bi-temporal tension.¹⁴⁷ As we have seen, fallen time though rendered irreversible by the tyranny of law nevertheless is arrested in its proclivity toward decay by the law. As such the time of the Church from the fallen perspective may be seen in a positive light. However this is not to suggest its terrestrial time

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 271.

¹⁴⁶STR, p. 99.

¹⁴⁷CAC, I, pp. 211, 312; SF, pp. cxxv-cxxvi; RP, pp. 51, 55; CAC, II, pp. 21-22; STR, pp. 156-157.

is in itself other than that of all the world in general. Torrance suggests, although the Church through the Spirit partakes already in the redemption of time in Christ, it

. . . is sent like Christ into the world as the servant of the Lord, humbling itself and containing itself in kenōsis within the limits and laws of this world in order to proclaim the Gospel of reconciliation and to live out reconciliation within the conditions of fallen human existence.¹⁴⁸

The time of the Church is the time in which the mission of the Church is conducted,¹⁴⁹ the time in which the divine consummation and judgment are held in abatement,¹⁵⁰ the time of decision,¹⁵¹ the time of the first fruits of everlasting life in the Spirit through the sacraments,¹⁵² the time between the times of the ascension and the second advent.¹⁵³ As such it is that time which flows in contrapuntal relation to Millennial Time.

One final implication of the filioque must be investigated. In our discussion regarding the unity of the Parousia, Torrance suggested the time which has been identified as the time of decision was time suspended in the face of Eternity.¹⁵⁴ Within the confines of his

¹⁴⁸STR, p. 99.

¹⁴⁹RP, p. 55; CAC, II, pp. 73-74; CAC, I, p. 312; AT, p. 160; STR, p. 104.

¹⁵⁰CAC, I, p. 313; CAC, II, pp. 73-74.

¹⁵¹CAC, I, p. 313; CAC, II, pp. 21-22; STR, pp. 146-147.

¹⁵²The Centrality of Christ, 22 May, p. 20; RP, pp. 47-48; "The Mission of the Church," Scottish Journal of Theology 19 (1966): 132.

¹⁵³Reconstruction, p. 240. CAC, I pp. 311-312; AT, pp. 158-159; STR, pp. 103-104.

¹⁵⁴AT, p. 84; "PC," p. 123.

theological relations this must be understood either derivatively or as hyperbola, for the Spirit unites us to the humanity of Christ and only by implication and derivation to His deity. As we have seen, His humanity is characterized by the fullness of Time--Millennial Time, which though hypostatically united with Eternity cannot be confused.

This is not a trivial matter, for he himself points out, this oversight leads to monophysitism.¹⁵⁵ It is only by circumventing the filioque that nomistic time could be directly conjoined with Divine eternity. The theological upshot to this is that the time of decision is fundamentally in dynamic tension to the imminence of the Eschaton. It is a temporal, not an Eternal tension and hence provisional as Torrance himself admits.¹⁵⁶ As such it is existentially urgent that the Church continue in its mission to redeem the time.

6. Relation in Reformed Perspective

Had Torrance not been Scots, the direction of his historical theological exploration may have taken a different tack. Although he never identifies the unitary mode of thought with his national heritage as he does with the Jewish, it is remarkable from this juncture onward how frequently his countrymen figure in the discussion.

Richard of St. Victor:
Trinity of Interpersonal Love

He begins by identifying Richard of St. Victor, the Scots-born Parisian abbot, as championing a distinctively

¹⁵⁵Reconstruction, p. 185.

¹⁵⁶SF, p. cxxv.

non-Boethian¹⁵⁷ doctrine of Trinitary personhood, in which personhood is defined in terms of interpersonal love (condilectio),¹⁵⁸ which is perfect and proper only because it extends itself towards another of equal stature, and in turn this communion of love extends itself to a third person. The Trinity is essentially unified yet personally distinguished (existentia in comunicabilis).¹⁵⁹ John Bligh concludes: "The dominant image of Augustine's De Trinitate is the trinity of mind, knowledge and love; the dominant analogy of Richard's De Trinitate is a trinity of three human persons united in condilectio."¹⁶⁰ Torrance elaborates the Richardine perspective in contrast to the Boethian:

Richard defines this then, not in terms of its own independence of thought--subsistence, [rationalis naturae individua substantia], but in terms of its ontological relations to other persons, that is, by a transcendental relation to what is outside of it and in terms of its own incommunicable ex-istence--this

¹⁵⁷La Trinitate [De Trinitate], trans. Gaston Salet (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1959): 4, xxi, pp. 278-281. See Muarice Nédonelle "L'intersubjectivité humaine est-elle pour saint Augustin une image de la Trinité?" in Augustinus Magister, Congres International Augustinien, ed. (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1954), I, pp. 595-602 and J. Ribaillier, Richard de Saint-Victor, de Trinitate (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958), p. 23 for their identification of Richard's trinitary source in Augustine. Cf. John Bligh, S.J., "Richard of St. Victor's De Trinitate: Augustinian or Abelardian?" Heythrop Journal 1 (1960): 133, 138 for his alternative view which treats Richard as fundamentally Abelardian and Achardian (Achard of St. Victor). Torrance's historical theological investigation tends to leave one with the impression that Richard's position was independently derived.

¹⁵⁸[De Trinitate], 3, xix, pp. 208-210.

¹⁵⁹Ibid. 4, xviii pp. 266-269.

¹⁶⁰"De Trinitate:" Augustinian or Abelardian?", p. 125.

explains the expression incommunicabilia existentia. A person can communicate with others, but he does not communicate himself, for he cannot be included in the subjectivity of the other. Nevertheless, a person is what he is only through a relation of being with others. The incommunicable existence represents the fact that the person is really objective to what is other than it, but this objectivity of one person to another is a necessary part of personal existence.¹⁶¹

Duns Scotus: Realist Roots of Reformed Theology

Although this definition was overlooked in the history of theology in the West, Torrance contends it was not totally lost, as some would suggest.¹⁶²

It survived the Middle Ages through the commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences by the Scottish born Franciscan, John Duns Scotus. Here he elaborates upon the Trinitary circumincession¹⁶³ and supports the Richardine critique of Boethius.¹⁶⁴ In Torrance's words:

. . . for Duns the proper notion of the person is derived from reflection upon the Holy Trinity, [and] is at once a relational and an ontological notion, for the relationship is not just a determination of our understanding . . . but an inherent and ontological determination of personal existence. Logico-abstractive acts of knowledge are unable to reach this, and so prevent us from knowing God in accordance with His own personal mode of Being--hence we have to speak of

¹⁶¹HL[RST], lect. 6.

¹⁶²E.g. H. C. Van Elswijk, New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. "Richard of St. Victor"; C.G. Thorne, Jr., New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, s.v. "Richard of St. Victor."

¹⁶³Opera Omnia, ed. P. Augustini: Sépinski and P. Carolo Balic, Ordinatio (Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1959) I, d. 23, q. 1, III, pp. 355-357. Cf. Friedrich Wetter, Die Trinitaetslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Muenster Westfalen: Aschendorffsche, 1967), pp. 272-273.

¹⁶⁴Ordinatio, I, d. 19, q. 2, pp. 280-303.

knowledge of God as personal Being in some form of intuitive knowledge, if only in this imperfect kind.¹⁶⁵

It is this decisive epistemological shift in the Scholastic rationalist method that marked the inception of the dissolution of the Medieval synthesis. No longer could one presume a necessary ontological connection between God and universe. The primacy of the will of God in creation called all rationalistic, causal relation into question. Causal relation was replaced with intuitive intellection, which interacted with the sense object immediately and constructively to form direct cognitive access to the real world.¹⁶⁶ Herein Torrance finds the onto-relational roots

¹⁶⁵"Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge from Duns Scotus to John Calvin," in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Tertii Congressus Scotistici Internationalis. Studia Scholastico-Scotistica, 5, (Rome: Societas Internationalis Scotistica, [1968], 1972): p. 298.

¹⁶⁶A change in the doctrine of God, Torrance argues, was prerequisite for the Copernican revolution and the Reformation doctrine of grace:

"In the old Greek notion of God, which was deeply embedded in the theology of the medieval world, God was regarded as impassible and changeless. Accordingly, nature also was held to be changeless and even eternal, and because men thought of it as impregnated with final causes, they imagined that the eternal pattern could be read off the book of nature, thus in effect substituting nature for God. With such a doctrine of God and nature behind it, medieval thought was essentially deductive and left no room for the element of contingency in nature, to the recognition of which modern empirical science owes its very existence. This science had to wait until the period of the Reformation when men learned from the Biblical revelation and more particularly from the Christian doctrine of creation that the world is contingent upon the divine will, and that the pattern of nature, while intelligible to us in principle, is essentially hidden and cannot be known in advance but only from the other end, through empirical observation. Thus the great difference between the more or less static science of the ancient and medieval world and the great movement of modern science rests upon a

of Reformed theology¹⁶⁷ and in consequence, the foundations of his own realist theology.¹⁶⁸

Torrance characterizes the Medieval perspective, initiated by Neoplatonic and Ptolemaic cosmology and transmitted to Thomas via St. Augustine as the sacramental universe. The natural world is seen only as a vehicle through which God and eternal realities are seen. "As such," Torrance comments, "the world has no significance in itself, or only significance in so far as it participated in

difference in the doctrine of God" ("ER," pp. 36-37/ KC, pp. 1-2).

For Scotus' influence upon Ockham's epistemological foundations see T. F. Torrance, review of William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse, by Gordon Leff, in Scottish Journal of Theology 29 (June 1976), p. 272.

¹⁶⁷"The second point that Calvin appears to owe to Duns Scotus and also to Richard of St. Victor, arises out of their critique of the Boethian notion of personality, and of their identification of the divine Essence and Existence in the Person (or Persons) of God. God is personal in his own mode of Being involving all his existence and acts. The notion of person here is at once a relational and an ontological notion, for the relationship is not just a determination of our understanding but an inherent and ontic determination of personal existence.

Now knowledge of God, like all true knowledge, is determined by the nature of what is known, and so knowledge of this personal God is determined by his nature as personal Being. Here we have a real and actual relation to God as object, but one that involves in the act of knowing an essential personal relation" (Reconstruction, pp. 85-86).

¹⁶⁸In the preface to DCO Torrance identifies himself with the Scottish realism of Scotus, which he carefully distinguishes from that of Thomas Reid, which eventuated in idealistic nominalism (RBET, 7/14/81).

For the implementation of Scotus' moderate realism and complementary epistemology in Torrance's thought see DCO, pp. 108-109; STI, pp. 86-87; TCFK, pp. 198, 313; RET, pp. 21-22; Bryan Gray, "Theology as Science," pp. 36-38.

divine and eternal patterns."¹⁶⁹ The relation between God and creation was in terms of pre-established patterns of suspended or final significance. Time and history themselves were thereby depreciated.

Calvin: A Dynamic Covenant of Grace

The Reformed alternative, by which Torrance intends Calvin as distinct from Calvinism, was what he describes as the covenant of Grace¹⁷⁰ which:

. . . embraces not only man but the whole of creation and the Creator--that is, not one reposing upon some inherent relation of likeness between the essence of God as such and the essence of man as such, but solely upon the gracious decision of God to create a world utterly distinct from Him and yet to assume it beyond anything it possesses in itself into such close relation with Him that it may reflect His Glory and be the appointed theatre of His revelation. Thus Reformed theology sought to assert the relation between Creator and creature, Grace and nature, in such a way as to repudiate any confusion or reversibility on the one hand and any separability or dichotomy on the other, for it took as its guide in understanding that relation the fulfilment of God's Covenant of Grace in Jesus Christ.¹⁷¹

In contrast to the static, causal mechanics of Roman grace the Covenant was understood in a living teleological-

¹⁶⁹TS, pp. 66-67; cf. SF, pp. 1-lvii.

¹⁷⁰By the term "Covenant", Torrance intends the pre-federal concept, which treats the Old and New Covenants as anticipatory and fulfilled in Christ and hence fundamentally unitary. He rejects with Calvin [cf. Institutes, II, X, 1, n.1] the dualism of the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The Covenant is always to be seen as fulfilled in Christ rather than principally regulative of him (cf. SF, p. lxiv).

¹⁷¹TS, p. 68.

eschatological way.¹⁷² The two, unlike Luther's two kingdom theology,¹⁷³ were intelligible only in interrelation with each other. One could not abstract the eternal decrees of God from their historic fruition, nor eschatology from teleology. In short there is a profound interconnection between eternity and time. In his Commentary on Hebrews, (2.5) Calvin argued much like Cullmann some four hundred years later: "Here the world to come is not that which we hope for after resurrection, but that which began at the beginning of Christ's Kingdom. . . ." ¹⁷⁴ Torrance therefore concludes,

. . . Calvin held the eschatological relation to involve not only the relation between the past and the future [teleology], between predestination and the last things, but also the relation in the present between the new world and the old [eschatology in the narrow sense], for the last days have already overtaken the Church so that it lives even now in the new world.¹⁷⁵

For Torrance this covenantal relation is evidenced externally and teleologically in the sacraments, which are ". . . the signs which mark out the sphere of God's self-revelation and self-giving to His people, and the seals of His faithfulness in fulfilling in them all His prom-

¹⁷²See "The Paschal Mystery of Christ and the Eucharist," (mimeographed), [pre-1974], pp. 2-3; Reconciliation, pp. 98-99; Reconstruction, p. 178. For the lapse of federal theology into a Roman understanding of grace see T. F. Torrance, "Thomas Ayton's The Original Constitution of the Christian Church," in Reformation and Revelation: Essays Presented to the Very Rev. Hugh Watt, ed. Duncan Shaw (Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press, 1967), p. 275.

¹⁷³Torrance with G. Rupp expresses the relation between the two kingdoms as tangential, meeting only in a mathematical point ("ER," pp. 43, 48/ KC, pp. 18-19, 45-46).

¹⁷⁴Quoted in "ER," p. 57.

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

ise. . ."¹⁷⁶ and internally and eschatologically in Spiritual communion, "through which we are taken up to share in life and love of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit."¹⁷⁷

Mystical Union as Spiritual Relation

It is to the mystical union of Christ with His Church that we must turn to find the distinctive unitary relation in Reformed thought. On the one hand, Calvin rejected Osiander's confusion of substantial body of Christ with the Church, and on the other he rejected the Zwinglian separation inherent in the notion of contemplation.¹⁷⁸ His sacramental theology is thoroughly Chalcedonian:

The sacraments of the world should not and cannot be at all separated from their reality and substance. To distinguish, in order to guard against confounding them, is not only good and reasonable, but altogether necessary; but to divide them, so as to make the one exist without the other is absurd.¹⁷⁹

He goes beyond the privative Chalcedonian expression however by arguing that the proper understanding of the sacramental presence is "that of a relationship [habitudinis]",¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶SF, p. lvi.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Cf. Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1953), p. 153; CAC, II, p. 143.

¹⁷⁹Opera Selecta 1:509, quoted in Kilian McDonnell, John Calvin, the Church and the Eucharist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 230.

¹⁸⁰Institutes, IV.17.13. This relational motif is elsewhere depicted in terms of "holy brotherhood" (ibid., II.12.2; 13.2; 14.6; III.20.36) with Christ and the "sacred wedlock" (ibid., III.1.3). Even St. Thomas recognized a habitus realis among his seven definitions.

which in the final analysis "is spiritual because the secret power of the Spirit is the bond of our union with Christ."¹⁸¹ He likens this to the radiance of the sun upon the earth which sustains and nourishes its growth,¹⁸² the diffusion of the vital sap throughout a tree or vigor of the head to the extremities of the body.¹⁸³ This serves as the ecclesiastical analogue to the hypostatic union.

Relational Ontology of the Extra-Calvinisticum

However it is through the discussion of the so-called extra-Calvinisticum that this comes into clearer focus. Calvin rejected the Roman and Lutheran local, physical solutions to the eucharistic presence. He contended just as the Word fully indwelt Jesus while

For him it denoted an extra-mental real relation (see Roy J. Deterrani and Sister M. Inviolata Barry, ed., A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas based on the "Summa Theologica" and Selected Passages of His Other Works [Baltimore: Catholic University Press, 1948]).

¹⁸¹Institutes, IV.17. 33. Cf. Short Treatise on the Lord's Supper in which Calvin elaborates: "We must hold that it [the presence] is made effectual by the secret and miraculous power of God, and that the Spirit of God is the bond of participation, this being the reason why it is called spiritual" (Opera Selecta, p. 530, quoted in McDonnell, John Calvin: The Church and the Eucharist, p. 262). In his 1561 treatise, The Clear Explanation of Sound Doctrine Concerning the True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood of Christ in the Holy Supper, he continues: "Although Christ is distant from us in respect of place, he is yet present by the boundless energy of his Spirit, so that his flesh can give us life" (Quoted in J. K. S. Reid, trans. Calvin: Theological Treatises, Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 22 [London: SCM, 1954], p. 289).

¹⁸²Institutes, IV.17.12.

¹⁸³The Best Method of Obtaining Concord Provided the Truth be Sought without Contention, trans. J. K. S. Reid, Vol. 22, Library of Christian Classics, p. 326.

continuously filling the world¹⁸⁴ and thus His deity suffered no spatio-temporal confinement, so in the Lord's supper "the whole Christ is present, but not in his wholeness"¹⁸⁵ in that his glorified body is ascended.

Of course Luther, by his inordinate stress upon the communicatio idiomatum, argued whatever pertains to one nature of Christ pertains to the other, so that God suffered upon the cross, and the physical body of Christ is ubiquitous in the eucharist. He utilized the spatial categories of Ockham and Biel¹⁸⁶ in arguing the body of Christ in the Eucharist was definitively present--the whole body of Christ is wholly present in every part of space which the elements occupy.¹⁸⁷ It is then proper to say by virtue of the communication idiomatum that the local space of the bread contained the omnipresent body of Christ--finitum capax infiniti.

It was his failure to maintain the delicate Chalcedonian balance that led him in this monophysite direction, as the divine and the human natures became confused. In the final analysis it was the Aristotelian concept of space or more particularly "place" (topos)¹⁸⁸ underlying the Lutheran

¹⁸⁴Institutes, II.13.4.

¹⁸⁵Institutes, IV.17.30.

¹⁸⁶See Seeberg, vol. II, History of Doctrines in the Middle and Modern Ages, pp. 326-327; Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), pp. 275-276.

¹⁸⁷This is distinguished from 1) "circumscriptive" presence, which is the usual manner of understanding an object filling space, the sum of its parts constituting its spatial location, and 2) "repletive" presence, which applies to the glorified Christ, who is wholly present in all space, but is contained by no place.

¹⁸⁸George Claghorn comments:
"Place stresses displacement, space emphasizes volume."

position which of necessity cast the argument in such an awkward light. In his definition of topos Aristotle asserts:

- (1) Place is what contains that which it is the place.
- (2) Place is not part of the thing.
- (3) The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing.
- (4) Place can be left behind by the thing and is separable.¹⁸⁹

Thus it becomes clear that the sacramental elements literally contained the humanity of Christ. Torrance argues:

(A) rejection of the 'Calvinist extra' raises very great difficulties, as one can see in a kenotic theory of Christ's self-emptying. Quite clearly if one operates with a receptacle view of space, one must think of the kenosis as the emptying of the Son of God into a containing vessel, but this way of thinking creates difficulties that need not be there and which once created need to be solved. The same problem arose in the Medieval doctrine of the real presence. If a receptacle view of space or place is held, how are we to think of the Body of Christ as contained in the host, in every part of it, and in a multitude of hosts at the same time, and how can we think of it as being contained without any relation between the dimensions of the Body of Christ and the space of the place that contains him?¹⁹⁰

It is telling that Aristotle developed this doctrine within his Physica rather than his Metaphysica. It was

Place is that which surrounds, while space is what is surrounded. There is no place of the whole, but there is a space of the whole. A place describes an existing thing, but cannot bring it about. A space is more than the thing existing in it at the moment; it has the ability to bring forth a new body where the old ceases to be" (Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's "Timaeus" [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954], pp. 16-17).

¹⁸⁹Physica, trans. R.P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), IV. 4, 210b-211a.

¹⁹⁰STR, pp. 124-125.

intended to be more a mathematical than a cosmological theory.¹⁹¹ The quantitative dilemma is never overcome by Luther. Calvin however escapes it by trafficking within a relational categorial system.

All of this presupposes a metaphysic which is quite alien to the physicalism of the Roman and Lutheran Churches. Although Calvin does not disparage the use of the term substance,¹⁹² he nonetheless redefines it:

. . . the body of Christ is given to us in the Supper spiritually, because the secret virtue of the Spirit makes things separated in space to be united with each other, and accordingly enables life from the flesh of Christ to reach us from heaven. This power and faculty of vivifying might not improperly be said to be something abstracted from the substance, provided it be truly and distinctly understood that the body of Christ remains in heaven, and yet from this substance life flows and comes to us who are pilgrims on earth."¹⁹³

Thus "substance" is no longer a substrate of the corporeal but the very energy of existence--a life-giving presence. Bard Thompson argues Calvin was enough of a humanist to draw upon the Renaissance humanist Alberti's notion of virtus, which meant neither power nor virtue, but ". . .that inner human force which constitutes our true and full humanity; it includes intelligence and reason; but it also includes that

¹⁹¹Even his theory of space (chora) developed in the Categories is construed as a continuous quantity.

¹⁹²"(A)s is declared in my writings more than a hundred times, I am so far from rejecting the term substance, that I simply and readily declare, that spiritual life, by the incomprehensible agency of the Spirit, is infused into us from the substance of the flesh of Christ. I also constantly admit that we are substantially fed on the flesh and blood of Christ, though I disregard the gross fiction of a local compounding" (True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood, p. 264).

Cf. Best Method of Obtaining Concord, pp. 328-329.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 329, emphasis mine.

which human beings can cultivate out of their own freedom of will, namely knowledge, control, balance, harmony, dignity."¹⁹⁴ This is significant for it dispells McDonnell's criticism of Calvin as tending toward impersonalism and modalism in his pneumatology¹⁹⁵ as for example, when he asserts ". . .the Holy Spirit is the bond by which Christ effectually unites himself to us."¹⁹⁶ The personal is now understood as interpersonal interaction rather than individual concretion. The personhood of the Spirit is variously depicted in terms of, ". . . virtus, vis, potentia, energia, effectus, impulsus, instinctus, motus, influxus".¹⁹⁷ What we see therefore is a relational or field rather than a substantival metaphysic.¹⁹⁸ Wallace argues,

. . . in revealing Himself God takes up into His activity an earthly action or event, and unites with Himself, for a moment, a human element. We call this activity of God His sacramental action. In such sacramental action a union takes place between the divine element--the Spirit or action of God--and the human activity, so that the whole event is effectual in conveying the very grace depicted in its outward form."¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴The Graduate School, Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, "Readings in Calvin," Course Lectures, Spring 1978, 25 April, 1978. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, I.13.18.

¹⁹⁵John Calvin: The Church and Eucharist, p. 253.

¹⁹⁶Institutes, III.1.1.

¹⁹⁷Ibid. p. 252; cf. Werner Krusche, Das Wirken des Heiligen Geistes nach Calvin (Goetingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957) p. 9.

¹⁹⁸Cf. J. Beckmann, Vom Sakrament bei Calvin (Tuebingen: J. C. Mohr, 1926), p. 151; McDonnell, John Calvin: The Church and Eucharist, p. 239.

¹⁹⁹Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament, p. 159.

Imago Dei as Interpersonal

In Torrance's classical treatment of Calvin's anthropology we find ample evidence that Calvin, by embracing the Scotistic volitional relation of God to creation, was fundamentally distancing himself from all Aristotelian substantival categories.²⁰⁰

This stress upon the will is of prime importance in Calvin's theology, for it indicates how much he broke with the traditional habits of the Schoolman who used to think of the relations between God and man in terms of a gradation of being, and so inevitably of the imago dei in terms of a static analogy of being. Calvin expressly repudiates the idea that the will is primarily in man, . . . but (w)hen the element of will is given its true place in the imago dei, the imago dei is seen to be the configuration formed in the person of man by the constant will of God to communicate Himself to man through the Word.²⁰¹

This continuous dynamic relation with creation entails a direct interaction of God with man. Calvin's doctrine of creatio continua replaces the primacy of secondary causation with the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit.²⁰² This undoubtedly marks a principle difference between Calvin and subsequent Calvinism and its reversion to Aristotelian

²⁰⁰CDM, pp. 55, & f.n. 8; 56, & f.n. 2; 120, 122. It is important to note that while in this 1949 publication Torrance differentiated between ontological and sacramental notions of revelation it appears he had not yet differentiated substantival from ontological, and in fact used them synonymously. Subsequently he has reconstrued the Reformed foundations of Calvin as onto-relational (as in CAC, II, p. 187), which he offers as an ontological alternative to substantival metaphysics. Thus although Torrance's thought had not fully matured to this point he would take no significant exception to what he developed in this initial phase.

²⁰¹Ibid, p. 65, & f.n. 2. Cf. p. 122.

²⁰²Ibid, pp. 61-63, 63 f.n. 4.

categories of causation introduced initially by Peter Martyr Vermigli and his disciple Jerome Zanchi. Justo Gonzalez remarks,

Whereas Calvin started from the concrete revelation of God, and always retained an awesome sense of the mystery of God's will, later Reformed theology tended more to proceed from the divine decrees down to particulars in a deductive fashion.²⁰³

This distinction also stands in bold relief to the Roman categories of predestination. Predestination is not an eternal pattern from which the structure of the church on earth may be derived. Rather,

. . . the whole history of the Church like nature is contingent on the will of God, and . . . while the pattern is discernible in principle, as it were, in Christ, in the Word of the Gospel, it remains essentially a mysterium and cannot be known in advance, but only from the final end, by apocalyptic manifestation at the Advent of Christ.²⁰⁴

If Calvin and subsequently Torrance's anthropology is to be understood aright it must be construed in its communal relation with the Word and Spirit.²⁰⁵ The *imago dei* is not in man's possession--not part of his private, autonomous person over which he may exercise control.²⁰⁶ First and foremost Jesus Christ is the *imago dei*²⁰⁷ to which he is dynamically and continuously related objectively by the sacramental operation of the Holy Spirit and

²⁰³From the Protestant Reformation to the Twentieth Century, p. 244.

²⁰⁴"ER", pp. 39-40 / KC, p. 5.

²⁰⁵CDM, pp. 19-20, 23-24, 26-27, 29-30 & passim.

²⁰⁶Ibid., p. 54; cf. The Christian Frame of Mind, p. 31.

²⁰⁷CDM, p. 86, & f.n. 1.

subjectively appropriated through the gift of faith.²⁰⁸ By "sacramental relation" Calvin intends the personalizing of the Word of man in such a way that it establishes "intercourse or communication or even incorporation with Christ the Word."²⁰⁹ In Calvin's words, "Not only does he cleave to us by an indivisible bond of fellowship, but with wonderful communion, day by day, he grows more and more into one body with us, until he becomes completely one with us."²¹⁰ Ultimately this reflects the perichoresis of the Trinity.²¹¹ Antepenultimately it is expressed in the Church: "as believers are bound together in the mutual relations of the Body of Christ . . . while many, they are one in the perfect Man, that through the Spirit of unity and love and Truth they image the unity of the Father and the Son."²¹²

Although the process of Spiritual intervention is hidden from us so that we cannot discern how the sacramental relation is transacted, we are experiential recipients of its benefits.²¹³ This is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which establishes the filial bond of adoption. Moreover all vital knowledge of God depends upon the mediation of the Word by the Spirit. In Calvin's Commentary on Ezekiel (2:2) he writes:

God indeed works efficiently by His own Words, but we must hold that this efficacy is not contained in the Words themselves, but proceeds from the secret instinct of the Spirit. This work of the Spirit then is joined with the Word of God. But a distinction is made, that

²⁰⁸CDM, pp. 138-139, 149-152.

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 138.

²¹⁰Institutes, III.2.24.

²¹¹CDM, pp. 45-46; 46, f.n. 1.

²¹²Ibid., p. 45.

²¹³Ibid., p. 138 & f.n. 6.

we may know that the external Word is of no avail by itself, unless animated by the power of the Spirit. . . . All power of action, then, resides in the Spirit Himself and thus all praise ought to be referred entirely to God alone. We hold therefore that, when God speaks, He adds the efficacy of the Spirit, since His Word without it would be fruitless; and yet the Word is effectual, because the instrument ought to be united with the Author of the act. . . . Hence we conclude that it is not in our power to obey what God commands, unless this power proceeds from Him.²¹⁴

It must not be forgotten that it is the image of God in man and therefore true humanity cannot be understood apart from relation with the Divine. "Imago dei", Torrance stresses, "is essentially a reflection in and by the soul of the Word of God which is itself the lively or quickening image of God."²¹⁵ Sin, by vitiating this relation, leaves man independent of God, and thereby devoid of His image.

Conversely, the believer stands in right relation to God. Calvin uses the term rectitudo--the principle of orderly dependence upon the grace and mercy of God,²¹⁶ reestablished upon the Cross and expressed in the gratitude of the believer for his redemption. Justification and rectification are synonymous.²¹⁷

It is important to note that while in this 1949 publication Torrance differentiated between ontological and sacramental notions of relation it appears he had not yet differentiated substantival from ontological, and in fact used them synonymously. Subsequently he has reconstrued the Reformed foundations of Calvin as onto-relational,²¹⁸

²¹⁴Quoted in CDM, pp. 132-133.

²¹⁵CDM, p. 56 & f.n. 5.

²¹⁶Ibid., p. 47; cf. p. 44.

²¹⁷Ibid., p. 50.

²¹⁸CAC II, p. 187.

which he offers as an ontological alternative to substantial metaphysics. Thus although Torrance's thought had not fully matured to this point, he would take no significant exception to what he developed in this initial phase.

Bi-temporal Eschatology of the Covenant

From the discussion we may extract several durational clues which should augment our understanding of Torrance. Our clues organize themselves around the eschatology of the Covenant in its outer-inner, creaturely-Spiritual, humiliation-exaltation, or teleological and eschatological forms. Torrance reminds us, it must never be forgotten that Covenant is Christocentrically defined:

The whole substance of this Covenant of Grace in its outer and in its inner form is Jesus Christ Himself, so that it is in accordance with the Person and Work of Christ, His Nature and His Mission, that the whole life and faith of the people of God in the economy of the New covenant is to be understood.²¹⁹

Thus the categorial center of our work heretofore remains inviolable:

. . . the Covenant is not related to Christ as the general to the particular, but as the general to the concrete universal. In this way the Covenant idea is entirely subordinated to the doctrine of Christ and cannot properly be erected into a masterful systematic principle. . .²²⁰

²¹⁹SF, p. lvi.

²²⁰Ibid., p. lv. Barth makes a similar point: "[Church Dogmatics]. . . has a circumference, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of last things, the redemption and consummation. But the covenant fulfilled in the atonement is its centre. From this point we can and must see a circumference. But we can see it only from this point. A mistaken or deficient perception here would mean error or deficiency everywhere . . ." (CD, IV, 1, 57. p. 3).

Jesus Christ, the Covenant of God's Grace toward the world, is the intersection of Eternity with time. Once the relational view of reality is fully appreciated the traditional dualist problem of transcendence and immanence is dispelled. It now becomes questionable how this disjunction was ever tolerated. The immanence of God in the world is intelligible only in light of its unconfused differential dependence upon His transcendence. It becomes apparent therefore, that the Extra-Calvinisticum is misunderstood if it is held to be ad extra per se. It is, rather, ad intra from the relational perspective. In Christ Time enhypostatically co-exists in differential relation to Eternity.²²¹

For Torrance, an analogous bi-temporality is reflected in the derivative relation of Christ to His Church in the Spirit as the implications of the mystical union are unravelled:

The Church . . . lives, as it were, in two times: in the time of this passing world, that is in the midst of on-going secular history and world events, the time of decay that flows down into the past and into the ashes of death, but also in the time of the risen Saviour and the new creation that is already perfected reality in him. This happens through the koinonia of the Spirit, so that the Church lives and works and fulfils its mission in the overlap of the two times or two ages, this present aeon that passes away and the new aeon that has already overtaken us in Christ Jesus, the end-time that has telescoped itself into the present and penetrated the Church through the coming of the Spirit.²²²

We have seen that the Man Christ Jesus lives out the redemption of time. But by virtue of the ascension it remains in eschatological arrears as millennial Time while the time of the Church still processes in its tyranny to the

²²¹STR, p. 126.

²²²Ibid., p. 99. Cf. T. F. Torrance, Foreward to Calvin's Doctrine of Last Things, p. 8.

law.²²³ This proves to be a compound-complex relation. Torrance writes:

The Church lives in the midst of that eschatological tension, but that tension is itself dual--that is the difficult thing about the eschatology of the New Testament, but its very heart. The tension is twofold: (i) tension between the new and the old here and now, and (ii) tension between the present and the future.²²⁴

The tension between the new and old creation is what he designates as a vertical, anhypostatic, apocalyptic, eschatological tension.²²⁵ Torrance employs the term 'eschatology' in both a non-technical, general sense as a dogmatic locus and also in the specialized sense of the millennial reign of Christ, the Eschatos,²²⁶ in contrapuntal relation to which the Church processes.²²⁷ His intent within the present context, of course, is the latter. The new-old tension is generated ". . . by present participation through the Spirit (in Word and Sacrament) in the new creation."²²⁸ The Parousia of Christ has come already--the Kingdom is in our midst. In Christ it has been intensively

²²³Cf. RP, p. 45; STR, pp. 132-133.

²²⁴CAC, I, p. 312; cf. p. 99; STR, p. 152; "MED," p. 101. Although in many respects this analysis parallels that of Oscar Cullmann, and Torrance even praises Christ and Time as ". . . certainly the most exciting work on eschatology since the epoch-making work of Albert Schweitzer" (review of The Earliest Christian Confessions, by Oscar Cullmann, in Scottish Journal of Theology 5 [1952]: 85), nevertheless he denies Cullmann's influence here (Interview, 15 July 1981).

²²⁵TS, p. 336; "MED," pp. 102, 225-226; CAC, I, p. 248; STR, p. 151.

²²⁶STR, p. 151.

²²⁷Cf. RP, p. 43.

²²⁸CAC, I, p. 312; cf. STR, p. 152.

realized.²²⁹ However, His presence is invisible: ". . . although we communicate with him immediately through the Spirit, he is mediated to us in our sense experience only through the sacramental elements."²³⁰ It waits only to be unveiled--the apo-kalupsis.²³¹

The tension between the past/present and future is designated as a horizontal, prophetic, enhypostatic, teleological tension.²³² This is a tension generated by the nomistic protraction of the time of the Church vis-a-vis the fullness of Time in Christ.

. . . although we communicate with him immediately through the Spirit, he is mediate to us only through the temporal and spatial acts of sacramental communion in the mist of the Church until he comes.²³³

The Kingdom of God has not yet come. The glory of Christ is veiled from history so that man is allotted a time for decision and faith. The Church processes toward its historical rendezvous with Christ in the second Advent. The Kingdom of God is extensively protracted into the teleological future.²³⁴

The great eschatological tension therefore is between the realization of the presence of Christ through His Spirit and the anticipation of the presence of Christ in His Person:²³⁵

²²⁹STR, p. 104; TCFK, p. 349.

²³⁰STR, p. 152.

²³¹Cf. DGAF, p. 35; STR, p. 112.

²³²TS, p. 336; "MED," pp. 102, 225-226; CAC, I, p. 248; STR, p. 151.

²³³STR, p. 153.

²³⁴Ibid., p. 104; TCFK, p. 349.

²³⁵"MED," p. 101; STR, p. 132; cf. p. 99.

. . . the New Testament emphasis upon the future of the Kingdom of God is not the future of the reality but the future of its full manifestation, so that the eschatological tension in linear time must be modified into eschatological tension between the time of a present but hidden reality and the time of the same reality manifest in the future.²³⁶

This therefore is Torrance's understanding of New Testament eschatology. It is both realized and future eschatology, which is sheer paradox outside of this contingent relation/bi-temporal context.

Torrance distances this view of time as contingent relation championed by Calvin's understanding of the covenantal grace from the alternative species, namely, time as necessary relation. It may be of help to briefly examine this alternative in order to see Torrance's perspective in relief.

Torrance cites Plato as the founder of a relational view of time²³⁷ in its necessitarian form. In Plato's cosmogenic myth, the Demiurge, in order to bring the universe into close conformity with the eternal gods did so

²³⁶"MED", p. 178.

²³⁷STI, p. 58. A. E. Taylor in, A Commentary on Plato's "Timaeus", p. 188 agrees:

"(T)ime is not something existing before or after or beside the events which make up the life of nature, a sort of frame into which the events are put, which might still be something without a structure of its own, if there were no events to fill it. It is itself a character of the events or rather an expression of the most universal character of nature, it is 'passage'. Fully thought out this implies a thoroughgoing 'relativist' theory of time such that an empty time, a time without events, like that which Newton is rightly or wrongly credited with asserting, is a phrase without meaning."

by ordering the cosmos into "a moving image of eternity."²³⁸ The Pythagorean intent of this formula is unmistakable as he continues: "While he was ordering the universe he made of eternity that abides in unity an eternal image moving according to number, even that which we have named time."²³⁹ A. E. Taylor comments, the image of eternity ". . . is to eternity as the series of integers . . . are, on the Pythagorean theory of numbers, to the unit or number one."²⁴⁰ Time therefore was a projection of eternity.

It appears Plato of necessity never adequately addressed the problem of dynamic time, because within the structure of his theory of forms time itself was a form, though perhaps of derivative or secondary status with respect to eternity.²⁴¹ Although the time/eternity connection was relational, it was necessarily so. Platonic participation was predicated upon formal ontological emanation. It failed to account for the radical contingence of creatio ex nihilo. Coupled with his systemic depreciation of the cosmos in light of the surpassing Form of the Good, the Platonic perspective underlies the Augustinian sacramental view of reality and the Platonic world-view which dominated Medieval cosmology. Torrance argues: "Everything that happened on earth corresponded in some way to an eternal pattern in the heavens, so that the whole

²³⁸The Timaeus of Plato, ed. P.D. Archer-Hind (New York: Arno Press, 1973), pp. 119, 376-377.

²³⁹Ibid., pp. 119, 121.

²⁴⁰A Commentary on Plato's "Timaeus", p. 187. It is significant to remind ourselves that Taylor was Torrance's philosophy mentor at Edinburgh.

²⁴¹Time ". . . was made after the pattern of the eternal nature that it might be as like it as possible. For the pattern is existent for all eternity; but the copy has been and is and shall be throughout all time continually" (Plato, Timaeus, 38B-6, p. 123).

purpose of life could be described in terms of imitatio or conformity to the heavenly reality."²⁴²

It is only within the context of contingency derived from the creative will of God purely out of grace that time may truly stand distinct from eternity yet integrally related to it.²⁴³ Grace does not foster autonomy but relation. The covenant of grace in the incarnate and ascended body of Christ establishes solidarity with creation in an enduring way. Christ in redeeming creation guarantees the perpetuity of the contingent--life everlasting. It is this same solidarity that is reflected in the Eucharistic elements, whereby in the assumption of our humanity he has made us Sons of God. It is, in Calvin's terms, this 'blessed exchange'²⁴⁴ which is signified in the body and blood such that "the power of his life-giving death will be efficacious in us."²⁴⁵

In that God has entered into our fallen time and redeemed us within its confines, Time is not ephemeral but real--transfigured into its intended glory in Christ. In that we are reconciled to God in Christ, Time cannot be abstracted from God's personal involvement in history. This is complemented by the fact that by stressing creatio continua time cannot be abstracted from person. But this is not to speak in Kantian terms of subjective forms of intuition.²⁴⁶ To speak of person is to speak in terms of the immediate relational activity of the Holy Spirit. It

²⁴²"ER", p. 36.

²⁴³Cf. The Christian Frame of Mind, pp. 32-33.

²⁴⁴Institutes, IV.17.2.

²⁴⁵Ibid., IV.17.1.

²⁴⁶In Barth's view, time is our objective form of existence (CD III, 2, 47, pp. 455, 456, 525).

is not too much to assert that teleological time is the creative expression of the activity of the Spirit in the past, present and future--space-time is the fundament of creatio continua.²⁴⁷ In Barth's words time is given to man as the form of prevenient grace.²⁴⁸ Time and history, not being expendable are of utmost significance. Because God is in Himself what He is in Jesus Christ, a depreciation of redemptive history is a depreciation of God.

We have made substantial progress in our interrogation of time and eternity in our Christological and anthropological investigation. We must not forget Torrance's admonition, however, that one cannot bifurcate man from his universe. As priests of creation God addresses us through the modes of rationality common to all creation--through space and time.²⁴⁹ As such, we would expect the scientific world to be of help in bringing to light the meaning of our common denominator. Torrance argues:

. . . what physics does is to bring to light the laws of the physical creation and thereby to establish a general framework in space and time within which all human knowledge, including theology, is pursued. Physics, of course, does not control knowledge of the truth into which we inquire in other fields or establish on other grounds, but owing to the intelligible interconnection of all order within the universe, it may nevertheless offer real analogies which can be used to give us a more distinct or precise grasp of truth in other fields.²⁵⁰

We therefore, albeit with caution, venture from our theological confines in an attempt at further clarification.

²⁴⁷Barth holds a similar position: "Time . . . is the formal principle of His [God's] free activity outwards" (CD, II, 1, 3, 609).

²⁴⁸CD, III 2, 47, p. 526.

²⁴⁹GGT, p. 1.

²⁵⁰The Christian Frame of Mind, p. 11.

CHAPTER III

GOD-CHRIST-UNIVERSE DIMENSION: CREATIVE RELATION

For most of the founders of classical science--even for Einstein--science was an attempt go beyond the world of appearances, to reach a timeless world of supreme rationality--the world of Spinoza. But perhaps there is a more subtle form of reality that involves both laws and games, time and eternity.

Ilya Prigogine
From Being to Becoming

7. Science the Outer Ground of Theology

Time is a contingent relation. In our exploration of Torrancian relation we have already outlined the God-Christ and God-Christ-man components of relation in its most general significance. As we examine the God-Christ-universe relation it becomes apparent that it is impossible to separate the human from the natural although it is impossible to confuse them. Nature may not be abstracted from grace, but neither may it be confused. In Torrance's words:

. . . it is scientifically incumbent upon theology, precisely as theological science, to engage in cross-questioning with other sciences, since it must operate with them within the same intelligible structures of

space and time in the universe which God has created.¹

Of course, in Torrance's view, the theological and philosophical mainstream, from Plato and Aristotle, through Augustine and Thomas, and Descartes, Locke, Newton, to Lessing, Kant, Schleiermacher and Ritschl,² never adequately establishing the relation of the transcendent with the immanent, left modern man in the throes of,

. . . the dualist bifurcation of nature which has resulted not only in the extremes of objectivist positivism and subjectivist idealism, materialist verificationism and existential detachment from externality, but therein an approach to science which is unable to formulate properly the basic problems that now challenge us.³

The unique message of Christianity necessarily transformed the dualist categories of thought of the Graeco-Roman culture in which it was born. There was no adequate conceptual stable for the God-man to lay his head. New categories of space and time were necessarily developed in order to account for the incarnation and revelation. In Torrance's view, this is the task of theology in every age, from which our era is not exempt.⁴ In the theory of relativity, developed by the Jewish genius, Albert Einstein, founded upon the electro-magnetic field theory of the

¹STR, p. 183.

²Cf. GGT, pp. 21-27 for a brief history of dualism.

³TCEK, pp. 143-144. T. F. Torrance, "The Concept of Order in Theology and Science," Princeton Seminary Bulletin 2 no. 2, New Series (1984): 134. For the positivistic consequence of Kantian dualism upon Mach see CTSC, p. 20. For the dualistic foundation of the science/religion bifurcation, see STR, pp. 40, 180-181.

⁴STR, p. 44.

Scottish Calvinist,⁵ James Clerk Maxwell, a non-dualist conception of space-time emerged, which in remarkable ways is consistent with a Christian understanding of time. However, before we may proceed we must establish the legitimacy of the cross-fertilization of science with theology from Torrance's perspective.

Scientific Theology and the Space-time
Common Denominator

This nature/grace, natural science⁶/scientific theology connection partakes of the same integral unity as the rest of Torrance's thought. God, being the creative

⁵Although Maxwell never aligned himself formally with any religious position as his ". . . faith was too deep to be in bondage to any set of opinions," his heritage was Presbyterian and Episcopalian, and Scottish Calvinism along with the writings of John Owen and Jonathan Edwards exerted the greatest influences upon him (see Lewis Campell and William Garrett, The Life of James Clerk Maxwell [New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1969], pp. 170-171, n. 2). Conceptually it was the interpersonal theological relations expounded in the metaphysical lectures of the Edinburgh Presbyterian, Sir William Hamilton, which Maxwell brought to bear upon his interpretation of Faraday's field theory (RBET, 7 July 1981). Cf. TCFK, pp. 223, 229-230; CTSC, pp. 50-51.

⁶Torrance distinguishes natural science from the traditional natural theology, the latter of which he sees as detrimental to science and theology, for whereas:

Natural science starts from premises that do not include God, and moves in an opposite direction to theology in accordance with the nature of its subject-matter, . . . 'natural theology' starts from the same premises and the same phenomena as natural science and seeks to move toward God, and in so doing brings itself into conflict with natural science and with pure theology. . ."(TS, p. 103).

The error of natural theology is that it proceeds in an asymptotic direction toward God (STR, p. 180). Curiously, he is not consistent with this nomenclature as later he lapses back into the traditional 'natural theology' terminology (see STR, p. 1, HL[RST], p. 42).

source of all rational unity, provides the sin qua non of all scientific inquiry, viz., the intelligible orderliness of the universe.⁷ Einstein expressed this same confidence in his now famous dictum, "God is deep but not devious" (contra scientific positivism, which fails to explore the profound rational, orderly reality beneath the phenomenal world). The Creator-creature relationship is, as our Christo-centric analysis above would predict, one of unconfused inseparability--utterly distinct, created of nothing, while entirely dependent upon the Divine will.⁸ Torrance depicts this in Barthian covenantal terms:

. . . the Covenant is the inner ground and form of the creation and creation is the outer ground or form of the Covenant, and the very center of the Covenant is the will of God to be our Father and to have us as his dear children. Creation is thus to be understood as the sphere in space and time in which God wills to share his divine life and love with man who is created for this very end. Creation cannot be understood, therefore, in abstraction from God's Covenant purposes, but only as an instrument of His purpose in revelation and reconciliation.⁹

Again, cloning a Kantian dictum, Einstein asserts, with Torrance's approval: "science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind."¹⁰ The relationship, furthermore, is hierarchical. Science is indefinitely open upward to theology, from whence comes its rational coherence and ultimate meaning. Thus scientific theology provides the controlling conditions which science requires for its

⁷The Christian Frame of Mind, p. 7. See DCO, pp. 2-3.

⁸TS, p. 67; cf. STR, pp. 183-184.

⁹SF, p. lii.

¹⁰Quoted without footnote in CTSC, p. 58.

full intelligibility.¹¹ That is not to confuse the two domains: ". . . the vectorial movements of theological and natural science run in different directions: one inquiring into the transcendent source and ground, and the other into the contingent nature and pattern, of all created order."¹² Just as the semantic level of language coordinates and raises the legitimate independent integrity of the syntactic to a higher level of meaning and function, so too, revealed theology provides the semantic conditions non-existent in the scientific realm which brings science to a profounder completion not entailed within the confines of its own discipline. The image most helpful in understanding this is the incarnation, in which the natural realm is fully dependent upon the divine, having no reality (anhypostasia) apart from its continual creation at the hand of God.¹³ Science, writes Torrance, ". . . by its very nature, requires to be completed beyond itself, i.e., by meta-theoretical relation to ever higher and wider systems of understanding."¹⁴ But as creation, it abides, through

¹¹GGT, pp. 144-145; cf. TS, p. 66.

¹²STR, p. 180. Cf. "The Concept of Order in Theological Science," p. 135.

¹³The doctrine of creatio continua in Calvin reflects his emphasis upon the dynamic God-man relation, e.g. in his Sermons on Job (10:7f.) asks: "What is to be done then, that we may continue in that state wherein we were established? God must breathe His power into us without ceasing and be continually at hand with us" (quoted in CDM, p. 62).

¹⁴STR, 180. See RET, pp. 38-39. In the same context Torrance argues against any science-theology dualism. In view of his late disclaimer of complementarity as a conceptually adequate tool for unitary thought (Interview, 5 April, 1982) our hypostatic analogy presents a refined development beyond his earlier appreciation of science-theology complementarity presented in TS, p. 103, and in his ostensive guidance of Christopher B. Kaiser's

its inseparable dependent relationship, in its fully functioning integrity (enhypostasia). The scientific analogue which Torrance introduces is that of Einstein's four-dimensional physical geometry in which time can no longer function apart from space, nor physics from geometry:

. . . natural theology cannot be undertaken apart from actual knowledge of the living God as a prior conceptual system on its own or be developed as an independent philosophical examination of rational forms phenomenologically abstracted from their material content, all antecedent to positive theology. Rather must it be undertaken in an integrated unity with positive theology in which it plays an indispensable part in our inquiry and understanding of God. In this fusion 'natural' theology will suffer a dimensional change and will be made natural to the proper subject-matter of theology. No longer extrinsic but intrinsic to actual knowledge of God, it will function as a sort of 'theological geometry' within it, in which we are concerned to articulate the inner material logic of knowledge of God as its mediator within the organized fields of space-time.¹⁵

Bearing this science-theology relation in mind we may legitimately inquire into a purely scientific understanding of time without lapsing into theological irrelevance. Torrance summarizes:

. . . we have been developing new, relational notions of space and time which are astonishingly similar to those which classical Christian theology found itself forced to develop, as it allowed the message of the incarnation and the resurrection, indeed the whole relation of God to history and nature implied in that message, to call for a reconstruction of the cultural foundations of the ancient world. It will be through dialogue of the deepest level between Christian theology and natural science, in which each remains faithful to the nature

"The Logic of Complementarity in Science and Theology" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1974). That he reintroduces "complementary" in his most recent book is an unforgivable inconsistency (see The Christian Frame of Mind, p. 15). Clearly a new term must be coined to eliminate this terminological ambiguity.

¹⁵STI, p. 70; cf. HL[RST], pp. 42-43.

and character of its own field of inquiry, and in recognition that both operate within the same field-structures of space and time as the bearers of all rational order in the universe, that interpretation and intelligible appropriation of the message of the resurrection may take place.¹⁶

The importance of Torrance's analysis of the hierarchical relation between natural and theological science is to establish the validity of our temporal inquiry into the domain of natural science. There is no essential antipathy between science and theology. In fact, they share the common denominator of space and time, which in Torrance's view are the invisible, rational ". . . functions of the universe and forms of their orderly sequence and structure."¹⁷ These are not artificial mental constructs placed upon reality but rather the immanent structures of rationality within the universe conditioned ultimately by the unique, metaphysical principle of light.¹⁸

In creating man, endowed with mind as well as with soul and body, out of nothing, God created within the universe an intelligent counterpart to the rational order immanent in the creation through the functioning of space and time. By positing the human intelligence along with space and time in his creation of the universe out of nothing, God conferred upon it a rationality of its own, independent of, yet contingent upon, his own uncreated and transcendent reality.¹⁹

It is inadmissible, Torrance argues, for theological inquiry to disregard its spatio-temporal commonality with natural science. He calls for a conjoint, differential dialog between theology and science. It is his thesis in

¹⁶STR, p. 45; cf. p. 23.

¹⁷STR, p. 130; cf. e.g. TCFK, p. 208; "Theological Realism," pp. 189-190.

¹⁸CTSC, p. 76; GGT, p. 4.

¹⁹GGT, p. 55.

Christian Theology and Scientific Culture,

. . . that theology cannot be pursued in any proper and rigorous way in detachment from the determinate framework of the spatio-temporal universe within which God addresses his Word to us and calls us to know and love and serve him. It is, I believe, indifference to that framework of objective rationality, or the isolation of theology from natural science, that lies behind the sense of lostness and bewilderment, as well as the sloppiness and ambiguity of thought, so often manifest in contemporary theological literature.²⁰

The space-time which emerges in the order of our existence is fallen. This applies no less to science than to theology. It may help to recall, Torrance, following Barth, maintains the Covenant to be the inner basis of creation and creation the outer basis of the Covenant.²¹ Although the fall included creation, so does redemption. Torrance points us to the physicist, John Archibald Wheeler, who contends the emerging universe was proleptically guided by its introduction of man.²² This "anthropic principle" serves as a natural scientific analogue to the covenantal principle, with Christ, the true Man, at its center.

What this suggests for our discussion is that when Torrance speaks of space-time in the scientific sense it is to be understood as the broader impersonal analogue to fallen human personal time. The latter is the internal ground and form of the former, the former the external ground and form of the latter.

²⁰UCTSC, pp. 8-9.

²¹TS, p. 68; cf. CD, III, 1, 41.

²²GGT, pp. 3-4. See J. A. Wheeler, "The Universe as Home for Man," in The Nature of Scientific Discovery, ed. O. Gingerich (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 1974), p. 261. For a brief, critical history of the anthropic principle see Heinz R. Pagels, "A Cozy Cosmology," The Sciences 25 no. 2 (March-April, 1985):34-38.

Unity of the Physical World

In contemporary physics the well advertised nature of light is alternatively depicted in terms of oscillating waves of energy and discrete material corpuscles--between electro-magnetic fields and elementary discontinuous quanta. Neither, at the present theoretical moment, are reducible to the other nor may light be fully understood without the complementary inclusion of both in the interpretation of the experimental results. This notwithstanding, Albert Einstein, throughout his life, maintained an unwavering confidence in the unity of all physical reality in terms of the energy field of relativity theory.²³ In his famous equation, $E=MC^2$, matter and energy are qualitatively identical. "Matter is where the concentration of energy is great, field where the concentration of energy is small."²⁴ The ultimate problem which relativity theory faces is to modify the ". . . field laws in such a way that they would not break down for regions in which the energy is enormously concentrated."²⁵ Einstein was intuitively disinclined toward the dualistic structure of reality, which Niels Bohr championed in his quantum mechanics. Einstein maintained:

What appears certain to me, . . . is that, in the foundations of any consistent field theory, there shall not be, in addition to the concept of field, any concept concerning particles. The whole theory must be based on partial differential equations and their singularity-

²³For Einstein's sometimes solitary quest for this illusive unity see Louis de Broglie, "A General Survey of the Scientific Work of Einstein," in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Schilpp, p. 121.

²⁴Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938), p. 242.

²⁵Ibid.

free solutions.²⁶

The final chapter on this controversy remains to be written in the annals of science. Because a latent dualism exists in the current state of the relativity physics/quantum mechanics debate, Torrance must be ultimately understood as thinking through and beyond complementarity as an adequate relational model for a unitary or interactionist theology.

Both the theologian and the scientist share the same space-time nexus--one defined as an ". . .organic . . . continuous, diversified but unitary field of dynamic structures. . ."27 This one compact statement is a distillate of an immense body of contemporary physics requiring a certain amount of exegetical elaboration if we are to fully appreciate its import. In Space, Time and Resurrection Torrance outlines the points at which contemporary science may have the greatest bearing upon a proper scientific theology. These include a fundamental change in the concept of reality from that of material substance in external causal connection to dynamic electro-magnetic fields of internal relationship.²⁸ Thus an understanding of field theory and its interdeterminate consequences will illuminate his space-time definition further.

Historically, Faraday and Maxwell's field theory eventuated in Einstein's relativity theory, which supplanted the classical dualism between absolute and relative space-time with an invariant, unitary, relational notion. This is the second scientific revolution of theological

²⁶"Physics and Reality", p. 74.

²⁷STR, p. 69.

²⁸STR, pp. 184-186; cf. GR, p. 13; DCO, pp. 13-15, 44; CTSC, pp. 51-52; RET, pp. 44-57; "Where is God?," p. 21.

moment.²⁹

The third and fourth have to do with epistemologico-methodological³⁰ and ontological³¹ implications of the multi-levelled universe. For our purposes it supplies the necessary conceptual analogue for exposition of the vertical time-eternity relation free of monist or dualist assumptions.

8. Field Theory

Metaphysics of Field

The analogical utility of the matter-energy equation for our understanding of Torrance from the scientific perspective is established as primary by his telling statement that it is ". . .the homouision of physics."³² Thus, just as the Christological homouision served as our theological starting point, $E=MC^2$ is our scientific prius. It introduces a metaphysical revolution on a grand scale.³³ No longer can matter be treated as atomistically distinct from its surrounding field of energy. Such material individualism has faded from the twentieth century scientific landscape. Whereas the classical theory qualitatively differentiated mass as matter and field as energy, relativity theory establishes the distinction as purely quantitative and energistic. Mass is not some material

²⁹STR, pp. 186-188.

³⁰Ibid, pp. 188-191.

³¹Ibid., pp. 191-193.

³²GGT, p. 162.

³³In Einstein's words, ". . . probably the most profound transformation which has been experienced by the foundations of physics since Newton's time" ("Physics and Reality", p. 76).

substrate but rather is a highly concentrated configuration of energy. Einstein and Infeld explain:

By far the greatest part of energy is concentrated in matter, but the field surrounding the particle also represents energy, though in an incomparably smaller quantity. We could therefore say: Matter is where the concentration of energy is great, field where the concentration of energy is small.³⁴

The concept of an electro-magnetic field at the hand of Clark Maxwell very simply was ". . . that part of space which contains and surrounds bodies in electric or magnetic condition."³⁵ Thus in contrast to Newtonian materialism, what happens between entities became just as important as the entities themselves. Furthermore, because the electro-magnetic phenomena were considered to be waves propagated through space, the field was extant only as dynamic.³⁶ This dynamicity required the passage of time and spelled the refutation of all action-at-a-distance theories, which suggested instantaneous, a-temporal, causal relationship.

³⁴Evolution of Physics, p. 242; see "E=MC²" (1946) in Out of My Later Years, pp. 49-53 for a popular account of the formula.

³⁵"A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field" (1864) in The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, 2 vols., W. D. Niven, ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1965), vol. 1, p. 527.

³⁶Mathematically the field in general is expressed by means of partial differential equations whereby the continuous space-time structure of events may be derived. John Graves summarizes the mathematical complex deriving a field magnitude:

Those magnitudes may be of three kinds:(1) scalars, characterized by a single number whose value at different points constitutes a scalar function of those points; (2) vectors, characterized by a set of numbers with the same dimensionality as that of space; and (3) tensors, characterized by m-dimensional square arrays of numbers (The Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971], p. 123).

That relationship requires time would be corroborated in the succeeding generation by the Einsteinian discovery of the relativity of simultaneity.

Through the inspiration of Einstein's general theory of relativity (GTR) (a field theory of gravitation as curved space) recent physicists have expanded upon his insights in what John Archibald Wheeler terms geometrodynamics (GMD)³⁷ in which geometry is no longer abstracted from physics but has taken upon itself its own dynamic freedom within physics. Geometry no longer imposes a static grid upon reality. A reality conceived in terms of spatial curvature and hyperbolic expansion (whether positively finite or negatively infinite) must necessarily incorporate time into its geometry, for its spatial configuration is contingent upon its temporal location within the history of the universe. In summarizing the future prospects for GMD John Graves explains, this dynamic unifying model should show the Riemannian curved space-time orientation of the GTR to be ". . . sufficiently rich that we can construct every physically interesting quantity out of space-time alone. . ." ³⁸ This is the ultimate unity. Perhaps Graves provides a necessary commentary to Torrance's statement that space and time ". . . constitute a continuous indivisible field." ³⁹:

We no longer have any irreducible matter or other entities different in kind from space-time; this

³⁷See Geometrodynamics (New York: Academic Press, 1962).

³⁸Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory, p. 236. This should not be identified with Samuel Alexander's attempt to construct all reality, both physical and spiritual, out of the building blocks of space and time. See Space, Time, and Deity, forward Dorothy Emmet (New York: Dover, 1966).

³⁹CTSC, p. 77.

space-time is not a passive arena but the source and medium of all interactions, its parts both acting and being acted upon by each other and finally, space-time is a unified whole, with global and topological as well as local characteristics. It is not a collection of things, but a single thing--that only thing that is really real. One could call it by such names as pure substance, or being as such.⁴⁰

Torrance takes this one step further by defining all spatio-temporality in terms of that which is metaphysically unique in all the world--light⁴¹--". . . a created reflection of that uncreated and unlimited light which God himself is."⁴²

This space-time monism is not a static undifferentiated one. Rather, Graves explains, ". . . it is capable of an enormous amount and variety of internal differentiation . . ."⁴³ in mutual interrelation. This eliminates (due to nonlinear field equations) any atomism in which the whole is derivable from the sum of the parts. Conversely, the parts cannot be uniquely differentiated from the whole. The interrelationship is all-important: ". . . actions depend on what other particles are also present, and where they are."⁴⁴

GMD augments our field metaphysic. No longer are

⁴⁰Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory, p. 314. By the term "substance" Graves intends that which is ontologically most fundamental rather than matter *per se*. Unquestionably Torrance would react to the monistic implications of Grave's interpretation as he does to Frijof Capra's (in GGT, p. 175). Nevertheless, within the confines of physics itself, the analysis is helpful.

⁴¹TCFK, p. 256; CTSC, pp. 76-77 and *passim* ch. 3, "The Theology of Light", pp. 73-104.

⁴²CTSC, pp. 75; cf. p. 92

⁴³Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory, p. 314.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

gentities perceptually delimited and spatially impenetrable. Rather, ". . . a body is where it acts. Insofar as the curvatures which it generates extend to the whole of space-time, there is a sense in which each body or source is everywhere, and at the same time."⁴⁵ The fact that velocities are not assigned to the space-time properties of the field reveals these events are not to be identified as unique, mobile substances.⁴⁶ The characteristic of space-time events are variably determined contingent upon the given spatio-temporal reference system. Torrance concludes:

This is a dynamical view of the world as a continuous integrated manifold of fields of force in which relations between bodies are just as ontologically real as the bodies themselves, for it is in their interrelations and transformations that things are found to be what and as and when they are. They are to be investigated and understood not by reference to a uniformity of causal patterns abstracted from the actual fields of force in which they exist, but in accordance with their immanent relatedness in the universe and in terms of their own inherent dynamic order. In such a universe in which form and being and movement are inseparably fused together things and events are to be explained and interpreted in terms of their ontological reasons, . . .⁴⁷

or dynamic rational continuities,⁴⁸ not in terms of their external, static mechanistic causes. Thus the field

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 315; cf. p. 125.

⁴⁶William Berkson, Fields of Force (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), p. 311.

⁴⁷STR, p. 185. That he speaks in terms of force fields belies a Faradaian inconsistency, which he would undoubtedly abandon if pressed, e.g., cf. DCO, pp. 77-78 where he distances himself from Faraday's view of a substantial field. The force field has been superseded by Einsteinian curved space. Cf. Einstein, "Physics and Reality", p. 80; William Berkson, Fields of Force, pp. 317-318, 323.

⁴⁸DCO, p. 81.

provides a radically new foundation for understanding causation.

One final explanatory note must be added. As is evident from the above quote, and consistent with the rest of his thought, Torrance never divests himself fully of the reality of "bodies." That is to say, he refuses to embrace a thoroughgoing act or energistic metaphysic.⁴⁹ Being and Act enjoy equal status within his theological scheme. If pressed, it is doubtful whether he could consistently subscribe to the equivalence or convertibility without remainder of mass and energy. Most recently he writes: ". . . space is not empty but filled with matter and energy, and . . . time enters effectively into the equation as an essential ingredient in the interrelations between particles and events affecting their configuration."⁵⁰ His quest for metaphysical unity must always be understood in terms of a differential unity.

Field and the Fullness of Time

St. Paul in his letter to the Ephesian Church designates Jesus Christ as the revelation of the mystery of God's will, ". . . as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth."⁵¹ Torrance comments, this serves as the interpretive center of covenantal history. He continues:

. . . Christian theology takes its stand in the fulness of time in Christ and looks back from there to interpret the previous history of the covenant and the creation

⁴⁹This interpretation is corroborated by Torrance's refusal to be identified with Macmurray's act metaphysic. See Introduction, f.n. 56.

⁵⁰"Time in Scientific and Historical Research," (Photostat.), p. 8.

⁵¹Eph. 1:10; cf. Gal. 4:4.

with which it is bound up, and looks forward to interpret the foundation and the life of the Church in the economy of the Covenant in the last times between the first and second Advents of Christ.⁵²

Elsewhere he adds:

In Israel God bound our time into Covenant-relation with Himself, but all that is completely fulfilled in Jesus Christ where time is not only the sphere of the eternal event, but time is sanctified, redeemed, reconciled, and given new reality in union with Eternity, once and for all.⁵³

Earlier we have seen that nomistic time, alienated from relation with God in Christ is futile, circular, and unfulfilled.⁵⁴

Now in light of electro-magnetic field theory with its understanding of dynamic relation we may find an elementary disclosure model which renders the differential between futile, nomistic and fulfilled, redemptive time more intelligible.

We have cited already the figure of the axial intersection of Christ incarnate in space-time history.⁵⁵ Torrance identifies this as:

. . . the theological field of connections in and through Jesus Christ who cannot be thought of simply as fitting into the patterns of space and time formed by other agencies, but as organizing them round Himself giving them transcendental reference to God in and through Himself.⁵⁶

⁵²SF, p. lvi.

⁵³CAC, II, p. 21; cf. AT, p. 164.

⁵⁴See above, Ch. I.3, Time and Incarnation: Time of this World Created and Fallen.

⁵⁵See above, Ch. I.3, Compound-Complex Relation of Hypostatic Union to Homoousion.

⁵⁶STI, p. 72.

The figure of a magnet and its field perpendicular to a two-dimensional space-time plane comes to mind. The iron filings on the plane would reflect certain relational characteristics within that frame of reference. Depending upon one's horizontal space-time sophistication these relationships may appear more or less complex (see Figure 1). However, it is not until the invisible field in the third, vertical, orthogonal, dimension is revealed that interpretive justice is done to the whole of reality of which the horizontal partakes. Diagrammatically this might appear as Figure 2. Notice how the relatively disparate events pictured in Figure 1 are also highly ordered field relations around the central magnetic axis.

The interpretive value of such a model becomes evident theologically once we identify the south and north poles of the magnet with the humanity and deity of Christ respectively. Let the plane be the plan of history. Although historiography may establish horizontal space-time interpretive models for the history of Israel, the life of the man Jesus, and the history of the church, it never proves adequately coherent. In its most refined development, it may embrace much but not all of the horizontal empirical data and it will always lack in coherent simplicity. Torrance elaborates:

. . . there are, it would seem, sets of circumstances or events in the life of Jesus, as he is presented in the Gospels, which do not seem to make sense to us when we regard them merely on the level of observable phenomena, for they conflict with the orderly way we are accustomed to interpret phenomena, but when we consider them in correlation with additional factors introduced from a higher level, they are discerned to present a profoundly intelligible pattern compelling the assent of our minds.⁵⁷

In Thomas Kuhn's terms, there will always be an anomaly

⁵⁷DCO, p. 25.




Figure 1 Historical relations interpreted within the confines of one time dimension.

Where a minute portion of the 'horizontal' terrestrial plane of historically significant space-time events depicted as points of a scatter-graph are given.

Let the line showing the idealized relation between the space-time events be an historiographic causal interpretation of these events, where trans-historical factors are excluded.




Figure 2 Historical relations interpreted in light of the Eschatological field of Christ.

Given the identical 'horizontal' plane of space-time events, the 'vertical' magnetic field lines are introduced demonstrating the higher-order unifying relation, which accounts for all space-time events, even remote events a, b and c, without imposing an idealized interpolation upon them.

which threatens the paradigm, which, if taken seriously will instigate an interpretive revolution. Such is the impact of the events in which the supernatural intersects history as, for example, the miracles and the resurrection of Jesus. If successful this revolution will eventuate in a paradigm more comprehensive in empirical scope and simpler and more refined in logical coherence.⁵⁸ One might liken the horizontal scheme to that of a statistical interpolation of a scatter graph. However, from the vertical, orthogonal dimension of the field even the most remote events from the incarnation (e.g., events A, B and C) are fully accounted for within the relational field though their significance in

⁵⁸For Torrance's discussion of the criterion of Truth as the interrelation of empirical, existent and theoretical, logical correlates see TS, chs. 4-5. The vertical, horizontal scheme is endemic to his epistemology:

". . . we may speak of the existence-statements as having a vertical reference, and the coherence-statements as having [a] horizontal reference, but the basic point at which the vertical and horizontal meet is in Jesus Christ--on earth, in history, in Israel, that is, within the space and time of our world where they have an observational and historical reference. That is the hinge of their meaning for it is in and through Jesus Christ that the existence-statements have their reference above and beyond themselves, to the Father (their extrinsic meaning), and it is through conformity with Jesus Christ that the coherence-statements have their interior reference in a coherent whole (their intrinsic meaning). Thus in Jesus Christ all theological statements are made within the concrete forms of time and space, within the medium of historical thinking and action, where they involve commitment to the Truth in historical life and action and an appropriate mode of verification. In existence-statements verification will involve concrete reference to Jesus Christ and in Him a fulness of light and a richness of illumination for their reference to the Reality of the Father. In coherence-statements verification will involve concrete reference to Jesus Christ and in Him a basic 'logical simplicity' through which all coherence-statements will have their orientation and inner perfection" (TS, pp. 176-177).

the flow of Christian history may be, if you will, inversely related to their 'distance' from the incarnate center.

It is the field analogue which allows us to appreciate the horizontal unity of Time in Christ. All of creation, as the outer basis of the covenant, and covenantal history, as the inner basis of creation, is oriented around the event of Jesus Christ, the fullness of Time.⁵⁹ Apart from this relation the bearings of history are but conventions.

Vertically we may suggest it is the differential in unity of the hypostatic union intervening in time that generates the field of temporal covenantal relations. There is no genuine history except it be enhypostatically configured in Christ. Apart from him all is ultimately vanity as in the words of the Teacher. Torrance explains:

Were all the lines of continuity in space and time actually to converge at some point in the centre, the universe would be meaningless; but when they break off at right angles to the coming of God himself in the midst of our human life, then the Incarnation becomes the great axis of meaning.⁶⁰

In Christ every moment is of everlasting importance. This field model illuminates Paul's working together of all things for the good for those in loving relation with Christ as no literary overstatement.

If we are to extend our model to reflect the foci of Christ's dynamic movement in history, we recognize the need to account for the incarnation, resurrection and parousia (in the narrow sense of second Advent) in such a way that

⁵⁹E.g. see Torrance, "Salvation is of the Jews," p. 166 where the entire life and liturgy of Israel is depicted as an historic progression toward the unique Messianic summation of its very heart and soul.

⁶⁰"The Whole Universe Revolves Round Christ," Life and Work (April 1977): 12.

the unity of the advents is maintained. The dynamic field is equal to the task as Figure 3 suggests.

Torrance, with Calvin⁶¹ and Barth,⁶² argues that it is the resurrection/ascension of Christ which serves as the universal focus of history.⁶³ He fully concurs with Walter Kuenneth's claim that the resurrection,

. . . is the primal datum of theology, from which there can be no abstracting, and the normative presupposition for every valid dogmatic judgment and for the meaningful construction of a Christian theology. Thus the resurrection of Jesus becomes the Archimedean point for theology as such, not derivable from empirical reflection, and established beyond any religion a priori. All theological statements are oriented in one way or another towards this focal point.⁶⁴

Torrance argues that New Testament theological language is informed by the impact of the "field" of the resurrection.⁶⁵ Thus there is good reason to represent the resurrection as the magnetic center of our model. In so doing the flow of the magnetic field, for our purposes ideally isolated in the opposite directions of the first and second Advents, faithfully represent the dynamic condescension of Christ in time.

What is more, the transcendent unity of the Parousia

⁶¹See KC, p. 6.

⁶²Barth contends, the one point of agreement among all views of the resurrection is its centrality in the New Testament: "Everything else in the New Testament contains and presupposes the resurrection. It is the key to the whole" (CD, III, 2, 47, p. 443). Cf. CD, I, 2, 13, p. 12.

⁶³See CAC, I, pp. 49, 98; Centrality of Christ, 22 May, p. 20.

⁶⁴The Theology of the Resurrection, p. 294 quoted in STR, p. 74.

⁶⁵STR, p. 36; cf. pp. 34-35.




Figure 3 Magnetic field model for the unity of the Advents.

Let the magnet lie perpendicular to the plane of history at the space-time event of the Resurrection-Ascension of Christ, with two isolated field lines intersecting the plane of history at the Incarnation and the Second Advent of Christ.

(N.B. A magnet by definition includes its field, which analogically points to the inseparability of the being and act of Christ.)

is fully represented while still accounting for its historical protraction. Jesus Christ is indeed the Alpha and Omega. This graphically represents the inadequacy of the kenoticist conclusion. The life of the historical Jesus is intelligible only within the whole field of its transcendent relationship. The extra-Calvinisticum is not expendable. To reduce the person of Jesus to a non-relational, one-duration individual is to eliminate the field of reconciliation and meaning whereby His life becomes salvific. If the motion of God toward man in Jesus Christ were kenotically severed there could be no field completing the response of man to God, for as Torrance reminds us:

Jesus Christ is the actualization of the Truth of God among us in such a way that it creates its own counterpart in us to itself, Truth from the side of God and truth from the side of man in inseparable union.⁶⁶

He depicts this in terms of the election of Christ, who is the Grace of God toward man and man's faithfully obedient response to God.⁶⁷ It is only within the field of this Response that our response is taken into the electing love of God.

The field model is particularly helpful in depicting the prospective and retrospective bearings of history all of which center in the finished work of the resurrected Christ. The redemption of Christ pervades all of space and time. History moves from its center which is also its beginning and end. The intensity of the field is greatest at its source, which is reflected in the events of Christ's ministry and passion on the one side and Pentecost and mission on the other. Once again if history is merely a one-time-dimensional linear progression redemption is

⁶⁶STR, p. 71; cf. TS, pp. 50-51.

⁶⁷TS, p. 215.

incomplete. As such it would be impossible to maintain, the writer to the Hebrews notwithstanding, that Christ is now seated at God's right hand, having offered for all time a single sacrifice for sin.⁶⁸

We cannot help but be impressed with the heuristic significance of implementing a field model into our hermeneutic endeavors. The more we use it the more we are convinced of its fidelity to the dynamic reality it purports to elucidate.

Dynamic Interaction

The Demise of Causality: From Hume to Quantum Indeterminacy

The father of modern philosophy, René Descartes, laid the theoretical foundations of a mechanistic universe adopted by Newton,⁶⁹ which from one perspective endured until the first quarter of the twentieth century in scientific circles. He posited two forms of efficient causation, parting ways with the four causes of Aristotle that had dominated physics for nearly two millennia. Theologically the first has been preserved as the primary cause, viz., God, who by creation and providence efficiently generated and sustains all that comes to pass:

As regards the general cause, it seems clear to me that it can be none other than God Himself. He created matter along with motion and rest in the beginning; and now merely by His ordinary cooperation, He preserves just the quantity of motion and rest in the material

⁶⁸Heb. 10:12.

⁶⁹See Alexandre Koyre, Newtonian Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 53-200; I. B. Cohen, "Quantum in se est: Newton, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and Lucretius," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 38 (1964): 36-46.

world that He put there in the beginning.⁷⁰

The second endures as the secondary cause, defined as ". . . the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it, and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others."⁷¹

As modern science progressed the primary cause was principally eliminated as an explanatory principle. Secondary efficient causation became the sine qua non of the scientific enterprise. This empirical, necessary, external relation was fundamentally depicted, in Victor F. Lenzen's terms, as dynamic causality⁷² and in R. Harre's terms as the generative theory of causality. The latter summarizes:

- (i) The cause produces the effect by the working of some mechanism.
- (ii) Given the cause it is naturally necessary that the effect will occur, i.e., the effect must occur unless something interferes.
- (iii) the connection between cause and effect is real, and is the causal mechanism.⁷³

However, at the hand of David Hume, this ontologically grounded view of causal relation was challenged as but the misconceived explanation for sequences of contiguous events. Causal explanation was transformed into a psycho-

⁷⁰Principles of Philosophy, Pt. 2. no. 36, in Descartes: Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. E. Anscombe and P. T. Geach (London: Nelson and Sons, 1954), p. 215.

⁷¹"The Principles of Philosophy," Pt. 2, no. 25, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), vol. 1, p. 266.

⁷²Causality in Natural Science (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1954), p. 8.

⁷³The Philosophies of Science: An Introductory Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 136.

logical category in which by dint of habit contiguous events through frequent recurrences were deemed to follow each other:

We are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other, we only find that one does actually, in fact, follow the other.⁷⁴

In that causality was now defined in terms of a uniform succession of phenomenon rather than as the power of efficacy, the empirical ideal of the scientific method was rendered a serious blow, eventuating in the nineteenth century positivism of Comte in which description rather than explanation became the order of the day.

In physics, the demise of causation was catalyzed by the First World War, following which Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West (1918) supplanted mechanical determinism with neoromantic, existential Lebensphilosophie in which the creative principle of destiny was idealized in juxtaposition to the deadening impact of causality.⁷⁵ By 1927 the decline was complete. Quantum mechanics at the hand of Max Born presented a statistical basis for wave theory and Werner Heisenberg articulated his now famous uncertainty principle, in which if the velocity of a particle is experimentally determined, its location necessarily cannot be, or vice versa.

The question remains, is this indeterminacy endemic

⁷⁴An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), ed., Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), p. 63.

⁷⁵ For an expanded analysis of the politico-scientific movement toward a-causality in post-Weimar Germany, see Paul Forman, "Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918-1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual Environment," Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 3 (1971): 1-115.

to reality itself or merely a human, epistemological inadequacy? Of the former William A. Wallace differentiates between those who hold indeterminacy as reducible to hidden determinate variables and those that maintain irreducibility.

Those who hold that the indeterminacy is reducible, along lines suggested by [David] Bohm⁷⁶ maintain that it arises from some type of lower-level motion or substratum state that is yet to be identified. Those who hold that it is irreducible, and these constitute the majority (led by Bohr and his Copenhagen School),⁷⁷ usually give a positivist or an empiricist explanation as to why this is so, maintaining that there is something in the nature of the things that makes it impossible to draw a sharp dividing line between subject and object, or that the indeterminacy results from a perturbation produced by measuring instruments that is impossible to remove. Again, some wish to give a more realist explanation for the irreducibility of the indeterminacy, tracing it to the operation of absolute chance at the subatomic level; Born and Reichenbach both seem to have favored this view in arguing for probability as a more ultimate category of explanation than causality in microphysics. Soviet philosophers have proposed yet another type of realist explanation consistent with their dialectical materialism, seeing the indeterminacy as arising from dialectical contradictions that are inherent in matter itself.⁷⁸

To this, Heisenberg more recently has championed an ontological position in which:

The indeterminacies of quantum theory are irreducible in a real way, not merely a logical way, in that they represent the indetermination of some protomatter that

⁷⁶E.g., Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, forward by Louis de Broglie (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), and Quantum Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1951).

⁷⁷Including Max Born, Werner Heisenberg and Arnold Sommerfeld.

⁷⁸Causality and Scientific Explanation, v. 2: Classical and Contemporary Science (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974) pp. 307-308.

is the basic substrate of the material universe.⁷⁹

Fundamental to all quantum theory is the statistical probability of occurrences at the microphysical level. The causal connection is expressed in terms of probability functions with ambiguity of relation evidenced in terms of standard deviations.⁸⁰ However, it has been argued, especially within the Copenhagen School, that indeterminacy points to the necessity of complementary approaches, which when taken together address the ambiguities of the separate results. Complementarity, therefore, may be seen as an attempt to retain the ideal of causality within quantum mechanics,⁸¹ though the degree of predictable specificity has decreased.

For Max Born, probability was an expression of chance, which became the ultimate ontological and therefore epistemological category within nature. The ideal of lawful deterministic predictability was abandoned for causal law-like dependence. The goal of science is to establish rules derived by induction which describe relationships within nature.

Now the curious situation arises that this code of rules, which ensures the possibility of scientific laws, in particular of the cause-effect relation, contains besides many other descriptions those related to

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 308.

⁸⁰For Max Plank's differentiation between dynamic and statistical causation see "Dynamische und statistische Gesetzmaessigkeit," in Physikalische Rundblicke (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1922).

⁸¹In Neils Bohr's words, ". . . the viewpoint of complementarity may be regarded as a rational generalization of the very ideal of causality" ("Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics," in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Schilpp, p. 211). Cf. Bohr, "On the Notions of Causality and Complementarity," Dialectica 2 (1948): 312ff.

observational errors, a branch of the theory of probability. This shows that the conception of chance enters into the very first steps of scientific activity, in virtue of the fact that no observation is absolutely correct. I think chance is a more fundamental conception than causality; for whether in a concrete case a cause-effect relation holds or not can only be judged by applying the laws of chance to the observation.⁸²

Einsteinian Dynamic Relation

To Born's elevation of chance over causation, Einstein responded, God does not play dice.⁸³ It is at this juncture that we access the foundations of Torrance's view of real relation, for he argues Einstein rightly has maintained the mean between chance and hard determinism. He was disputing with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, ". . . for failing to penetrate into the inner structures of quanta and explain them in terms of field-structures and of field-laws representing them. . . ." The statement "God does not play dice" rejects the idea of chance in favor of an objective but dynamic

⁸²Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance. The Waynflete Lectures 1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 46-47.

⁸³Correspondence from Einstein, 3 December 1947 quoted in *ibid.*, pp.122-123. Wallace reminds us, "Among the outstanding physicist in the early 1920s, . . . only Plank and Einstein took the stand in defense of causality" (Causality and Scientific Explanation, vol. 2: Classical and Contemporary Science, pp. 281-282). Einstein cites among Newton's greatest achievements, the clear conception of differential calculus which served as the fundamental postulate upon which modern causality and therefore modern science rested ("The Mechanics of Newton and Their Influence on the Development of Theoretical Physics," [1927]) in Ideas and Opinions, trans. Sonja Bargmann [New York: Crown Publishers, 1954], pp. 254-255, 256, 261).

relatedness inherent in quanta.⁸⁴ Torrance further supports his interpretation by oblique reference to an obscure letter from Wolfgang Pauli to Max Born in which Pauli writes:

. . . Einstein does not consider the concept of 'determinism' to be as fundamental as it is frequently held to be (as he told me emphatically many times), and he denied energetically that he had ever put up a postulate such as . . . : 'the sequence of such conditions must also be objective and real, that is, automatic, machine-like, deterministic'. In the same way, he disputes that he uses as criterion for the admissibility of a theory the question: 'Is it rigorously deterministic?'

Einstein's point of departure is 'realistic' rather than 'deterministic' which means his philosophical prejudice is a different one.⁸⁵

Nature is not fundamentally capricious or random. Einstein maintained a profound commitment to an underlying pre-established harmony of thought and reality.⁸⁶ It was this which served to spur him on in his unfulfilled quest for a unified field theory. Despite the scientific importance of the Copenhagen quantum theory he considered it ultimately leading down a blind alley due to its dualistic matter-field basis and its mathematical abstraction into multi-dimensional probabilities, imaginarily removed from

⁸⁴GGT, pp. 112-113; cf. DCO, p. 45; TCFK, pp. 250-253.

⁸⁵Max Born, ed., The Born-Einstein Letters: Correspondence between Albert Einstein and Max and Hedwig Born from 1916-1955 with Commentaries by Max Born, trans, Irene Born (New York: Walker, 1971), #115, 31 March 1954, p. 221; cf. #116, 15 April 1954, p. 225.

⁸⁶E.g., "Our experience up to date justifies us in feeling sure that in Nature is actualized the ideal of mathematical simplicity" (On the Method of Theoretical Physics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933], p. 12). Cf. Ideas and Opinions, pp. 226, 227; Torrance, TCFK, p. 112.

the bedrock of physical reality.⁸⁷ Henry Margenau, in his discussion of Einsteinian ontology concludes:

If the theory of relativity is correct, even only in its special form, the meaning of independent particles is an absurdity because their states cannot be specified in principle.⁸⁸

This is due to Maxwell's revolutionary contribution which supplanted substantial points with dynamic electromagnetic fields. This was a fundamental shift from an external, mechanical contiguity to an internal, dynamic continuity. Margenau concludes:

Hence their states cannot be presumed to be given by a finite set of variables, and this condition threatens the validity of causal description in an embarrassing way. It is clear, therefore, that physical description must either avail itself of the simplifying facilities offered by fields which satisfy partial differential equations and thereby insure sufficient regularity for causal analysis, or else it must entirely abandon the four-dimensional manifold and follow new lines such as those indicated by quantum mechanics.⁸⁹

To Torrance's way of thinking field theory was not a reversion to the classical, albeit more sophisticated ideal of mechanism.

Quite clearly the sort of connection which theology requires must be more subtle and flexible, yet no less rational, than those traditionally isolated in the natural and human sciences, if it is to have the kind of precision and range appropriate to the interaction between God and the world, or divine and human agency, that belongs to the essential heart of the subject-

⁸⁷Cf. Albert Einstein, The Word As I See It, trans. Alan Harris (N.Y.: Covici, Friede 1933], 1934), pp. 38-39; "Physics and Reality," in Out of My Later Years, p. 88; Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, p. 293.

⁸⁸"Einstein's Conception of Reality," in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Schilpp, p. 258.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 259.

matter. Here, I believe, theology can learn from another development in modern science, in the rise of field theory, that is, not from the material content of any particular field theory but from the way in which approach is made to the question of connection, from the actualities of the objective field.⁹⁰

A mediating interpretation between chance and necessity comes from what William Wallace⁹¹ terms the scientific realists, David Bohm⁹², Mario Bunge⁹³, and Rom Harre.⁹⁴ Bunge defines it as a partial or incomplete determinism. Although the unique, necessary causal mechanism of quantum physics cannot in principle be specified as, for example, in the case of the refracted path of a particle encountering the interaction potential of a field, nevertheless, the consequent event is determined in the sense that the transition is definitive within the parameters of statistical probabilities. He concludes, the Copenhagen theory, ". . . does not eliminate determinism in the general sense, moreover, it retains a certain dose of causality. But it does drastically restrict the Newtonian form of determinism. . . ." ⁹⁵ The efficient agent is partially determinative in that it must always be coupled with inner conditions or processes of the 'patient'. This is a synthesis of extrinsic and self-determination, ". . . in which external causes are conceived as unchainers of inner

⁹⁰GR, p. 13.

⁹¹Causality and Scientific Explanation, vol. 2, pp. 228-287.

⁹²Cf. Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.

⁹³Cf. Causality and Modern Science, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1979).

⁹⁴8Cf. The Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

⁹⁵Causality and Modern Science, p. 15.

processes rather than as agents molding a passive lump of clay."⁹⁶ It is this universal dynamic character of reality which is fundamental to this contingency and which necessitates that science no longer be oblivious to questions of origin and destiny.⁹⁷ The relativistic temporality of reality renders the descriptive and deterministic scientific explanation ultimately deficient. Reality is not explicable apart from its history.⁹⁸ In fact, Torrance argues, it would be appropriate to assert, reality is its history and history is invisibly contingent upon,

. . . a higher level order beyond space and time as its ground which cannot be articulated reductively in terms of the manifest explicate patterns of the lower level of order of space and time.⁹⁹

Bohm goes so far as to say relativity, i.e., the dynamic interrelationship of events, is the absolute. Reality is defined as the totality of relationships.¹⁰⁰ These relationships are not ultimately reducible to mechanistic causation, as in historical retrospect there is a factor of contingency which defies the causal sequence and defies approximating closure.¹⁰¹

Eric Mascall attempts a theological extrapolation of this view in which the primary Divine causality is in differential relation to human secondary causality. Natural

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 197. For Torrance's epistemological sequel to this in the willing submission of the scientific mind to reality upon it, see GR, p. 198; TS, p. 36; Reconstruction, p. 86.

⁹⁷Cf. DCO, pp. 80-81.

⁹⁸TS, p. 154.

⁹⁹Ibid, p. 82.

¹⁰⁰Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, p. 170.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 159, 168.

activity is fully dependent upon the continual creative hand of God without sacrificing the integrity of its own interaction. How is this possible? Developing his paradigm from quantum mechanics he reminds us that with the help of a Geiger counter the statistical rate of radio-active decay may be established within high degrees of probability. When a particular alpha-particle emission will occur is completely unpredictable. The statistical probability is dependent upon a higher order for it to be fully explained. This leads to a differential God-man relation:

The degree of autonomy with which God has endowed the finite agents is sufficient to specify the relative frequency or probability with which specific types of events occur, but nothing more. Even this is perhaps too much to say, as the probabilities are not numerically fixed from the start; the degree of indeterminacy that attaches to a measurable quantity is affected by previous measurement of its dynamical conjugate.¹⁰²

Secondary causation, sustained by the continual creative and conserving act of God, accounts for the probability factor. God's primary causal activity determines if, when and where the event occurs. Mascall elaborates: "Thus the relative autonomy which God has given to his creatures does not in the least diminish his sovereignty; whether a particular event happens or not depends in the last resort upon his choice and upon it alone."¹⁰³ Once again, the hypostatic, inseparable yet inconfused structure applies. Secondary causation is not reducible to, yet totally dependent upon, the act of God. As the boundary between the two is traversed, a categorial threshold is passed. If this threshold is not honored a fatalistic understanding of

¹⁰²E.L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science: Some Questions on Their Relations (New York: Ronald Press, 1956), p. 200.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 201.

sovereignty results.

Although we have taken some pains to redefine this relationship, Torrance would be uncomfortable with the classical primary/secondary causative distinction, and the designation 'partial determinism,' for they fail to adequately reflect the thoroughly dynamic immediacy of the creatio continua of the Spirit.¹⁰⁴ We must purge our analysis of any hint of scientific semi-Pelagianism without lapsing into its opposite deterministic extreme.

Differential Interaction as Dynamic

It is the fundamental dynamicity of relation which is the differentia between Torrancian and Calvinistic determinism. It is a difference which Torrance designates as factual vs. causal necessity:

. . . it is important to distinguish in historical happening between causal necessity and factual necessity, between causal determination of events and the fact that once they happen they cannot be otherwise. An historical event, once it has taken place, is factually necessary for it cannot be other than it is, but an historical event comes into being through a free happening, by means of spontaneous human agencies.¹⁰⁵

In essence factual necessity is that which is observed retrospectively. It is the ongoing deposit of history, which due to the nomistic, irreversibility of time is indelibly fixed,¹⁰⁶ though not in any retrogressive, fatalistic way.¹⁰⁷ It is a becoming necessity, that is, it is necessary only in its actualization. The potentiality for actualization should be seen as a meta-historical,

¹⁰⁴Reconstruction, pp. 102-104; CDM, p. 29.

¹⁰⁵STR, p. 92; cf. GR, pp. 11-12; DCO, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁶DCO, p. 56; cf. p. 22.

¹⁰⁷STR, p. 91.

rather than a prior-historical potential.¹⁰⁸ He calls these the "sufficient reasons" for an event, in contradistinction to their causes.¹⁰⁹

Here within the realm of contingent events and contingent rationality we have to do with connections which, precisely because they are contingent, cannot be completely formalized, and so must guard against the temptation through some sort of Euclidean idealization to convert them into the kind of necessary connections which we have in logico-causal relations. On the other hand, the contingent rationality which pervades the created universe demands a sufficient reason for the unitary order which everywhere becomes manifest in our inquires, but because this rational order is contingent, and therefore not self-sufficient, its sufficient reason becomes disclosed only through correlation with some meta-level beyond it.¹¹⁰

Torrance is doing nothing more radical here than explicating the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. If this is taken without hidden reservation, because the hierarchical relations within the universe ultimately are established by the gracious will of God, one cannot but affirm it is in principle impossible to formalize the contingent, that is, to turn the grace of God into a necessity.

It is the inveterate problem of causal necessity that it presupposes a metaphysic of natural continuity rather than contingent discontinuity, i.e., what we have called differential relation. Theologically this is to say reality is an expression of the nature of God such that in nature there is a logically formalizable continuity ultimately grounded in God, the first cause.

¹⁰⁸For the Medieval problem of prior-contingency cf. TS, p. 62, n. 1.

¹⁰⁹Cf. DCO, p. 81.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 4. Cf. "Time in Scientific and Historical Research," p. 1. See DCO, pp. 17-18 and 58-59 where sufficient reason is distinguished from the law of non-contradiction.

For Torrance, following Einstein and Polanyi, reality and therefore knowledge is hierarchically ordered.¹¹¹

. . . various sciences themselves, ranging from physics and chemistry to the humanities and theology can be regarded as constituting a hierarchical structure of levels of inquiry which are open upwards into wider and more comprehensive systems of knowledge but are not reducible downwards . . .¹¹²

It is not the boundary point between successive levels at which the lower is coordinated with the higher, that the lower is afforded a higher, more coherent intelligibility beyond itself. An additional factor not inherent in the lower level is introduced giving the lower level a cross-level depth of meaning beyond itself.¹¹³ For example, biology introduces principles of life which transform pure chemical structures into organismic events. Chemistry in itself is incomplete, i.e., indeterminate, and becomes determinate only through relationship with conditions beyond itself.

This same idea is reflected by Kurt Goedel's proof that the consistency of an arithmetic system requires it be incomplete, i.e., be based upon principles which are

¹¹¹For Einstein's discussion, which emphasizes the methodological and epistemological aspects of hierarchical reality see "Physics and Reality," pp. 63-65. For Polanyi's discussion see, e.g., The Tacit Dimension, pp. 34-45; The Study of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 71-99.

For Torrance's major epistemologico-methodological discussion see GGT, pp. 156-159, 169-171, and STR, pp. 188-191. Following the latter is his brief metaphysical discussion, pp. 191-193.

¹¹²STR, p. 188. For the theology-science relation cf. TCFK, pp. 257-258.

¹¹³STR, p. 188.

formally undecidable within that given system.¹¹⁴ Torrance summarizes the implications of this theorem:

(a) Structures of thought coordinated in this way are necessarily open structures, always incomplete in themselves, but oriented beyond themselves; (b) the different levels in which these structures are found constitute a hierarchy, . . . which is open upwards and not downwards; and (c) statements are normally tested and controlled from two coordinate levels, but because the structures are open upwards and not downwards, there can be no reductionism.¹¹⁵

Once again Christological categories analogously illuminate our discussion. The lower level is thoroughly contingent upon the higher, i.e., in itself the lower level is 'anhypostatic'--it has no self-subsisting integrity but requires an 'enhypostatic' assumption into the higher order for its full functional identity. Reality is conceivable as complete only in its hierarchical relation of differential dependence. In other words, it is sustained from above rather than below. Torrance argues, ". . . the Creator . . . sustains it beyond its contingent capacities and makes it terminate on his own reality and rationality."¹¹⁶

It is clear that such a hierarchical view of reality dispels mechanistic reductionism. The extra-systemic "reasons" are not translatable downward across the boundary. That is to say, in theological terms, there is no Lutheran communicatio idiomatum, genus majestaticum. The Chalcedonian inconfusability of natures must be implemented into dynamic interrelations.

¹¹⁴On Formally Undecidable Propositions of "Principia Mathematica" and Related Systems, trans. B. Meltzer, intro. R. B. Braithwaite (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962).

¹¹⁵TCFK, p. 323; cf. pp. 137-139; STI, pp. 87-88; STR, pp. 188-189.

¹¹⁶GGT, p. 106; cf. pp. 143-144.

Just as we do not speak of the eternality of Jesus but affirm the initiation of His existence as a moment in time, so too the hierarchy of reality endures only as dynamic relations. Field theory teaches us,

. . . far from being isolated from one another in space and time, [events] are already found in a field of continuous wave-like interconnections, where no single event can be apprehended adequately except in indissociable relationship with the whole.¹¹⁷

The upshot of this is that dynamically continuous inherent relations replace classical necessary causality.¹¹⁸ The full meaning of this must await our discussion of relativity. Suffice it to say, it is the ongoing matrix of relations in space-time that is created reality. As these events themselves are susceptible to an indefinite number of relational perspectives, none of which is a privileged perspective, created reality itself is undecidable except within a specific spatio-temporal framework. The particular space-time perspective is constitutive of the actuality. Reality cannot be abstracted from its spatio-temporal context. Torrance presses this to its theological conclusion:

Because the Truth [of God] has entered into our creaturely existence and has become historical, because He lives and acts in space and time, He is only known in active, living, temporal relation to Him. This is living Truth, Truth that has come into our human life and has taken up our time and life into Himself, Truth that is identical with the whole life and activity of Jesus Christ. He does not first become living and active by entering into our space and time and sharing in our human life, but in and through doing that He reveals that living and acting belong to His being as the Truth of God. What He is toward us He is eternally and antecedently in Himself, but what He is in Himself He is toward us within our life in space and time. In

¹¹⁷GR, p. 13.

¹¹⁸Cf. DCO, pp. 12-14, 80-81, 100.

Himself and toward us He is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.¹¹⁹

God is knowable only a posteriori, i.e., only through the act of His self-revelation to us in Jesus Christ. Therefore the only way in which the contingent actuality of His revelation may be rendered logically necessary is to bypass the revelational relation He has established in the humanity of Jesus Christ and to forge a direct connection with his eternal Deity. Torrance would identify this as a monophysite temptation.¹²⁰ This is not only Christologically perilous, but calls creatio ex nihilo into question. We shall shortly examine the import of this dynamic contingent relation in the hermeneutic assessment of predestination and election. Its impact shall prove significant.

9. Space-time Relativity

Absolute Time as Infinite Receptacle: Classical Physics

The foundations of modern science were essentially dualistic. Torrance traces their roots to the quantitative, fifth century B.C. atomists, ostensibly Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera,¹²¹ who maintained all material activity occurred as a result of discrete atoms falling through an infinite void. It was this real, empty space which provided the framework within which atomic matter subsisted. It was a comparable infinite receptacle which Newton incorporated in his now classic definitions of time and space. For him there was real, objective time and apparent, subjective time:

¹¹⁹TS, p. 208; cf. GR, pp. 101-102.

¹²⁰Cf. Reconstruction, pp. 185-186.

¹²¹STI, p. 57; DCO, p. 75.

Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration; relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.¹²²

Duration existed independent of any actual events--an infinite, immutable, neutral ticking of the cosmic clock. Any attempt to measure this time was purely conventional and relativistic. Just as the Atomists introduced the void to address the need for identity throughout the diversity of atomic motion so Newton championed the absolutes of time and space as the Divine sensorium which renders the universe both infinite and closed.

Relativity of Simultaneity: Einstein

Einstein, Torrance argues, freed science from this rigid tyranny.

The controlling concept of the space-time metrical field implies the integration of finite space and time with physical reality, with the result that the universe may be described as 'finite and unbounded'. That is, so to say, instead of being closed from above down, the universe is to be regarded as open from below upward.¹²³

In this new world there is no absolute or privileged position, and hence each standpoint is relative to what space-time frame of reference one chooses. Different space-time frameworks alter the various relations such that the masses, space, and time of an event cannot be universally specified. The landmark Michelson-Morely experiment

¹²²Scholium to the Definition of Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, reprinted in Problems of Space and Time, J. J. C. Smart, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 81.

¹²³DCO, p. 79.

decisively set to rest the widespread assumption that electromagnetic waves were subject to the same conditions as all other waves, viz., that they require a medium for propagation, and motion with respect to this medium alters the speed of light. That is to say, they found the theoretical ether medium not to exist and the speed of light to be a finite constant. Its speed is not subject to vectorial addition or subtraction of its source motion. There is no way to hasten or retard its transmission within a uniform environment. Thus without a universal frame of reference (the ether) it is in principle as true to affirm the space-time reference of the light source is at rest relative to the observer's space-time frame as the converse. Without such a privileged position, simultaneity is called into question, i.e., relativized. For example, a railway car is travelling at a velocity approaching the speed of light. It is equipped with an observation dome so the surrounding events are observable from the inside. As it completes a junction block the controller sees the block signal to the fore turn red while the one to the aft turns yellow. The control tower is positioned equidistant to the two signals (by its local standard of measurement) which, from that vantage point change simultaneously (see Figure 4). However, from the perspective of the passenger in the dome car the events appear quite different. Although the signals change from the controller's perspective when the controller observes the dome car directly in front of the control tower, because of the train's speed the passenger gap is narrowed toward the red and increased away from the yellow such that the distance travelled by the red light to the passenger is less than from the yellow light to the observer. From his perspective the red event is prior to the yellow (see Figure 5). In other words what to the controller was simultaneous is successive to the passenger.




Figure 4 Relativity of simultaneity: initial space-time frames of reference.

Where the velocity v of the train approaches the speed of light and t_{2r} and t_{2y} are the identical times required for the light from the signals to travel to the controller.




Figure 5 Relativity of simultaneity of two space-time frames in relative motion.

Where light from the red signal reaches the passenger in time t_{3y} and the controller in t_{2y} , and light from the yellow signal reaches the passenger in time t_{1x} and the controller in t_{2x} , where $t_{1x} = t_{2x}$ and t_{3y} is less than t_{2y} , and t_{2x} is greater than t_{1x} .

Due to the constancy and finitude of the speed of light simultaneity has become relativized. Time sequence therefore, cannot be taken for granted. The red-yellow present for the controller is the red-past, yellow-future for the passenger. Since time itself is relative to and (with space) constitutes the frame of reference, there is no higher space-time frame to which one might appeal. Our example may leave the mistaken impression that the block signals are really stationary. But from the vantage point of a third space-time system, for example Mars, one may easily see both the train and the signals in axial rotation and helial revolution, in which case the history of the event will assume a third interpretation. The relativity of which we speak is thorough. Each space-time system is equally valid and real. Of course at relatively slow speeds and short distances at which man travels the effects of relativity are so minuscule as to be negligible and in effect our normal experience is perceived as Newtonian rather than Einsteinian.

The Lorentz Transformation

Time Dilation

The relativity of simultaneity is confirmed by Lorentz' time dilation formula:

$$\Delta t = \Delta t_0 / \sqrt{1-(v/c)^2}$$

where

Δt	=	time interval measured by a clock within the inertial frame of reference
Δt_0	=	time interval measured by a clock in relative motion to the inertial frame
v	=	velocity of this relative motion
c	=	velocity of light

Equation 1

Here we see that an inertial time frame t_0 is identical to that of t when its relative velocity (v) with respect to t is zero. We could say two people walking in step share the same time frame. However, as the velocity of the frame in relative motion approaches the speed of light (c) the clock time of t_0 dilates relative to the clock time of t . In other words from the perspective of t , t_0 'ages' more slowly--its time reference slows down.¹²⁴ Diagrammatically this can be represented by the twin paradox (Figure 6). While on earth an astronaut synchronizes his atomic clock with that of his terrestrial twin. He ventures on a voyage at a constant velocity¹²⁵ of 270,000 km/sec. or 9/10 the speed of light for twenty years. Every year to the second he signals earth with a laser beam. Due to the finitude of the speed of light and the relativity of simultaneity we find that the one year signal intervals have been dilated by

¹²⁴Much like viewing the station from a train or the train from the station: Which one appears in motion depends upon the particular standpoint. Perhaps on those disorienting occasions when one fails to detect the train's acceleration from its station stop (and hence psycho-
logically remaining within the inertial constraints of the STR) from its station stop one could claim an existential experience of relativity. The inertia of the inner ear convincingly argues for the inertia of the train in relationship to a moving world! This physiological illusion bespeaks a relativistic reality!

¹²⁵The special theory of relativity requires that the frames of reference be inertial. The effects of acceleration and deceleration are ignored and we shall assume for our purposes the moot perspective that they may be insignificant if they are relatively short lived in comparison with the overall trip. However they do account for why the astronaut and not his terrestrial counterpart (in a non-relativistic turn of events) always ages more slowly (see P. C. W. Davies, Space and Time in the Modern Universe [London: Cambridge, 1977], pp. 39-45).

a factor of 2.33 on his departure and .434 upon his return¹²⁶ (Equation 1').

$$\Delta t = \Delta t_0 / \sqrt{1-(v/c)^2}$$

where

$$v = 270,000 \text{ km/sec}$$

One solves for Δt to obtain $\Delta t = 2.33t_0$

Equation 1'

Given the fact that there were twenty signals emitted we find upon his return the terrestrial atomic earth clock reads not twenty years but 27.64 years. His twin has aged a comparable amount. The astronaut's clock, be it atomic, mechanical or biological, has slowed relative to the terrestrial clock. There is no absolute standard of measure with which to adjudicate time. Time is inseparable from and relative to the particular event it defines.

Invariance: Relativity, not Relativism

It is essential at this juncture not to construe relativity as a relativism. The absence of an absolute frame of reference does not imply some sort of Kantian subjectivism in which space and time are mental forms of intuition imposed upon the observed world. Hans Reichenbach explains:

Such Protagorean interpretation of Einstein's relativity is utterly mistaken. The definitional character of simultaneity, for instance, has nothing to do with the perspective variations resulting for observers located in different frames of reference. That we co-ordinate different definitions of simultaneity to different observers merely serves as a simplification of the presentation of logical relationships. . . . In a logical exposition of the theory of relativity the

¹²⁶These calculations are exclusive of the Doppler effect, which would render the differences more dramatic.




Figure 6 Time dilation: twin paradox.

Let BC be a wave of light that propagates at constant speed c toward the future with respect to the coincident starting point B of the terrestrial space-time inertial frame BE and the astronautical moving frame of reference BHE with respect to BE.

Let CE be a wave of light that propagates at constant speed c from the past with respect to the coincident finishing point E of both the terrestrial and astronautical frames of reference.

Let H be the half-way point of 10 years for the astronaut with respect to his moving space-time frame AHE and Y the half-way point signalled from H with respect to the inertial frame BYE.

Let v be the velocity of the astronautical journey, 270,000 km/sec or $9/10$ the speed of light (not to scale).

Let the dashed lines be the laser light signals sent from the astronaut to earth.

The signal intervals along the BHE journey are all spaced at equal one year intervals except for the relatively minimal acceleration and deceleration times near B and H respectively and the acceleration and deceleration times near H and E respectively.

The first 10 signal intervals constituting BY are evenly spaced at 2.33 years except for the relatively minimal acceleration and deceleration times near B and Y respectively (not calculated).

The last 10 signal intervals constituting YE are also evenly spaced at .43 years except for the relatively minimal acceleration and deceleration times near Y and E respectively (not calculated).

observer can be completely eliminated.¹²⁷

Mathematically, when the time dilation equation is solved with respect to two inertial space-time coordinate systems the result is termed the Lorentz transformation equation, which serves to establish the invariant relationship of any given space-time frame to another. The lawful interrelationships between frameworks is maintained through space-time. Lorentz' equation served to demonstrate the continuity of reality¹²⁸ without appeal to an enduring substrate or an absolute standpoint. In William Berkson's words: "The idea of invariance of laws and properties with respect to the relativistic transformations was the replacement for the old guiding idea of identity of a substance through changes in space and time."¹²⁹ The special theory of relativity serves to elaborate this transformation equation.¹³⁰

Dynamic Relation

With the introduction of the Lorentzian invariance comes a thoroughly new view of relationship. Torrance

¹²⁷"The Philosophical Significance of the Theory of Relativity," pp. 294-295. Cf. pp. 295-296; Henry Margenau, "Einstein's Conception of Reality," in *ibid.*, p. 254; Evolution of Physics, p. 188; CTSC, p. 77; TCFK, pp. 235-236; Stanley L. Jaki, "The Absolute Beneath the Relative: Reflections on Einstein's Theories," The Intercollegiate Review (Spring/Summer 1985): 29-38.

¹²⁸For Torrance's polar correlation of the logico-mathematical and ontological significance of invariance see TCFK, pp. 273-275; Juridical Law and Physical Reality, pp. 25-26; "Theological Realism," pp. 183-184; CTSC, pp. 80-81.

¹²⁹Fields of Force, p. 312; cf. Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, pp. 158, 177, 178, 188.

¹³⁰Cf. Einstein, "Physics and Reality," in Out of My Later Years, p. 79.

stresses:

It should be appreciated that invariance is a realist and not a determinist concept. It has nothing to do with the rigid necessity that characterised the static structure of causal connections imposed on our understanding of nature by the framework of absolute isotropic time and space. Rather does invariance refer to a dynamic relatedness inherent in the empirical universe which through the space-time metrical field gives objective reliable configuration to all our experiences within it.¹³¹

It is not possible within relativity theory to assign a unique mass, dimension or time to an event. To do so is to treat field theory atomistically rather than exclusively in terms of spatio-temporal functions.¹³²

Speed of Light as Absolute

Lorentz' equation affords us one further extrapolation. As becomes mathematically obvious, the speed of light serves as the boundary of time as we know it. As velocity (v) of time frame t_0 approaches the speed of light the denominator approaches zero. If (v) were to exceed the speed of light the denominator would become imaginary. Einstein believed light to be the absolute speed barrier of the universe.¹³³ When coupled with the matter-energy equation to account for the time dilation of special relativity, the Lorentz contraction demonstrated the

¹³¹CTSC, p. 78; cf. DCO, pp. 13-14.

¹³²Einstein terms such atomism ". . . the great stumbling-block for a field-theory. . ." (The World as I See It, p. 38).

¹³³Einstein and Infeld, The Evolution of Physics, p. 192. Einstein ostensibly established the impossibility of velocities greater than the speed of light due to the (impossible) necessity of the infinite energy of the electron at such speed (cf. William Berkson, Fields of Force, p. 308).

mass of an object approaches infinity as its velocity approached (c). Conversely, the energy necessary to achieve such a speed would be infinite.

$$E = M_0c^2 / \sqrt{1-(v/c)^2}$$

Where

- E = total energy of the particle in the system of relative motion
 M_0c^2 = rest mass energy of the particles with
 M_0 = the mass of the particle in a system at rest
v = velocity of relative motion
c = velocity of light

Note, as v approaches C, $E = M_0c^2 / \sqrt{1-(v/c)^2}$ approaches infinity

Equation 2

As the asymptote of light reveals, time of the speed of light ceases. Light itself becomes the bearer of the present. In other words, travel at the speed of light would perpetuate that single instant indefinitely. The flight of time would be frozen. The moment would endure forever.

More recently it has been demonstrated to be theoretically consistent with special relativity that there may exist subatomic particles characterized by the fact that they always exceed the speed of light.¹³⁴ These particles have been termed tachyons, from the Greek tachy, meaning fast. The prohibitive energy requirements to exceed the light barrier would be unnecessary as the speed of light serves as the lower, not the upper limit.

¹³⁴Feinberg, Gerald, "Particles that Go Faster Than Light," Scientific American 222 (February 1970): 68-77; Encyclopedia of Physics, p. 1981, s.v. "Tachyons," by Gerald Feinberg; P .C. W. Davies, Space and Time in the Modern Universe, pp. 46-47.

$$E = \mu c^2 / \sqrt{(v/c)^2 - 1}$$

Where μ is the imaginary rest mass, $M^0 / \sqrt{-1}$

Equation 3

Note that as long as v is greater than c the denominator remains positive, that is, real rather than imaginary and is thus solvable. As the speed of the tachyon increases the energy requirement decreases until at infinite velocity the energy reaches zero. The distinctive peculiarity of tachyons for our purposes is that they would travel backward in time from present to past. Causally this produces the paradox of the priority of effect to cause.

Although experiments have been conducted to detect tachyons they heretofore remain but unconfirmed, hypothetical particles. Nonetheless physics now offers three distinct theoretical modes of duration: that characterized by the subliminal world, in which time process from present to future, the superliminal world of tachyons in which the progress of duration is retrospective, from present to past, and the realm of the photon which bears the perpetual present of the speed of light.

Minkowski: Space-Time

Light-Cone

Although the Lorentz transformation implied the interrelation of space and time it was not until 1908 when H. Minkowski presented his essay "Space and Time" before the 80th Assembly of German National Scientists and Physicists that they became definitively linked. All phenomena are four-dimensional spatio-temporal events. Time had become understood as an inseparable dimension of reality. In this essay he developed the light-cone, which differentiates between those events which are within a given spatio-

temporal framework, i.e., those events ("world-points" which through time generate a "world-line") within the limiting space-time boundary of the speed of light (300,000 km/sec), designated time-like events and those which exceed the space-time boundary, designated space-like events.¹³⁵ That which lies on the boundary itself would be designated light-like (see Figure 7). In that time is unidirectional the future is designated only by that which lies after (above) the present and the past by that which lies before (below). Any event which lies outside the confines of the light-cone are in that place and time too spatio-temporally removed to be causally related to any event within the light cone. Thus the light cone may alternatively be conceived as the cone of interrelation or the causal cone. Only those events which are spatio-temporally interrelated may be in causal relationship. Though space-time contiguity does not necessarily entail causal conjunction, space-time contiguity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for causality to occur.

Relativity of Past, Present and Future

The implications of finitude of the speed of light may be illustrated by the use of two familiar inertial frameworks: the terrestrial and the solar (see Figure 8). Arbitrarily we select the terrestrial space-time coordinates as the inertial frame of reference. As we have already seen from the Lorentz transformation equation a geocentric reference may be invariantly transformed into a heliocentric reference without remainder. The chosen framework is

¹³⁵In Problems of Space and Time, ed. J. J. C. Smart, pp. 297-312, reprinted from The Principles of Relativity, ed. Albert Einstein, et al., trans. W. Perett and G. B. Jeffery, with notes by A. Sommerfeld (New York: Dover, 1923).




Figure 7136 Minkowski light-cone.

¹³⁶For simplicity's sake the diagram is pictured in one spatial and one temporal dimension with the unit of spatial measure equals 1 meter and the temporal measure equals $1/3 \times 10^8$ meters or the time it takes light to travel 1 meter. The resulting light-lines will bisect the space-time coordinate system, i.e. be inclined at 45° .




Figure 8 Finite speed of light.

- Let AO L be the light-cone of earth with respect to space-time
 E (earth)
 point O at time zero.
- Let LO B be the light-cone of the sun with respect to space-time
 S (sun)
 point O .
- Let the distance $O O$ be 150,000,000 km., the spatial interval sep-
 $E S$
 arating the earth from the sun.
- Let $O W$ be the space-time world line of the earth toward the future.
 E
- Let P_1 be the space-time point at which light event $O L$ intersects the
 S
 1
 world-line $O W$.
 E
- Let t_1 be the time with respect to inertial frame $O W$ it takes a
 1
 E
 S 1
 light event to travel from O to P_1 (8.33 min.).

relative but mathematically invariant. From our diagram it becomes clear, any solar event cannot be of relational causal significance until it intersects the terrestrial time frame. An event at O_S cannot influence an event at O_E . The past, present and future are irreversible. If we could exceed the speed of light the unidirection of time would reverse such that the future would precede the present. A race could be finished before it started.¹³⁷ Relativity spelled the demise of the absolute simultaneity, i.e., action-at-a-distance. A solar event at O_S , for example a solar flare, cannot be a terrestrial event (P_1) until at least approximately 8.33 minutes later--the time it takes light to travel the 150,000,000 km. expanse. Thus we may say the solar present is 8.33 minutes to our future, or our solar present is 8.33 minutes in the solar past. The speed of light constitutes the absolute limiting definitional medium of temporal relation throughout the universe, and thus past, present, and future are relative to the given space-time frames under discussion.

The solar past may be the lunar present while still approximately 1.2 seconds¹³⁸ to the terrestrial future (during new moon), while the solar past may be the terrestrial present while still 1.2 seconds the lunar future (during full moon) (see Figure 9). It would be a lapse into Newtonian mechanics to treat one present as more real than another. The arbitrarily imposed coordinate systems conveys the false illusion that the chosen 0 points are the absolute times relative to which all else is artificial. The finitude of time prevents such an interpretation. Events do

¹³⁷Such an extrapolation is purely imaginary as the STR applies only to inertial systems and thus is not applicable to events in which acceleration is introduced.

¹³⁸The time it takes light to travel the 380,000 km. from the moon to the earth.




Figure 9 Past, present and future time relativity.

The coordinates here are identical to that of Fig. 8 with the addition of the lunar light cone OK and its space-time world-line ONM (New Moon) which the solar light event OS intersects at space-time point P .

Let $O_{E\ NM}$ be the distance 380,000 km. between the earth and the moon (not to scale).

Let $P_{O\ 1}$ be the difference in time with respect to the inertial frame $O\ W$ required for light event OL to travel P to P (1.2 sec.).

For the corresponding full moon frame of reference, the lunar coordinates would shift in identical proportions to the left of the terrestrial world-line $O\ W$ with the point of the lunar intersection of the solar light event OL coming 1.2 sec. after rather than before its intersection of the world-line $O\ W$.

not exist apart from their spatio-temporal designation, and thus one cannot speak of the Present but only the present here-now. Time is an inseparable aspect of reality. In Torrance's words, space and time,

. . . are functions of events in the universe and forms of their orderly sequence and structure. Space and time are relational and variational concepts defined in accordance with the nature of the force that gives them their field of determination. In modern thought we cannot separate space and time but think of space-time in a four dimensional continuum--although there is a difference between them, for, whereas space is three-dimensional, time is one directional or irreversible. But in the nature of the case we cannot separate space from time, or location from time--temporal relation belongs to location. This is another way of saying that we must think of place as well as time in terms of that for which they exist or function.¹³⁹

Aloys Wenzl interprets the non-Euclidean space of GTR as, ". . .not something which exists prior to or alongside of material reality, but is produced by it and at the same time together with it . . ." ¹⁴⁰ By virtue of the inseparability of time from space the same generalization obtains for time. There is no absolute temporality which preconditions actual time. Such a view lapses into a reduction of time to space--the dynamic to the static--against which Bergson has cautioned us.

10. Thermodynamics of Open Systems: A Physical Precedent for Bi-temporality

The differential relation which is so much a part of Torrance's theology may be illuminated from yet another

¹³⁹STR, pp. 130-131.

¹⁴⁰"Einstein's Theory of Relativity Viewed from the Standpoint of Critical Realism, and Its Significance for Philosophy," in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Schilpp, ed, p. 595; cf. T. F. Torrance, "The Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science, " p. 147.

perspective--that of contemporary thermodynamic theory, most noticeably through the work of the Nobel Prize winning Russian Jew, Ilya Prigogine.

His pervasive concern is to establish the relation between being--the static, structural, determinate aspect of reality--and becoming--the temporal, functional, indeterminate aspect.¹⁴¹ As such he sees chemistry occupying the second role and physics the first,¹⁴² and by physics he intends not merely classical Newtonian but contemporary relativity and quantum theories as well:

. . . relativity and quantum mechanics seemed to adhere to the basic world view expressed in Newtonian mechanics. This is especially true regarding the role and meaning of time. In quantum mechanics, once the wave function of time zero is known, its value Ψ (t) both for future and past is determined. Likewise, in relativity theory the static, geometric character of time is often emphasized by use of four-dimensional notation (three dimensions for space and one for time).¹⁴³

In light of our previous space-time relativity discussion this change is quite shocking.¹⁴⁴ What is essential in understanding Prigogine's critique of spatialized, mechanical time, is that by 'time' he intends the unidirectionality

¹⁴¹Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature, forward Alvin Toffler (New York: Bantam, 1984), pp. 10, 209, 255, 291.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁴³Ibid., pp. 229-230; cf. p. 218.

¹⁴⁴To support his claim he cites Einstein's denial of temporal irreversibility. Einstein, in response to his close friend Michele Besso, maintained irreversibility to be but a result of an "improbable" starting point. Correspondence, Albert Einstein--Michele Besso, 1903-1955 (Paris: Herman, 1972), n.p. cited in *ibid.*, p. 294. For a denial of time in Bergson's "lived" sense see *ibid.*, p. 294. For his reluctance to introduce history into cosmic evolution see *ibid.*, p. 215.

of time as truly dynamic. The upshot of this is that by its introduction into the course of scientific investigation the procedure cannot be reversed such that the antecedents can be recovered from the consequents, the conclusions cannot be in any way deduced from the premises. The temporal process has introduced an indeterminate progression into the state of affairs which in principle cannot be frozen into an a-temporal geometric equation. Time, for Prigogine entails sheer dynamic novelty, the footsteps of which can never be retraced. "These phenomena are governed by equations which are not invariant, as are the equations of mechanics, under the substitution $t \rightarrow -t$. On the contrary, the direction of temporal development plays an essential role."¹⁴⁵

Where does such dynamism exist? Both in the chemical and the biological realm. Heretofore, however, the two have proved antithetical. He distinguishes the two countervailing views of time emerging in the nineteenth century as thermodynamic and biological. The former, following the second law of thermodynamics, viz. the entropy of the cosmos tends toward maximization, asserts the direction of time is regressive, i.e., toward maximum distribution of heat and therefore toward thermal death. Arthur Eddington maintained this to be the greatest of the laws of Nature and associated time with increasing entropy.¹⁴⁶ The cosmogenic presupposition is that the origins of the universe were highly organized but gradually fell into disorder. Because entropy assumes a closed system, one must look outside the system to explain any

¹⁴⁵"Time, Structure and Entropy," in Time in Science and Philosophy: An International Study of Some Current Problems, ed. Jiri Zeman (Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing, 1971), p. 90.

¹⁴⁶The Nature of the Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), p. 333 cited by Ilya Prigogine, "Time, Structure and Entropy," p. 90.

tendency toward a decrease in entropy. That is to say, an external source of heat must be introduced to reverse the process. In a word, therefore, thermodynamic time is characterized by irreversibility.

In contrast to the regressive time of entropy is the progressive time of evolution in which the biosphere tends toward higher degrees of order and structure. The cosmogenic assumption here is that the origins of the universe were primitive and chaotic. Time becomes identified with creativity. It is Prigogine's thesis that contemporary thermodynamics accounts for both of these processes.

Broadly speaking, destruction of structures is the situation which occurs in the neighborhood of thermodynamic equilibrium. On the contrary 'creation of structures' may occur with specific non-linear kinetic laws of far-from-equilibrium conditions. The energy exchanged by the system with the outside world is then really transformed into structure.¹⁴⁷

In other words, the dissipative tendency of classical thermodynamics applies in those situations in which relative equilibrium exists. The second law holds. This we may liken to the anhypostatic pole of nomistic time. However, surprisingly, as the entropy gradient decreases and disequilibrium reaches the extreme, a critical threshold is reached called the "bifurcation point" in which spontaneously and in defiance of all probability a new highly structured order emerges. This is the point of genuine 'decision', of pure chance, of an irreducible random event.¹⁴⁸ Disequilibrium becomes the source of order.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ "Unity of Physical Laws and Levels of Description," in Interpretations of Life and Mind: Essays Around the Problem of Reduction, ed. Marjorie Grene (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 2. Cf. "Time, Structure and Entropy," p. 91. It is important here to note the new order comes at the expense of increased entropy elsewhere.

¹⁴⁸ Order Out of Chaos, pp. 160-162.

This we suggest, is analogous to the enhyposstatic or the theotic pole of nomistic time in which a modicum of order is maintained. Such is the function of the space-time field--the function of orderly relations within the universe.

A simple example is that of thermodiffusion in which a beaker of water when heated transfers its heat energy by means of thermal conduction at a steady rate until a critical point is reached at which time convection occurs by means of spontaneously organized hexagonally structured convection cells. This phenomenon defies all reasonable limits of probability as 10^{19} molecules highly organize themselves within a fraction of a second to accomplish this thermal transfer. "This probability is unthinkably small in an isolated system, and yet this phenomenon occurs spontaneously when the conditions of energy input are realized."¹⁵⁰ The interrelation between irreversible time and indeterminacy is inseparable. The future is not determinate in the past. Rather, ". . . the scientific picture has shifted toward a new, more subtle conception in which both deterministic features and stochastic features play an essential role."¹⁵¹ The closed deterministic understanding of the world has been superseded by an open, innovative one. What Prigogine has identified is the thermodynamic foundations

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 287. Recently Torrance, following R. B. Lindsay, has designated this aspect of thermodynamics, "entropy-consuming" ("The Concept of Order in Theology and Science," p. 132; reprinted in The Christian Frame of Mind, ch. 2, p. 19.

¹⁵⁰"Time, Structure and Entropy," p. 96; cf. Order Out of Chaos, p. 142.

¹⁵¹Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming, p. 210; cf. p. xvii. Torrance cites this as one of the most significant developments in recent science ("Acceptance Address for the Templeton Prize, 1978," Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 31 no. 2 (June 1979), p. 105.

for indeterminate, emergent evolution--a process which advances in qualitative quantum leaps and quantitative determinate steps--in which becoming and being, thermodynamics and dynamics "can be incorporated into a single noncontradictory vision."¹⁵²

11. Space-time Relativity and Theological Hermeneutics

Our discussion on the speed of light has differentiated three distinctive¹⁵³ durational modes which find their theological analogue in Torrance's thought.

Nomistic Time as Time-like Duration

Time as Regressive

Time as universally experienced is fallen from its created perfection. It is a ". . . regressive flow of corruption and decay . . .",¹⁵⁴ defined only in conjunction with the guilt incurred upon its origin.¹⁵⁵ Because of its irreversibility, it irretrievably cements our shame and guilt into our history.¹⁵⁶ The actualization of the present posits a necessity from which no natural escape is possible. Torrance writes: "While this time is, as it were, alive in the present moment, it decays right away, and suffers from a sort of rigor mortis, a fixity from which we cannot escape

¹⁵²Order Out of Chaos, p. 255; Cf. DCO, p. 55.

¹⁵³Torrance confirms the categorial distinction between fallen and unfallen time. It is a relationship which cannot be historically expounded, ". . . for that imports the categories of fallen historicity into an unfallen context" RBET, 7/8/81).

¹⁵⁴STR, p. 90; cf. WCCCA, p. 68.

¹⁵⁵CAC, I, p. 255; RP, p. 50.

¹⁵⁶T. F. Torrance, The Centrality of Christ, p. 19.

and within which we are incarcerated in our ageing and dying."¹⁵⁷ Earlier he posits:

The kind of time we have in this passing world is the time of an existence that crumbles away into the dust, time that runs backward into nothingness. Hence the kind of historical happening we have in this world is happening that decays and is so far illusory, running away into the darkness and forgetfulness of the past.¹⁵⁸

This flight of time is self-contradictory in that the vital, actually indeterminate dynamism of existence lapses into a-temporal spatialized time of determinate necessity. The time of this world is futile, though not utterly so. Its futility consists in its vain circularity imposed upon it by the curse. It is a time in need of redemption:

As long as the time of our life in this world is devoured by the dragon of evil and guilt, time has no meaning for us. It returns upon itself in empty circularity and futility, unable to arrive at its true goal, unable to reach the fullness of life.¹⁵⁹

This circularity is perhaps better depicted as a spiral, as

¹⁵⁷STR, p. 91.

¹⁵⁸STR, p. 88. Torrance identifies this view with that of Emil Brunner, "The Christian Understanding of Time," pp. 1-12. On the succeeding page of STR he refers to fallen time as illusory and privative (also cf. TS, p. 335). If he intends this in a Platonic-Augustinian sense, such a designation must be regarded as fundamentally inconsistent with the main thrust of his unitary realist position, which fully invests the natural world with reality. That he rejects a privative view of evil and fallen time as illusory is confirmed in his designation of hell as temporally continuous beyond death (AT, p. 171). Cf. DCO, p. 119 where evil is depicted as anti-being sustained in an 'improper existence' by God. Such negated being must be defined in terms of relative non-being (mē oun) as opposed to absolute nothingness (ouk oun) (cf. STR, p. 79); Paul Tillich develops this distinction in, Systematic Theology, vol. 1: Reason and Revelation, Being and God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 188.

¹⁵⁹AT, p. 169.

it has beginning and end by no fulfillment.¹⁶⁰ This repetitious succession (stoicheion) of which Paul speaks is oppressively binding, transposed into a legal principle, demonically enslaving man to this cursed futility in alienation from God and one another.¹⁶¹ Emil Brunner elaborates the relational impact of such alienation upon time. Fallen time is characterized by anxious preoccupation with the future and guilty reminiscence of the past. We seek unsuccessfully to dominate the future and escape the past and in so doing we lose the present.

This lack of a real present, which is the existence of sinful man, manifests itself particularly with regard to his fellow-man. He is too pre-occupied with his own past and his own future to realise properly the thou of the other.¹⁶²

In effect, time as a field of dynamic relation becomes time as an object--a means to an end. This is nomistic time which has "refracted" the orderly dynamic interaction of natural and personal events in kinetic relation to Christ into a necessitarian regimen.¹⁶³ It is the mechanistic fatalism of relentless succession which characterizes the time of the world. Hence implicit echoes of Calvin's understanding of the first use of the moral law surface. In its punitive function, in tragic relief to the righteousness of God, it accuses, condemns, and destroys. It exposes the utter sinfulness and helplessness of man. Calvin writes: "(T)he law which had been given for salvation, provided it met with suitable hearers, turns into an

¹⁶⁰Ibid, p. 163.

¹⁶¹CAC, I, pp. 256-257; STR, p. 97.

¹⁶²"The Christian Understanding of Time," p. 11. Torrance cites this as in harmony with his view of fallen time in STR, p. 88, n. 4.

¹⁶³STR, p. 97.

occasion for sin and death."¹⁶⁴ Theologically for Torrance, the weight of legal obligation finds its temporal analogue in the burden of irreversible time.

Clearly emerging from Torrance's discussion is the realization that the time of this world is wrongly conceived as a neutral, natural reality or a theological abstraction. It is intimately bound up with the history of salvation. Because it cannot be understood apart from redemption, i.e., apart from Christ, it is in and of itself anhypostatic, and it is in this sense which we must understand Torrance's allusions to its privative character. Just as the human nature of Christ had no existent status in and of itself apart from its hypostatic incorporation with the Divine nature, so fallen, nomistic time is fulfilled only in its hypostasis--in Christ redeeming time.¹⁶⁵ By virtue of the atoning act of Christ, time becomes truly temporalized.

However, it is precisely this legal-moral autonomy which is the perverse surrogate--the time of the anti-Christ. It is false, unfilled time. It cannot be confused with created or redeemed Time.

This distinction corresponds with Barth's development of unfallen, created duration as "saga" in contrast to fallen "history:"

It [saga] looks to the basic and impelling occurrence behind the everyday aspect of history, where the latter is not only no less history than on this everyday aspect but has indeed its source and is to that extent history in a higher sense. It looks to the hidden depth of time where time is already time, and indeed genuine time. It looks in a most literal sense to the "radical" time of history. Where divinatory and poetical saga is not allowed to speak, no true picture of history, i.e., no picture of true history, can ever

¹⁶⁴Institutes, II.7.7, p. 356.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 98.

emerge.¹⁶⁶

Those who criticize such a position as depreciating the historicity of the creation account either deny the "goodness" of the creative act or else deny the fallenness of the present order. In one way or another the important categorial distinction is lost.

When we overlay our physical discussion of the speed of light upon our theological exposition we find the time-like dimension of the light-cone of some analogical utility. Life within the light-cone, that is life which is bounded by the asymptote of the speed of light, is asymmetric or irreversible. Within a given space-time framework the present always irretrievably recedes into the past. Although the speed of this recession may be slowed relative to another system, nonetheless it may never be reversed.

The second law of thermodynamics illustrates this asymmetric temporal process. Heat energy, when undisturbed by external factors, always moves toward dissipation, i.e., from hotter concentrated to cooler less concentrated energy states. This is the law of entropy which asserts the universe is moving as a whole from higher order states in relative disequilibrium toward lower disordered states of great equilibrium. The cosmic clock is winding down.

Time as Progressive

The scenario looks quite bleak, but in Torrance's view a higher-order factor is operative to mitigate the prevailing decay of the world. There exists a blessing behind the curse of the law. The law serves to inhibit the lawlessness of man and prevent chaos from inundating him. Torrance writes, this nomistic, irreversible time frame served to confine ". . . man within an order of existence

¹⁶⁶CD, III, 1, 41, p. 83.

validated by God but within which he was not the man he ought to be."¹⁶⁷ Again strains of Calvin appear relevant. What Calvin terms the second or civil use of the law is a "constrained or forced righteousness" restraining man from lawlessness.¹⁶⁸ It does produce a modicum of external moral achievement: ". . . they progress but slightly for the present, yet become partially broken in by bearing the yoke of righteousness."¹⁶⁹ Torrance summarizes:

The kind of time we have in historical events is the time of creation that has fallen from what it ought to be into disorder, and yet is contained through nomos from disappearing or vanishing into illusion, but as such it is time in which we are subjected to law, time within which we are all servants.¹⁷⁰

There is a sense here, which he confesses is not fully developed, that there is an anti-entropic aspect within the course of nature which ultimately must be attributed to the covenant:

God does not allow the creation to run away from Him, namely His grace and steadfast love. He holds on to the fallen world and its development so that the whole of space and time is held within the grasp of God's covenant love.¹⁷¹

However, he maintains the distinction between the custodial anticipatory character of the Old Covenant in contrast to the New Covenant which brings the redemptive will of God to

¹⁶⁷STR, p. 97; cf. CAC, II, pp. 13-14.

¹⁶⁸Institutes, II.7.10, p. 359.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

¹⁷⁰STR, p. 97.

¹⁷¹Torrance Interview, 5 April, 1982. Cf. TS, p. 68; CAC, II, p. 13.

light.¹⁷² He concurs with Barth's analysis of creation as the outer form of the covenant.¹⁷³ Creation has no autonomous teleology of its own. It exists only in dependence upon the Creator as the external created context in which the covenant is fulfilled. Barth explains: ". . . the covenant is the goal of creation and creation the way of the covenant."¹⁷⁴ By rejecting any theological dualism, creation even in its meanest form, is ultimately sustained by the gracious hand of God ". . . in a sort of half-alienation . . ."¹⁷⁵ As a result we find the unidirectionality of time is not to be interpreted solely as evil and increasing in entropy. The evil of the world ironically serves the purposes of God.¹⁷⁶ Torrance suggests:

. . . the equation of entropy and disorder needs to be counterbalanced by the recognition that the principle of increasing entropy, as classically formulated, holds only within a closed system and cannot apply to the universe as a whole or to its constant development in the emergence of richer and more complex forms of order, and by the recognition that for change and increase in order to take place there must always be latent in the orderly patterns of nature a measure of entropy resisting necessitation or fixation in order (T)hermodynamically regarded, 'order' and 'disorder' condition one another and together make for the orderly advance or development which we find in nature.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷²CAC, II, p. 14.

¹⁷³TS, p. 68.

¹⁷⁴CD, III, 1, 41, p. 96.

¹⁷⁵DCO, p. 119.

¹⁷⁶Cf. DCO, pp. 114, 116, 124, 128-129. He even goes so far as to say decay and death have more to do with the teleological advance of creation through thermodynamic progression than with evil (DCO, p. 122).

¹⁷⁷Ibid, p. 121.

The temporal scheme which Prigogine elaborates coincides directly with that which Torrance provisionally diagrams¹⁷⁸ (see Figure 10). This is not a naive linear time, but one which runs forward toward higher and richer order. Torrance summarizes:

. . . here time is given its full meaning associated with irreversibility within spontaneously arising structures, and does not merely appear as a geometric parameter externally associated with motion. We have a new kind of time--dependent functional order coordinating space-time to the dynamic processes within the system, and a non-unitary transformation theory is developed to enable a move from a thermodynamic to a genuinely dynamic account of nature. In this way once more an historical element is introduced even into physico-chemical description of processes in the universe.¹⁷⁹

Time is not an homogeneous substrate in the Newtonian sense but is an integral aspect of both creative and redemptive events of history.

Regarding creation, Torrance subscribes to a variational process within evolution which Prigogine's fluxations depict.¹⁸⁰ However the bifurcation point is not an autonomous phenomenon but is in correlation with ". . . the unlimited freedom of the reality of God. It is in God's inter-relation with the world that nature has its staggering . . . possibility of creating surprising elements which you cannot possibly explain."¹⁸¹ The order within

¹⁷⁸RBET, 7/8/81.

¹⁷⁹DCO, pp. 55-56.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 55; GGT, pp. 140-143.

¹⁸¹RBET, 7/8/81; cf. GGT, pp. 142-143. The probability of this emerging by chance alone requires an untenable age of the universe, therefore he concludes, ". . . time-dependent laws of probability exclude this kind of explanation by chance developments completely" (DCO, p. 125).




Figure 10 Non-linear, nomistic time as regressive and progressive.

Where any actual segment of fallen terrestrial time is given and where the 'horizontal' arrow of time reflects the regressive 'anhypostatic' bearing of nomistic time corresponding to near-equilibrium entropy and the 'vertical' arrow of time reflects the progressive, 'enhypostatic,' analogue of nomistic time corresponding to far-from-equilibrium entropy.

the universe is a contingent order, i.e., an order dependent upon the gracious will of God to create and sustain a universe out of nothing.¹⁸² It is Torrance's theological notion of contingency which finds its natural expression in the unpredictable spontaneity of evolution--". . . the future of the universe in the redemptive purpose of God's love is not to be divorced from the design of the universe, or therefore from the future of the universe . . ."183 This is a creative evolution, or shall we say redemptive evolution of the most comprehensive sort. The creative-redeeming work of God is not confined to the origins of the universe but pervasively impinges upon it throughout its history in an ongoing dynamic process.¹⁸⁴ The near-equilibrium--far-from-equilibrium model of Prigogine is helpful to a point here. Under equilibrium or near-equilibrium conditions the system is determinate and predictable. However as it reaches the bifurcation point of a far-from-equilibrium state it becomes indeterminate and unpredictable. Torrance introduces the teleological and eschatological aspects of duration under a similar scheme:

In that they [theological statements] bear upon him [God] in his infinite transcendence over all time and history, they must have an eschatological quality in a reference through time and history to the future; and since the future is not arbitrary, but is bound up with the ultimate purpose of God's love revealed in Jesus Christ, they will also have a teleological quality in being geared into the consummation of that purpose. . . . If they were only teleological, it might be possible to develop some sort of calculus of possibilities in prediction; if they were only eschatological, they would break off without any clear predictive reference even in indicating more than they can

¹⁸²DCO, p. 111.

¹⁸³GGT, pp. 138-139.

¹⁸⁴DCO, p. 110.

express.¹⁸⁵

The temporally linear, continual process of evolving creation and historical redemption is 'interrupted' by the non-linear, creative and redemptive fullness of time in Christ through his Spirit. Torrance continues:

(W)hile the teleological ingredient derives from the incarnation, or the embodiment of God's eternal purpose of love in space and time, the eschatological ingredient relates to the fact that the fulfillment of that purpose cuts across and outruns all our expectations, for it is correlated to the infinite differentiability in the relation of God to the creation.¹⁸⁶

From the human subjective perspective the redemptive bifurcation point is the time of decision, repentance, faith.¹⁸⁷ It is that point in time in which the soul, like Mary at the Annunciation, acquiesces, 'So let it be unto me.' It is the time of confirming what Christ has objectively completed upon the cross. For Torrance,

Time, as it were, is no more in that hour--it is the moment of eternal decision.

. . . The Word of God refuses to let him [man] drift aimlessly down the current of time any longer. He is confronted with Eternity and at last he must decide. He cannot bluff himself any longer. That is the divine stroke that suspends the flow of time--the moment of eternal destiny and predestination: mankind face to face in time with the eternal Word of God.¹⁸⁸

The question of the frequency of this 'interruption' must be addressed. For Torrance the eschaton not merely impinges upon teleological time in the 'punctiliar' historical sequence of the post-resurrection sojourn on

¹⁸⁵GGT, p. 138.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁸⁷WCCCA, p. 133; AT, p. 186; CAC, I, p. 313.

¹⁸⁸AT, pp. 83-84; cf. p. 186; "In Hoc Signo Vincas," p. 17.

earth nor the Second Advent, but it runs 'concurrent' to the teleological time of this world. It is the "silver lining behind that time of secular history,"¹⁸⁹ "the new time which is permanently real and which is continuous reality flowing against the stream of crumbling time."¹⁹⁰ It is here where Prigogine's model proves deficient for interpreting Torrance. For Prigogine, the near-equilibrium states and far-from-equilibrium states are inversely related to each other and form a continuum. They are mutually exclusive of the other, related at best as polar opposites. That is to say the thermodynamics developed by Prigogine are dualistic or dialectic, not differential.¹⁹¹ The fact that he describes his position as a synthesis of Eastern and Western thought is telling.¹⁹²

Once again we must conclude, although Prigogine illuminates our understanding of Torrance, in the final analysis the unitary relation has not been achieved.

Redemptive Time as Space-like Duration

Time travel has stirred the scientific imagination for generations. Since Einstein's STR the theoretical implications of exceeding the speed of light have become an increasing preoccupation within the public domain. However as our discussion of tachyons has shown, the imaginary may be but a prelude to a more profound reality. Science has served as well in widening the domain of the possible by its implementation of models which exceed the province of

¹⁸⁹STR, p. 110; cf. AT, p. 166.

¹⁹⁰RP p. 50; cf. AT, p. 165.

¹⁹¹Cf. Order Out of Chaos, pp. 252-253 where he identifies the relation of physics to chemistry, dynamics to thermodynamics as analogous to dialectical materialism.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 22

the perceptual.

When we enter into a discussion of eschatological time we encounter a new dimension generated by the reality of the resurrected humanity of Christ. It is, Torrance suggests: ". . . a new kind of historical happening which instead of tumbling down into the grave and oblivion rises out of the death of what is past into continuing being and reality."¹⁹³ "(I)t is something that bursts through the structures and limitations of space and time as we know them. . . ."194

This eschatological, redemptive time, unlike nomistic time, is not bound by present to past irreversibility. Its direction corresponds with the double aspect of Christ's activity: His humiliation and His exaltation. The former is not merely an historic first century event but a redemptive recapitulation of all history. As the second Adam He reverses the course of sinful history. The arrow of time moves from present to past. Torrance argues:

Through the atonement, then, Christ broke into the kingdom of the irreversibility of time and guilt with its strength in the law, and by a complete act of expiation He has undone its power and cancelled guilt and sin. That means that in the death of Christ we have an act of justification that penetrates back to the very beginning and sets man's life on the basis of God's creative purpose. The Cross makes contact with creation. Christ the Second, the Last Adam undoes the work of the first Adam and heads the race to a new and higher glory that far transcends the old, for here the past is not only undone but suborned by the Cross and made to serve the purpose of God's redemption.¹⁹⁵

It is precisely this reversed time which Minkowski's light-

¹⁹³STR, pp. 88-89.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁹⁵CAC, I, pp. 255-256. Cf. STR, p. 86; "In Hoc Signo Vincas," p. 17; WCCCA, p. 68; AT, p. 167.

cone model may illustrate. That which could exceed the light-like boundary would in fact be travelling backward in time, that is to say, the past, rather than fleeting away, would be approaching and thus constituting the present (see Figure 11).

From the time-like frame of reference, of course the fall precedes the Incarnation which precedes the Resurrection/Ascension. However from the reversed Eschatological, 'tachyonic' perspective, relatively speaking, P_3 precedes P_2 which precedes P_1 , i.e., the resurrection antedates the incarnation which antedates the fall. In actuality the tachyon duration is a reverse image of the time-like duration.

This reverse time orientation of the exinanition of Christ corresponds quite closely with the light-cone model. From our time-like perspective the ravages of sin are in actuality negated from this historical record.

Eschatological time also has a positive, constructive dimension which ushers the future into the present. It is a recapitulation, in Torrance's view, which ". . . involves a forward movement, in which the unravelled existence and time of man are gathered up and restored in Christ in ontological relation to God."¹⁹⁶ This is the time of the new creation--the time of growing young.¹⁹⁷ This is resurrection time which,

. . . runs not backwards but forwards, and overcomes all illusion and privation of being. This is fully real historical happening, so real that it remains real happening and does not slip away from us, but keeps pace with us and out runs us as we tumble down in decay and lapse into death and the dust of past history and even comes to meet us out of the future. This is how we are to think of the risen Christ Jesus. . . . He

¹⁹⁶STR, p. 86.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 90, 100.




Figure 11 Reversibility of Redemptive Time.

Let $AF L$, $BI M$ and $CR N$ be the future light-cones of three sequential historic events, the fall (F), the Incarnation (I) and the Resurrection-Ascension of Christ (R) connected by the world-line, FR , which serves as the inertial frame of reference. The enclosed angles of the light-cone are the respective time-like domains such that 1) the space-time coordinates of any events with respect to the inertial world line FR within the cones are less than the speed of light (c); 2) the space-time coordinates of any events with respect to the inertial world-line FR on the light-like boundaries are equal to the speed of light (c); 3) the space-time coordinates of any events with respect to the inertial world-line FR in the space-like region beyond the light-cone exceed the speed of light (c).

Let RT be the tachyon event of the Resurrection-Ascension.

Let P_1 be the space-time intersection of T with the fall (FL), P_2 be the space-time intersection of T with the Incarnation (IM), and P_3 be the space-time intersection of T at the Resurrection-Ascension (RN).

lives on in the present as real live continuous happening encountering us here and now and in the present and waiting for us in the future.¹⁹⁸

To understand this resurrection time we must examine a third analogy through which the present and future undergo a relativistic transformation.

Relativity of Simultaneity in Bi-temporal Theology

The relativity of simultaneity provides us with a marvelous analogue for understanding three aspects of Torrance's thought: the unity of the two Advents of Christ, the already but not-yet of the Kingdom of God, and the immediacy of personal resurrection.

Torrance argues there is but one Parousia in the New Testament, ". . . applied equally to the first and the second advents and the nature of the coming-and-presence which is envisaged when Jesus Christ comes again to make all things new. . ."199 The New Testament speaks of it only in the singular. Yet by virtue of the ascension our experience is one of a past First Advent and a future Second Advent. Torrance comments: "The ascension of Christ thus introduces, as it were, an eschatological pause in the heart of the parousia . . ."200

What the relativity of simultaneity demonstrates is the feasibility of a temporally differential treatment of a given event. Recalling our discussion of the controller-passenger relativity of simultaneity example (Figures 4 & 5 above), the simultaneity, i.e., the unity of the 'yellow' Incarnation and the 'red' Second Advent from the vantage

¹⁹⁸Ibid., p. 89, emphasis mine.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 144.

²⁰⁰Ibid., p. 145.

point of the ascended 'controller', Christ, is properly the past Incarnation and the future Second Advent from the perspective of the saint travelling within the time frame of this world. That which is present to God may actually and truly be temporally protracted to us.

The reality with which we are concerned, Torrance argues, nevertheless, is a single reality.

Here it does appear Torrance tends to treat the Divine perspective as the privileged one. Does this contradict the relativity of simultaneity analogy? This apparent non-relativistic 'absolutization' of the Eschatological perspective of the ascended Christ is warranted by virtue of the twin paradox in which the acts of ascension and return are the theological sequels to the acceleration and deceleration of the astronaut. For these brief moments the conditions under which STR is applicable are violated, accounting for why aging of the twins is not susceptible to a relativistic transformation. It is the astronaut who invariably is the younger of the twins. Here the durations with which we are concerned are not necessarily invariant with respect to each other. That is to say their differentiation is not merely quantitative. The character of fallen time (terrestrial time) is not invariantly transformed into that of redemptive time (astronautical time). What we find operative in effect is the enhypostatic introduction of the fallen time of this world into the new time of the eschaton. Although on the one hand this establishes the priority of Eschatological Time it fully legitimizes the space-time frame of fallen history, for this is a relational priority which requires an alternative space-time framework to establish its space-time definition.

Our analogy of the relativity of simultaneity corroborates what we have already discovered in the hypostatic union. A single reality may be differentially

addressed. Here both the duration of the person of Christ and the time of the Church consist of irreducible components. Where the fullness of time in Christ is comprehensively understood only in the hypostatic union of eternity with new time, the time of the Church consists of the new time of the eschaton in hypostatic union with the teleological progress of the Kingdom of God in history. Just as relativity teaches us that a single reality has alternative, fully legitimate interpretations invariantly related, so the fullness of time in Christ or the time of the Church are unitary events properly understood from diverse durational frameworks.

Because all discussion of eschatological time, be it past, present, or future, is not reducible to a common durational denominator, the language which Torrance employs must be relativized, i.e., discriminated and adapted for the intended space-time frame of reference. The transformation equations of relativity theory are a transformation in kind. Although time undergoes quantitative variation it does not undergo qualitative transformation. Its rhythm may vary, but its direction and dissipation do not. This is not the case in relating teleological and eschatological time, the time of the Church and the time of the ascended God-man. Torrance asserts:

On the one hand, then, the ascension must be thought out in relation to its actual relations of space and time. On the other hand, however, the ascension must be thought of as an ascension beyond all our notions of space and time (cf. 'higher than the heavens', Heb. 7:26), and therefore as something that cannot ultimately be expressed in categories of space and time, or at least cannot be enclosed within categories of this kind.²⁰¹

This must be contrasted with Oscar Cullmann's now classic

²⁰¹Ibid., pp. 127-128; cf. p. 78.

distinction between D-Day and V-Day as illustrative of the already/not-yet character of the Kingdom of God, in which, "The decisive battle in war may already have occurred in a relatively early stage of the war, and yet the war still continues."²⁰² Clearly, such a distinction does not fully account for the actual completion of the Kingdom of God in the finished work of Christ. The analogy is cast upon a single continuum of time. It thus fails to account for the hypostatic differential which enhypostatically incorporates the 'not-yet' into the 'already.' As long as an exclusively one-dimensional time is operative it is impossible to do full justice to both aspects. Either one collapses into the other as the realized eschatology of C. H. Dodd on the one hand or the future eschatology of Schweitzer on the other.²⁰³ Otherwise a paradoxical dualism maintained in proportional tension results, as in Cullmann's salvation history.

Torrance supersedes these all by implementing differential hypostatic durations:

The Christian Gospel . . . is synonymous with exciting news that the future age has already come upon us, telescoping itself, as it were, into the present age. The present age still goes on; history continues in the same old way, but the whole framework is altered, for the final goal of history has come into the midst of time and is now lodged in the very heart of it. That is the eschatological significance of the Incarnation, and that is what Jesus preached. "Repent! for the Kingdom of God is at hand; it has come upon you."²⁰⁴

In asserting time "keeps pace" yet "outruns us", is "here now", "comes to meet us out of the future", yet is "waiting

²⁰²Christ and Time, p. 84.

²⁰³Cf. "MED," pp. 101-102; CAC, I, pp. 307-308.

²⁰⁴CAC, I, p. 307; cf. STR, p. 151.

for us in the future,"²⁰⁵ we must orient Torrance's language within our time-like frame of reference so that the durational inversion of the tachyon environment does not introduce confusion. We must interpret these references to the present and the future as relative to our nomistic time frame. If we were to de-relativize the concept of the future, i.e., absolutize it, we would at once de-temporalize it and thus fall into a fatalistic determinism, which as will become evident later, is quite alien to Torrance's thought.

With this caveat in mind, the light-cone model is still of expository help. We have already established by virtue of the relativity of simultaneity something as commonplace as the sunrise as 8.33 minutes to our future. As such, to speak of the resurrection 'coming to meet us out of the future' need not be religious hyperbola.

For Torrance the resurrection initiates the time of the eschaton--time as it was always intended to be. This is totally authentic historical happening, "real" time, enduring reality confronting us in the present as a flowing continuous and yet permanent live happening.²⁰⁶ It is "the perfected reality of what Christ has done,"²⁰⁷ dynamically complete rather than organically progressive.²⁰⁸

However this side of the veil--this side of death or this side of the Second Advent--consummate time is perceived by Torrance as apportioned, split apart as ordinary space-time experience is, ". . . because our eyes

²⁰⁵STR, p. 89.

²⁰⁶TS, pp. 335, 336; RP, p. 50.

²⁰⁷STR, p. 152; cf. p. 101; AT, p. 166.

²⁰⁸CAC, I, p. 61; cf. STR, pp. 151, 152, 153.

cannot keep up with the speed of light in terms of which all motion and structure in the universe are defined."²⁰⁹ Therefore that which is complete in Christ and already ours from the eschatological dimension is not yet fully ours from this space-time teleological perspective. Elaborating upon Torrance's suggestion, therefore, the First and Second Advents though eschatologically singular as light-like events would be teleologically bifurcated as time-like events (see Figure 12).

Let us undertake a relativistic thought experiment. From our time dilation discussion of the twin paradox (see Figure 6 above) we see as a traveller approaches the speed of light, time dilation for the terrestrial observer approaches infinity with respect to the traveller, i.e., the space-time event of the First Advent in effect endures continually. As Figure 12 suggests, at any point along the light-like A_1P journey, from the perspective of the light traveller, no time has transpired from A_1 to A_2 , while any amount of terrestrial time may in fact separate A_1 and A_2 without effecting the time traveller. He may be everlastingly present at any space-time point along A_1A_2 . Hence we may conclude, relativity physics embodies its own manifestation of 'a thousand years is as a day and a day as a thousand years,' the Alpha is also the Omega. This analogy demonstrates the notion of the immanence of the Parousia to be, from a purely scientific perspective, actually possible relative to the eschaton.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹STR, p. 144; cf. p. 153.

²¹⁰AT, p. 186; STR, p. 146. Although mathematically an infinity would be required before the traveller returned, thus nullifying the actuality of the Parousia, the point of the analogy is to disclose the possibility of the interrelation of differential times. By virtue of the ectypal nature of such analogues it serves a heuristic purpose despite mathematically saying more than we care to

This same analogue illuminates the 'paradoxical' death of the individual saint. The Biblical text reveals, "To be absent in the body is to be present with the Lord", and yet the resurrection of the saints occurs at the end of history. Torrance explains:

When the believer dies, he goes to be with Christ and is in his immediate presence, participant in him and made like him. That is to each believer the parousia of Christ to him. Yet when this is regarded on the plane of history and of the on-going process of the fallen world, the death of each believer means that his body is laid to sleep in the earth, waiting until the redemption of the body and the recreation of all things at the final Parousia. Looked at from the perspective of the new creation there is no gap between the death of the believer and the parousia of Christ, but looked at from the perspective of time that decays and crumbles away, there is a lapse in time between them. How do we think these together? Only by thinking of them exclusively in Christ in the one Person of Christ in whom human nature and the divine nature are hypostatically united, and in whom our human existence are taken up into his divine life. We must think Christologically here.²¹¹

This Christologic dispels the fatalist problem of a predetermined history. To reduce the eschatological to the teleological would be in Gilbert Ryle's term, a category mistake. The two cannot be confused. The teleological future is not already fixed. It is anhypostatic in itself. Yet it lapses into a radical secularism when it is considered separable from Christ, the Eschatos.²¹² Teleological time is enhypostatically, i.e., differentially dependent upon eschatological time in Christ. Paradox occurs only as a result of refusing to appreciate the implications of 'theological relativity'--of lapsing into a classical

express.

²¹¹STR, p. 102; cf. TCFK, p. 343.

²¹²Cf. STR, p. 151.




Figure 12 Unity and imminence of the Parousia.

- Let QA_1P be the future light-cone from the terrestrial perspective of the First Advent of Christ.
- Let QA_2P_1 be the past light-cone from the terrestrial perspective of the first possible space-time occurrence of the Second Advent.
- Let A_{2n+1} be the next possible terrestrial occurrence of the Second Advent, and so forth until the actuality of the Second Advent from the terrestrial perspective.
- Let A_1A_{2n} be the world-line of the first and next possible Second Advents, and serving as the inertial space-time frame of reference.
- Let A_1PA_2 be the first possible 'light-like journey' from the terrestrial perspective of the ascended Christ from the First to the Second Advents.
- Let $A_1P_1A_{2n+1}$ be the next possible 'light-like journey' from the terrestrial perspective, of the ascended Christ from the First to the Second Advents, and so forth until the actuality of the Second Advent from the terrestrial perspective.

Newtonianism which de-temporalizes time. This is the theological analogue of demythologizing the supernatural. Both are forms of a provincial, single durational thinking. It is analogous to the geometric myopia of Edwin Abbott's Flatlanders who reduce without remainder the two dimensional circle to either its punctiliar or linear intersection with the one dimension of Flatland.²¹³ If the fullness of time in the resurrected Christ is dismissed as religious mythology the same hermeneutic myopia ensues.

²¹³Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions, 5th rev. ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963).

SECTION II

THE THEORETICAL MATRIX

CHAPTER IV

ANALOGIC

No one simply by being clever can see God in Jesus Christ. "No man says Jesus is Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." The doctrine of analogia entis applied to Christology inevitably means the humanisation of God. . . . Similarly a doctrine of analogia entis in Grace and election inevitably means synergism or determinism. It is just because the only analogia we may use is an analogia fidei, that we can still talk analogically--and we cannot talk of God apart from analogies--and anthropomorphically, without humanising God. This analogia we find in the person of Christ, who is the only point . . . where God and man come indissolubly together.

--T. F. Torrance
"Predestination in Christ"

Relativity theory has taught us to understand the interrelation of observable events through the transformation equations of the invisible space-time field. Relativity takes into full account the particularity of a given field. Because it is a theory of sufficient adaptability it does justice to the space-time contours of the cosmos. This new theory required new terms, concepts and modes of thought

which from a classical perspective were unintelligible.

In a coincident way Torrance argues, similar theoretic tools are essential if theology is to understand the theanthropic conjunction:

Unless we can make this transition to the level of thought which these new kinds of structures are revealed we remain stuck at levels which deprive us of the ability to penetrate into those real connections which we require for precision in our knowledge. . .¹

Torrance directs us to the ana-logic, i.e., the referential structure of language as providing the transformational semantics essential to an appreciation of the differential contours of duration.

12. Christologic as Analogia Analogans

Topological Language

The sine qua non of all theological language as referential is the mediating reality of Jesus Christ, the incarnate and risen Word of God to man and Word of man to God. The hypostatic union has served as the unique deposit of the God-man differential relationship. From here Torrance offers an oblique treatment of this all-important connection: "Another way to express the co-ordination of divine and human centres of reference in the space-time of the Incarnation seems to be offered by the analogy of topological language. . ."² Topology is a mathematical discipline within geometry which seeks to establish homeomorphic transformations of a group of elements. Torrance refers to it as the mapping of "elastic connections."³

¹STI, p. 84.

²Ibid., 81.

³Ibid.

Raymond Wilder elaborates for the layman:

. . . a topological transformation is . . . often roughly described as any deformation of a configuration that does not "tear" or "fold" but is otherwise unrestricted. . . . [A] circle may thus be deformed into an ellipse, a triangle, a polygon of any number of sides--but not into two non-intersecting circles (because of the "no tearing" condition) nor into a figure eight (because of the "no fold" condition). . .⁴

The operative principle is that of a loose one to one correspondence.

Correspondence theory has always characterized realist epistemology. However, when Torrance conjoins the concept of homeomorphic topology with correspondence, an analogical flexibility--a translogical hierarchy--is introduced which prevents a naively realistic implementation of the one to one relation.⁵ He designates his position as critical realism.⁶ In contrast he identifies naive realism with 'fundamentalism' (including Gordon Clark and Carl F. H. Henry), which forgoes a direct logico-linguistic link between God and Scripture such that propositional revelation in all of its literal perspicuity and logical veracity lie at our disposal.⁷ It is a universally accessible deposit within the public domain.

Such "ultra-realism" because it fails to appreciate the Christo-logic of revelation, i.e., the epistemological implications of the dynamic hypostatic relation in Jesus

⁴Introduction to the Foundation of Mathematics, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 188-189.

⁵TS, p. 231-232, 237. Notice how more recently he consciously abandons the potentially ambiguous term "correspondence" for the more precise "translogical" (TCFK, pp. 304-305, 323-324).

⁶STR, p. 6, n. 9.

⁷RBET, 7/13/81; STR, pp. 7-8.

Christ, inadvertently detaches the written from the Incarnate Word, who is both the Divine ground and historic center of interaction with mankind. To render revelation propositional is to confuse the personal and totally unique interaction of God with man with an abstract generality devoid of its intended significance.⁸

The ecumenical solution to the problem of theological language for Torrance, predictably, lies within the hypostatic complex. The ideal human language must be fundamentally referential and dynamic.

The Incarnation has bequeathed to us the illusive task of coordinating the ". . . divine and human, eternal and temporal, invisible and visible, spiritual and material relations. . ." with one language. Such an undertaking Torrance contends, is impossible,⁹ resulting in paradoxical contradictions. The attempt at such a reduction is tantamount to a 'Eutychian' confusion of language, of which fundamentalistic literalism is guilty.

However, at the other extreme Torrance defers from suggesting a dual system of language, which ultimately leads to the 'Nestorian' detachment of word from reality, faith from history, Geschichte from Historie, Scripture from Logos.¹⁰

The alternative he envisions, albeit never positively executes, is a language stretched, as with Athanasius, to its human limits,¹¹ bursting the wine-skins of its traditional confinement.¹²

⁸RET, p. 66; cf. TS, pp. 233-234.

⁹STI, pp. 53, 76; CTSC, pp. 31-32; TS, pp. 179-180.

¹⁰GR, pp. 120-121; Reconstruction, pp. 18-19.

¹¹Interview 15 July 1981.

¹²TS, p. 25.

Language, for Torrance, is referential. It serves a semantic function. It is a sign, which while pointing beyond itself nevertheless participates in that which exceeds it.¹³ It is, in principle, therefore, incomplete yet faithful to the object of its reference. Torrance aligns this with Kurt Goedel's analysis of complex arithmetic systems, which are consistent only by finding their axiomatic justification beyond the system.¹⁴

As this sign focuses more acutely upon the reality it discloses, it approaches transparency, and serves as a "model" or "analogue"--an operational vehicle through which reality is apprehended.¹⁵ Biblically the parable serves as an analogue par excellence:

. . . the whole significance of a Parable is that it is analogy with a difference, analogy which has at its heart an eschatological event which, until it actually overtakes us, nothing in the natural or historical order can begin to reveal.¹⁶

This Torrance elsewhere designates as apocalyptic language.

¹³TS, pp. vi, 145, 166, 172. For the referential function of Scripture, see T. F. Torrance, "The Place of Word and Truth in Theological Inquiry according to St. Anselm," in Studia mediaevalia et mariologica, P. Carolo Balic' OFM septuagesimam explenti annum dicata, ed. P. obertus Zavalloni (Rome: Editrice Antonianum, 1971), pp. 151-152; TCFK, p. 317; Reconstruction, p. 32; "HA," pp. 454-455; "HHP," pp. 44, 66; CTSC, pp. 123-124. For a similar relation of mathematical numbers to reality see TS, pp. 94-95.

¹⁴Goedel's proof, hailed by R. B. Braithwaite as among the most significant contributions in the field of logic since Aristotle, appears in On Formally Undecidable Propositions of "Principia Mathematica" and Related Systems. Among Torrance's allusions to this landmark are TCFK, pp. 136-146; STI, pp. 86-88; STR, pp. 188-190.

¹⁵TS, pp. 240-241; GR, pp. 94-95.

¹⁶CAC, II, p. 60; cf. pp. 58-74; GR, pp. 150-151; TS, pp. 273-276.

It allows us to speak of history, not in terms of fallen time but in terms, provisional though they are, of God's redemptive intervention in opposition to that history.¹⁷ These analogues are corroborated through, ". . . a repetition of the original intuitive experiences that gave rise to them. . ."¹⁸ whether it be,

. . . as the applicability of a model to the real world, . . . the persistent relevance of an analogue to the nature of the reality into which we inquire, . . . or as the fertility of a theory in throwing light upon a set of stubborn problems and at the same time revealing new facts . . .¹⁹

The emphasis upon intuition in this process is due to the qualitative differential between language and reality. Reality cannot be reduced to language; language must not be separated from reality. Here we find another variation upon the unio hypostatica theme. The unitary critique of monism and dualism remains applicable.

Wittgenstein champions this differential language/reality relation in his Tractatus.²⁰ Torrance summarizes the argument:

We may say that theological statements refer to an eternal world and are related to it, but even if this did relate to it, we could not say how they are related to it, for what we cannot represent in language is the relation of language to the external facts--that is, . . . we cannot produce a picture of the relation of a

¹⁷STR, pp. 90, 99-100, 127; AT, p. 16.

¹⁸TS, p. 241, emphasis mine. Cf. "The Integration of Form in Natural and Theological Science," p. 155, reprinted in TCFK, pp. 79-80.

¹⁹TS, p. 242.

²⁰Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, intro. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), 4.0f., 4.12f.

picture to that which is pictured.²¹

Mutatis mutandis we may extend this axiom to entail, 'One cannot temporally express the relation of time to eternity.' Any attempt to do so leads to an infinite regress, as the conjunction is never satisfied. This is the fundamental dilemma of process theology, which in the final analysis collapses into a temporal reductionism.

However neither are we looking for a linguistic tertium quid, for the regress would reappear once removed.

For Torrance it is this unformalizable intuitive resonance with reality facilitated but in no way controlled by the analogue, that is the indispensable onto-epistemic between.²² At times he even suggest this to be a mystical conjunction.²³

The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Intuitive conjunction with the reality is prerequisite to knowing reality. Thus it is the avenue of escape from the inveterate circularity of language.²⁴ Thought and being,

²¹TS, p. 183; cf. Reconstruction, pp. 56, 92; RET, pp. 73-74; TCFK, p. 304. In Reformed theology this view of language derives from the Extra-Calvinisticum (T. F. Torrance, "John Calvin's Values for Today," Common Factor 2 [1964]: 25). Cf. TS, pp. 24-25 where this connection of language and reality is described as sacramental.

²²TS, pp. 226-227, 294. John Atkinson fails to appreciate this unitary relation and hence lapses into a typical dualist criticism of Torrance's doctrine of Scripture as subjectivist ("The Theological Method of T. F. Torrance," p. 159).

²³Cf. CTSC, pp. 89-90.

²⁴TCFK, p. 143; TS, pp. 50-54. Notice here he is cautious to distance this from [monistic] mysticism. Cf. Bryan Gray "Theology as Science," p. 418 for a brief critique of this position.

epistemology and ontology are inseparable.²⁵ One cannot know the truth without being in the Truth. An epistemological presupposition is, ". . . an ontological act of recognition and assent which cannot be further analyzed, but without which there could be no rational or scientific knowledge."²⁶ Thus Torrance is highly critical of those who develop epistemology as propaedeutic to the living dialog of theological discourse.²⁷

One might at this point despair of all language as oriental mysticism is wont to do. This would be appropriate if man were left to his own devices. However, the referential propriety of language is conferred from beyond itself--it is conferred by the grace of the living Word of God.²⁸

Analogia Gratia as Via Scientia

Language is referential, i.e., grounded in the reality it purports to elucidate sola gratia. This is the antidote to nescience, scepticism and agnosticism--an antidote championed by theological science. What is significant about the grace connective is that it is irreversible and therefore quintessentially objective. It establishes "the unconditional priority of the Truth."²⁹

²⁵Juridical and Physical Law, pp. 24-25.

²⁶RET, p. 54.

²⁷TS, pp. 3-4, 10; KB, p. 141; RBET, 6/29/81; "Introduction" in Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928, p. 47.

²⁸TS, pp. 214-216; cf. Reconstruction, p. 41 wherein Christ is described as self-communicating and self-authenticating.

²⁹TS, p. 214; cf. RET, p. 119; SF, liii-liv.

It is given independent of our knowing it,³⁰ because it is given concretely as Jesus Christ.³¹ And yet as such it graciously becomes our true and proper avenue to God:

. . . the indispensable presupposition of theological knowledge, and [that] with which Christian theology stands or falls, [is] that God Himself, and only God, the living and true God, has condescended to enter within our creaturely and contingent existence, to objectify Himself for us there in Jesus Christ, so that Jesus Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, in whom and through whom alone we go to the Father, and by reference to whom alone we have true knowledge of God.³²

That is to say, our knowledge of God, and in particular for our purposes, our knowledge of His duration is analogical rather than univocal, i.e., referential, mediate, anhypostatic, and yet it is in fact not equivocal knowledge. The contingency of this connection serves to guarantee its dynamicity grounded in God: ". . . eternal Truth encounters us also as temporal fact."³³ Because this connection is all of grace it cannot be reduced to the static logic of either Roman or Protestant Scholasticism.³⁴ This analogia gratia, which derives from the heart of the Reformation, guarantees if God is related to man it is initiated by God alone through the Spirit of Christ and as such is a living, personal and unpredictable relation apart from the grace of revelation. As grace it cannot be

³⁰TS, p. 27.

³¹Ibid., pp. 34-43; 216-222.

³²Ibid., p. 32; cf. pp. 136-137; STR, p. 71.

³³TS, p. 154.

³⁴For Torrance's critique of Cornelius Van Til on this count, see review of The New Modernism: An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth and Brunner, by C. Van Til, p. 148.

possessed or controlled, i.e., transubstantiated into an analogia entis wherein man is in synergistic relation to God.³⁵

Kenosis as Bi-durational

Torrance reminds us that in Barth's transition from dialectical to Christological theology in 1932 the analogia gratia shifted from a dualistic division between time and eternity to an appreciation of the incorporation of temporal history into eternal history, which surrounds it, ". . . as a circle round its centre and so encloses all history beyond, before and after."³⁶ Thus grace Christologically construed entails both the katabasis of God to man in Christ and the anabasis of man to God in Christ. These cannot be separated, as Barth's standard Reformed interpretation of kenow (Phil. 2:7) explains: "The kenosis consists in a renunciation of his being in the form of God alone."³⁷ While maintaining His deity without diminution, He now divested Himself of the exclusivity of His deity, incorporating humanity into Himself. Thus the kenosis is the negative designation for what the enhypostasis and bodily ascension positively assert.³⁸ By abandoning the status of exclusive deity, God assumes the hypostatic conjunction as God-man. Kenosis is the hinge upon which the theological periochoresis becomes Christological peri-

³⁵Cf. Reconstruction, pp. 114-115; Reconciliation, p. 101.

³⁶KB, p. 119; cf. "Karl Barth," in Ten Makers of Modern Protestant Thought, p. 63; STR, p. 95; KB, p. 44.

³⁷CD, IV, 1, 59, p. 180, emphasis mine. Cf. GR, pp. 141-142; "HA," p. 106.

³⁸Cf. STR, pp. 71-72, 81-82.

choresis.³⁹ To say kenosis is to say relation, communion, service--it is to say I-Thou.

Furthermore, to say kenosis is to say the eternal God has now incorporated temporality into Himself in Jesus Christ. He has become bi-durational. Torrance concedes, ". . . our time is taken up into God so that there is something new even for God with the incarnation. . . ."40 Time is not antithetical to His eternality. Like a parabola, the incarnation-resurrection united eternity to time in the katabasis and time to eternity in the anabasis.⁴¹

Torrance develops the durational impact of this in contrast to the Lutheran Kenoticists, who in confining the Word within the limitations of incarnation, assumed a container notion of God's durational presence within the confines of the time-space terrestrial limitations--finitum capax infiniti.⁴² It is in the Reformed interpretation of kenosis that time stands in subordinate reciprocity with eternity. This becomes particularly illuminating when it is applied to the relation of Christ to His Church. Torrance identifies a bi-durational status in his ecclesiology:

. . . though risen with Christ and already a partaker through the Spirit in the new creation, the Church is sent like Christ into the world as the servant of the Lord, humbling itself and containing itself in kenosis within the limits and laws of the world in order to

³⁹"Jesus Christ the Servant-Son."

⁴⁰Interview 5 April, 1982. However, in his mimeographed lectures Torrance is careful to maintain no metaphysical change has occurred in God the Son ("Jesus Christ the Servant-Son," p. 4).

⁴¹Cf. STR, pp. 98, 114-115, 129-130, 190; STI, pp. 52-53.

⁴²STR, p. 124-126. Cf. STI, p. 36; STR, p. 84.

proclaim the gospel of reconciliation and to live out reconciliation within conditions of fallen human existence.⁴³

In other words, for Torrance, the 'already' of its redemption, the fullness of its time in Christ, is the ecclesiological Extra-Calvinisticum which exceeds while incorporating the 'not-yet' of the same Church in historical garb. There is not diminution of the eschatological completion of the Church. The Church is in the dimension and under the conditions of the eschaton, characterized by the session of Christ at the right hand of God the Father, what it is becoming within the confines of fallen space-time history. Time as we know it is neither a privation of nor in dialectic tension with eternity or redeemed time. It is hypostatically incorporated into this bi-durational dimensional field of Christ without any absorption into it.

The Church thus lives, as it were, in two times: in the time of this passing world, that is in the midst of ongoing secular history and world events, the time of decay that flows down into the past and into the ashes of death, but also in the time of the risen Saviour and of the new creation that is already a perfected reality in him. This happens through the koinonia of the Spirit. . .⁴⁴

Therefore we may conclude it is a proper Reformed understanding of time which renders life as truly dynamic and of actual eternal significance. This counters the Scholastic Calvinistic perspective, which is constantly plagued with a depreciation of history in the light of a sovereign God--a Calvinism which has replaced its Christocentric life with a theocentric mind.

⁴³Ibid, p. 99; cf. CAC, I, p. 250.

⁴⁴STR, pp. 124-126.

13. Pneumatologic as Analogia Analogata

Analogia Fidei as Real Relation

The eyes of faith are required to view the eschatological, which otherwise remains veiled. Our terrestrial viewpoint is in what Calvin via Torrance terms, "eschatological arrears":

And though we are renewed by the Spirit of God, yet as our life is still hidden (Col. 3:3) the manifestation of it will truly and perfectly distinguish us from strangers. In this sense our adoption is said by Paul to be delayed till the last days (Rom. 8:21).⁴⁵

Torrance explains, the primary Christological, hypostatic expression of the analogia gratia finds its answering, secondary, anthropological, communal expression in the analogia fidei:

It is the Word, the lively and essential Image of God, which is the analogia analogans, so that only over against its activity does man have an analogia analogata: that is to say, an analogia fidei corresponding with an analogia gratiae, that we may know God truly. . .⁴⁶

Complementing the ontological, creative relation of Jesus Christ with all mankind is the personal relation of the Holy Spirit, who consummates this creative relation, "actualizing within creation its bond of union with the Logos. . ."⁴⁷ Here we encounter a decisive junction between subjective, existential epistemology and objective, realist epistem-

⁴⁵KC, p. 104.

⁴⁶Reconstruction, p. 116.

⁴⁷GR, p. 172. Cf. "Spiritus Creator: A Consideration of the Teaching of St. Athanasius and St. Basil," Reconstruction, pp. 209-228.

ology.⁴⁸ Do I find vested within myself the capacity to know God or is that knowledge proffered only in relational dependence? For Calvin, as for Torrance, the analogia fidei is a self-emptying of subjective faith and a total dependence upon the grace of God ministered via the procession of the Spirit of Christ, whom is Himself internal to God and bearing witness of the same.⁴⁹ Torrance identified the filiogue as the essential relation between Christ and Spirit which guarantees the veracity of religious knowledge.

The Holy Spirit, who is not knowable independently in himself, is known through this one self-revelation and self-communication of God in Jesus Christ. Nevertheless it is only in the Spirit that we may thus know the Son, and know that he is antecedently and eternally in himself what he is toward us in revelation and redemption. Only he who is of God . . . and consubstantial with him can thus impart knowledge of God in himself. It is from the Son that the Spirit shines forth . . . and in the Spirit . . . that God is known.⁵⁰

Another way of saying this is to speak of a sacramental analogy through Word and Spirit rather than an analogia entis.⁵¹ The sacramental analogy of Baptism and Eucharist reflect respectively the unity of relation and function, Word and Act of Christ now ". . . held

⁴⁸"Theology and Science. Dogmatics as the Key to Church Unity," The Scotsman, 10 February 1964, p. 6 cols. 3-5; TCFK, p. 318; Reconstruction, pp. 227-228, 231.

⁴⁹Reconstruction, pp. 59-60, 105, 115, 204-205, 229-230, 238, 257; GR, pp. 171, 181, 184, 185; TS, pp. 244-245; Torrance, "Theological Realism," pp. 186-187.

⁵⁰Reconstruction, p. 215; "The Deposit of Faith," pp. 19-20. Cf. pp. 93-97; GR, p. 172; "HHP," pp. 46-47. For the ironic twist in appreciation of the filiogue in the East and disregard in the West see Reconstruction, p. 229. Cf. pp. 217-218.

⁵¹CDM, pp. 138, 141-142; "PC," pp. 140-141, n. 79.

partially apart in order to make room for personal relations in decision and faith and repentance, and so for the growth of communion and love."⁵² Life in the interim while eschatologically in suspension is sacramentally complete. So too, theological knowledge is both true and incomplete with no contradiction involved. This is possible by virtue of the Holy Spirit. It is God through His Spirit who creates within the saints the capacity to understand.⁵³ In Torrance's words,

He is the creative Agent of God's revelation to us and the creative Agent in our reception and understanding of that revelation, but He is not Himself the Word of that revelation or the Form which it assumes as it proceeds from God and is appropriated by man. He is the living Action and Presence of God in it all, who so relates the divine Word to the human and earthly forms which it assumed in Jesus Christ that in Him we are enabled to meet God face to face, shining in His own uncreated Light and speaking to us personally in His own eternal Word.⁵⁴

A third way of saying this is that religious epistemology derives from justification by grace.⁵⁵ By virtue of the mediating, vicarious role of Christ as both God's revelation to man and man's knowledge of God, true theological knowledge is possible.⁵⁶ The Word becoming flesh without ceasing to be the Word is epistemologically tantamount to the ineffable becoming effable without losing

⁵²CAC, II, pp. 145-146; STR, pp. 152-153. For the sacramental analogue in religious art, see RP, p. 93.

⁵³RBET, 6/29/81; TS, p. x; GR, p. 176; STR, pp. 99-102; STI, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁴GR, p. 168; cf. pp. 187-188.

⁵⁵Reconstruction, p. 84.

⁵⁶Reconstruction, p. 132; "HHP," pp. 47-48; CDM, p. 130. For the Spirit's parallel role see Reconstruction, p. 242; GGT, p. 166.

its ineffability.⁵⁷

It is by virtue of our relation to Christ that our knowledge is proper to God. Our relation to Christ finds its hypostatic analogue in the mystical union--fellowship (koinonia)/abiding (menein) in the mystery of Christ--⁵⁸ through which the Spirit who processes from Christ effectually actualizes,

. . . the relation between language and the divine Being. That is the epistemological relevance of the doctrine of the Spirit for Calvin's theology. No work of ours can establish a bridge between our understanding and the Truth of God. Knowledge of God is in accordance with his nature as Spirit, and takes its rise from his living personal action upon us.⁵⁹

This spiritual transaction is in principle unformalizable, even miraculous.⁶⁰ Historically it devolves from the community of reciprocity established with ancient Israel and the apostolic foundations of the Church.⁶¹ This double living witness and the enscripturation of their communion with God serves as the secondary mediating link or hinge of meaning of God's self-revelation to the Gentiles and the

⁵⁷GR, p. 186. For the same point made by St. Anselm see STI, p. 65.

⁵⁸CAC, II, pp. 62, 88-89; STR, p. 99; HL[RST], p. 134. This entails theological discourse is dialogical rather than dialectical (TS, pp. 133-134). See Reconstruction, pp. 184-185 for the distinction between koinonia and the monophysite tendency of Greek participation (methexis).

⁵⁹Reconstruction, pp. 93. Cf. p. 257; "The Place of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 40; "'PC," p. 127; GR, pp. 170-171, 183.

⁶⁰WCCCA, p. 27; STR, p. 11.

⁶¹Cf. RET, p. 85; Mediation of Christ, pp. 22-23; Reconstruction, p. 135.

Church.⁶² The mode of mediation intended here is, in Athanasius' terms, mimetic, not one of identity or equality. God graciously exercises stewardship (oikonomia), over His Kingdom through the Incarnation and Atonement of Christ, it is only in and through the paradigms of this economy that revelation is commuted⁶³--paradigms which stand in melodic counterpoint to the cantas firmus.⁶⁴ Scripture, although subsidiary to Christ, serves as the indispensable, "divinely approved and inspired linguistic medium" of God's self-revelation.⁶⁵

[W]e have to reckon with a first-order relation ontologically inseparable from the fact that the Word became man, a relation such that the human word is Word of God. But in the relation between divine revelation and the language of the Holy Scriptures we have only second-order relation in which the human word of the Scripture is not ontologically identical with the incarnate Word. Since this second-order relation is contingent upon and controlled by the first-order relation of hypostatic union in Christ himself, we may

⁶²RBET, 7/13/81; cf. RET, pp. 91-92; Reconstruction, p. 43; Mediation of Christ, p. 31.

⁶³"HA," pp. 102-105, 461. Cf. RP, p. 37; "RISNT," pp. 68-69; Reconstruction, pp. 34-35; TS, pp. 245-246; Torrance, "The Implications of Oikonomia for Knowledge and Speech of God in Early Christian Theology," pp. 225, 235. To reconcile these statements with that of Reconstruction, pp. 90-91 wherein he equates the mimetic with the descriptive and thus abandons it for the ostensive, referential import of language, we must differentiate between mimetic in an ectypal, invisible, mediate sense and in an archetypal, visible, participational sense.

⁶⁴RET, pp. 107-108; CAC, I, pp. 219-220; STI, pp. 72-73; HL[RST], p. 147, n. 30.

⁶⁵RET, pp. 92-93; cf. pp. 64-65; STR, p. 12. For an expanded treatment of Torrance's position regarding revelation, see H. M. Vroom, De Schrift Alleen? (Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij J. H. Kook, 1979), pp. 5-58. For a critique of Torrance's view of Scripture see T. A. Langford, "T. F. Torrance's Theological Science: A Reaction," Scottish Journal of Theology 25 (May 1972): 162-163.

well hold that here also, although on a different level of reality, we have a relation between the divine and the human factors in which they may neither be divided from nor confused with each other. In this case the relation of asymmetry is very different, for it obtains in a relation not of ontological identity but of ontological difference. The Holy Scripture is not Jesus Christ, the Word of God incarnate.⁶⁶

It is by lapsing into the nominalistic error of treating the lalia of Scripture as the Logos of God, the Word of God confined to the finite container of Scripture, that the mediating, referential cord is cut.⁶⁷ The Church abandons its epistemologically realist birthright of the community of reciprocity "objectively and ontologically controlled" by God's self-communication for the potage of linguistic or existential subjectivism.⁶⁸

Analogia Fidei as Intuitive

In its most fundamental, primordial form of actualization revelation emerges as intuitive. Torrance interprets Calvin's definition of intuition as, "direct knowledge of an actually present object, naturally caused by that object and not by another."⁶⁹ Torrance concurs.⁷⁰ Psychologically this appears as a renewed conscience, which

⁶⁶RET, pp. 94-95; cf. GR, p. 152; WCCCA, p. 55. This entails the controversial notion that Scripture itself is in need of redemption (see Reconstruction, p. 139; TS, p. 193).

⁶⁷RET, p. 80.

⁶⁸TCFK, p. 307; Reconstruction, pp. 19, 51; STR, p. 8; cf. RET, p. 96; "HA," p. 146.

⁶⁹Reconstruction, p. 84.

⁷⁰TS, p. 165, n. 3. For the analogous place of intuition in scientific

through the conviction of the Spirit accuses us of ego-centric rather than theo-centric conceptions, questioning our subjectivity so that our knowledge may be con-science, i.e., a knowing of God solely in co-understanding relation with Christ, the Truth of God.⁷¹ Because this is a work of the Spirit we have no control over it. Our sole preparation, which we have already seen above is non-mechanical--is that of prayer.⁷² Thus we see, one must be in the Truth, i.e., related to the Truth, if he is to know the Truth. This is what Torrance intends by the 'existential' apprehension of truth.⁷³ Clearly, with Calvin and the later Barth, it is antithetical to any subjectivist interpretation. This relation is strictly of grace. In personal reconciled relation with Christ through the Spirit our knowledge of God is faithful to the Being God is, for He is in Himself what He is toward us in Jesus Christ. The finitude and alienation which impedes our knowing God⁷⁴ is enhypostatically taken up into the life of God by virtue of the reconciling Incarnation of Christ.

Just as the doctrine of the enhypostasis asserts the full unimpaired reality of the humanity of the historical Jesus as the humanity of the Son of God, so it affirms in our theological knowledge full and unimpaired place for human decision, human response, and human thinking in relation to the Truth of God's Grace.⁷⁵

⁷¹GR, pp. 172-174.

⁷²Ibid., p. 191, cf. Reconstruction, p. 187.

⁷³"The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 33.

⁷⁴TS, p. 49.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 218.

Analogia Fidei as Kinetic: Kierkegaard

It is essential to the new realism which Torrance espouses in concert with Søren Kierkegaard and Michael Polanyi, that subjective immersion in the truth is not antithetical to objectivity, but rather is an essential ingredient.

Contrary to much popular Kierkegaardian interpretation, his assertion of Truth as subjectivity,⁷⁶ Torrance argues, is not an existential idealist credo but rather an existential realist one.⁷⁷ It is an epistemological inversion such that truth is a reality beyond our control. We know God by being known by Him.⁷⁸ The standards of nineteenth century scientific objectivity were those of neutral detachment, and hence the subject-object dualism was fueled by it. Such knowledge of God deliberates over the truth of the object. On the other hand, truth as subjectivity, or as Torrance retranslates, truth as subject-ivity or subject-being, is possible only by dwelling in the truth.⁷⁹ Kierkegaard writes:

When the question of truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of the

⁷⁶E.g. cf. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Pt. 2, ch. 2.

⁷⁷Cf. TS, pp. 5-6; "Faith and Philosophy," p. 246; GR, p. 177. Recently Torrance laments: ". . . unfortunately Kierkegaard was seriously misunderstood in the rise of an existential philosophy in which there was no conception of the inherence of logos in physis or of the intrinsic intelligibility of empirical events--otherwise a very different understanding of the historico-critical method would have emerged" ("Time in Scientific and Historical Research," p. 7).

⁷⁸RBET, 7/10/81; Cf. "Kierkegaard on the Knowledge of God," p. 4.

⁷⁹Cf. KB, p. 45; RBET, 7/10/81.

relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.⁸⁰

Torrance comments:

. . . authentic subjectivity on the part of man . . . is only possible when he collides with the objectivity of the divine subject. This is the experience of faith, 'the highest passion of subjectivity', in which he so encounters Truth that his own existence is involved and transformed in conformity to it.⁸¹

This is a living, kinetic relation, which cannot be established from a position of logical, detached abstraction. One must dwell within the dynamic present wherein possibility blossoms into existent actuality.⁸² "All understanding comes after the fact,"⁸³ i.e., knowledge is a function of existence, life, time. Torrance draws the analogy of the speed of light to illustrate this kinetic mode of apprehending the Divine Light incarnate in Jesus Christ:

If physical light has anything to teach us here, it is that since light is never at rest but always in motion[,] in order to appreciate its nature and activity we must abandon any attempt to understand it from a point of absolute rest and develop an a posteriori, kinetic way of thinking in which we allow our minds to behave obediently in accordance with the movement of light and thereby penetrate into the intelligible relations of the invisible space-time metrical field which controls all observable or invisible realities

⁸⁰Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 178.

⁸¹TS, p. 5. Torrance suggests H. Diem, J. Brown and J. Heywood Thomas are in agreement (*Ibid*, f.n. 1).

⁸²Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 90-96; TS, pp. 2, 4; Reconstruction, pp. 72-73; TCFK, p. 278; STR, p. 93.

⁸³Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 108; cf. DCO, pp. 22-23.

in the empirical universe.⁸⁴

Because the Divine has entered into space and time in Jesus Christ, theological truth is ipso facto inherently kinetic, existential.⁸⁵ For Torrance revelation is inseparable from the historical reconciling act of God toward us in Jesus Christ. "All genuine knowledge involves a cognitive union of the mind with its object, and calls for the removal of any estrangement or alienation that may obstruct or distort it."⁸⁶ This can only be understood from man's perspective as dynamic:

The Truth of God cannot be separated from the whole historical Jesus Christ, for time, decision, action, history belong to the essential nature of this Truth. Therefore we cannot apprehend or consider the Truth in detachment from relation in space and time without downright falsification. . . . Knowing the Truth involves on our part a corresponding movement in space and time, a dynamic, living, active relationship, a constant historical communion with the Truth, in which we grow in the Truth and learn the Truth increasingly, so that there can be no genuine knowing the Truth or speaking the Truth without doing the Truth.⁸⁷

Herein lies the primordial mode of verification, which is necessarily an internal criterion.⁸⁸ This, superseding Kierkegaard, applies to all provinces of knowledge.

⁸⁴CTSC, p. 95

⁸⁵Cf. HL[RST], pp. 42, 100-101. For Calvin this kinetic stance entails obedience (CDM, p. 151 [Institutes, I.6.2]).

⁸⁶The Mediation of Christ, pp. 34-35. Cf. Reconstruction, p. 132-134, 142; TS, pp. 207-208; GR, p. 179.; Joannes Guthridge, S.J., The Christology of T. F. Torrance, pp. 32-35; KB, p. 189.

⁸⁷TS, p. 208.

⁸⁸TS, p. 200.

Analogia Fidei as Tacit: Michael Polanyi

The Jewish chemist and sociologist, Michael Polanyi undertakes a detailed refinement of the relational connective, which he epistemologically designates as indwelling "the tacit dimension." The theory of tacit knowing establishes a continuous transition from the natural sciences to the humanities. It bridges the gap between the 'I-It' and the 'I-Thou' by rooting them both in the subject's 'I-Me' awareness of his own body, which represents the highest degree of indwelling.⁸⁹

Polanyi overcomes the subject-object dichotomy by analyzing the bipolar constitution of knowledge as it emerges out of our intimacy with the world. This intimacy is initially tacitly experienced. Our most primordial relation with the world, therefore, lies necessarily beyond the specifiable. Ironically, rather than appreciating the essence of relations as such, philosophic inquiry has persistently framed this relation in specifiable terms and thus necessarily perpetuated its problematic status. In recasting twentieth century science upon a ". . . harmonious view of thought and existence,"⁹⁰ Polanyi examines the proximal and distal aspects of the tacit dimension.⁹¹ The former, which is the tacit pole proper, is implicit, emerging out of our embodied relation with the world, confronting us in the immediacy of unspecifiable particular-

⁸⁹"Tacit Knowing: Its Bearing on Some Problems of Philosophy, 1962," in Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi, ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 160.

⁹⁰The Tacit Dimension, p. 4.

⁹¹For a brief, imaginative elaboration of Polanyi's epistemology see Richard Gelwick, The Way of Discovery: An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 65-78.

ity. He alludes to the sub-conceptual union of the mind with objective reality. As such, the starting point of all knowledge is, ". . . we know more than we can tell,"⁹² because in its immediacy it has not yet risen to the articulate, conceptual level. The distal or existential pole of knowledge, conversely, is explicit, deriving from our intentional directedness toward the world which manifests itself as an integral Gestalt. Because the proximal pole of tacit knowledge is sub-conceptual it is not conceptually identifiable, but rather is recognized only as the functional precondition of the distal: ". . . we know the first term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second."⁹³ Thus the immediacy of the ontological/proximal is functionally mediated to the phenomenal/distal. As this conjunction is attended to consciously, meaning results. This is the semantic function of knowledge, upon which Torrance relies so heavily. In a word, Polanyi's conclusion to epistemological dualism is that as a result of our tacit immediacy with the world, there is a ". . . correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the structure of the comprehensive entity which is its object."⁹⁴

To go beyond this we must seek a new medium. To reduce the inexpressible to language is to violate the very structure we are concerned to understand. Polanyi commends Wilhelm Dilthey and Theodor Lipps for their suggestion that the avenue of aesthetic appreciation follows the path of "empathy" or "indwelling." Polanyi prefers the latter, which he defines as the incorporation, inclusion, integration or interiorization of the proximal term of tacit

⁹²The Tacit Dimension, p. 4.

⁹³Ibid., p. 10.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 33-34.

knowing in our bodies.⁹⁵ "It brings home to us that it is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we understand their integration."⁹⁶ Such is exemplarily the case in physiognomic recognition, skillful performance, sensory perception, or utilization of instruments.⁹⁷ One may recognize one face out of a million, execute a masterful recital, synthesize innumerable bits of sensory information into an intelligible entity, or wield an artificial extension of his body as if it were a natural extremity, all without being able to identify nor articulate the rudimentary processes involved. Polanyi insists he is not ". . . disposing of an enigma by postulating a miracle. . ."⁹⁸ unless we lapse back into the classical definition of science, which disparages anything but complete specifiable command of all experience.⁹⁹

Philosophically, in Polanyi, we find an expression of relation in terms of phenomenological intentionality.¹⁰⁰ Without digressing further into his thought at this point, the question remains critical for our interpretation of

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 16-17; "Tacit Knowing," p. 160.

⁹⁶The Tacit Dimension, p. 18. See John C. Puddefont, "Indwelling: Formal and Non-Formal Elements in Faith Life", in Belief in Science and in Christian Life, pp. 28-48 for the significance of indwelling in the Christian life.

⁹⁷"Knowing and Being, 1961," in Knowing and Being, p. 128; "Sense-Giving and Sense-Reading, 1967," in ibid., p. 182.

⁹⁸"Tacit Knowing," p. 167.

⁹⁹Personal Knowledge, pp. 16, 18.

¹⁰⁰Polanyi concludes, his theory of non-explicit thought may be called, ". . . a phenomenology of science and knowledge, by reference to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This would correctly relate my enterprise. . . to phenomenology or existentialism" ("The Logic of Tacit Inference," in Knowing and Being, p. 155.)

Torrance, 'To what extent are Torrance's Polanyian inclinations inseparable from Husserlian phenomenology?' or more specifically for our immediate purposes, 'Is Torrance's concept of relation definable in terms of Husserlian intentionality?'

By dint of Torrance's fond dependence upon Polanyi one would think this the case. However, Torrance does distance himself from such an interpretation. In fact he identifies the contemporary Roman Catholic problem as that of embracing the phenomenological method, which in his view is a synthesis of Thomistic passive perception with the Kantian active reason.¹⁰¹ In other words, he conceives of phenomenology as a mode of idealism, preoccupied with the question of perception.¹⁰²

By way of contrast, he writes, the proper theological method must,

. . . break through the surface to the depths of intelligible reality and engage with orderly relations lodged in it that reach out far beyond our experience and understanding, that is to say, with patterns that have objective depth and which cannot be identified with the surface patterns of our formal logic or phenomenal motifs. It is only when we penetrate behind phenomena in this way that we can understand the reality of which they are the phenomena and so understand the phenomena themselves.¹⁰³

In short, the phenomenology of religion is but the apotheosis of man.¹⁰⁴

How then is Polanyi of help in interpreting Torrance? It appears, from Torrance's view, that Polanyi

¹⁰¹RBET, 6/29/81.

¹⁰²TS, pp. 21; 28, n. 2.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 188; cf. HL[RST], lecture 5.

has conceded too much by associating himself with Husserl.¹⁰⁵ He would better be described as a phenomenological realist, for by his own admission there is an ontological givenness of the world to consciousness¹⁰⁶ in contrast to the Husserlian epoche. Polanyi admits, "Thinking is not only necessarily intentional as Brentano has taught: it is also necessarily fraught with the roots it embodies. It has a from-to structure."¹⁰⁷ Torrance elaborates:

Polanyi's quarrel with these psychological and phenomenological approaches to knowledge reduces in the end to their lack of a proper ontology, for unless the forms of thought which we develop about things are ontologically grounded in their reality, they are caught in an alienating dualism which can only strip them of meaning.¹⁰⁸

For Torrance the immediacy of this tacit relationship with reality is expressed variously by onto-relation, intuition, indwelling, or faith.

Tacit knowing is operative in two dimensions--the created, temporal, and divine, eternal. The former, Torrance, in expositing Polanyi, describes as that of personal participation, acts of personal judgment and decision, which link the various logical levels together in a unified, meaningful complex.¹⁰⁹ Polanyi uses the example of the hierarchical strata of speech, consisting of voice, words, sentences, style and composition, to illustrate his point.

¹⁰⁵Cf. GR, p. 105.

¹⁰⁶The Tacit Dimension, p. 13.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. x.

¹⁰⁸TCFK, pp. 156-157; cf. p. 308.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 144, 145.

Each of these levels is subject to its own laws, as prescribed (1) by phonetics, (2) by lexicography, (3) by grammar, (4) by stylistics, and (5) by literary criticism. These levels form a hierarchy of comprehensive entities, for the principles of each level operate under the control of the next higher level. . . . Thus each level is subject to dual control, first by the laws that apply to the elements in themselves and, second, by the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them. . . . (I)t is impossible to represent the organizing principles of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.¹¹⁰

Thus all reductionism to lower levels is excluded.

On a larger scale, Torrance identifies chemistry, physics, and biology as such an ascending hierarchy.¹¹¹ The upper adjacent level is said to exercise marginal control over the lower; the lower imposes restrictions on the higher.¹¹² In effect this is the expression of a hypostatically unified creation--inseparable, inconfused unity in qualitative multiplexity.

Where does this progression end? It is open, indefinitely, via the contingency of creatio ex nihilo, to God. All deism is dispelled. Torrance recounts,

. . . Polanyi used to point out, man must be regarded as one whose level of rational existence and behaviour is to be understood only if it is coordinated with a higher level beyond him--that is, with the transcendent level of God's interaction with man in the space-time track of the universe.¹¹³

In principle the relation is unformalizable--tacit.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰The Tacit Dimension, p. 36.

¹¹¹TCFK, p. 147.

¹¹²The Tacit Dimension, pp. 40, 41.

¹¹³TCFK, pp. 187-188; cf. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 279-286.

¹¹⁴TCFK, p. 157; cf. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, p. 172.

As we have already seen, for Torrance, it is the Holy Spirit which performs the marginal control of the universe. The Spirit creates in us the immediate capacity to understand God. This is an objective, realist doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit. The Word of God through the Spirit bears its objective Divine impress upon my mind rather than giving me free reign to interpret according to my own subjectivity and experience.¹¹⁵ The Spirit effects the divine-human from-to structure.

14. Analogical Relations

There has never been a consensus, however, as to the precise manner by which this cognitive union is to be understood. As long as we refrain from lapsing into the univocal or equivocal, mystical or apophatic¹¹⁶ extremes of a radical monist or dualist position there is a middle analogical ground of operation which warrants investigation if we are to appreciate Torrance's epistemological stance.

Traditional Analogical Genre

This ground has been occupied by many who would seek to establish the veracity of divine revelation. Traditionally four species of analogy have been identified, which may be classified according to two genre. Etymologically these reflect the double meaning of the Greek analogia: reciprocal or retrospective relation or proportion and reciprocal or

¹¹⁵RBET, 6/29/81. Torrance cites the existential theology of Tillich as exemplary of the subjectivist doctrine of the internal testimony of the Spirit.

¹¹⁶For Torrance's critique of a theological priority to the via negativa of Pseudo-Dionysius leading to a God of non-descript philosophical proportion, see GGT, p. 167; "Toward and Ecumenical Consensus on the Trinity," p. 341. For its proper place in theological discourse see TCFK, p. 321.

similar terms.¹¹⁷

Analogy of Proportionality

Improper Proportionality

Initially analogia referred to proportionality between mathematical ratios, such as the 'double' relation between $1/2$, $2/4$, Here a purely numeric relation was struck without assuming any direct likeness between the terms of the relation--one is not analogous to two, nor is two analogous to four. Philosophically this was transposed from a mathematical identity to a conceptual analogy. In our example the relation of 'doubleness' is constant and identical throughout the series of ratios. However in the philosophical realm no such identity exists. There is but a similarity of relation which is maintained. In George Klubertanz' words this is to be defined as:

. . . that analogy in which there is no direct relationship between the analogates themselves; there is instead a relationship within each of the analogates, and these relations are similar, though all the relata, four in number are different. . .¹¹⁸

The analogy is divided into two species, proper and improper. The analogy of improper proportionality approaches equivocism in that the analogical relation is quite tenuous. It rests upon a figurative or metaphoric likeness. Mondin argues all Biblical anthropomorphism falls

¹¹⁷See H. Lyttkens, The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1952), pp. 15-28; Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v., "Analogy in Theology," by Frederick Ferré; Battista Mondin, S.X., The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁸St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), p. 7.

into this category:

We can express some of God's actions only by using names like repentance, punishment, anger, etc. But these names are not predicated of God as names of perfections that constitute His divine nature, but because God in His relations to man acts in ways that resemble repentance, punishment, anger.¹¹⁹

Proper Proportionality

However, when a stronger epistemic bond than the metaphoric is intended we move to the analogy of proportionality properly conceived. Consider, for example the incommunicable attribute of God's eternity in relation to human temporality:

Eternity	::	time
-----		----
God		man

Analogy 1

Here no communication of God's eternity is suggested. The analogy does not intend to assert any conceptual likeness between time and eternity. Yet the durational relations, each in a way appropriate to its subject, is comparable. Aquinas found little use for this analogy as it does nothing to bridge the transcendent-immanent gap.¹²⁰

Analogy of Attribution

The second genre of analogy is that of 'attribution', its species 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'. Its inception was philosophical, not mathematical. It focused upon the meaning of the analogates themselves with the

¹¹⁹Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Thought, pp. 94-95.

¹²⁰Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 101; TCFK, p. 321.

definitive primary analogate serving as the source of predication of the quality to the indeterminate, secondary analogate. The means of attribution was in effect synonymous with one of the modes of Aristotelian causation. Intrinsic attribution refers to efficient causation; extrinsic attribution to either material, formal or final.

Intrinsic Attribution

Most frequently depicted in terms of Thomas' analogia entis, intrinsic attribution asserts an ontological continuity between the terms of the primary and secondary analogates. Some argue there must be a univocal point of contact between analogates to prevent an infinite regress of meaning, which in the final analysis collapses into agnosticism with reference to the God-man relation.¹²¹ Thomas, however, argues for a derivative, participational predication of the secondary analogate by the primary.¹²²

This analogy of intrinsic attribution maintains a univocity in its mode of predication and an analogue based upon efficient causality in its predicated attribute.¹²³ The attribute is properly inward to both though dependently and by way of participation in the second. For example in Thomism the communicable attributes of God find their created analogue in man: 'God is just'; 'man is just'. God is the primary analogate to whom justice pertains intrinsically and properly. In man, the secondary analogate, justice, is causally derived from the Justice of God. Man is not inherently just but just only to the extent that his

¹²¹Fredrick Ferré, "Analogy in Theology," pp. 95, 96.

¹²²B. Mondin, Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, pp. 70-71.

¹²³Ibid, p. 62.

justice participates in God's justice. George Klubertanz explains, for Thomas,

Creatures resemble God because they are proportional to Him as effects to their cause. Proportion, once it has been purified of unacceptable quantitative connotations offers one simple way of describing the similarity which obtains between God and creatures as a result of the creature's relationship to the First Cause.¹²⁴

Thus the primary causation of God the Prime Mover finds its created analogue in the secondary causation of nature. There is a reciprocity between the two analogates. This gives rise to a theologia eminentia which asserts the propriety of a theology from below--of thinking from the creaturely attribute, to the divine.

As expected Torrance takes exception to this view of analogy as he did to natural theology classically construed.

This contingent relation between God and the world is also irreversible, in the sense that while the world is continuously upheld in its being and form by the creative presence of God, there is no statically continuous and logically compelling relation between the being of the creature and the being of the self-existent Creator. Since there is no logical bridge between God and the world, there is no logical reversibility between them. If there were such a relation, knowledge of the created world and knowledge of God would be changed together in such a way that we would derive knowledge of God necessarily and coercively from knowledge of the world, while knowledge of the world even in its natural operations would not be possible without constantly including God among the data.¹²⁵

The upshot of this, of course is a confusion of humanity

¹²⁴St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, p. 48.

¹²⁵DCO, p. 34; cf. p. 112; "PC" 140-141, n. 79; "The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 39. For a similar assessment by Barth see CD, II, 1, 26, p. 81. For Barth's critique of Quenstedt's trespass into the analogia attributionis see *ibid*, II, 1, 27, p. 238.

with deity--the essence of idolatry.¹²⁶ The fundamental flaw is its emphasis upon the inseparability of the Creator with the creature to the exclusion of their inconfusedness. But more subtly is the imposition of logical necessity upon the dynamic God-man relation.¹²⁷ In the final analysis, theologically, it is a confusion of the analogates of the hypostatic union which calcifies the dynamic mystery of the gracious will of God in the Incarnation into a predictable necessity of His nature. Torrance identifies Scholastic Calvinism and its absolute particular predestination as its net result.¹²⁸ The epistemic upshot of this is that revelation may function logically and propositionally apart from reconciliation. There is no informal, kinetic indwelling of the truth prerequisite to true knowledge.

Extrinsic Attribution

The second species of attribution is that of extrinsic or virtual denomination. Although there may be formal, material, or final similarity there is no efficient causal similarity, i.e., there is no ontological participation of the secondary analogate in the primary. As the analogy of improper proportionality lacks any similarity of relation so the analogy of extrinsic attribution lacks any ontological commutation. This is the case because the mode of predication rather than the predicate itself is the

¹²⁶See Reconstruction, pp. 19-20. Cf. TCFK, p. 297 for the same problem inherent in the vestigia trinitatis of Augustine.

¹²⁷Cf. Reconstruction, p. 114; DCO, p. 112.

¹²⁸"The Place of the Humanity of Christ in the Sacramental Life of the Church," pp. 7-8; review of Reformed Dogmatics, Set Out and Illuminated from the Sources, by Heinrich Heppe, in Scottish Journal of Theology 5 (1952): 83-85. Cf. DCO, pp. 12, 74 for the Newtonian correlate of Scholastic Calvinism.

analogical term.

Analogy of Attribution
Hypostatically Conceived

Extrinsic Attribution: Barth

For Barth, all that the Scholastics held to be attributed intrinsically, i.e., as a derivative expression of the nature or Being of God must be reinterpreted as communicated through the thoroughly dynamic contingent category of grace:

. . . what converts the creature into an analogue of God does not lie in itself and its nature, not even in the sense that God will acknowledge and accept as an analogue (in itself) something of that which lies in the nature of the creature. What converts the creature into an analogue of God lies only in the veracity of the object known analogously in the knowledge of God and therefore in the veracity of God Himself.¹²⁹

Thus there is no necessary connection but only a connection which God graciously established through His revelation in Jesus Christ. Hence unlike the analogy of intrinsic attribution there is no natural link to God and therefore no possibility of reversing the epistemological avenue. There is no natural revelation. All revelation is mediated through the man Christ Jesus by virtue of the hypostatic union:¹³⁰ ". . . because God, who is always God in this relationship, takes the part of man, there is genuine correspondence and agreement. . ." between Himself and our knowledge of Him.¹³¹

¹²⁹CD, II, 1, 27, p. 239; cf. Torrance, "Kierkegaard on the Knowledge of God," p. 5.

¹³⁰Ibid, p. 252.

¹³¹Ibid, p. 226.

Hypostatic Attribution: Torrance

Now this is precisely the position which Torrance takes:

It is this relationship with the Person of Christ between His divine and human natures (called the hypostatic union) that provides the normative relationship for every theological statement where the relationship between God and man is involved. Thus whenever our knowledge of the Truth is properly ordered it will reveal a structure in its material content that reflects the Christological pattern of the hypostatic union. This is the interior logic of theological thought, logic that arises under the impact of the Object. . .¹³²

There arises a certain difficulty in categorizing Torrance's genre of analogy. Although he appears quite Barthian at this point it must not be forgotten that the latter Barth excludes any analogia proportionalitatis,¹³³ whereas at least on two occasions Torrance includes it within his position.¹³⁴

The solution to the problem is to be found in that Torrance utilizes both genre at mutually exclusive junctures. His primary concern is with the logic of transcendent reference, i.e., of the God-man, "vertical" relation. In one definition of analogy he opts for the retrospective, philosophical rather than the mathematical, relational etymology:

¹³²TS, p. 207; cf. pp. 186-187, 216-222; Reconstruction, pp. 129-130; STR, p. 134.

¹³³CD, II, 1, 27, p. 238. Torrance alludes to this citation as corroborating his discussion in Reconstruction, p. 116, n. 4.

¹³⁴CAC, I, pp. 246, 251, n. 1, and Reconstruction, pp. 114. Cf. Donald Klinefelter's critique of the same, "God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance," p. 122. See CDM where Calvin's anthropic, husband-wife relations are interpreted in terms of proportionality.

I am not thinking of 'analogy' here as the great mediaeval thinkers, for the most part, employed it, in terms of proportional relationships transferred from Greek mathematics. I am thinking rather of analogy as the tracing of our concepts back to the source which gave rise to them. This is not a logical movement of thought on one and the same logical level, but a movement of thought across logical levels.¹³⁵

As we have seen, this stance is aligned with the attributive genre. Because primarily there can be no confusion between the categorial levels at issue, that is, no causal reciprocity, no analogia entis between God and man, we are dealing with a form of extrinsic attribution.¹³⁶ Another way of asserting this is to identify the humanity of Christ and therefore all creaturely reality as anhypostatic. There is no necessary ontological reciprocity between the Creator and creature, and thus all knowledge of God in and of itself would be equivocal--extrinsic--except by virtue of His grace incarnate as Jesus Christ. He has enhypostatically assumed our creaturehood into His Deity. The incarnation becomes the locus of legitimation for all theological knowledge. Apart from this we would be left in Tillichian ignorance of God.

It is the secondary, enhypostatic aspect of Christology, which supersedes the Barthian analysis.¹³⁷ It is the foundation upon which Torrance established his ontological correlation of man with God.¹³⁸ Because the incarnation is solely dependent upon the contingent grace of God the onto-relational connection can never be construed primarily

¹³⁵HL[RST], p. 79.

¹³⁶Cf. "The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 39.

¹³⁷Cf. STI, p. 65.

¹³⁸Cf. CAC, I, p. 248.

in terms of intrinsic attribution.¹³⁹ Soteriologically it is the covenantal pledge of chesed love, a "personalogic" of Christ establishing inter-personal conformity to Him, which maintains the otherwise tenuous relation.¹⁴⁰ The covenantal bond was forever established through Christ, the High Priest, who,

. . . on the ground of that complete solidarity with us in our humanity and also in involvement with us in our estrangement from God entered into the presence of God, offering Himself as the atoning sacrifice, and consecrating Himself on our behalf. . . . [such that] we entered with Him and we are accepted by God in the person of Christ as having suffered and died with Him, as if we had offered to God atonement for our own sin.¹⁴¹

What differentiates Aquinas from Torrance is that the analogia entis forges an immediate ontological relation between Creator and creature circumventing the mediatorial role of the active being who is Christ found at the center of the analogia gratia. For Torrance there can be no ontology apart from Christ, for incarnate reconciliation lies at the heart of the God-man relation. The Thomistic participation with God through efficient causal creation is conceived apart from Christology and soteriology. It is by virtue of their differing views of ontology that no direct comparison of analogical categories is appropriated.

¹³⁹Cf. TS, p. 206; Bryan Gray, by failing to appreciate the subtle distinction between analogia entis and what I develop as the "analogy of enhypostatic attribution" fails to discern the fundamental onto-relational structure pervading Torrance's thought (see Gray, "Theology as Science," p. 400).

¹⁴⁰DGAF, pp. 13-14, 17; "The Doctrine of Grace in the Old Testament," Scottish Journal of Theology, 1 (1948): 58-65; TS, p. 208.

¹⁴¹"The Priesthood of Christ," [pre-1974]. (Mimeographed), p. 11; RP, p. 29.

We shall consider this below, but for our present purposes it suffices to coin new terms for these relation analogies. That which serves the primary, extrinsic function is the 'analogy of anhypostatic attribution' (analogia gratia). Consequent to and subsumed within this primary analogy is that which corresponds to a truly intrinsic, ontological connection, viz., the 'analogy of enhypostatic attribution' (analogia fidei). This is implicit within Torrance's Christocentric perspective:

Jesus Christ provides us with a truly human but divinely prepared response: and that is at once divinely given objective reality of our knowledge and response, and the divinely appointed norm and pattern of our knowledge and response.¹⁴²

These two designations serve as terminological short-hand for all we have developed epistemologically to this point concerning unitary relation.

In sum, the unconfused aspect of the hypostatic union guarantees that knowledge of God is always in and of itself extrinsic while the inseparable aspect guarantees that it is intrinsic--truly revelatory of God in Christ. Torrance concludes:

That two-fold truth of the doctrine of anhypostasia and enhypostasia is what we have to keep clearly in mind in thinking out the interior logic of theological thought. The primary and determinative relation in all our knowing and thinking is prescribed by Grace, but that Grace is translated into a discernible pattern within our humanity in the incarnate Son, and it is only through conformity to that pattern which is the fruit of Grace, and therefore only in conformity to the movement of Grace in Jesus Christ as the Way, the Truth, and the Life, that we discern the interior logic of theological knowledge.¹⁴³

¹⁴²Reconstruction, p. 132.

¹⁴³TS, p. 218; cf. STR, p. 95; Reconstruction, p. 131.

Another way of saying this is that our knowledge is ectypal of archetypal reality.¹⁴⁴

Analogy of Proportionality
Differentially Conceived

To this point we have considered the vertical, hypostatic, interrelational structure of the theanthropic Christ. However we must also address the horizontal, intra-relational status of the man Christ Jesus as homousion with us with regard to our manhood. How are we to understand our generic participation in the Second Adam, or how are we to understand the Church as the body of Christ? Torrance implements the analogy of proportionality for this epistemological task.¹⁴⁵

He reminds us, initially Thomas employed an analogy of proportionality. Of course Euclidean geometry, upon which such analogy was based, antedated the more adequate geometric relations which contemporary non-metric, non-quantitative typology addresses. Thomas grew dissatisfied with the tendency to reduce the proportionalities to equal levels, and therefore abandoned all proportionality.¹⁴⁶ Torrance however, mutatis mutandis, reinstates it devoid of any metrical rigidity. Because we are concerned with multi-leveled reality and epistemology we must encourage a full implementation of this differential structure. It is

¹⁴⁴TS, pp. 133, 238; cf. pp. 20-21. Frederick Norris, in levelling the charge, "If the relation of geometry to physics instructs the theologian on how to relate natural theology and dogmatics, then science teaches faith, not the reverse," (Mathematics, Physics and Religion," p. 266), exposes his misreading of Torrance's unitary theology as championing an analogia entis.

¹⁴⁵CAC, I, p. 251, n. 1.

¹⁴⁶TCFK, p. 321.

operative as a means to clarify the horizontal conference between referential, attributive analogies.¹⁴⁷ In the case of the Church there is no sacerdotal connection with Christ. Hence once again Torrance cannot be understood within the Thomistic framework.

The ministry of the Church is not to be related directly to the ministry of Christ as if it were an extension or prolongation of His ministry or even an extension of certain of His functions. There can be no question of distinguishing between certain functions of Christ as primary and non-transferable and other functions which can be transferred by His authority to chosen representatives. The New Testament nowhere makes any such distinction but boldly speaks of the Church as participating in Christ's own ministry. He fulfills His ministry in a unique and unrepeatable way, as Prophet, Priest, and King. The Church's ministry as prophetic, priestly, and kingly is correlative to Christ's whole ministry but entirely subordinate to it and fulfilled alterius rationis, in a way appropriate to the Church as the Body of which Christ is the Head, as the servant of which He is Lord, as the herald of which He is King.¹⁴⁸

This is an oblique or indirect proportionality the differential of which is not fully formalizable due to the fact that, as in Reformed sacramental theology, the Spiritual presence of Christ is not controlled by the ex opere operato. Such suggests an instrumental control over Christ, the grace of God, which Torrance completely rejects:

. . .it is not we who effect the union between ourselves and Christ in his body and blood, nor we who bring about his real presence to make effective what he has done and still does for us, but Jesus Christ alone through his holy and life-giving Spirit whom he shares with us. . .¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷TS, pp. 239, 245.

¹⁴⁸CAC, I, p. 251; cf. p. 45.

¹⁴⁹Reconciliation, p. 119; cf. RBET, 7/16/81; CD, IV, 4, p. v; STR, pp. 118-122; Reconstruction, pp. 184, 188.

15. Master Matrix of Fluid Axioms

We are now in a position to identify the master analogical matrix, which serves as the disclosure model for all Torrancian relation:

. . . as divine and human natures are related in Christ, so in the Church Christ and human nature are related, for the Church is the Body of Christ. The analogy then takes the proper form; as A is to B, so C is to D, where C is: A to B.¹⁵⁰

The importance of this to Torrance is unmistakable:

It is the relationship within the Person of Christ between His divine and human natures . . . that provides the normative relationship for every theological statement where the relationship between God and man is involved. Thus whenever our knowledge of the Truth is properly ordered it will reveal a structure in its material content that reflects the Christological pattern of the hypostatic union. This is the interior logic of theological thought, logic that arises under the impact of the Object. . ."151

Schematically this appears as follows:

GOD				
----	in Christ	::	Christ	
MAN			-----	in Church
			mankind	

Analogy 2

therefore:

GOD			
---	in Christ		
MAN			
-----	in Church		
man			

Analogy 3

¹⁵⁰Reconstruction, p. 185.


¹⁵¹TS, p. 207; cf. pp. 186-187, 217, 273.

Although Torrance alludes to this analogy on various occasions, nonetheless it would be easy to miss its strategic importance.¹⁵²


Fully elaborated in its most universal and comprehensive form it appears as master Matrix 1. Its underlying structural logic is identified in Matrix 2, which then is conflated in Matrix 3 to expose the hierarchical relational structure. In configuring the relational matrix in this way we immediately recognize the hierarchical Christ-man-universe structure of Torrance's analysis. The archetypal reality of Christ is differentially reflected in the first degree in the ectype of Covenant and in the second degree in the ectype of Creation. It is Jesus Christ in his horizontal concrete universal identity with our humanity, homoousion/homo-kairos-homo-chora, which serves as the onto-relational connective--the common denominator--between strata. The homoousion of mankind with creation, we suggest, consists in man's origin 'âphâr min hâ 'adâmâh (of dust from the ground) (Gen. 2:7). Torrance directs us to the propriety of this hierarchical implementation of Christo-logic:

. . . for example, the doctrine of the hypostatic union, in so far as it is a faithful expression of the "form of Christ," can be deployed as a servant-category in the Christological correction of the other doctrines. . . . In such deployment it must be carefully and fully acknowledged that there is bound in these other doctrines only a subsidiary reflexion of the "form of Christ," and that subsidiary reflexion consists in obedience and conformity to Christ, and is in no sense a transference of "the hypostatic union" from the doctrine of the unique Person of Christ Himself to other areas of


¹⁵²To my knowledge it is only in Reconstruction, p. 185 and in an obscure epilogue to a Reformed-Catholic debate in the Scotsman (16 December 1957), reprinted in CAC, I, p. 191 that this analogy of indirect proportionality occurs, although it is more or less directly alluded to in CAC, I, pp. 44-45, 203, 251-252; GR, pp. 24-25.



Matrix 1 Christ-Covenant-Creation relational hierarchy.



Matrix 2 Structural ana-logical relations of Christ-Covenant-Creation Matrix. The relations of being have been isolated from Matrix 1 in order to highlight the logical and analogical structure inherent in it. The matrix reads: A (Word, Deity, Son) is to B (MAN, Humanity) in C (Christ) as C (Christ) is to D (man, mankind) in E (Church, Covenant Community) as E is to F (Universe) in G (Creation). The three 'vertical,' intra-categorical relations are to be construed in terms of the analogy of hypostatic attribution. The two 'horizontal,' inter-categorical relations are to be construed in terms of the analogy of differential proportionality.



Matrix 3 Conflated ana-logical relations of Christ-Covenant-Creation Matrix. Matrix 2 has been conflated in order to highlight the hierarchical relational structure and the structural indispensability (contra monophysitism) of the humanity of Christ (B) and its Covenant and Creation analogues in mankind (D) and Universe (F) respectively.

Christian teaching. The organic unity of all theological knowledge arises not from categorisation and certainly not from the reduction of every other doctrine to Christology, but from consistent obedience to Christ. The way that the Word has taken in the Incarnation, life, death and resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ, is the way in which God means us to apprehend and receive His Word.¹⁵³

The covenantal analogue to the hypostatic union is the mystical union. Its creation counterpart is the creatio continua of God's providence. The former reflects the incarnation and resurrection in the provisional, first fruits form of the katabasis of the Spirit of Christ at Pentecost and His sacramental apocalypsis of the Parousia of Christ. The latter best represents this dynamic motif in the events of creation and consummation of the universe.

The anhypostatic status of the human nature of Christ is paralleled within the covenant in terms of grace. Torrance's 'supralapsarian' unity of the covenant precludes the introduction of the dualistically construed covenant of works, which would give man a certain hypostatic standing before God apart from Christ. The universe correlate here is the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, the relation of thoroughgoing contingency.

As has previously been elaborated the enhypostatic assumption of the human nature of Christ into hypostatic union with the Word, otherwise referred to as the Christological theosis, finds its covenantal sequel in the pneumatological theosis. Whether we should look specifically for a covenantal 'theosis' of the universe created ex nihilo is open to question as man enjoys a unique status as priest and crown of creation.¹⁵⁴ However, it is the case that the

¹⁵³SF, pp. lxii-lxiii.

¹⁵⁴Cf. e.g. GGT, pp. 5-6 where man as scientist articulates the orderly structure of dumb nature and

orderliness of the contingent universe is intelligible only in light of Christ the eternal Logos and embodied covenant. Torrance explains:

. . . the contingent rationality which pervades the created universe demands a sufficient reason for the unitary order which everywhere becomes manifest to our inquiries, but because this rational order is contingent, and therefore not self-sufficient, its sufficient reason becomes disclosed only through correlation with some meta-level beyond it.¹⁵⁵

To be sure, the I-Thou, Subject-Subject relation which the theosis so vividly establishes is absent in this impersonal context.

Finally, the Extra-Calvinisticum is covenantally expressed in the full reality of the Kingdom of God in the ascended Christ, which though Spiritually present through Word and Sacrament to the covenantal community, remains Personally in eschatological suspension until the second Advent.¹⁵⁶ We have already examined the covenant-creation relationship and the irreducibility of the former to the latter.

There is one precaution that Torrance enjoins. It is the humanity of Christ upon which the whole structure depends. Without His concrete universal embodiment of our humanity an untenable monophysitism sets in. Torrance reminds us:

Jesus Christ is Mediator in such a way that in his incarnate Person he embraces both sides of the mediating relationship. He is God of the nature of God, and man of the nature of man, in one and the same Person The Incarnation means that in Jesus Christ we have to do with One who is wholly God and yet with one who is

so uncovers its purpose as revealing the handiwork of God.

¹⁵⁵DCO, p. 4; cf. pp. 23-25.

¹⁵⁶Cf. CAC, I, p. 206.

wholly man, but very God of very God though he is, the Son of God comes to us as man."¹⁵⁷


This becomes more apparent by use of the conflated diagram, Matrix 4. The slashed deletions (////) convert the orthodox hierarchy into its 'monophysite' aberration. When the humanity of Christ is circumvented, theological science becomes divinized as is the case with the Magisterium Romanum--dogmatic assertions are sanctioned as divine declarations.¹⁵⁸ They become univocal rather than differential analogical statements and thus inherently and immediately rather than referentially and mediately true. When we extend this anomaly into the realm of natural science such that the human factor is eliminated by the dashes(----), the universe becomes a direct extension of God, natural science directly emanates from theological science--the problem restricting true scientific advance until the modern era.¹⁵⁹ Torrance depicts the critical mediatorial role of man, the priest of creation, as follows:

[Christ, the Living] Word is intelligibly mediated to us and knowledge of God becomes communicable through Holy Scriptures. But since all this takes place within the created universe of space and time, and since space and time are the bearers of all rational order within the universe, it is in and through this universe as its orderly connections are unfolded under man's scientific investigations that we are surely to develop and express our knowledge of God mediated through his Word. The natural scientist and the theologian are both at work within the same space-time structures of the universe

¹⁵⁷The Mediation of Christ, pp. 66, 67.

¹⁵⁸For an additional illustration from Roman ecclesiology see Reconstruction, p. 185.

¹⁵⁹For example, we may cite the infamous use of Galileo's Copernicanism which was silenced by the Inquisition (5 March 1616) as anti-Scriptural and therefore heretical, for the scientific implication of the cessation of the motion of the sun in the conquest of the Amorites by Joshua (Josh. 10:12) was understood to be a geocentrism.



Matrix 4 'Monophysite' aberrations in theological and natural science.

and under the limits of their boundary conditions. The natural scientist inquires into the processes and patterns of nature, and man himself is a part of nature; and the theologian inquires of God the Creator of nature and the source of its created rationalities, to which man also belongs. Thus theological science and natural science have their own proper and distinctive objectives to pursue, but their work inevitably overlaps, for they both operate through the same rational structures of space and time.¹⁶⁰

What should also be observed is that natural science in its 'monophysite' form in principle eliminates the human, personal coefficient of knowledge within the scientific enterprise, to the dismay of Heisenberg, Polanyi, and Torrance. In both instances the spatio-temporal homouision is eliminated and rigid, abstract, causal theological and scientific categories result.

This relational model becomes eminently helpful in organizing and expanding upon nearly any facet of Torrance's thought. Once the durational components we have identified are introduced in Chapter V relative to this analogue then much of the power of Torrance's Christocentric hermeneutic will be heuristically disclosed. The model allows us to travel beyond the express confines of Torrance's thought while still maintaining fidelity to it. It is our vehicle for discovery.¹⁶¹ He outlines the proper function of disclosure models as follows:

¹⁶⁰GGT, p. 6.

¹⁶¹Torrance himself uses it as a heurisitc tool: "If the substance or content of the analogical relation between Christ and His Church is the doctrine of Christ Himself, the relationship involved is to be formulated in terms of the doctrine of the Spirit and Eschatology. In this way I believe the Church of our day will be able to do something that has never yet been done in the whole history of the Christian Church: give full dogmatic formulation to the doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ" (CAC, I, p. 233).

We make it central and organize the other forms round it in a harmonious pattern of reference. Then we imaginatively and tentatively project that as a hypothesis and put it as a complex question to the reality we are investigating in such a way that the answer is clearly intuited, and so once again in the light of what is revealed we proceed to reconstruct it. We clarify and sharpen its focus as an act of interrogation, we simplify and unify its conceptual form, in the hope that it will become such a transparent medium for our apprehension that our thoughts will fall under the power of the logic or the interior connection in the components of reality itself.¹⁶²

As with all models it may be in need of further development or clarification and it may never be treated as an end in itself.¹⁶³ With this in mind, Torrance cautions:

No matter how successful such a theory . . . may be in mediating insight into the latent organisation or systematic connectivity of any field, it would still remain valid that there is no logical bridge between the structure of that theory and the objective structure of the real world. Hence, just as it was not through any logical nexus that the basic concepts (out of which the theory was built) were derived from experiences, so likewise there is at the conclusion no logical nexus by means of which it can be demonstrated or verified: the all-important connection at the end must be just as

¹⁶²TS, pp. 239-240. On the surface this appears to be identical to Ian Ramsey's disclosure models which echo or are isomorphic to the phenomena while refraining from sheer reproduction, and in so doing ". . . leads to disclosures when (as we say) 'the light dawns'" (Models and Mystery [London: Oxford, 1964], p. 10). However, upon closer scrutiny, the concrete-universal relation of the anthropological consubstantiality of Christ with our humanity, which serves as the ultimate ground for analogical mediation is at best reduced to a mere "tangential" connection (Cf. *ibid.*, p. 16). Thus Ian Barbour's critique of Ramsey's theological models as bypassing, ". . . the problem of their relation to each other and to anything outside man" is apropos to Ramsey (Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion [New York: Harper and Row, 1974], p. 63), while irrelevant to disclosure models from Torrance's Christocentric perspective.

¹⁶³SF, pp. lxii-lxiii.

empirical and intuitive as it was at the start.¹⁶⁴

With this proviso in mind we venture into the meta-scientific phase of our study wherein we put our relational model to the test as an organizational and heuristic tool.

¹⁶⁴TCFK, pp. 79-80.

PART II

META-SCIENTIFIC LEVEL

CHAPTER V

HERMENEUTIC DYNAMICS

[T]he work of biblical scholars . . . with strong Nicene convictions and . . . with strong evangelical convictions broke down the hard literalistic and rationalistic approach to the Bible in which biblical statements were held to contain the very truth they expressed, and helped to restore the Patristic and Reformation ways of interpreting the Holy Scripture, in light of the realities they refer to rather than interpreting the realities in terms of the letter of Scripture.

--T. F. Torrance
"The Deposit of Faith"

The entire bearing of Torrance's thought has been toward recovering the inherent unitary foundations of reality. As a critical realist it is essential that thought not be abstracted from being. As a theologian it is essential that the being and act of God, i.e., the ontology and economy or the person and work not be divided.¹ As such, an adequate theology must be inherently scientific such that,

. . . concepts are not found in isolation but are interlinked in a field of conceptuality which is co-ordinated with a continuous flow of orderly, intelligible happening in space and time. Our primary

¹E.g., cf. TCFK, pp. 279-280; TS, p. 344; STR, pp. 55, 116; RET, pp. 142-143.

concepts arise in a situation where thought is already and immediately engaged with reality which is the ontological basis and rational source of their development, and they function as the hermeneutic media through which reality is disclosed to us in its inner relations and we on our part are enabled to grasp it in accordance with its objective structure and interpret it to others through series of conceptual extensions. All concepts are properly defined by the conceptual field in which they function and ultimately have their meaning through the semantic coordination of that field with reality, but are immediately vague when they are detached or isolated.²

Contemporary theological hermeneutics has not by and large come to an appreciation of the profound hermeneutic impact of realist dynamics. Let us, for a moment, examine the current alternatives.

16. Duration and Contemporary Hermeneutics

In surveying the progress of hermeneutics since Schleiermacher, one cannot help but acknowledge the ironic lack of consensus in determining the thematic foci of the various options. Carl Braaten distinguishes between the Historie-Geschichte dualism of Bultmann and the non-dualists, Heinrich Ott, Gerhard Ebeling, and Wolfhart Pannenberg.³ Paul Ricoeur differentiates between the demythologizers and the demystifiers, the latter of which include the iconoclastic efforts of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.⁴ Helmut Thielicke, in discarding the traditional distinction between modern and conservative theology,

²GR, pp. 16-17.

³William Hordern, gen. ed., New Directions in Theology Today, 7 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), vol. 2: History and Hermeneutics, p. 40.

⁴De L'interprétation: Essai sur Freud (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1965), pp. 36-44.

replaces it with a more refined Cartesian vs. Non-Cartesian dichotomy.⁵ The former is characterized by the primacy of the ego as the interpretive agent, Lessing, Schleiermacher, and Bultmann being exemplary representatives. The latter is characterized by the primacy of the historically concrete mediated by the agency of the Holy Spirit, which is Pannenberg's position. Richard Palmer enumerates six perspectives: (1) Biblical exegesis governed by interpretive rules and principles (J. C. Dannhauer the first modern representative); (2) general philology, bringing universal grammatical and historical principles to bear upon Scripture (Ernesti, Kurt Froer, J. S. Semler, Friedrich August Wolf, and Friedrich Ast); allgemeine Hermeneutic of Schleiermacher, which broadens hermeneutics into the scientific linguistic understanding; (4) Wilhelm Dilthey's psychologico-historical foundations of Geisteswissenschaften; (5) phenomenology of human existence (Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer); (6) system of rules for recovering the deeper meaning behind myths and symbols (Ricoeur).⁶ He then immediately proceeds to reclassify these into two groups: that of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Emilio Betti, who stress the narrower view of hermeneutics, ". . . as a general body of methodological principles which underlie interpretation" and that of Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, Ebeling, and Fuchs, ". . . who see hermeneutics as a philosophical exploration of the character and requisite

⁵The Evangelical Faith, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, ed., vol. 1: Prolegomena: The Relation of Theology to Modern Thought Forms (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), part one: "The State of Theological Discussion," pp. 212-218.

⁶Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), ch 3: "Six Modern Definitions of Hermeneutics," pp. 34-45.

conditions for all understanding."⁷ Josef Bleicher delineates three conflicting strands within contemporary hermeneutics.⁸ 1)The "hermeneutical theorists" such as Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Betti approach the problem of interpreting the historically distanced data by employing universal canons of language reflective of the human understanding whereby the particulars may find their meaning. 2)The "hermeneutic philosophers" reject the ostensive conclusion of the hermeneutical theorists. Subject and object are inextricably linked such that all interpretation entails a pre-understanding. "The conception of what is involved in understanding consequently shifts from the reproduction of a pre-given object to the participation in on-going communication between past and present."⁹ The approach shifts from a methodological to a philosophical orientation, centered around a descriptive phenomenology of human existence, as articulated by Heidegger, Bultmann, and Gadamer. 3)"Critical hermeneutics" rejects both the linguistic and idealistic emphases of the other views, criticizing the existing structures of authority and tradition in light of rationally projected superior ones. Karl Marx, K. O. Apel, Juergen Habermas, Hans Joerg Sandkuehler, and Alfred Lorenzer are its chief representatives. Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutic mediates and transcends all three.

In distinction from each of these views, Torrance asserts the theological water-shed, and thus by implication, the hermeneutic water-shed is the doctrine of the

⁷Ibid., p. 46.

⁸Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 1-5, 257-259 and passim.

⁹Ibid., p. 2.

Incarnation. Hilary, Athanasius, Peter Lombard, Calvin, Luther and Barth¹⁰ stand on one side:

. . . where theological language is certainly employed in its analogical character, . . . deriving from and reposing upon objective reality, the concrete act of God in Jesus Christ. That supplies the basic frame of reference for all theological doctrines and gives them their realist character.¹¹

Allegorical exegetes, Ockham, Erasmus, Dilthey and Bultmann¹² stand on the other.

(T)he Incarnation is regarded as a mythological construct designed to express in an objectified manner the creative spirituality of the early Christians. Behind this lies a horror for the notion of the Being of God in space and time and therefore for the concrete act of God in the objective historical reality of Jesus Christ. Hence, everything is given a fundamentally symbolic interpretation, not symbolic of an objective reality, but symbolic of a subjective state or of a basic self understanding of man over against God.¹³

Torrance concludes: "Either we take the one way or the other--there is no third alternative"¹⁴ by which he intends, either scientific or existentialist theology.

This poses an interesting problem in light of the fact that he articulates a third option elsewhere, namely, that which has variously appeared as Protestant scholasticism, rationalism, positivism, linguistic analysis,

¹⁰"HA," pp. 448, 453, 459, 134-135; RBET, 7/9/81; TS, p. xi; cf. p. 328.

¹¹KB, p. 206.

¹²TCFK, p. 309.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 207.

and fundamentalism.¹⁵ Is this a genus of its own or merely a species of subjectivism? Our durational inquiry may offer us a clue.

Liberal Hermeneutics

After explicating the time/eternity, God/man vertical distinction and the past/present, kerygma/myth horizontal distinction, Braaten concludes: "Hermeneutics . . . is the science of reflecting on how a word or event in a past time and culture may be understood and become existentially meaningful in our present situation. Hermeneutical reflection enters into the problem of the horizontal gap."¹⁶ Torrance argues, as history has proved, this jeopardizes the very heart of Christology, as the eternal deity of Christ is bifurcated from his historical humanity and theology lapses into anthropology.¹⁷ At best

¹⁵CTSC, p. 126; RBET, 6/29/81; GGT, pp. 34-35; RET, p. 68.

¹⁶History and Hermeneutics, p. 131.

¹⁷"Once this radical dichotomy is posited, then, as for example in a Schleiermacher or Bultmann, the basic affirmation of the Christian Faith, namely that in Jesus Christ we have none other than the Being of God himself in our human existence in space and time, is called in question as a rational statement in its own right and must be 're-edited' or 'reinterpreted' as a correlate to human being or man's attitude to existence. Indeed all the basic affirmations of the Christian Faith are processed in such a way that from being primarily and essentially theological statements they become statements of human concern with varying degrees of ultimacy" (Reconstruction, p. 263).
Cf. STR, p. 4; GR, p. 55; TS, pp. x, 213; "Time in Scientific and Historical Research," pp. 5-6. For Heidegger's phenomenology as a priori anthropology see review of Being and Time, p. 477, and review of Theology and Church, p. 21.

we are left with a deism¹⁸--at worst an atheism.¹⁹ Christologically we find a repetition of the ancient heresies of gnosticism,²⁰ docetism,²¹ and its corollary of Arianism.²² The God-man bond has arbitrarily been eradicated from proper 'theological' inquiry. To this point we may speak of liberal dualism as a one temporal dimension hermeneutic. However, a very telling second stage immediately follows this vertical durational reduction. The existentialization of history performs a horizontal reduction of the extended past into the infinitesimal present. Lutheranism, Torrance writes, verifies this conclusion:

To investigate history, according to Lessing, is to appropriate it for ourselves and make it a part of our own experience as the particular symbolic point where the general truth of reason necessarily imposes itself upon us, and in the last analysis quite apart from any foundation in history. The effect of this was to reduce the historical Jesus Christ to a vanishing point, but Lessing's appeal to Luther indicates that, in his own thought at any rate, this had an inner connection with Luther's dynamic reduction of the presence of God to the mathematical point of 'for you'. Thus there grew up in modern Protestant theology a sharp antithesis between phenomenal events and eternal ideas, so that it came to be widely held that the spatial and temporal ingredients in theological concepts must be entirely discarded if we are to succeed in jumping over the chasm between them. But to retain spatial and temporal ingredients in the structures of our thought, as D. F. Strauss taught, is

¹⁸STI, pp. 48-49; GGT, pp. 30, 71.

¹⁹Reconstruction, pp. 18-19; TS, p. xi.

²⁰Reconstruction, p. 263.

²¹Ibid., CAC, I, p. 101; "The Place of the Humanity of Christ in the Sacramental Life of the Church," p. 9.

²²Reconstruction, p. 263; RET, p. 15.

to remain stuck in mythology.²³

This horizontal reduction results in a positivistic methodology, which in turn exposes an implicit conventionalism or even nominalism.²⁴ A thoroughgoing relativism ensues.²⁵ The existential present becomes the sole criterion for judgment, but because of its temporal nature it itself becomes constantly superseded and therefore relativized. Herein the Heraclitan problem of flux appears in modern dress--just as the same river can never be entered twice (if in fact it can be entered at all!), so first century Christian history can never be recovered. Ironically, those who in Dilthey's shadow profess to be historically preoccupied have been the paramount force in the contemporary eradication of the historical. Existential theology has delimited time to the specious present of contemporary man, a tendency which approaches an a-temporal

²³STI, pp. 42-43; cf. 48-49; STR, pp. 125, 150-151.

²⁴GGT, p. 29; STR, pp. 2,3. For the positivism of phenomenological method, see STR, p. 168.

²⁵Since the historico-critical school, ". . . declines to accept any objectively grounded revelation of God or any knowledge of God objectively grounded in himself, biblical and theological interpretation of this kind is regularly trapped within the fallacies of socio-cultural relativism and linguistic nominalism. That is to say, by cutting short the ontological reference of biblical and theological statements to God (at least in respect of any cognitive relation to him) it is forced to interpret them merely culturally in terms of the socio-religious self-understanding of the times, or merely linguistically in terms of the sentential meaning defined through grammatical usage and syntactical complexes--although, admittedly, attempts are made to combine both these approaches" (STR, pp. 2-3).

hermeneutic.²⁶

Fundamentalist Hermeneutics

Torrance reserves the designation 'fundamentalist', for the biblicists of conservative Protestantism, which at various junctures have been identified as Gordon H. Clark, Carl F.H. Henry, Daniel Fuller, James Barr, et al.²⁷ Although diametrically opposed to the theological method of liberalism, they none the less evince some striking parallels. By identifying Scripture as the written Word of God, fundamentalism employs a representational view of reality, in which intervening sense-data (propositional Scripture) mediate between the historical reality and the mental apprehension of it. In Ockham's terms, the intentio-obliqua supplants the intentio-recta such that any relation with objective reality is mediated by a significate. Once this significate becomes identified with the object which it represents, it no longer is a transparent or analogical vehicle through which reality is understood, but rather becomes its univocal surrogate.²⁸ Once scripture serves as the Word of God, the sign becomes indistinguishable from the living reality. Reality itself becomes expendable as dualism sets in, and biblical ultra-realism lapses, ironically into nominalism.²⁹ In Torrance's final analysis, Christology is jeopardized:

²⁶The hypothetical limit of a-temporality is actually never reached as all created existence as we know it would collapse into oblivion if time were eliminated. For demythologization as detemporalization see STR, pp. 80, 134; STI, pp. 48-49; TS, pp. 323-324, 327, n. 2.

²⁷RBET, 7/13 and 7/14/81; Reconstruction, p. 19.

²⁸RBET, 7/9/81.

²⁹RET, p. 66.

Fundamentalism stumbles, not so much at the consubstantial relation between Jesus Christ and God the Father, at least so far as his person is concerned, but at the consubstantial relation between the free continuous act of God's self-communication and the living content of what he communicates, especially when this is applied to divine revelation in and through the Holy Scriptures. It rejects the fact that revelation must be continually given and received in the living relation with God--i.e., it substitutes a static for a dynamic view of revelation.³⁰

In other words, the eschatological aspect of revelation is abandoned, leaving hermeneutics to operate with only the classical two-dimensional dichotomy of time and eternity.

Moreover, the temporal pole lapses into an a-temporal point as a result, not of existential relativism, but propositional necessitarianism. The contemporaneity of Christ is not due to his dynamic presence with us through the Holy Spirit but rather by his static logical universality. In that God is propositionally contained within Scripture, the Newtonian view of space and time is reintroduced. It is instructive that because the container cannot contain itself, Newton's cosmology led him to a unitarian theology and its Arian Christological subordinationism.

Retro-Orthodox Hermeneutics

In light of these alternatives it should be clear why it has been essential to belabor the relational heart of Torrance's thought, for the difference between competing positions may ultimately be reduced to their respective relational cores.

Recent metaphysical philosophy on various fronts has corroborated the Einsteinian insight that reality is

³⁰Ibid., p. 16.

fundamentally relational.³¹ Torrance, distancing the metaphysical implications of relativity theory from the conventionalism of instrumentalism on the one hand and the idealism of classical essentialism on the other, argues:

This is a world in which relations between bodies are just as real as the bodies themselves, for it is in their interrelations that things are found to be what and as and when they are. . . . The real world confronts us, then, as a continuously integrated manifold, in which structure and substance, form and being, are inseparably conjoined in the immanent relatedness of the universe.³²

We have attempted to sketch the relational architecture of Torrance's thought. It may seem in so doing we have ventured far afield from our stated purpose of disclosing the hermeneutic import of duration within his theology. However, this is not the case. We have been guided in our inquiry by the simplest and possibly most difficult definition of time, expounded throughout his corpus as 'contingent relation.'

The relational matrix of Torrance's theology which

³¹Cf., e.g., Harold H. Oliver, A Relational Metaphysic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) who posits, "only relation as are real" (p. 155). Philosophically, although bearing in the same general direction as Torrance, he fails to maintain the differential of the contingent world reflected in creatio ex nihilo and in the anhypostatic contingency of Christ's human nature (and derivatively all human nature) upon the Divine Word (cf. pp. 168-171). In effect the ontological refinement of the hypostatic relation John of Damascus offers over Leontius of Byzantium remains to be implemented.


We have already had opportunity to mention the personal, relational ontology of John Macmurray. See especially Persons in Relation (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1961).

See John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, pp. 192-209 for recent theological developments in this wider relational movement.

³²TCFK, pp. 72-73.

we have exposed is, qua relationally real, inherently and inextricably durational. It is unfortunate that everything that must be said cannot be said simultaneously, for in portraying the relational matrix we at one and the same time imply a durational matrix. The following diagram, therefore, should be understood as implied within the relational structure. We look now, as if by means of a Gestalt switch, to the relational matrix which is as relational, durational (See Matrix 5).

Without reiterating all that the scientific phase of our study has already clarified, let us observe, this disclosure model emanates from the bi-durational ectype of Eternity and its hypostatic conjunction with our time, nomistic time, in the fullness of redemptive Time in Jesus Christ. He is the living, concrete solution to the time-eternity problematic. This time which He enhypostatically assumed into inseparable relation with Himself, was fully contingent by virtue of creatio ex nihilo and fully fallen, save for the residuum of grace in the law, by virtue of the sin of Adam, the concrete universal head of our race. This hypostatic conjunction was an historical event accomplished in retrospective and prospective recapitulation in the exinanition and exaltation of our Lord. Eternity has become integrally related to our time in such a way that time has been rendered fully Temporal for the first time as the everlasting Time of the ascended Christ. In the contrapuntal perpetuity of Eternity and Time there is no conflict or confusion. His Everlasting life in no way mitigates His abiding Eternality. This extra-tempus, if you will, especially in its covenantal sequel, namely, the millennial Time of the ascended Christ, proves to be hermeneutically decisive, for as we have seen both liberal and fundamental hermeneutics ignore it all together. It is this millennial or eschatological Time which is reflected in



Matrix 5 Christ-Covenant-Creation durational dimensions.

the revelatory record as the fully realized Kingdom of God. Because it is in onto-relational 'concurrence' with covenantal time, i.e., the teleological time of the Church in anticipation of the future Eschaton, every dogmatic locus which addresses the relations of the covenantal community to Christ invariably include the bi-temporal poles of eschatological, apocalyptic and teleological, prophetic time. Torrance reminds us the historical life of Christ,

. . . cannot but contain powerful eschatological elements, for it must offer an account of the interaction of divine acts with human agencies throughout history, and therefore of the persisting conflict between the Kingdom of God and the sin-distorted patterns of human life or the power structures of temporal and political existence; but it must also contain powerful teleological elements, for it must offer an account of the redeeming and creative work of God in Jesus Christ, and therefore of the evangelical mission of the Church in world history as through its witness to Jesus Christ the original events remain dynamically operative in our midst and press toward their consummation.³³

Once again, it is anhypostatic, nomistic time hypostatically united to the fullness of Time in Christ which constitutes the Time of the Church. This is purely a spiritual transaction--a pneumatological theosis. The time of the Church is not a tertium quid, not a time alien to fallen time, but rather fallen time from the perspective of grace, i.e., the Time of its mission. Torrance writes,

. . . though risen with Christ and already a partaker through the Spirit in the new creation, the Church is sent like Christ into the world as the servant of the Lord, humbling itself and containing itself in kenosis within the limits and laws of the world in order to proclaim the Gospel of reconciliation and to live out reconciliation within the conditions of fallen human

³³TS, p. 336.

existence.³⁴

We must remember that the kenotic aspect of the Church is one of addition rather than subtraction, for even here Torrance affirms the full bi-temporality of the Church in its eschatological and teleological dimension.

If Pentecost is the katabasis of the Spirit of Christ in His Church then the sacramental parousia must be seen as the anabasis of the Church to Christ. Here the Holy Spirit performs the analogous double movement that Christ transacted in the incarnation and resurrection. Torrance summarizes,

[The Holy Spirit] is the creative Agent of God's revelation to us and the creative Agent in our reception and understanding of that revelation, but He is not Himself the Word of that revelation or the Form which it assumes as it proceeds from God and is appropriated by man. He is the living Action and Presence of God in it all, who so relates the divine Word to the human and earthly forms which it assumed in Jesus Christ that in Him we are enabled to meet God face to face, shining in His own uncreated Light and speaking to us personally in His own eternal Word.³⁵

Because revelation is inherently temporal we may generalize this by saying it is through His creative agency that the reality of eschatological Time is teleologically appropriated.

Finally, in moving to the level of creation as such we to a certain extent must extrapolate from our analogue to bring our durational model to completion. Here then its heuristic utility emerges.

To be sure the fundamental time within the universe is that same time which is con-temporal throughout the matrix--the contingent and fallen nomistic time of this

³⁴STR, p. 99.

³⁵GR, p. 168; cf. pp. 181, 183.

world. Thermodynamically we have met this as time characterized by the second law of thermodynamics--the time of chaotic entropy. Save for the continual creative enhypostatic intervention of the Spirit time would be no more. However, as Prigogine has pointed out, this same entropic movement unexpectedly evinces moments of unpredictable order. We suggest this to be nomistic time in its positive bearing restraining chaos. If time is ultimately to be understood from its Christological center it is best understood within this mutual context as hypostatically conjoined with redeemed creation as Paul expounds in Rom. 8:19. In Christ the New Heavens and New Earth have come and with them the fullness of recreated Time.³⁶ Torrance speaks of the re-creative act of God in Christ proleptically revealed in miracle, which in no way suspends space-time natural laws, but overcomes disorder,

. . . by bringing his own creative being redemptively to it, and deepens its ordering by correlating it on its own contingent levels in a new way with the power of his own transcendent life and rationality, where its ultimate and sufficient reason is lodged.³⁷

Although held invisibly in eschatological arrears and unconfused with the fallen time of this world, nevertheless the New Creation is inseparably maintained by the continual creation of the Spirit of Christ in hypostatic conjunction with ordering entropy.

From the perspective of relativity theory space-time also reflects a positive and negative polarity. Regarding the former it is the invisible dynamic metrical field of relations. Without Light and its finite, constant space-time correlates, chaos once again would prevail over the face of the deep. As John Wheeler argues: "There is no

³⁶"PC," pp, 119.

³⁷DCO, p. 24.

law of physics that does not demand space and time for its statement. With the collapse of space, and the end of time, the very framework for every law of physics therefore collapses."³⁸ On the other hand the asymmetric arrow of time has been characterized as the tyrannic aspect of fallen time.

Thus, whether thermodynamically or relativistically conceived it appears progressive time is the inseparable but inconfused conjunction of regressive time in differential dependence upon the Time of New Creation in Christ. This proves illuminating within the scheme of Torrance's thought for he appears to subscribe to Wheeler's thesis concerning the anthropic principle, viz., that the universe is proleptically conditioned by the future requirements of life and mind.³⁹ Wheeler, of course is speaking within the confines of astrophysics. However, if we are to take Christocentric time seriously we are forced to think in eschatological and redemptive terms such that the universe including space-time and thermodynamics is proleptically, i.e., teleologically bearing toward what it is already in Christ. The step from man to Christ is a direct, 'homoousial' one, but it is because of its inadequate, individualistic, non-relational anthropology that the scientific community would be expected to balk at such a 'radical' conclusion.

³⁸"The Universe as Home for Man," *American Scientist*, 61, no. 6 (November-December, 1974), p. 686 cited in *DCO*, p. 145, n. 6.

³⁹Cf. *GGT*, pp. 4, 140; *The Christian Frame of Mind*, pp. 44-45.

17. Dynamic Hermeneutics

The Christocentric Core of Hermeneutics

Having adumbrated the ontological Christ-man-universe relational matrix and its concomitant durational implications, we are now in a position to demonstrate a remarkable feature of Torrance's unitary approach--the inconfused inseparability of being and thought, ontology and epistemology, dogmatics and hermeneutics. For Torrance reality is inherently intelligible. Intelligibility is not something conventionally or instrumentally attached to it. He writes:

. . . concepts are not found in isolation but are linked in a field of conceptuality which is co-ordinated with a continuous flow of orderly, intelligible happening in space and time. Our primary concepts arise in a situation where thought is already and immediately engaged with reality which is the ontological basis and rational source of their development, and they function as the hermeneutic media through which reality is disclosed to us in its inner relations and we on our part are enabled to grasp it in accordance with its objective structure and interpret it to others through series of conceptual extension. All concepts are properly defined by the conceptual field in which they function and ultimately have their meaning through the semantic coordination of that field with reality, but are immediately vague when they are detached or isolated.⁴⁰

This being the case, the sine qua non of all theological hermeneutics is the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the Truth.⁴¹ Torrance explains:

If we really regard the Logos not simply as the archetypal or the seminal reason but as the Personal Word of

⁴⁰GR, pp. 16-17; cf. Juridical Law and Physical Law, pp. 24-25, 30; TS, ch. 1; STR, p. 169; DCO, p. 1; "The Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 22.

⁴¹Cf. RET, pp. 125-126, 138.

God incarnate in the form of a Man, and therefore as comprising in toto all the forms and categories which reason may legitimately use in knowing God, then the Incarnation becomes the guarantee of a truly rational faith whose logic, certainly a personal logic, is in the Word before it is in reason, but in the Word made in the form of a Man, and therefore in Word already amenable to human rational activity.⁴²

It cannot be stressed enough that by virtue of the theological homoousion all theological truth is absolute, ultimately and immanently in God Himself,⁴³ but by virtue of the anthropological homoousion, the one true Man, it is actually revealed within the confines of our created rationality.⁴⁴ It is by virtue of the hypostatic union of the Word with the Man, Jesus that Divine Truth is inconfusedly inseparable from human truth. This is the ultimate antidote to theological agnosticism.⁴⁵ He acts in the unique capacity of Being Divine Truth to mankind and mankind's knowledge of that Truth properly and transcendently grounded in God. He is both the Truth and the knowing of the Truth.⁴⁶ Torrance refers to this as the circle of knowing.⁴⁷ Here Christ's response to Philip takes on new significance: "He who has seen me has seen the Father."⁴⁸

These three Christological relations are the foci of

⁴²Review of Towards a Christian Philosophy, by Leonard Hodgson, Evangelical Quarterly 15 (1943): 239; cf. SF, p. lxi.

⁴³GGT, p. 158; RET, p. 24; GR, p. 201; CTSC, p. 80.

⁴⁴Cf. TS, p. 298.

⁴⁵Cf. GR, p. 98.

⁴⁶2Cf. Ibid., p. 154; Reconstruction, p. 132; TS, pp. 47-52, 215.

⁴⁷HL[RST], Lect 5.

⁴⁸Jn 14:9.

Torrance's entire epistemological structure. Borrowing a distinction developed by St. Anselm,⁴⁹ he asserts the Deity of God in Christ is the ground of the "supreme Truth of God." It is self-defining, a se Truth without which there would be no truth. God Himself is definitive of Truth. There is no truth beyond Him. It is the theological homoousios of Christ in His deity which is the guarantor that the terminus ad quem of terrestrial epistemology is God Himself.

Despite the revelation of God in the space-time Incarnation of Jesus Christ it is nonetheless appropriate to affirm the incomprehensibility of the Truth of God. This affirmation is the extra-Calvinisticum of theological knowledge. This reflects the ultimate open contingent relation of God with His creation. For Torrance the incomprehensibility of God means,

. . . behind the objectivities and intelligibilities of the spatiotemporal universe in which the Truth of God discloses himself to us, there is an infinite depth of Reality calling for recognition and reverence, openness of mind and wonder toward it.⁵⁰

We must remind ourselves of the relational character of truth and reality lest we interpret the Divine incomprehensibility in Lutheran dialectical terms. Torrance likens God's Truth to the invisible Light illuminating all reality.⁵¹

To the other extreme we find what Anselm refers to as the truth of signification. This connotes a referential, semantic, epistemological fidelity to the reality in question. To borrow our Christological categories the Truth

⁴⁹RET, p. 127-137.

⁵⁰RET, p. 141; cf. p. 140; SF, p. lxi; CTSC, pp. 89-90.

⁵¹CTSC, p. 85.

of Signification is anhypostatic, having no truth inherent in itself but designated true only in so far as it is enhypostatically, i.e., actually and faithfully reflective of the reality to which it refers. In essence all that we have developed in our previous chapter is exposition upon this aspect of Truth. Here the human nature of Christ as bearing witness to God is intended.

Thirdly, I believe Torrance understands the mediating role of Anselm's "truth of things" as reflecting the epistemological sequel to the hypostatic union.⁵² The Truth of signification is true by virtue of fulfilling its obligation of fidelity to the truth of a thing, i.e., to the essence of its reality as a thing. Signification is not constitutive of the Truth of the thing. The fundamental realism of Torrance's position thus emerges. All signification must be grounded in created reality. Herein the epistemological importance of space-time as endemic to the rationality of all created things again surfaces. Torrance explains:

. . .since the whole realm of space and time is maintained by God as the object of His creative knowledge and power, space and time are to be conceived as a continuum of relations given in and with created existence and as the bearers of its immanent order. Apart from space and time nature would be indeterminable and unintelligible, for it would have no sequences or patterns of change and no series of continuous coherent structures, and would thus be incapable of any kind of meaningful formalisation. It is to space and time, therefore, that we have to look for the determinate and intelligible medium within which God makes Himself present and known to us and within which our knowledge of Him may be formed and grounded objectively in God's own transcendent reality.⁵³

⁵²Cf. TS, pp. 50-51; STR, p. 71.

⁵³STI, pp. 60-61; cf. TS, p. 43; STR, pp. 134-135; RET, pp. 36-37.

However, he elsewhere continues, God transcends the spatial and temporal. Therefore,

. . . this truth or rightness of being in created things is not immanent or self-subsistent in them as such, but it is in them only so far as they are truly or rightly related to their source in the supreme Being, who only is self-subsistent.⁵⁴

In that the Truth of created things is a derivative of the Truth of God there is a certain kenotic dependence inferred.⁵⁵ God assumes within Himself the form of man's created space-time rationality.

In saying this we must not speak in the abstract. The space-time incarnation of the Living Word in Jesus Christ was in humiliation and exaltation an act of reconciliation. Torrance reminds us that God is incomprehensible not merely because of His transcendence but also because of our sinfulness. The atoning work of Christ, therefore is the decisive precondition for epistemology.⁵⁶ For Torrance, it is clear this is not an isolated event, for it reaches back to antiquity wherein God, electing unto Himself a people in Israel to be the medium of God's revelation to man, was part and parcel of that which eventuated in the atoning life of Jesus Christ, who in the fullness of time consummated that which historically in Israel was already proleptically wrought in Christ.⁵⁷ There is no bridge between the Truth of God and truth of human signification apart from reconciliation to the Truth. One cannot know the Truth apart from being in the Truth, i.e., in reconciled

⁵⁴RET, p. 129.

⁵⁵Cf. TS, p. 47.

⁵⁶CTSC, pp. 90-91; TS, pp. 46-50.

⁵⁷"Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," pp. 88-91; Mediation of Christ, pp. 17-19.

relation with it. The inseparability of hypostatic being and atoning act must not be forgotten. Another way of stating this is, relations are inherently dynamic--durational. We shall examine the significance of this in subsequent epistemological strata.

In that the essential Christological relations are inherent within this epistemological pattern, I believe Torrance's summarizing statement is clarified and completed:

. . . the fact that the Ultimate Truth of God has become incarnate in our world of contingent being and encounters us there in such a way that he shares and gathers up into himself, in his relation as Man on earth to God and Father in heaven, the whole structure of truth, from the truth of signification through the truth of being [things] to the supreme Truth of God, . . . constitutes for us at every level of truth both the controlling and integrating center of reference and the reality of its anchorage in God.⁵⁸

Theological Hermeneutics

In moving from the Christological precondition of hermeneutics to the human enterprise of theological hermeneutics we necessarily remove ourselves one degree on the hierarchical scale from the Incarnate Logos/Rationality of God. Jesus Christ alone is the Truth of God to man and the human response of knowing God. It becomes immediately evident that apart from an onto-relational connection of the man Christ Jesus to all mankind as elaborated in the concrete universality of the anthropological homoousion the possibility of knowledge of God would be eliminated. But because of the inseparability of being and thought, ontology and epistemology, the objective possibility of theological knowledge is also made a subjective actuality. Herein lies the distinctive of Torrance's hermeneutic. There is no univocal identity between the Incarnate Logos and the

⁵⁸RET, pp. 136-137.

enscripturated lalia. Scripture in and of itself is fully human, that is to say anhypostatic.⁵⁹ He even goes so far as to say it is in need of redemption.⁶⁰ It is epistemically inert apart from its pneumatological theosis whereby it is covenantally constituted as revelatory of God in Jesus Christ. Another way of saying this is that Scripture is essentially analogical, i.e., theological. Meaning exceeds the grammar, or semantics controls syntactics from above. Torrance explains:

. . . our interpretation and understanding of the Bible cannot be established or defended simply by appealing to biblical texts or passages or even biblical concepts, but only through listening to the truths they signify or attest and allowing our minds to be objectively determined by them. That is to say, biblical statements are to be treated, not as containing or embodying the Truth of God themselves [anhypostatic], but as pointing, under the leading of the Spirit of Truth [anhypostatic], to Jesus Christ himself who is the Truth.⁶¹

In effect theology is the rational correlate of the 'theotic' relation. That is to say it is the theological meaning of Scripture which allows the text to stand outside (ek-stasis) of itself. Therefore a proper exegesis of Scripture is open-ended grammatico-historico-theological. On the one hand one cannot do enough grammatical exegesis, for here the consistency of Biblical statements in their coherent syntactical interrelation is established.⁶²

⁵⁹CAC, II, p. 62; Reconstruction, p. 141. Cf. TS, pp. 39-40 where Torrance distinguishes between "the inner Word" of God and "the outer word" of Scripture.

⁶⁰Reconciliation, p. 138. Cf. pp. 135-136 where the Apostolate functioned only under the conditions of sin and therefore were not co-revealers with God but ambassadors in need of revelation.

⁶¹RET, p. 119; cf. p. 144; TS, p. 20.

⁶²RBET, 7/14/81.

Exegesis also takes the full historicity of the space-time incarnation into account, which in the New Testament includes, "the whole apostolic tradition in its stratified depth", as opposed to the source-critical and historical-critical depreciation of the same.⁶³ However this is not enough in itself. Torrance contends:

. . . historical inquiry into the fact of Jesus Christ must be theologico-historical, for we are confronted with a complex fact that includes its own interpretation as part of its facticity.⁶⁴

Dogmatic theology serves to control the text from above in such a way that if it is controlled by the impact of the Word of God⁶⁵ it serves,

. . . as a guide to further interpretation of the Holy Scriptures but . . . will be progressively revised and deepened in the course of that interpretive activity. It is a framework, of course, which will be organized not logically, but contrapuntally, and which will function as a transparent medium or a "disclosure model" through which we allow our understanding more and more to yield obediently to the self-revelation of God himself.⁶⁶

This Objective self-revelatory aspect of hermeneutics, however, has yet to be clarified.

Revelation is the inseparable but unconfused union of Christ with Scripture (in its theological extension) through the gracious act of the Spirit. In this capacity the double Christological aspect of kenosis and enhypostasis are emulated by the Spirit in the event of Revelation. Torrance explains:

⁶³STR, p. 10; cf. p. 14.

⁶⁴TS, p. 326; cf. RET, p. 69.

⁶⁵TS, p. 194.

⁶⁶RET, p. 117.

There is a two-fold movement from the side of the object known and from the side of the knower, and both have to be fully considered in the way from God to man and the way from man to God. These are not two separate movements, each proceeding from its own independent ground to meet the other, but one two-fold movement, for even the movement from the side of man toward God, free and spontaneous as it is, is coordinated with the movement of God toward man, and is part of the divine movement of revelation and reconciliation.⁶⁷

The Holy Spirit performs both epistemic functions for man.⁶⁸ But to be sure this is the Spirit of Christ who acts not in some charismatically spectacular way, but invisibly as self-effacing:

. . . He is not Himself the Word of that revelation or the Form which it assumes as it proceeds from God and is appropriated by man. He is the living Action and Presence of God in it all, who so relates the divine Word to the human and earthly forms which it assumed in Jesus Christ that in Him we are enabled to meet God face to face, shining in His own created Light and speaking to us personally in His own eternal Word.⁶⁹

Thus he mediates revelation through the space-time frameworks He has ordained, namely the Church both in its ancient Jewish and modern apostolic form. We have already established the indispensibility of Israel, both ancient and modern in its role as mediating the Truth of God to mankind.⁷⁰ The New Testament Church continues as a community

⁶⁷Cf. Mediation of Christ, chs. 1 and 2. Elsewhere he speaks of this double movement as revelation and creation (GR, p. 183). 'Recreation' would undoubtedly take the fundamental soteriological aspect of reconciliation more into account.

⁶⁸GGT, p. 166; GR, pp. 168, 170-171.

⁶⁹GR, p. 168; cf. p. 167; CAC, II, p. 17; SF, p. cvi.

⁷⁰Cf. subsection 4: "Relation in Jewish Perspective" above. See also Mediation of Christ, ch. 1; Israel, People of God, p. 14.

of differential reciprocity through which Christ, its head, has graciously become inseparably bound. More particularly it is the Spiritual presence of Christ in Word and sacrament which constitutes the dynamic con-temporaneity of the revelation of God. Once again the Christo-logic is operative, this time in Torrance's sacramental theology:

. . . just as in the Incarnation the Word was made flesh, so in kerygma, the same Word continues to be made flesh. That is why the kerygma and Baptism, followed by the Eucharist, always go together. In kerygma it is the Word made flesh; in the sacrament it is the Word made flesh. But apart from the Word there is no sacrament, for it is the living Word and nothing else that is made flesh (Jn. 6:63); while apart from the sacrament the kerygma as act of the living Christ does not reach its proper fulfilment.⁷¹

The spiritual presence of Christ in the sacrament is to be understood as both Eschatologically immediate and teleologically future.⁷² The same applies to theological hermeneutics. It is an ongoing process,

. . . within our human existence and history and their rational, linguistic and social structures. In this way God shuts us up, as it were, to knowledge of Him in and through the human and worldly and historical forms which His revelation has assumed and so excludes from us any possibility of non-objective knowledge. . .⁷³

This in essence legitimizes the ongoing theological tradition of the Church as semper reformanda and accounts for the theological weight Torrance puts upon the Ecumenical creeds and contemporary dialog. Nevertheless, he continues, the Spirit of Christ also encounters us in eschatological immediacy ". . . as Supreme subject, and thus in all His

⁷¹CAC, I, p. 209.

⁷²STR, p. 149; cf. "MED," pp.227-228; CAC, II, pp. 163-164.

⁷³GR, p. 184; cf. GGT, p. 138.

ultimate objectivity as Lord God."⁷⁴ In effect, the fundamentally anthropomorphic form of space-time revelation becomes truly and properly referential. The Holy Spirit,

. . . so relates the human and worldly forms of divine revelation to God Himself that they become diacoustic and diaphanous media through which God discloses Himself to us in His own Word and Reality and makes us capable of knowing Him beyond ourselves. Apart from this work of the Holy Spirit all the forms of revelation remain dark and opaque but in and through His presence they become translucent and transparent.⁷⁵

Polanyi's dictum, "We know more than we can say" is particularly appropriate.⁷⁶ Our immediate, eschato-logical relation to the Truth exceeds necessarily our ability to articulate it within the confines of created language. The two cannot be confused. This then points to the 'mystical' pole of theology--the hermeneutic Extra-Calvinisticum. Torrance outlines its importance:

Mystical theology functions as a constant corrective on the margins of our conceptualising and formalising operations by sustaining the non-formalisable, intuitive relation to God and by restraining the systematic impulse of dogmatic theology.⁷⁷

Yet by virtue of the space-time mediation of revelation by the Spirit of Christ we need not disparage the inseparable propriety of Scripture in the hermeneutic task. It is through it He chooses of Grace and not of necessity to ultimately ground theological knowledge in God.⁷⁸ The ultimate criterion of verification is the hermeneutic

⁷⁴GR, p. 184.

⁷⁵GR, p. 185.

⁷⁶Cf. Reconciliation, p. 292.

⁷⁷HL[RST], p. 140, cf. pp. 141-143; Interview 15 July 1981; SF, p. lxi.

⁷⁸TS, p. 195.

analogue of justification by grace.⁷⁹ It is beyond human control.⁸⁰ But it is radically distorted outside the circle of faith.⁸¹ As we have already intimated, theological knowledge presupposes reconciliation to the Truth. Torrance explains: "All genuine knowledge involves, cognitive union of the mind with its object, and calls for the removal of any estrangement or alienation that may obstruct or distort it."⁸² This is another way of expressing the kinetic relation of subject and object. Or again, one must be in the truth to know the truth. Differentially relational theology requires an epistemological inversion of knowing

⁷⁹Ibid, pp. 197-198; RET, p. 148; GR, p. 67; Reconstruction, pp. 269-270.

⁸⁰This exposes the fundamental 'Pelagian' orientation of the logical positivism of those like Anthony Flew who seek to vest all verification within the confines of human empirical control. See, e.g., his now classic Parable of the Gardener, in "Theology and Falsification," in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. by Anthony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 96.

⁸¹STR, p. 38. This is the persistent flaw of the sociology and psychology of religion which through phenomenal reductionism a priori is oblivious to the creative activity of the Spirit, which is the very dynamism which renders religion irreducible to the social scientific purview. Torrance writes: "Regarded . . . from the perspective of the scientific revolution, the activity of the Spirit is to be understood above all as an activity of inter-level coordination and synthesis by means of which the forms of created being are opened to higher levels which endow them with their meaning, since it is only in correlation with them that empirical events on the phenomenal level can be seen to form patterns of significant depth and intensity" (Reconciliation, p. 292).

⁸²The Mediation of Christ, pp. 34-35; cf. CTSC, pp. 90-91; TS, p. 41; SF, p. xxiv; GR, p. 179; Reconstruction, p. 142. That realist epistemology requires sanctifying reconciliation of the mind to God in Christ, see The Christian Frame of Mind, p. 11.

wherein God is known only because we are known by Him.⁸³ He creates within us the capacity to know Him. This is the capacity of faith. Clearly it has nothing to do with the subjectivist or existentialistic apprehension of God. Possibly the most appropriate definition from the human pole is intuitive apprehension in immediate conjunction with reality as a whole.⁸⁴ It is an ultimate belief emerging compulsorily out of our experience with God.

It is an ontological act of recognition and assent which cannot be further analyzed, but without which there could be no rational or scientific knowledge. Genuinely ultimate beliefs of this kind are by their nature unprovable and irrefutable, because they have to be assumed in any attempt at proof or disproof and because they involve a relation of thought to being which cannot be put into logical or demonstrable form.⁸⁵

What is explicitly stated within this context but is not always obvious elsewhere is that the intuitive or faith connection concerns the form-content connection, not the material content per se.⁸⁶ This brings us to the most perplexing question of Torrance's hermeneutic method, which has never satisfactorily been addressed for those still operating from dualist epistemological perspectives: What are the rational, publicly accessible criteria of truth by which to adjudicate whether one has indeed been faithfully established in the Truth?⁸⁷ We shall address this within

⁸³TS, pp. 131-132.

⁸⁴TS, p. 165, n. 3.

⁸⁵RET, p. 54.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 53.

⁸⁷John Atkinson argues, "Every other scientific methodology is expected to give the grounds on which its assertions can be verified and unless theological science has an adequate approach to the question of verification, the whole concept of theology as a science

the context of theological hermeneutics.

Here the heuristic power of our model may be demonstrated. From the onset we must note Torrance denies the charge of fideism.⁸⁸ This is not merely a defensive remark. It is grounded in a relational way of thinking which frames the epistemological task in a distinctive way. Religious epistemology Christocentrically informed can be rightly conceived only as a hypostatic venture in which the object of inquiry, God, and the inquiring subject are differentially united. As with the theanthropic union, man is the subordinate partner in the relation. God is said to be given in the experience of faith. He is not a projection of human consciousness. Again this is to assert the priority of realism in Torrance's approach. This givenness of God is a sheer act of grace. Its epistemic correlate is faith. It is not an active appropriation of the object by reason,⁸⁹ but a passive surrender:

. . . in faith we do not have knowledge in the usual sense, but rather knowledge in the sense of acknowledgment because the fact that God's Word has become the Word of God to us, and its actual Truth are indistinguishable. Acknowledgment is the kind of knowledge where the driving power lies not in the knower himself but in the determination of what is known, namely God's own Person, in the self-imposition of Truth that is Real in itself. This knowledge is one in which we surrender ourselves to the Word and to its power of disposal and

seems to be called in question" ("Theological Method of T. F. Torrance," p. 256). Cf. p. 205. N. H. G. Robinson pejoratively identifies Torrance's concept of faith as "brainwashing" ("Barth or Bultmann?," Religious Studies 14 [September 1978]: 283). Donald Klinefelter accuses Torrance of "a sophisticated Barthian fideism" ("God and Rationality," p. 128).

⁸⁸Cf. STR, p. 38; RET, p. 54.

⁸⁹TS, p. 76.

qualification.⁹⁰

This is comparable to Polanyi's intuitive knowledge in proximal union with its object. Within religious epistemology, as we have seen, it is the Spirit of Christ who mediates Christ to us. The elimination of this primary aspect of hypostatic hermeneutics is tantamount to blasphemy of the Holy Spirit.⁹¹

Obviously the sort of apodictic verification which Torrance's critics (and the logical positivists) seek is in principle excluded. It proves as Medieval as Thomas's co-operating grace, which in effect is self-contradictory, for it renders synergistic that which qua grace can only properly be monergistic. In effect Torrance is one of the few whom the epistemological implications of the Reformation has ever reached. To seek human criterion for verification of the Truth of God given graciously to man through the Spirit is as medieval as to add co-operating grace to the operating grace of God. The call for apodicticity from man's side apart from the apodictic apprehension of God by man in Christ is to seek the intrinsic infusion of veracity into human categories. This, Torrance cites, is frequently the inappropriate, anthropocentric interpretation of Spiritual illumination.⁹²

We must not too easily forget that the object of theological knowledge is God who is inherently and consequently revealed to us in Jesus Christ. This is a statement of faith, which cannot be made apart from the Holy Spirit.

⁹⁰"Place and Function of Reason in Christian Theology," p. 37.

⁹¹A charge Torrance levels against fundamentalism (RBET, 7/15/81). Cf. Reconstruction, p. 256.

⁹²RBET, 6/29/81, 7/9/81, 7/14/81. Cf. "Imago Dei as Interpersonal" in subsection 6 above.

It is a positive rather than an abstract statement which already distances itself from the comparative religions dialog. Such a dialog would be essentially apologetic. Torrance, however, conceives of theological epistemology, in the first instance, as evangelistic.⁹³ This is but another way of stressing there is no revelation of God apart from reconciliation. Or, in alternative terms, revelation is primordially special revelation, i.e., revelation from above.

We have to this point only spoken of the primary pole of hypostatic hermeneutics. The critics essentially stop here and thus miss the epistemological power and utility of his Christologic.

Revelation is not merely revelation of God but revelation for man. Or in Polanyi's terms, it has a from-to structure, a proximal and a distal pole. Epistemology, no less than ontology, is relational. But it is differentially relational. Thus in and of itself, any attempt to know God is empty, anhypostatic. We need merely mention the woeful failings of philosophical theology in abstraction from an identifiable personal object of investigation. It is tantamount to the Athenian 'unknown God'. However, within the circle of faith, i.e., in reconciled reunion to God in Christ, there is to be found understanding. Torrance thus reinterprets Augustine and Anselm's, 'I believe in order that I might understand':⁹⁴ the faith-reason dialectic has been transposed into an inseparably inconfused relationship. We properly understand God not by somehow confining him within the bounds of (N.B. the receptacle connotation) our comprehending grasp but by holistically apprehending him

⁹³RBET, 7/17/81.

⁹⁴Belief in Science and in Christian Life, p. 5; STR, p. 20.

such that his mysterious transcendent reality is not reduced to something less. Torrance continues:

. . . it does not follow from the fact that we are unable to give a precise conceptual definition of the reality of God that it cannot be conceptually grasped but may only be envisaged in some indefinite, non-conceptual way. Conception of God involves a differential relation within it in accordance with the nature of the divine and of the human pole. We know God or rather, as St. Paul put it, are known by God. We know God only in that we are seized by His reality. It is in response to that divine grasping of us that our human grasping of Him takes place, in functional dependence upon Him, as an act of 'under-standing.'⁹⁵

With the help of our durational model we recognize that whereas the intuitive or proximal pole of theological epistemology is already eschatologically fulfilled in Christ, the understanding or distal pole is in teleological development in anticipation of the union of 'knowing even as also we are known.' The heuristic value of this insight is enormous. It solves the perplexing questions of the continuity of the true Church through heresy, the validity of infant baptism in the absence of an articulate confession of faith, and the possibility of ecumenical relations despite conflicting theological stances.

The Church is eschatologically already complete in Christ while suffering under the teleological conditions of nomistic time, both progressively and regressively. Eschatologically it knows more than teleologically it can ever express. That is to say, eschatologically in Christ it knows all things while teleologically it may in fact articulate nothing. Its works of knowledge are in no way a precondition of its eschatological Faith. This is why despite Torrance's critique of Roman sacramental theology he affirms the validity of its baptism by virtue of its

⁹⁵GR, p. 22.

Christian administration in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.⁹⁶

This bi-temporal epistemology even goes so far as to predict theological disagreement, for it is the same Church already risen in Christ which retrogressively continues to live as a militant servant within the conditions of sin. In Torrance's words:

The Church militant is still under the cross and it belongs to its life and mission to work out analogically in itself what happened in Christ for the Church, to fill up in its body that which is eschatologically in arrears of the sufferings of Christ and so to fulfil the Word of God.⁹⁷

As such it is plagued by a certain degree of ambiguity: "(N)on-theological factors deriving from this or that passing phase of culture. . . introduce interpretive aberrations."⁹⁸ Yet prospectively, because of its relational conjunction with Christ this ambiguity is alien to its constitution, and so it is called ". . . to live out reconciliation within the conditions of fallen human existence."⁹⁹ This lies at the heart of Torrance's continual active concern for the unity of the Church. This of course includes theological unity:

There can . . . be no fruitful discussion of the form of the Church as the Body of Christ in history which is divorced from the dogmatic form of the Church. Through the Word of God the Mind of the Spirit gives the Church conformity, in its growth into truth, with the Mind of Christ The relation between the dogmatic and the ecclesiastical forms of the Church, the inner form

⁹⁶Cf. WCCCA, p. 104. Of course the heirs of Anabaptism, whether directly or in principle, are the rare exception to this universal recognition.

⁹⁷CAC, I, p. 250; cf. RP, pp. 56-57.

⁹⁸HL[RST], 6 p. 135.

⁹⁹STR, p. 99; cf. CAC, I, p. 270.

and the outer form, as it were, must be thought out, not in static terms, but in dynamic terms of growth into the fulness of Christ. And growth must be thought out and be expounded not only in terms of teleological development but in terms of eschatological fulfilment, for the growth cannot be formulated in terms of a biological organism but in terms of the death and resurrection of Christ.¹⁰⁰

Within the community of faith, understanding may be fully operative though never usurping the lordship of faith. Such mutiny is tantamount to the alienation of objectivity. Once again Kierkegaard and Polanyi's stress upon knowledge as personally engaging though not subjectively generated must be appreciated. There is no absolute, neutral human vantage point from which God may be known. Man knows Him only as the Man Jesus Christ knows Him. By declaring that the ultimate criterion of truth is the reality itself, the way of Christ is the way of Truth. Torrance's Christological criterion pervades his theology. It is not too much to say that the unanimous criterion of his entire rational, teleological argument rests upon the analogical propriety of the consensus of Nicea and Chalcedon (as he has distinctively understood it) to Christ. For criticism to wield any internal force, it must devolve from this point.

We apply this criterion to both the monistic and dualistic revelational camps with the following results. The fundamentalist tendency is to confuse the Word of God with Scripture. To do so is to wander into an Apollinarian view of revelation in which the Divine mind of Christ usurps the place of the fully human, depraved mind of man. That is to say, the human rationality of Scripture is replaced with the Divine rationality/Logos of Christ. Such a heterodox construction vests Scripture with intrinsic rather than enhypostatic holiness. The importance of inerrancy then as

¹⁰⁰CAC, I, p. 235.

the ultimate criterion of revelation becomes obvious, for the Divine, a priori, cannot contradict the Truth of His own Being. Bibliolatry becomes unavoidable. Hermeneutically this results in the overbearing importance of the literal historico-grammatical method frequently in oblivion to the theological consequences, the current discussion being a case in point: despite the universal judgment of the Church the theological charge of Apollinarianism will leave most fundamentalists undaunted in their empiricistic ways.

To the other extreme the liberal doctrine of Scripture accepts an essentially Nestorian perspective such that no hypostatic union between Christ and Scripture is ever affirmed. As such Scripture is never more than purely anhypostatic cultural accretions through history. If revelation is to be argued for it must come from below as the humanity of Scripture is but a symbolic medium one may use but finally jettison to existentially encounter God. Demythologization becomes the hermeneutic watchword.

We turn now, briefly, to examine the positive impact of differential, dynamic hermeneutics within various dogmatic loci.

CHAPTER VI

DURATION AND DOGMATICS

I know that I have laid myself open to the charge of imposing a meaning upon the text rather than extracting its meaning from it, and that my method implies this. My reply is that, if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth.' The relation between such a God and such a man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy.

--Karl Barth
The Epistle to the Romans

If our model is at all appropriate, Torrance insists, it must be apposite and adequate to the objective ground it purports to disclose. To accomplish this we must subject our model to the reality itself. Such a test of truth, he suggests,

. . . can be described in various ways, as the applicability of a model to the real world, which in some sciences is empirically verifiable in determinate ways, or as the persistent relevance of an analogue to the nature of the reality into which we inquire, as we experience it or intuit it with increasing understanding through the analogue, or as the fertility of a theory in throwing light upon a set of stubborn problems and at the same time revealing new facts, but in whatever form

it may be stated it is the discovery of a far-reaching rationality in the nature of things which we are forced to distinguish from our knowing of it, and to which we give authority in working our conception of it.¹

In the final analysis, our model is appropriate to a greater or lesser degree to the extent that it is, ". . . a heuristic instrument in opening up new avenues of knowledge which could not otherwise be anticipated, and as an interpretive frame of thought to cope with a wider range of elements not originally in view."² We shall now undertake that test.

18. Dynamic Christocentric Predestination

From the very onset we observe theology proper cannot be divorced from Christ and as such it is inherently dynamic. Torrance writes:

If Jesus Christ is the one place in space and time where we may really know the Father, then God the Father made known to us through him cannot be some static, immutable, impassible Deity utterly remote from us, but the dynamic, living God, whose Being is inherently in his Word and Act and whose Word and Act are inherent in the unity of his Being, and who has locked himself with us in our being and destiny in Jesus Christ our Brother.³

The acts of God therefore are revealed in Christ and though as the Extra-Calvinisticum has taught us, not reducible to His earthly sojourn, nonetheless relationally inseparable and fully consistent with who He is in His space-time presence. There is, therefore, for Torrance,

¹TS, p. 242; cf. pp. 252, 255-256; STR, pp. 5-6; Juridical Law and Physical Law, p. 48.

²STR, p. 15.

³GGT, pp. 40-41; cf. The Incarnation, pp. xx; STR, pp. 67-68, 81, 178.

but one decree of God:

. . . God is not one thing in Christ and another thing in himself. He has not shown us one face in Jesus Christ but kept his real face hidden from us behind the inscrutability of his ultimate unknowableness.⁴

In 1941 he criticizes Calvin for treating Christ as the instrument and the author of election but not the ground of election--for allowing a dualistic wedge between the inscrutable arcanum consilium of God's will and the redemptive existence of Christ:

The position of the traditional [Augustinian-Calvinistic] doctrine here implies that there is a higher fact than Grace, and therefore Christ does not fully go bail for God.⁵

As we have already seen, creation and covenant, providence and predestination are inseparable manifestations of the Grace of God. And the Grace of God is the concrete universal, Jesus Christ. As Divine, He is the elector; as human he is the elected. The latter proves especially offensive to the scholastic Calvinists, but to reject this thesis proves ultimately disastrous as it introduces the monophysite circumvention of the homoousion discussed earlier (see Matrix 2 above). Christ Jesus no longer serves as the sole mediator between God and man. He is merely a man among men, an ebionite rabbi of exceptional insight. The implication is that there is an alternative, immediate way of salvation other than through Christ the second Adam,

⁴Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii; cf. "Universalism or Election?," Scottish Journal of Theology 2 (1949): 315. For his critique of the dualism inherent in the Westminster Confession re: the separation of creation from redemption, i.e., the covenant of works from the covenant of grace, see SF, pp. liv-lv, lxxix.

⁵"PC," pp. 109-110. By 1959 he apparently retracts this charge against Calvin (SF, p. lxxvii), but the thrust of the argument remains apropos for Scholastic Calvinism.

the concrete universal focus of all humanity. This courts soteriological disaster. The bifurcation of the will of God into secret and revealed, decretive and preceptive, and therefore ultimately Theology from Christology, implicitly lies behind Torrance's charge of bi-theism⁶ and Nestorianism.⁷

What Torrance so effectively demonstrates and our model graphically enhances is, there can be no orthodox theological traffic which does not pass exclusively through the homousion--". . . the ontological and epistemological linchpin of Christian theology. With it, everything hangs together; without it, everything falls apart."⁸

Having established election as a dynamic dogma, solo Christo, some dramatic categorial changes are necessarily introduced into the discussion. As our analysis of dynamic interaction revealed, relational theology requires the substitution of actual necessity for logical necessity, open extra-systemic reasons for closed, intra-systemic causes. Torrance elaborates:

The confusion of temporal with logical connection corresponds here to that between spontaneity and causal determinism in natural science. We can see this error recurring, for example, in notions of predestination where the free prius of the divine grace is converted by the scholastic mind into logico-causal relation, while the kind of time relation with which we operate between natural events is imported into the movements of divine love and activity.⁹

That is to say, to conceive of predestination as the logical precondition of salvation is to introduce the

⁶"PC," p. 110; cf. CD II, 2, 33, p. 111 for a similar charge levelled by Barth.

⁷CTSC, p. 129.

⁸GGT, pp. 160-161; cf. pp. 39-40.

⁹STR, p. 92.

dual category mistakes of confusing a posteriori actual necessity with a priori causal necessity and eternity with time. Torrance applauds Calvin in his final, 1559, Institutes for maintaining predestination in its Scriptural form as an eschatological reflection of election and reprobation rather than a logico-theological precondition.¹⁰

Positively, Torrance defines election or predestination as,

. . . the free sovereign decision and utterly contingent act of God's Love in pure liberality or unconditional Grace whether in creation or in redemption. As such it is neither arbitrary nor necessary, for it flows freely from an ultimate reason or purpose in the invariant Love of God and is entirely unconditioned by any necessity, whether of being or knowledge or will, in God and entirely unconstrained and unmotivated by anything whatsoever beyond himself.¹¹

Here predestination is to be strictly understood as the priority of God's Grace in Jesus Christ. God's dealings with man are preeminently personal.¹² As we have seen, the archetype of relation, be it in its Christological or Theological form is quintessentially the interpersonal communion of love. It is the impersonalization of relation which eventuates in the deterministic understanding of election. It is only as personal intervention of Christ into our space-time existence that election becomes fully dynamic. Torrance explains:

. . . God encounters us personally in Christ through the Word. Just because He comes to us with and through the Word, it means that He has come not to manipulate human beings, but to bring them to decision. God has not come

¹⁰Review of Reformed Dogmatics, Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, by Heinrich Heppe, p. 83; cf. CAC, I, pp. 91-92.

¹¹CTSC, p. 126.

¹²"PC," p. 112.

to elect stocks and stones but to elect human beings and to do it in such a way that He brings their whole being under the sovereignty of His Word, that He makes them responsible, and so for the first time truly personal.¹³

He borrows Luther's distinction between divine free-will (arbitrium) and human volition (voluntas) to establish a differential understanding of man's response to God's electing love in Jesus Christ. In sum, man's freedom toward God is anhypostatic until enhypostatically assumed by Grace into the Divine will of God.¹⁴ Once again, man's penultimate decision is ultimately decisive only as the freedom of man in Jesus Christ toward God.

The 'pre-' of predestination, therefore, is not a causal antecedent preceding grace but rather is,

. . . intended to make the point that the Grace by which we are saved is grounded in the inner Life of God himself, and that we are saved by the Grace of God alone. Predestination means therefore that no matter what a man thinks or does he cannot constitute himself a being under Grace, he cannot constitute himself a man loved by God, for he is that already.¹⁵

It is when predestination is cast into logical and temporal categories that it imports the deterministic dualism of limited atonement vs. universal salvation. This is the point which critics within the Augustinian-Calvinistic tradition will undoubtedly miss. It is only within this categorial framework that the either/or dilemma arises. The hierarchical differential of grace is reduced to one dimension. In Goedel's terms the imposition of such logical

¹³"PC," p. 112, cf. pp. 115, 116-117; STR, p. 92. For the Trinitary implications of impersonal determinism see Reconstruction, p. 187.

¹⁴"PC," pp. 120-121; 136, n. 45.

¹⁵CTSC, pp. 128-129; cf. "PC," p. 115; DGAF, p. 106; "Theology and Science. Dogmatics the Key to Church Unity," p. 6, col. 4.

completion renders it inconsistent. In this context the Grace of God is inconsistently bifurcated into the benevolence of God's electing Love and the malevolence of His reprobation. Grace is no longer grace. Torrance develops this at length:

. . .by reading back . . . into God temporal, causal and logical relations from our experience in this world, Calvinism was forced to connect the relative apparent distinctions between the believing and unbelieving, the obedient and disobedient, to the absolute decree of God. Hence predestination had to be construed . . . into the double form of 'election' and 'reprobation.' This entailed, however, a duality in God himself, an ultimate 'Yes' and ultimate 'No', which could not be explained away by claiming, as was often done, that the 'No' of reprobation was only a 'passing over' of some people rather than a deliberate damnation of them. At this point Calvinism is trapped in its own logic. . . . But to construe that in terms of necessary logical connections is to convert grace into something quite other than it is, for it would imply, for example, that there is not a free contingent relation between the self-giving of Christ for us on the cross and our salvation, but a logico-causal relation. It is on the basis of just a logico-causal understanding of divine Grace and the twin errors of 'limited atonement' and 'universalism' arise. Thus it is argued, a posteriori, that if as a matter of fact some people believe in Christ and are saved and others reject Christ and are damned, then Christ must have died only for the believing and not for the unbelieving. But it is also argued, a priori, that if Christ died for all people, then all people must be and will be saved. But of course if we had to depend on a logical relation between the death of Jesus and the forgiveness of our sins, we would all be unforgiven whether we believe or not.¹⁶

Torrance will not be reduced to this Calvinistic problematic. To force such closure is to violate the differential hierarchy of his thought, which in the final analysis is to confuse the contingent temporal humanity of Christ with the gracious eternal Word.

¹⁶CTSC, pp. 130-131; cf. p. 84; "PC," p. 114; "Universalism or Election?," p. 317.

Torrance is no universalist. His refusal to derive reprobation from the eternal decree of God is not a denial of the actuality of damnation. Both evil and hell are real,¹⁷ but ultimately, with Calvin, there is no logical explanation for them.¹⁸ It is a surd, which in principle cannot be explained for it is the very antithesis of God's Grace.¹⁹

Because Jesus Christ is both the "Elect One" and the "Electing one", the "Chosen Man" and the "Choosing God",²⁰ election is inseparable from the space-time act of God in the incarnate life of Christ. It is therefore because of the ascension rather than the secret will of God that election is veiled from our eyes. Here Calvin's emphasis upon predestination as essentially an eschatological event proves hermeneutically invaluable.²¹ Torrance argues:

. . . Calvin's conception of the arcanum consilium that lies behind and above predestination is to be understood in terms of the ascension, which means that Christ as Cause of our election transcends our reason and suspends our full understanding until He comes again, and yet insists that we must lift up our minds to meditate upon His heavenly glory and advent. . . . The conjunction of eschatology with predestination means that eternal election is more to be wondered at than expressed. . . .

¹⁷Torrance refers to evil as not a privation of the good but as "anti-being", 'improperly existent', or in Barth's terms, "impossible possibility" (DCO, p. 119). For the temporality of hell, see AT, p. 171.

¹⁸CTSC, p. 131. SF, pp. lxxvii-lxxviii.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. cxiv-cxv.

²⁰T. F. Torrance, "The Continuous Union in the Historical Life and Obedience of Jesus," [pre-1974]. (Mimeographed), p. 5.

²¹Here Torrance refers to Institutes 3.22.6 in which Jacob's election as primogenitor was an earthly symbol of his heavenly inheritance in the age to come as one engrafted into Christ (KC, p. 107, n. 3).

The school of meditation upon the future life and the resurrection is the only place where we may learn to speak properly about election.²²

Merely a casual glance at Calvin's 1559 Institutes will reveal election appears within his soteriology (Book III) rather than his theology proper (Book I). For him soteriology cannot be understood apart from eschatology. But the designation 'eschatology' must be understood in the differential or contrapuntal sense rather than in the linear sense. Thus eschatology is not a residual dogma reserved for the last chapter, but rather pervades his entire theology. Calvin anticipates the bi-temporal, eschatological-teleological function of our duration model. Having borrowed this bi-polar eschatology from Martin Butzer, he conceived of predestination functioning in what we have identified as the role of eschatology in the narrow sense, i.e., the priority of the finished work of Christ concealed by virtue of the resurrection. By eschatology he intended what we have designated linear teleology anticipatory of the historical Parousia at the end of our time. Torrance comments:

The eschatological relation between predestination and post-destination, the prius and the posterius of our salvation, he [Calvin] saw in the essentially historical perspective of the two ages, the old world and the world to come or, as he calls it too, the renovated world, but like the New Testament he thinks of these two worlds as overlapping. Commenting on Hebrews 2.6 he wrote: 'Here the world to come is not that which we hope for after the resurrection, but that which began at the beginning of Christ's Kingdom, though it will no doubt have its full accomplishment in our final redemption.' That is, Calvin held the eschatological relation to involve not only the relation between the past and the future, between predestination and the last things, but also a relation in the present between the new world and the old, for the last days have already overtaken the Church so that it lives even now in the new world. Regnum

²²KC, pp. 107-108.

Christi inauguratum est.²³

The dogmatic consequence of dynamic Christocentric election is that election is a relational category. We do not possess it for it is not ours to possess. It is only by virtue of Christ's redemptive assumption of our sinful humanity as the one, prefigured in Israel,²⁴ to be the elect of God and our 'theotic' incorporation into that act by the Grace of the Spirit of Christ that we have any claim upon election.

Clearly the burden has shifted from the extremes of either a deterministic or even fatalistic theological understanding of election or from a subjectivistic anthropocentric understanding to a Christocentric differential-relational understanding in which Christ becomes the manifest affirmation of election.

That the Scriptural doctrine of election or predestination is replete with relational language is beyond dispute. The most uncontestable passage is Ephesians 1:3-14:

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, even chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before him. He destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of his glorious grace which he freely bestowed on us in the Beloved. In him we have redemption through his blood, For he has made known to us all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite

²³"ER," p. 57.

²⁴Cf. CAC, I, pp. 294-295; Reconstruction, p. 197; "The Continuous Union in the Historical Life and Obedience of Jesus," p. 3. For the place of Israel as the elect of God throughout history see "Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," pp. 85, 89-90, 94-96; Israel, People of God, pp. 10-13, 15.

all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth. In him, according to the purpose of him who accomplishes all things according to the counsel of his will, we who first hoped in Christ have been destined and appointed to live for the praise of his glory. In him you also, who have heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation, and have believed in him, were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit, which is the guarantee of our inheritance until we acquire possession of it, to the praise of his glory.²⁵

Having exposed the dynamic relational differential of Torrance's thought we have gained heuristic access not only to his theology but derivatively, though of primary importance, to a tool for disclosing the Christo-logic of the Biblical text. We cannot help but be in his debt for such theological insight.

19. Atonement from the Perspective of Differential Relation

Seldom outside the confines of Dispensational Theology does a Protestant theologian find such an integral place for the ongoing importance of Israel within the redemptive purposes of God as does Torrance. As an ecumenist with Judeo-Christian catholicity in mind one might see this as fundamentally a political gesture. However on a few recent occasions he has afforded Israel an ongoing theological position right in the center of the doctrine of the atonement.

In his exposition of Yom Kippur (Lev. 16) he writes:

Two goats were taken from the flock and presented before the Lord for a sin offering. One goat was killed and offered in holocaust on the altar as an atoning sacrifice for the people of Israel in expiation of their sins, and its blood was sprinkled before the propitia-

²⁵RSV. For Torrance's exegesis of the potter-clay motif of Romans 9 as the election of the vessel, Israel, rather than the Gentile Church or individuals in particular see "Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 88.

tory or mercy-seat of the divine presence, but it was also an act in atoning consecration of the very holy place itself. The other goat was made a living sacrifice. The high priest laid his hand on it, confessing over it all the iniquities, transgressions and sins of Israel, and then sent it away in utter rejection into the wilderness and released alive as a 'scapegoat' bearing and bearing away the guilt of the people. Each half of the mysterious ritual was incomplete without the other. How much Israel had to learn from the fact that both sacrifices were required, the sacrifice by blood and the living sacrifice, in liturgical witness to an atonement for sin which God himself alone could provide.²⁶

If one were to underplay the liturgical and therefore Eschatological reference in this statement he might very easily suspect a heterodox doctrine of atonement. From a dualistic perspective Torrance appears to admit two ways of salvation, which in the most charitable light might be construed as complementary. The sole, final sufficiency of the atoning work of Christ would be lost. Torrance would have violated his own Christological criterion.

However, as we bring our disclosure model to bear upon this statement, its liturgical, i.e., its differential, referential subordination to Christ is unmistakable. Jesus Christ is the archetype of Yom Kippur. As the bi-durational fullness of Time we would expect this same bi-temporality to be reflected in the atonement. This I believe informs Torrance's sometimes ambiguous exposition, and clarifies something which heretofore we have left undeveloped: the relation of Israel to the New Testament Church.

The archetypal analogue to the scapegoat is Christ the living sacrifice, the suffering servant in his teleological exinanition from the event of his birth to the Cross:

²⁶Ibid., p. 99, emphasis mine; cf. Mediation of Christ, pp. 45-46.

. . . from his baptism in the river Jordan and his struggle with the evil one in the wilderness to his lonely death upon the Cross, the Lamb of God bore and bore away the sin of the world and the curses of its guilt, ridiculed and disowned by his brethren, the outcast of humanity.²⁷

The Word becoming flesh was not merely an ontological conjunction but an historical act. In his unpublished lectures Torrance equates this with the Biblical goel--kinsman redeemer--the Word made flesh assuming our very humanity in hypostatic union with God. Hence the prophetic office of Christ appears as, ". . . Redeemer in Word and Act, as our Advocate who not only gives to God an account for us but stands in for us taking our cause upon Himself completely."²⁸ This, in Torrance's judgment, embraces the historical strands of incarnational atonement (e.g., Clement of Alexandria) and subjective atonement (e.g., Abelard or Socinius).

The archetypal object of the sacrificial lamb is Christ the Lamb of God who gathers man's tangled existence into reconciled relation with God: "The one Mediator between man and God, [through] an act of sacrifice in blood perfected [atoning reconciliation] once and for all at Calvary . . ."²⁹ This in effect is the passive obedience of Christ, who is both priest and victim. Biblically this is intimated by the priestly liturgy of kippur and its blood atonement. Its archetype is found in the priestly office of Christ, ". . . in which He offered atoning sacrifice for us and reconciled us to the Father through removing the objective obstacle of guilt between us. That is both a

²⁷"Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 100.

²⁸"The Threefold Office of Christ," [pre-1974]. (Mimerographed), p. 1; cf. SF, p. lxxxviii.

²⁹"Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 100.

priestly and a forensic act."³⁰ This incorporates the cultic-forensic atonement theories throughout history as per Anselm and Tertullian respectively.³¹

There is, however, a third aspect to the atonement which has no analogue in the liturgy of Yom Kippur. It is the active obedience of Christ, which Torrance identifies with the Biblical padah--". . . the act of the King the mighty arm of the Lord, rescuing us from the alien dominion of sin and evil and taking us into the Kingdom of God."³² Here the resurrection motif is most visible: ". . . it is with his exaltation to the throne of God and his sitting at the right hand of the Father that his kingly ministry properly began. It stretches from ascension to final advent . . ."³³ From our terrestrial perspective, therefore, this reflects the atonement in its eschatological perspective. Within the history of doctrinal discussion this is reflected in the Christus Victor concept identified by Gustaf Aulén.³⁴

Torrance summarizes the three aspects of atonement:

Now in the nature of the case, while all these aspects of the ministry of Christ, and all aspects of His redeeming activity, are interwoven and cannot be separated out from each other, the emphasis falls distinctly at certain places. The Goel-redemption is clearly linked with His life and ministry as the Word

³⁰"The Threefold Office of Christ in Atonement," p. 1; cf. SF, lxxxvii.

³¹"Historical Emphasis in the Doctrine of Atonement," p. 1.

³²"The Threefold Office of Christ in Atonement," p. 1. Cf. SF, lxxxvii.

³³STR, p. 106.

³⁴"Historical Emphasis in the Doctrine of Atonement," [pre-1974]. (Mimeographed), p. 1. See Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement, trans. A. G. Hebert, forward Jaroslav Pelikan (New York: Macmillan, 1969 [1931]).

made Flesh, the Son of God become man, that is in His life and work leading up to the Cross, . . . The Padah-redemption is clearly emphasized in His mighty act in breaking the power of sin in the death and resurrection and in His triumph over all the principalities and powers of evil, in His ascension to fill all things with His power as Lamb of God, and so to take up His Kingdom and reign through the Gospel. That stress falls mostly upon what follows the Cross, the resurrection, ascension, heavenly intercession and Parousia all of which have emphatically to do with the Kingly ministry of Christ. But between these two we have Kipper-redemption stressed which corresponds to the work of Christ as Priest and as Judge, but a priest who is a sacrificial Victim,³⁵ and a Judge who takes His place among us as judged.³⁵

Incidentally our model suggests, per the Extra-Calvinisticum, that the atonement ultimately lies within the field of the Eternal decree of the Grace of God in Jesus Christ--the sacrificial Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.³⁶

In our understanding of relativity theory we have come to appreciate the relativity of simultaneity--the time of events in one time frame may vary greatly from the time of the same events in another. In a striking way, it is possible to say the resurrection has yet to occur for Israel. By and large for Israel, the elect of God, the continuation of their role as scapegoat antedates the Cross. Cullmann argues Judaistic eschatology, in contrast to Christian, places the mid-point of time as separating the present and the coming age, i.e., the Messianic age and its concomitant salvation initiated at the Parousia.³⁷ It would seem for Torrance the relativity of simultaneity in essence renders this time reckoning valid from Israel's

³⁵"The Threefold Office of Christ in Atonement," pp. 1-2. Cf. STR, p. 106.

³⁶Cf. AT, p. 103; RBET, 7/14/81.

³⁷Christ and Time, pp. 81-83.

perspective and thus accounts for its inescapable suffering as the Elect of God, the incarnate Seed of which Christ is the quintessence.

Torrance differentiates the mission of the one Church³⁸ in its double identity as follows:

The Christian Church went out into history from the resurrection sides of the Cross as the Church of the Lamb of God who has been slain but is now very much alive, with the message of universal salvation and reconciliation and the promise of a new humanity in the triumph of the Kingdom of Christ over all nations. The Jewish Church went out into history from the shadow side of the Cross to be scattered among the peoples and nations of mankind, where Jews were despised and rejected of men, the butt of the taunts, the scapegoat for all their ills, bearing mute and unwilling witness to the antagonism of man to God and thereby to the ineradicable reality of God for mankind.³⁹

Thus, in effect, the Christian Church lives in light of the reality of the eschaton, while the Jewish Church lives in teleological anticipation of it. This is not to suggest that Torrance subscribes to a view of the Christian Church as triumphant.⁴⁰ However through the Spirit it is given to live sacramentally in the fullness of the Presence of Christ.⁴¹

In the final analysis the atonement must be interpreted eschatologically: Eschatologically as fully realized in the shed blood of the Passover Lamb of the New Covenant and teleologically as the Exodus into the wilderness of humble service. For Torrance, the atonement is inseparable from ecclesiology:

³⁸SF, p. cxx.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰RP, pp. 56-57.

⁴¹Reconciliation, p. 135; CAC, II, p. 187.

. . . because the Church is already sacramentally incorporate with the Risen Body of Christ but still waiting herself for the redemption of the body, it is the function of the Church to live out the reconciliation or atonement of Christ in the world--that is, to be in the flesh the bodily instrument of God's crucial intervention, the sphere in which the great reconciliation already wrought out in the Body of Christ realized among men, so that the life and action of the Church militant become sacramentally correlative to the life and passion of Jesus Christ, the Suffering Servant.⁴²

The implication here is that the New Testament Church, not just Israel, participates in the humiliation of Christ, but as such, we suggest, in an antepenultimate sense, as branch to stump to root.⁴³

Torrance's intuitive commitment to the unity of reality, and in this instance, the unity of the Church has led him to discover the significance of Israel in its ongoing role in the Kingdom of God to declare to the world that, ". . . the Jesus of Calvary is still the despised and rejected of men."⁴⁴ He who entered into the utter sinfulness of our humanity, suffered the holocaust of God-forsaken alienation, without which atonement would be but partial. Through the use of our disclosure model we have been able to establish its dynamic Christological consistency embedded within his larger outline of atonement. The ostensive anomaly which appeared to jeopardize the very Christocentric core of his thought has proven benignly compatible after all.

⁴²CAC, I, p. 220; cf. pp. 81, 235, 250, 270-271; Reconciliation, pp. 15-16; RP, pp. 99-100; STR, p. 99; "Liturgy and Apocalypse," Church Service Society Annual 24(1954): 6.

⁴³T. F. Torrance, review of Le Problème Oecumenique, by Bernard Lambert, Scottish Journal of Theology 16 (1963): 104; Reconstruction, p. 193.

⁴⁴"Divine Vocation and Destiny of Israel," p. 100.

20. Justification-Sanctification in
eschatological Relation

Torrance's view of justification proves unintelligible from a dualistic perspective, for it appears to leave the individual out of the picture.⁴⁵ It is only by fully appreciating the concrete universality of the homousion and thus our intra-personal solidarity with Christ that one will ever be able to surmount the crypto-Catholic, synergistic implications inherent in any dualist approach. We shall not rehearse our exposition of unitary thought, for by now it should be clear that Jesus Christ is, in Torrance's words, both ". . . the embodiment of God's justifying act . . . [and] the embodiment of our human appropriation of it."⁴⁶ That is to say, Jesus Christ is the ground of both objective and subjective justification. He not only has fulfilled the divine requirements but He has also fulfilled the human. "He was the Word of God brought to bear upon man, but he was also man hearing that Word, answering it, trusting it, living it--by faith."⁴⁷

He patterns his understanding of objective justification in the same way that he did the atonement--in terms of the active and passive obedience of Christ in which he completely fulfilled the will of God and suffered the judgment upon our sin. Thus Christ imputed to us his active righteousness along with pardoning our sin.⁴⁸ Torrance contends it is our actual sin which is forgiven and sup-

⁴⁵Cf. David Atkinson's critique which evinces this problem ("The Theological Method of T.F. Torrance," p. 229).

⁴⁶Reconstruction, p. 157.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 155.

planted by His righteousness. It is our original sin which is justified in his ontological union with our humanity in the incarnation. That is but to say objective justification entails sanctification.⁴⁹ Justification and sanctification are inseparable though distinct. Thus the very foundation of the Christian life is in the final analysis inseparable from the perfect life of Christ.⁵⁰

The problem therefore of the believer's participation in Christ's justification is solved once again through the pneumatological theosis--the Spirit ek-statically relating us to Christ. Torrance summarizes:

Through union with him we share in his faith, in his obedience, in his trust and his appropriation of the Father's blessing; we share in his justification before God. Therefore when we are justified by faith, this does not mean that it is our faith that justifies us, far from it--it is the faith of Christ alone that justifies us, but we in faith flee from our own acts even of repentance, confession, trust and response, and take refuge in the obedience and faithfulness of Christ--'Lord I believe, help thou mine unbelief.'

. . . . Justification has been fulfilled subjectively as well as objectively in Jesus Christ, but that objective and subjective justification is objective to us. It is freely imputed to us by grace objectively and we through the Spirit share in its subjectivity as we are united to Christ.⁵¹

It goes without saying, the believer still lives in the interim between the ascension and Parousia of Christ and is subject to the conditions of fallen time. Does Torrance provide for this ongoing, teleological aspect of the life of

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 155-156.

⁵⁰This accounts for the ostensibly curious feature from the standpoint of Reformation theology of the primacy of regeneration to justification in Calvin's Institutes. Justification must be grounded in ontology, i.e., the homousion (GR, pp. 64-65). Cf. Reconstruction, p. 156.

⁵¹Reconstruction, pp. 159-160.

the Christian? Our disclosure model suggests that justification in Christ must be conceived as eschatologically complete but teleologically unfolding. Torrance directs us to Calvin for such an understanding. "Sanctification is not a response of man that must be added to justification, but it is the continual renewing and re-enacting in the believer of a justification that is once and for all."⁵² The Christian life therefore does not evolve or progress but processes in terms of apocalyptic growth through the Spirit,⁵³ looking out of ourselves to the righteousness of Christ. Koinonia, Torrance asserts, reflects this growth:

"Participation means to share in another, to have one's life in another. That does not imply absorption or loss of self-identity, but it means such a sharing in the life of another that it determines our innermost life."⁵⁴

Christ's justification calls our sanctification into question. Thus justification Christocentrically conceived puts to rest all personal, subjective piety. All works are in principle anhypostatic and therefore of no intrinsic merit.⁵⁵ Their benefit to the Church resides exclusively in their enhypostatic incorporation by the Spirit of Christ into contrapuntal harmony with the Kingdom of God. This pneumatological event is wholly unconditioned by human initiative, controlled from above. Another way of expressing the same thing is the ethical indicative is differen-

⁵²CAC, I, pp. 65-66; cf. p. 55; T. F. Torrance, "The Mediation of Christ," class discussion, 7/6/81.

⁵³Cf. CAC, I, p. 48.

⁵⁴T. F. Torrance, "Reconciliation in Christ and in His Church," Biblical Theology 11 (1961): 29.

⁵⁵Cf. CTSC, p. 83.

tially superordinate to the imperative.⁵⁶ Man's ethical obligation is fulfilable only because Christ has already fulfilled it. But in all man's activity he remains but 'an unprofitable servant.' Torrance suggests, with H. R. Macintosh, a proper understanding of the Gospel must include the suspicion of antinomianism--any other gospel is anti-Christian--demonic.⁵⁷ Jesus Christ, and He alone is our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption.

21. Christo-Eschatological Ecclesiology

Differential Union of Christ with His Church

As with all other theological formulae except for the Trinity, ecclesiology for Torrance is to be construed in terms of Christology.

Certainly it is clear that no doctrine of the Church can be formulated which is in any sense divorced from the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, or from the doctrine of the Spirit, but it is as the Body of Christ alone that it can be formulated. The relation of union between the Church and Christ is grounded on the consubstantial communion of the Holy Spirit between the Father and the Son, but the material content of that relation of union is given by the Incarnation of the Son of God. The "divine nature" of the Church is not God, nor the Spirit, but the Word Made Flesh, who is True God and True Man."⁵⁸

It is this differential relation which served as our final decisive clue in formulating our master relational matrix.⁵⁹

⁵⁶DGAF, p. 134.

⁵⁷RBET, 7/16/81.

⁵⁸CAC, I, p. 231; cf. p. 17.

⁵⁹See subsection 15: "Master Matrix of Fluid Axioms" above.

GOD			
---	in Christ	as	Christ
MAN			----- in Church
			saints

Torrance comments:

. . . we must think of the Church as involving two natures, a divine and a human. But the divine is no Arian nature, nor any divinizing of the human element. The divine element is the Holy Ghost, or rather Christ Himself the Head of the Church. The human element is the body which composes all creatures who believe and are incorporated into Christ, sacramentally incorporated, but are never anything else in themselves but human and creaturely.⁶⁰

That is to say, the ecclesiastical body of Christ is anhypostatic, except by virtue of its incorporation into fellowship with Christ, its head, by the creative vitality of the Spirit (pneumatological theosis).⁶¹

Just as Scripture from time to time speaks solely in terms of the Divine or human natures while utilizing the common designation, "Jesus Christ," so too we must be careful to differentiate Torrance's three-fold ecclesiological designation. We shall distinguish it as follows: Christ the 'CHURCH' by virtue of His headship, saints as 'church' in a subordinate, bodily status, and the 'Church' as the Spiritual fellowship of the two, i.e., the 'hypostatic union.'

The differential matrix demonstrates that it is impossible to conceive of the Church monistically as an extension or continuation of God's redemptive act in

⁶⁰CAC, I, p. 44; cf. pp. 48-49.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 248-249, 271; Reconstruction, pp. 204-205; Torrance and Wright, A Manual of Church Doctrine, p. 3; SF, p. cxxi; T. F. Torrance, "The Mission of the Church," Scottish Journal of Theology 19(1966): 137; Reconciliation, p. 101; T. F. Torrance, "The Breaking of Bread," pp. 21-22.

Christ, as redemption is complete in Him. Nothing is left to be fulfilled. Torrance contends, ". . . Heilsgeschichte has been completed and only awaits its ultimate epiphany or apocalypse in the consummation of the Second Advent. . ."62 The Church therefore must not be confused with Christ.

Nevertheless the Church is inseparable from Christ: ". . . the Church is founded on earth wherever men bear witness of the Name of Christ as the Son of the living God."63 Torrance even goes so far as to say "Christ is the Church,"64 for it is out of Him alone that the saints live. The Church finds its ontological reality in hypostatic union with Him.65 As we have already seen, the common denominator and therefore the indispensable point of contact is the concrete universality of His humanity. The ecumenical center of all church unity is to be found in the catholicity of the incarnate, atoning, risen, present and returning Christ rather than in an institutional catholicity. Therefore Torrance defines the Catholic Church as:

. . . the Church which retains in every time and place throughout the world a wholeness of life, worship and doctrine grounded in the original datum of divine revelation and embodying the permanent substance of the

62SF, p. lviii. For the Roman tendency toward monophysitism see Reconstruction, p. 185; "What is the Reformed Church?," Biblical Theology 9 (1959): 54; AT, pp. 159-160; T. F. Torrance, review of The Realm of Redemption. Studies in the Doctrine of the Nature of the Church in Contemporary Protestant Theology, by J. Robert Nelson, Scottish Journal of Theology 6 (1953): 322.

63WCCCA, p. 104.

64CAC, I, p. 108.

65CAC, I, pp. 248-249. Cf. T. F. Torrance, "The Pre-eminence of Jesus Christ," Sermon to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland before H. M. the Queen, Expository Times 89, n. 2 (1977): 54.

faith once and for all delivered to the Apostles.⁶⁶

The indivisibility of Christ is the ground of the indivisible Church. Upon this basis Torrance calls upon all churches to be one in Christ what they are yet to be among themselves: "There is only one Faith, one Baptism, and one Communion. We have no right to speak of "Churches" in the modern way. There is only One Church, for there is only One Body in Christ."⁶⁷

Because the unity of the Church is maintained by Christ in eschatological completion it is inappropriate to perpetuate an apostolic continuation of the incarnation. Torrance contends:

. . . what we sometimes calls "Apostolic Succession" really refers to the complete Body of Christ, the all-inclusive fulness or wholeness which precisely because it is that, cannot be thought of in terms of the more or less of historical succession and temporal fulfilment, as something that can be added up in history or formulated in documentary lineage. Rather is it the continuing wholeness of Christ's Body into which from age to age we are sacramentally incorporated, and which can no more be a phenomenon within the time-series than the Parousia itself.⁶⁸

The unrepeatable apostolic foundation of the Church is controlled from above through the Spirit in the sacramental boundary conditions. The dogmatic progression of the Church therefore is not an organic developmental addition to Christ but moments of apocalyptic vision.⁶⁹ This then is the

⁶⁶Reconciliation, p. 17.

⁶⁷CAC, I, p. 268; cf. p. 138; Torrance and Wright, A Manual of Church Doctrine, p. 8.

⁶⁸CAC, I, p. 217; cf. pp. 46, 133.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 105; Reconstruction, p. 244.

Church semper reformanda.⁷⁰ The ecumenical councils and dogmatic decisions are events in which the eschatological presence of the ascended Christ is revealed.⁷¹ It is the historical revelatory event of the conjunction of the Spirit with the Apostolic foundations of the Church. The Church has in effect caught up with its past, contemporary in Christ. It is a Church growing young.⁷² Thus the teleological semper reformanda of the Church is the historical protraction of its semper eadem,

. . . identical with itself in its sole foundation in Christ, living throughout all the changes of history and all temporal succession in such a way as not to be conformed to this world but to be transformed by the renewing of its mind and so to be conformed to Christ.⁷³

We must not, with the Post-Millennialists, suspect that the historical progression of the Church will eventuate in the Kingdom of God on earth, i.e., with the coincidence of teleological and eschatological/ontological ecclesiology.⁷⁴ The glorification of Christ's body was subsequent to His death. The Parousia from the terrestrial time frame is in principle unpredictable. "It is not for us to know the times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own

⁷⁰HL[RST], p. 141.

⁷¹CAC, I, pp. 166, 198.

⁷²Ibid., p. 96; RP, pp. 48-49; STR, p. 100.

⁷³Reconstruction, p. 140; cf. CAC, I, p. 131.

⁷⁴Cf. Reconciliation, pp. 64-65; CAC, I, pp. 204-205; "ER," p. 50; STR, p. 137; SF, pp. cxxv-cxxvi. T. F. Torrance, "The Mission of the Church," p. 140; T. F. Torrance, "La Mission de l'Eglise," in L'Espirit Saint et l'Eglise. Catholiques, orthodoxes et protestants de divers pays confrontent leur science, leur foi et leur tradition: l'avenir de l'Eglise et de l'eocumenisme. Actes du Symposium organise par L'Academic Internationales des Sciences Religieuses, ed. S. Dockx (Paris: Fayard, 1969), pp. 287, 289.

authority." The imminence of the Parousia, hierarchically superordinate, cannot be reduced to the horizontal conditions of history.

Bi-temporality and the
Marks of the Church

The eschatological-teleological constitution of the Church is reflected within its Christocentric order. Torrance writes:

Jesus Christ is Himself the fullness of time. Therefore the order of the Church in time means the ordering of the Church's life and mission in relation to the time of Jesus Christ, the historical Christ, and the risen and ascended Christ. In all Church order we are concerned with the time of Jesus on earth when God's Son condescended to enter within our fallen time in order to redeem it, but also with the time of Jesus ascended into Eternity who yet bestows Himself upon us in time through His Spirit. The time of the Church will therefore be defined by the relation of the Church in history to the historical Jesus Christ, and to the ascended and advent Jesus Christ; the Church's life, worship, fellowship, and ministry are all ordered with regard to that twofold time, heavenly and earthly, historical and eternal time. No adequate understanding of the order of the Church can overlook that twofold involvement in time.⁷⁵

As our analogue model suggests, church ministry only becomes Church ministry, i.e., the dynamic ministry of Christ to His body, as the Spirit covenantally unites the two.

In the name of Jesus Christ these ministers lead the worship of God's people, declare the forgiveness of sins, and celebrate Baptism and the Lord's Supper, but through the power of his Spirit it is Christ himself who confers forgiveness, builds up his Church on earth, renews it in the power of the resurrection, and presents it as his own body to the Father.⁷⁶

⁷⁵CAC, II, pp. 22-23. Here, clearly, Torrance's allusion to "eternity" is intended to refer to what he has designated elsewhere as millennial or Eschatological Time.

⁷⁶STR, p. 122; cf. p. 148.

In order to implement his Christocentric ecclesiology Torrance again borrows Calvin's designation of the threefold office of Christ, which we have already encountered in his doctrine of atonement:

. . . the mission of the whole Church as the Body of Christ on earth and in history is called through the Spirit, as it were, into contrapuntal relation to the heavenly ministry of Christ, King, Priest and Prophet. . .⁷⁷

Prophetic Preaching

The ministry of preaching, which we have already encountered under the guise of revelation,⁷⁸ is conceived as the prophetic ministry of Christ on earth as the Spirit echoes as He will the kerygma of Christ through the Church.⁷⁹ The same bi-temporal relation of Logos with lalia obtains.⁸⁰

Priestly Sacraments

The value of our disclosure model in explicating Torrance is nowhere more apparent than in his sacramental theology. It is here, in his sacramental theology, that the unity of ecclesiology with Christology, soteriology and eschatology are most vividly displayed. He depicts the

⁷⁷STR, p. 122; cf. Torrance and Wright, ed., A Manual of Church Doctrine, pp. 4-6. For the same taxonomy for Old Testament Israel see CAC, I, pp. 251, 288. For the inseparability of the Spirit from Christ in implementing the offices in the Church see SF, pp. ciii-cv.

⁷⁸See above, Theological Hermeneutics under subsection 17: Dynamic Hermeneutics.

⁷⁹STR, pp. 119-120.

⁸⁰See above, Theological Hermeneutics under subsection 17: Dynamic Hermeneutics.

Christo-soteriological nature of the sacraments in their inseparable unconfused relation as follows:

If incarnation and atonement are to be understood in terms of each other, the same is true of Baptism and Eucharist in terms of one living, saving operation of reconciliation and unification. But if Incarnation and atonement are to be distinguished as dual moments in the one movement, similarly Baptism and Eucharist enshrine corresponding duality.⁸¹

Hence, in effect Baptism is primarily the sacramental relation with Christ from the perspective of Being while the Eucharist is primarily that same relation with respect to Act, though their mutual inner dependence is undeniable.⁸²

Eschatologically a further relation applies:

Between the times faith and hope are confirmed and nourished by the two sacraments of the Word made flesh, baptism and holy communion, which are essentially signs belonging to the fullness of time, that is to say, filled with the complete incarnate presence of the Son of God, who gives Himself to us in forgiveness and reconciliation through the cross and the resurrection. In baptism that is communicated in a once-for-all sense, in which the wholeness of Christ and the completeness of our salvation are particularly enshrined. In Baptism we have to do with the new creation, the perfect body of Christ into which we become incorporated. In holy communion, on the other hand, we have to do with the continuance of that in conditions of time, with the Church as the bodying forth in this fallen world of communion with Christ. These two sacraments correspond to the twofold tension of Christian eschatology. The doubleness of the eschatological tension of the Parousia as both presence and coming, as something once for all and yet as the showing forth of that until the Lord comes, is enshrined in both of them, but the emphasis upon the once-and-for-all union of God and man, of the eternal [i.e., the Eschatological] and the temporal, falls most heavily upon the sacrament of baptism, while in the sacraments of communion we have most of the emphasis upon the continuation of that in the contradic-

⁸¹CAC, I, p. 258; cf. CAC, II, pp. 163-164; Reconciliation, p. 89.

⁸²Cf. STR, p. 150; CAC, II, pp. 145-146.

tions and abstractions of fallen time. . . . If at baptism we think of our having died and risen with Christ, new creatures, so that old things are passed away and all things are become new, at holy communion we think of that creation not only as a datum but as a dandum which must ever be given from moment to moment in the conditions of our passing and sinful world so that every time we communicate is eschatological time (kairos) until we drink it new in the Kingdom.⁸³

These respectively are the sacraments of faith and hope, of justification and sanctification.⁸⁴ Ethically we reflect the same relation in positing the imperative as the teleological expression of the eschatological indicative.

In Christ's vicarious, concrete universal baptism unto death the believer's teleological future is already given in his past. Whereas the Old Testament believer proleptically looked forward to Christ, the New Testament believer looks back in fulfilment.⁸⁵ The date of one's salvation therefore is relative reckoned not only from the space-time frame of his personal history but through the sacramental 'transformation equation' when Christ was crucified, buried, risen and ascended.⁸⁶ On the analogy of light emitted from a star some 2000 light years away we may conceive of the eschatological reality of Christ's death and resurrection sacramentally intersecting our twentieth century history. The present, relative as it is, is sacramentally transformable to the time-frame of the stellar event of the finished work of Christ, such that,

As one baptized into Christ he is told by God's Word that his sins are already forgiven and forgotten by God,

⁸³"MED," pp. 227-228; cf. CAC, I, pp. 49, 217; CAC, II, p. 156; "The Mission of the Church", pp. 137-138.

⁸⁴"MED," p. 228; STR, pp. 150, 158.

⁸⁵Reconciliation, p. 89; cf. CAC, I, p. 287.

⁸⁶Cf. CAC, II, p. 128.

that he has been justified once and for all, and that he does not belong to himself but to Christ who loved him and gave himself for him.⁸⁷

This being the case it should be obvious that Baptism is not in need of augmentation,⁸⁸ just as sanctification does not add to justification, nor the imperative add to the ethical indicative.

This is especially obvious when we examine the Eucharist from the eschatological perspective, for, as Torrance argues, the Eucharistic event is the Spiritual telescoping of the fullness of the Parousia into a moment of teleological time.⁸⁹ He calls this a "miraculous, eschatological event. . . ."⁹⁰ Thus there is no better confirmation of the immanence of the Parousia than the Eucharist.

We are unable to understand the repetition of the Lord's Supper, however, unless we examine it in its predominant teleological context, where it is refracted or diffused through history.⁹¹ The Eucharistic apocalypse of the Parousia is as fleeting as the transfiguration, for it points beyond itself to the ontological reality of the consummation.⁹² It is repeated, Torrance explains, for the Church militant lives under the conditions of nomistic time, i.e., under its tyranny and decay.

In this eschatological reserve and deep teleological ambiguity the Church lives and works under judgment as well as grace, so that it must constantly put off the

⁸⁷STR, p. 158.

⁸⁸CAC, I, pp. 260-261. Cf. RP, p. 48 where neither sacrament adds anything to Christ.

⁸⁹Cf. STR, pp. 101-102.

⁹⁰"Liturgy and Apocalypse," p. 9.

⁹¹KC, p. 126.

⁹²"MED," p. 231; CAC, II, p. 139.

'image of the old man' that passes away and put on 'the image of the new man' who is renewed in the likeness of Christ.⁹³

The violent death of Christ is sacramentally reflected in the broken bread and poured wine, which is the liturgical sign of the mission of the Church.⁹⁴

Kingly Service

The Church eschatologically triumphant in Christ nonetheless teleologically continues to militantly complete the finished sufferings of Christ.⁹⁵ Torrance, with Calvin, correlates these two conditions with the anabasis and katabasis of Christ respectively.⁹⁶ Because the eschaton is not exclusively or even primarily to be understood as an event at the end of human history, Torrance speaks of the historical mission of the Church as a kenosis. That is to say, the Church, though triumphant in Christ and through the Spirit,

. . . is sent like Christ into the world as the servant of the Lord, humbling itself and containing itself in kenosis within the limits and laws of this world in order to proclaim the Gospel of reconciliation and to live out reconciliation within conditions of fallen human existence.⁹⁷

It is because of the concealed (though operative) reality of the triumphant, eschatological Church that the fundamental form of service is reconciliation through suffering.

⁹³STR, p. 156; cf. CAC, I, pp. 197-198.

⁹⁴CAC, I p. 260.

⁹⁵Ibid, p. 250.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 81; cf. pp. 220, 252, 270-271; RP, pp. 99-100.

⁹⁷STR, p. 99.

Here it appears, not only Israel, but the Gentile Church as well is to be understood as the suffering-servant, the scapegoat sent out into the world, calling it to decision until the day the Church itself succumbs to the cross in order that the Parousia of Christ might be revealed.⁹⁸

⁹⁸"Liturgy and Apocalypse," p. 6; cf. CAC, I, p. 252.

EPILOGUE

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE QUEST FOR THE UNIFIED THEOLOGICAL FIELD

Einstein himself dreamed of a unified theory so simple that even the good Lord would not have been able to fashion the world along any other lines.

--Stanley L. Jaki
"The Absolute Beneath the Relative"

A theology open upward in contingent differential dependence upon God and thus at its very center inherently dynamic is a theology semper reformanda. As we have seen, in Goedel's terms, if we were to force closure upon Torrance's system we would violate its realistic, referential consistency. As such, both principally this thesis remains provisional and open, and in actuality Torrance himself has not spoken his final word. Our discussion can only point us deeper into the depths of the reality to which Torrance directs us. Although he has intimated the trinitary direction of the next hierarchical level, he reminds us, "There are no formal rules for acquiring these enlightening intimations of reality."¹ We therefore will not venture to speculate beyond what we have already established in sub-section two above regarding the theological homousion and subsection five regarding the trinitary peri-

¹HL[RST], ch. 3: "The Science of God."

choresis, but await Torrance's future disclosure of the Trinitary superordination of Christology.² It appears beyond doubt this constitutes the ultimate controlling hierarchical level of theology. Torrance concludes:

. . . I myself like to think of the doctrine of the Trinity as the ultimate ground of theological knowledge of God, the basic grammar of theology, for it is there that we reposing upon the final Reality of God himself, grounded in the ultimate relations intrinsic to God's own Being, which govern and control all true knowledge of him from beginning to end.³

Furthermore, despite the economic subordination of the eternally generated Son, the way into the ontological Trinity is through Christ and in no way supplants him. Recently Torrance explains:

. . . knowledge of God the Father and knowledge of God the Son mutually condition one another, for we know no God but the God who has communicated himself to us in and through Jesus Christ, through Jesus Christ alone, and in the One Spirit whom he mediates, we are given access to the Father. Thus the functional and dogmatic centrality of Christ carries with it the full trinitarian theology of the Church.⁴

Ultimately therefore the quest for a unified theological field must be understood not as either Christo-

²Here I concur with Bryan Bray's judgment that despite Torrance's appeal for a Trinitary foundation to theology it is only fair to say at this point his is a Christological rather than a Trinitary theology (see "Theology as Science," p. 372). Robert Palma makes a similar point in "Thomas F. Torrance's Reformed Theology," Reformed Review, 38, no. 1 (Autumn, 1984): 14.

³GGT, pp. 158-159. Cf. pp. 148, 173; CTSC, p. 38; "The Framework of Belief," in Torrance, ed., Belief in Science and in Christian Life, pp. 24-25; "Toward and Ecumenical Consensus on the Trinity," pp. 349-350; CD, I, 1, p. ix.

⁴"Ecumenism and Rome," p. 60; cf. Reconciliation, pp. 253-254; GGT, p. 40; CAC, II, p. 91.

logical or Trinitary as the dualists might argue. Rather, it is, to borrow an Einsteinian analogy, a movement from a special to a general, more comprehensive theory of relativity or relation, or shall we say, to the illusive unified field theory itself. This then is Torrance's final aim. He projects:

Here in the doctrine of the Trinity we have a refined model comprising the minimum of basic concepts derived immediately from experience and our intuitive apprehension of God in His saving activity in history, together with a minimum of secondary concepts or relations of thought which are connected together in such a way that through this model we allow our understanding to fall under the pressure of God's own reality and seek to grasp in our thought as much as we may of what God reveals of His own unity and simplicity.⁵

If we are to take the God-Christ-world interrelation seriously, I suggest, a unified theological field theory ultimately, though mutatis mutandis, i.e., differentially, should even inform and comprehend the natural sciences. The implications of this, of course, are so vast as to intimidate even the most ambitious. However a brief glance at the current state of the particle-wave controversy with respect to light may be heartening. As we have already explained the traditional dualist rendering of complementarity is alien to Torrance's (and Einstein's) view. However in a recent article by William G. Pollard, in criticizing Bohr's complementarity resolution, he argues for what is tantamount to Torrance's differential relation between waves and particles, with the former functioning within an invisible, transcendent "configuration space" whereas the later appear within the ordinary, visible space of our experience. He writes:

The configuration space which accommodates the waves differs from ordinary space in being both complex and

⁵HL[RST], Lect. 6.

multidimensional. Moreover, there is no ether or anything else in space capable of "waving" as in the case of true waves like those on water or sound waves in the air. Light waves, electron waves, or neutron waves are never observed as such within nature. All the wave aspects of matter and radiation exist only in configuration space. As particles move about in ordinary space, their waves accompany them in configuration space and determine how and where they move, their speed, energy spin, and other experimentally measurable properties. The waves in configuration space are actually waves of probability, since the wave amplitude multiplied by its complex conjugate at any point in this shadow space measures the probability of finding the particle at the corresponding point in ordinary space.

The reality of this shadow space, or configuration space, and the waves of probability in it are essential to the demonstrated capacity of quantum mechanics to explain in accurate detail an immense range of phenomena within the order of nature. To be sure, the transcendence of configuration space is very different in its content from transcendence in religion. There is no hint of God in it or of a numinous or holy quality of the transcendent. This is because we are rigorously limited in our access to what lies beyond space and time by our reliance on mathematics to take us there. Thus quantum mechanics provides, as an essential feature, the reality of the transcendent order in which the natural universe is embedded.⁶

This solitary example corroborates the realistic claim of Torrance's analysis of relation. Many more such examples, of course, need be forthcoming to scientifically confirm the God-Christ-world hierarchy as the theological field which differentially controls and informs all reality. Nevertheless, at this point in time, provisional as it is, we are inclined to suggest, though Abraham and Einstein died without reaching their respective envisioned goals, with Thomas F. Torrance we have a theological John the Baptist, harbinger of the Messianic age of theological revolution.

⁶"Rumors of Transcendence in Physics," American Journal of Physics, 52, no. 10 (October 1984): 878. I am indebted to Dr. W. Jim Neidhardt, Associate Professor of Physics, New Jersey Institute of Technology, for directing me to this as well as several other articles.

To the extent that we have succeeded in calling attention to this nearly solitary voice crying in the wilderness, we shall be satisfied that our labor has not been in vain.

FOR FROM HIM AND TO HIM AND THROUGH HIM ARE ALL THINGS.
TO HIM BE GLORY FOR EVER.
AMEN.

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>AT</u>	<u>The Apocalypse Today</u>
<u>CAC, I</u>	<u>Conflict and Agreement in the Church. Vol. 1: Order and Disorder</u>
<u>CAC, II</u>	<u>Conflict and Agreement in the Church. Vol. 2: The Ministry and the Sacraments of the Gospel</u>
<u>CD</u>	<u>Church Dogmatics (Karl Barth)</u>
<u>CDM</u>	<u>Calvin's Doctrine of Man</u>
<u>CTSC</u>	<u>Christian Theology and Scientific Culture</u>
<u>DCO</u>	<u>Divine and Contingent Order</u>
<u>DGAF</u>	<u>The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers</u>
"ER"	"The Eschatology of the Reformation"
<u>GGT</u>	<u>The Ground and Grammar of Theology</u>
<u>GR</u>	<u>God and Rationality</u>
"HA"	"The Hermeneutics of St. Athanasius"
"HHP"	"Hermeneutics, or the Interpretation of Biblical and Theological Statements, according to Hilary of Poitiers"
<u>KB</u>	<u>Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931</u>
<u>KC</u>	<u>Kingdom and Church--A Study in the Theology of the Reformation</u>

"MED"	"The Modern Eschatological Debate"
"PC"	"Predestination in Christ"
RBET	The Realist Basis of Evangelical Theology (Transcribed course)
<u>Reconciliation</u>	<u>Theology in Reconciliation</u>
<u>Reconstruction</u>	<u>Theology in Reconstruction</u>
<u>RET</u>	<u>Reality and Evangelical Theology</u>
"RISNT"	"The Relation of the Incarnation to Space in Nicene Theology"
<u>RP</u>	<u>Royal Priesthood</u>
HL[RST]	Harris Lectures [<u>Reality and Scientific Theology</u>] (Forthcoming)
<u>SF</u>	<u>The School of Faith</u>
<u>STI</u>	<u>Space, Time and Incarnation</u>
<u>STR</u>	<u>Space, Time and Resurrection</u>
<u>TCFK</u>	<u>Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge</u>
<u>TS</u>	<u>Theological Science</u>
<u>WCCCA</u>	<u>When Christ Comes and Comes Again</u>

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